,^r 

>^™ 

•*§  ^#^^■■1 

^^^_^* 

^y 

BATTLES 

OF  THE 

WAR 

FOR  THE 

UNION 

LIBRARY    OF    THE    COMMANDERY    OF 
THE  STATE  OE  MASSACHUSETTS  MILITARY 
ORDER  OF  THE   LOYAL  LEGION  OF  THE 
UN  ITED  STATES 

CADET    ARMORY,    BOSTON 


'/•/•//•  -  t/irrJ  \////////' 


_Z_-   50.85 
TvTi<, -,„.., 7,7 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00022245303 


^  B.CLARKE  CO.  \ 
500K,saLE_R^lTATIONERS 

26«,23TREM0NTST8. 
30  COURT  SO.  BOSTON 


^~  *Vh£ 


Aii    Incident  at  Gettysburg  (July   8,  !S(i3). 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2012  with  funding  from 

University  of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hill 


http://www.archive.org/details/battlesofwarforuholm 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I.      THE   SECESSION    MOVEMENT         .  .         g 

Lincoln  Inaugurated  —  "Confederate  States"  Government 
Formed — Jefferson  Davis  Declared  President  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy — Fort  Sumter  Bombarded — Its  Surrender — The 
Rush  to  Arms — Richmond  Made  the  Capital  of  the  Con- 
federacy— Harpers'  Ferry  Evacuated  by  the  Union  Forces — 
The  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  Evacuated  and  Burned — Robert  E. 
Lee  Placed  in  Command  of  the  Confederate  Forces  in  Vir- 
ginia— Massachusetts  Troops  Fired  Upon  in  Baltimore — 
General  Irwin  McDowell  in  Virginia — Battle  of  Big  Bethel — 
The  First  Union  Defeat — The  Shenandoah  Valley — General 
George  B.  McClellan's  Campaign  in  Western  Virginia — Rich 
Mountain — McClellan  Commands  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — 
English  Government  Confers  Belligerent  Rights  on  the  Con- 
federates— Confederate  Privateers — "On  to  Richmond" — 
General  Beauregard — Battle  of  Bull  Run — Joseph  E.  John- 
ston and  "Stonewall"  Jackson — The  Union  Forces  Defeated 
— Stampede  to  Washington — Battle  of  Ball's  Bluff — Another 
Defeat  for  the  Union  Troops. 

CHAPTER  II.  THE  CAMPAIGNS  IN  THE  WEST  (1862)  47 
McClellan  Made  Commander  of  the  Union  Forces — Formu- 
lates Plans  of  Campaigns — General  Halleck  in  the  West — 
Fort  Henry  Attacked  by  General  Grant  and  Commodore 
Foote,  and  the  Ironclads — "Unconditional  Surrender"  of  Fort 
Henry — Operations    Against    Fort    Donelson — Geneia'.s    Floyd, 

(5) 


6  CONTENTS. 

Tillovv,  and  Buckner — Donelson  Taken — Johnston  Abandons 
Nashville,  and  Retreats  to  Murfreesboro — Grant  and  Buell 
Advance — Island  No.  10  Attacked — The  Position  Surrenders 
to  Commodore  Foote — Battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  or  Shi- 
loh — Albert  Sidney  Johnston  Killed — Success  Crowns  the 
Union  Arms — Fort  Pulaski,  Near  Savannah,  Bombarded  and 
Captured — Fall  of  New  Orleans — The  Submission  of  Natchez 
— Butler  Superseded  by  Banks — The  First  Attack  on  Vicksburg 
— The  Siege  Abandoned — Bragg  Succeeds  Beauregard  — 
Guerilla  Warfare — Movements  in  Kentucky — Union  Troops 
Surprised  and  Defeated  by  Kirby  Smith — Bragg  Defeats 
Huell — Rosencrans  Assumes  Command  of  Buell's  Army — 
Battle  of  Corinth — Confederates  Defeated — Joseph  E.  John- 
ston Commands  the  Confederates  in  the  West — Attacks 
Rosencrans — Battle  of  Stone  River,  or  Murfreesboro — Confed- 
erates Repulsed — Morgan  and  Forrest's  Guerilla  Depreda- 
tions— Sherman  Attacks  Vicksburg — Haines'  Bluff. 

CHAPTER  III.   the  "monitor"  and  the  "merrimac"    IlG 
The   Naval    Engagement  in    Hampton    Roads  —  Shot-proof 

Vessels — The  Merrimac — Her  First  Successes — Destruction 
of  the  Cumberland,  and  Others  of  the  Wooden  Fleet — Des- 
cription of  the  Moiitor — The  Great  Combat  Between  the 
Mailed  Vessels — The  Merrimac  Disabled — The  Blockading 
Fle;t  Saved. 

CHAPTER       IV.  THE      PENINSULA      CAMPAIGN,      FROM 

YORKTOWN    TO    GETTYSBURG    .  .  .  .  .128 

The  Union  Army  Crosses  into  Virginia — McClellan  in  Com- 
mand— Forward  Movement — Winchester —  Yorktown  Cap- 
tured— Williamsburg  Occupied-  Norfolk  Evacuated,  and 
Burned  by  the  Confederates — McClellan's  Reverses — "Stone- 
wall "  Jackson  in  the  Valley — Banks  Surprised — Fremont 
and  Shields  Attacked — Jackson  Escapes — Battle  of  Seven 
Pines,  or  ^'air  Oaks — Confederates  Defeated — Jackson    Re- 


CONTENTS.  f 

inforces  Lee — The  Seven  Days'  Battles — General  Pope  Super- 
sedes McClellan — Cedar  Mountain — Second  Battle  at  Bull 
Run,  or  Manassas — Union  Forces  Retreat  to  Washington  — 
McClellan  Reinstated  —  Lee  Enters  Maryland  —  Harper's 
Ferry  Surrenders — Battle  of  Antietam — Lee  Repulsed  and 
Retreats  to  Virginia — McClellan  Removed  and  the  Com- 
mand Conferred  on  General  Burnside — Battle  at  Fredericks- 
burg— Burnside  Defeated — General  Joseph  Hooker  in  Com- 
mand—  Battle  of  Chancellorsville  —  Hooker  Defeated — 
George  G.  Meade  Commands  the  Union  Forces — Lee  Plans 
to  Conquer  a  Peace  Upon  the  Soil  of  the  Loyal  States,  and 
Invades  Pennsylvania — Battle  of  Gettysburg — Confederate 
Successes  the  First  Day — Generals  Hancock  and  Longstreet — 
Confederates  Repulsed — Pickett's  Famous  Charge  —  Lee 
Defeated — Northern  Invasion  Abandoned. 

CHAPTER    V.      VICKSBURG,    AND    the    operations    in 

THE    WEST    (1863)  ......     192 

The  Reduction  of  Vicksburg  Determined  Upon  by  Grant — 
Porter,  and  His  Iron  Clads — Haines'  Bluff  Abandoned  by 
the  Confederates — General  Pemberton  Shut  Up  in  Vicksburg 
— Vicksburg  Bombarded — Its  Siege  and  Surrender — Sherman 
and  Johnston — Port  Hudson  Taken — The  Conquest  of  the 
Mississippi — Operations  in  Tennessee — Rosencrans  and  Bragg 
— Battle  of  Chickamauga — Union  Forces  Retreat  to  Chatta- 
nooga— Grant's  Arrival — Battle  of  Chattanooga — Bragg  Re- 
moved from  Command — Longstreet  Before  Knoxville  — 
Sherman  Relieves  Knoxville. 

CHAPTER    VI.       CHARLESTON    AND    FORT    SUMTER.  .     235 

Expedition  Against  Charleston — The  Ironclads  Seriously  In- 
jured— The  Attack  Abandoned — A  Third  Attack  Begun  by 
Lincoln's  Orders — Forts  Wagner  and  Sumter  Bombarded 
— Sumter  in  Ruins — Charleston  Bombarded — The  Attack 
Abandoned. 


8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII.    Sherman's  march  to  the  sea    .  250 

Sherman  Against  Johnston — Generals  Hardee.  Hood  and 
Polk — Operations  of  McPherson — Thomas  and  Schofield — 
The  Siege  of  Atlanta — Sherman  Captures  Atlanta — Jefferson 
Davis  Visits  Hood,  who  Assumes  the  Defensive — Con- 
federates Repulsed — Beauregard  Assumes  Command — The 
March  to  the  Sea — Atlanta  Burned — Savannah  Occupied — 
Hood  in  Sherman's  Rear — Hood  Surprises  and  Defeats  Scho- 
field— Hood  and  Thomas — Battle  of  Nashville — Hood  De- 
feated— Sherman  in  the  Carolinas — Columbia  (S.  C.)  Cap- 
tured and  Burned — Charleston  Evacuated  by  Hardee — The 
City  Burned  by  the  Confederates — Wilmington  (N.  C. ) 
Taken — Schofield  Moves  to  Goldsboro — Battle  of  Benton- 
ville — Sherman    Reaches    Grant's    Headquarters. 

CHAPTER  VIII.  THE  (LOSING  BATTLES  IN  VIRGINIA  297 
Grant  Commands  all  the  Union  Armies — Battles  in  the 
Wilderness — Meade  and  Hancock — Longstreet  Wounded — 
Confederates  Repulsed- — Battle  of  Spottsylvania — General 
Sedgwick  Killed — "I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line" — 
Battle  of  Cold  Harbor — Attack  on  Petersburg — General  Early 
Advances  into  Maryland — Washington  Narrowly  Escapes 
Capture — Early's  Retreat — Burning  of  Chambersburg,  in 
Pennsylvania — Sheridan  Against  Early — Battle  of  Cedar 
Creek — Sheridan  "thirty  miles  away" — Early  Defeated — 
Hancock  Attacks  Lee's  Forces — Siege  of  Richmond — Fort 
Fisher  Assaulted — Butler  Superseded — A  Second  Assault- 
Fall  of  Fort  Fisher — Peace  Negotiations  Opened  by  the  Con- 
federates— Lincoln  Insists  on  Absolute  Submission — Lee 
Strikes  at  Grant  with  the  View  to  Unite  with  Johnston's 
Forces — Attack  on  Fort  Steadman — Battle  of  Five  Forks — 
Confederates  Retreat  to  Petersburg — Petersburg  and  Rich- 
mond Taken — Lee's  Army  Surrenders — President  Lincoln 
Assassinated — Surrender  of  Johnston  and  Others — Jefferson 
Davis  Captured — The  Cost  of  the  War  in  Blood  and   Money. 


THE  BATTLES  FOR  THE  UNION. 


CHAPTER    I. 

The  Secession  Movement.* 

On  March  4,  1861,  Abraham  Lincoln  was  inaugu- 
rated President  of  the  United  States,  surrounded  by 
soldiers  under  the  command  of  General  Scott.  During 
the  campaign  preceding  the  election,  the  Southern 
leaders  had  threatened  to  secede  from  the  Union  if 
Lincoln  were  elected.  Charles  A.  Dana  puts  the  case 
in  the  following  succinct  way: 

"  The  election  of  Abraham  Lincoln  was  brought  about 
by  a  dissension  in  the  Democratic  party.  It  was  divided 
and  the  Republican  party  was  united,  and  the  conse- 
quence was  his  election.  The  great  question  at  issue  in 
that  election  was  this :  Shall  the  owners  of  slaves  enjoy 
the  right  of  taking  their  slaves  into  the  Territories  of 
the  United  States  that  are  now  free,  and  keeping  them 
there  ?  The  slave-owners  claimed  that  right.  Slaves 
were  property.  They  were  like  other  property,  and  why 
should  their  owners  be  denied  the  right  of  taking  their 
property  into  the  Territories,  when  a  Northern  man 
could  take  his  property,  his  horses,  his  oxen,  whatever 
he  possessed  ?  The  slaves  were  their  oxen  ;  they  were 
their  chattels,  and  they  insisted  that  they  ought  to  have 
the  right  of  taking  them  into  the  Territories  and  keep- 

*The  history  of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  Civil  War  will  be  found 
in  the  "  Lives  of  the  Presidents,"  in  Altemus'   Young  People's  Series- 

(9) 


I0  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

ing  them  there  as  slaves.  That  was  the  fundamental 
question  of  the  election.  And  when  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
elected,  the  South  said  :  '  Now  we  are  denied  this 
right,  we  will  break  up  the  Government;  we  will  secede; 
we  will  withdraw.'  That  right,  too,  they  claimed  as  a 
constitutional  principle.  No  Northerner  had  claimed  it, 
though  some  ardent  partisans  had  threatened  it ;  but 
several  of  the  Southern  States  now  set  it  up  as  an 
original,  inalienable  right.  They  claimed  that  the  re- 
fusal to  them  of  the  right  to  take  their  property  with 
them  when  they  went  to  live  in  one  of  the  new  Terri- 
tories, was  sufficient  occasion  for  the  withdrawal  from 
the  Union  of  the  slave-holding  States,  and  for  the  break- 
ing up  of  the  Government." 

The  South  had  been  contemplating  rebellion  for 
years,  and  had  only  refrained  from  attempting  it  because 
hitherto  she  had  pretty  generally  had  her  own  way. 
The  choice  of  Lincoln  immediately  determined  their 
resolution.  John  B.  Floyd,  of  Virginia,  the  Secretary 
of  War  under  Buchanan,  had  quietly  contrived  that  the 
arsenals  of  all  the  Northern  States  should  be  stripped 
of  their  arms  and  ammunition,  and  those  warlike  mate- 
rials concentrated  in  the  Southern  section  of  the  Union. 

South  Carolina  naturally  led  off  in  the  Secession 
movement,  her  Ordinance  of  Secession  being  adopted 
on  November  17,  i860;  Georgia  came  next,  and  the 
remainder  of  the  border  (or  planting)  States  quickly 
followed.  Virginia  joined  two  days  after  the  fall  of 
Sumter. 

On  February  9,  186 1,  Jefferson  Davis,  of  Mississippi, 
was  declared  President,  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  of 
Georgia,  Vice-President  of  the  Confederate  States 
of  America.  On  March  4,  1 861,  the  Confederate  flag 
was  unfurled  from  the  State  House  at  Montgomery, 
Alabama,  and  the  Confederacy  was  inaugurated. 

Of  moral  justification  for  the  disruption  of  the  Union 


JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

(President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.) 


12 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNI  OK. 


there  was  absolutely  nothing.  The  South  separated 
themselves  from  the  Union  from  motives  of  transparent 
and  avowed  selfishness.  Stephens  declared  that  "  the 
corner-stone  of  the  new  Confederacy  was  slavery."     In 


MAJOR   ROBERT   ANDERSON. 


a  few  years  that  corner-stone  was  pulled   out,  and  the 
whole  fabric  came  toppling  down  in  irremediable  ruin. 

War  between  the  new  Slave  Power  and  the  Old 
Union  was  so  certain  to  ensue  that  the  South  made  in- 
stant preparations  for  the  worst.  The  Southern  Con- 
gress authorized  Davis  to  accept  100,000  volunteers  for 


14 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION1. 


twelve  months,  and  to  borrow  fifteen  millions  of  dollars. 
And  so  great  was  the  faith  of  most  foreign  nations  in 
the  permanence  of  the  Confederacy  that  the  bonds  were 
circulated  in  Europe,  and  principally  in  England.  This 
was  one  reason  why  English  opinion,  among  the 
wealthy  classes,  was  so  largely  enlisted  in  favor  of  Se- 
cession. The  bondholders  felt  they  had  an  interest  in 
securing  the  triumph  of  the  Southern  aristocracy,  and 
they  brought  every  possible  pressure  to  bear  on  their 
Government  to  force  a  recognition  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  the  raising  of  the  blockade.  When  the  rebellion 
collapsed,  great  was  the  regret  of  these  investors  that 
they  had  relied  upon  the  ability  of  a  Slave  Empire  to 
stand  up  against  the  might  of  freedom. 

When  the  Lincoln  Administration  came  into  power 
sixteen  forts  were  in  possession  of  the  Secessionists,  who 
had  thus  acquired  1226  heavy  guns  to  turn  against  the 
Federal  authority.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
North  was  left,  at  the  very  commencement  of  the 
struggle  with  comparatively  few  educated  officers.  The 
greater  number  of  those  who  graduated  at  the  Military 
Academy  at  West  Point,  and  continued  in  actual  ser- 
vice, were  Southern  men  ;  and  these,  with  comparatively 
few  exceptions,  although  trained  at  the  expense  of  the 
nation,  and  bound  to  loyalty  by  the  most  solemn  oaths, 
at  once  joined  the  Southern  forces. 

Fort  Sumter  (April  12,  1861). — The  first  gun  was 
fired  by  the  South  on  Fort  Sumter,  in  Charleston  harbor. 
The  fort  was  commanded  by  Major  Anderson,  with  but 
70  men.  It  was  bombarded  by  the  forts  and  batteries 
under  command  of  Peter  G.  T.  Beauregard;  and  for 
34  hours  this  little  garrison  of  70  men  contested  with 
7000  rebels,  no  one  being  hurt  on  either  side.  The 
shells  set  fire  to  the  barracks,  and  the  garrison,  worn 
out,   suffocated  and  half-blinded,  were  forced    to  sur- 


FORT  SUMTER. 


15 


render  on  April  13.  The  effect  of  this  event  was  electri- 
cal. It  unified  both  the  South  and  the  North  ;  the  Amer- 
ican flag,  the  symbol  of  Revolutionary  glory  and  of  na- 
tional unity  being  unfurled  thoroughout  the  North. 

If  there  had  previously  been  any  doubt  as  to  the 
necessity  of  taking  serious  steps  against  the  rising  re- 
bellion, it  was  now  evident  that  pacific  measures  were 
no  longer  possible.  Until  then,  the  shrinking  from  civil 
war  had  been  so  great  that  men  were  willing  to  compro- 


THE  CONFEDERATE   FLAG. 


mise  matters  with  the  South,  even  at  the  cost  of  not  in- 
considerable sacrifices.  But  now  a  spirit  of  determined 
resistance  to  Southern  aggression  was  aroused  in  every 
one  of  the  Northern  States.  It  was  seen  that  a  bloody 
struggle  was  inevitable,  and  men  nerved  themselves  to 
meet  the  terrible  demands  that  would  be  made  upon 
their  patriotism.  A  national  fort  had  been  seized;  a 
body  of  Federal  troops  had  been  defeated ;  the  flag  of 
the  Union  had  been  lowered  at  the  demand  of  traitors. 
The  time  for  hesitation  had  gone  by,  and  the  Govern 


x6  hie  battles  for  the  union. 

ment  understood  its  duty.  Lincoln  issued  a  proclama- 
tion on  April  15,  declaring  that  the  laws  of  the  Republic 
had  been  for  some  time,  and  were  then,  opposed  in  the 
States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida, 
Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Texas,  "by  combinations 
too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by  the  ordinary  course 
of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by  the  powers  vested  in  the 
marshals  by  law."  The  President  accordingly  called 
forth  the  militia  of  the  other  States  of  the  Union,  to  the 
aggregate  number  of  75,000 men.  He  appealed  to  all 
loyal  citizens  "  to  favor,  facilitate,  and  aid  his  efforts 
to  maintain  the  honor,  integrity,  and  existence  of  the 
National  Union,  and  the  perpetuity  of  popular  govern- 
ment." This  was  responded  to  by  300,000  volunteers. 
The  resolution  of  the  North  to  fight  for  the  existence  of 
the  Union  has  never  been  surpassed  by  any  popular 
movement  in  any  account  of  the  world's  history. 

The  Secessionists  audaciously  thrust  their  capital  into 
their  northernmost  State,  and  on  April  20,  made  Rich- 
mond the  Capital  of  the  Confederacy. 

Troops  were  pushed  into  Virginia,  and  threatened 
Washington.  The  Sixth  Massachusetts  Regiment,  hur- 
rying to  the  defence  of  the  National  Capital,  were 
attacked  in  Baltimore,  and  several  men  were  killed. 
Thus,  the  first  blood  shed  in  the  Civil  War  was  on 
April  19,  the  eighty-sixth  anniversary  of  Lexington  and 
Concord. 

Harper's  Ferry,  in  Virginia,  was  attacked  on  April  18. 
The  commander,  whose  force  was  small,  observed 
symptoms  of  dissatisfaction  all  around,  and  fearing  that 
he  could  not  withstand  the  attack  that  he  knew  was  to 
be  made,  blew  up  the  fort,  crossed  the  river  with  his 
men,  and  retreated  towards  Pennsylvania. 

It  was  resolved  by  the  Secessionists  to  seize  the  Navy 
Yard  at  Norfolk,  Virginia,  to  prevent  which  it  was 
determined  to  set  fire  to  all  the  ships,  together  with  all 


THE    CALL   FOR    TROOPS. 


*7 


the  public  buildings,  and  national  property.  The  loss 
to  the  Government  was  estimated  at  seven  millions  of 
dollars.  Eleven  vessels  were  thus  destroyed.  The 
Merrhnac  was  sufficiently  uninjured,  to  be  afterwards 
repaired  by  the  Confederates,  and  to  render  service  to 
their  cause. 

Pennsylvania  and  Massachusetts  were  among  the  first 
to  answer  President  Lincoln's  call  for  troops.  Fortress 
Monroe,  situated  on  the  point  of  land  between  the  James 
and  York, Rivers,  at  the  junction  with  the  Potomac,  was 
the  only  place  now  held  by  the  Federal  Government 
in  Virginia.  Those  rivers  were  blockaded  by  what 
remained  of  the  fleet,  and  the  vessels  were  concentrated 
at  Hampton  Roads,  near  the  fortress. 

Baltimore  refused  to  allow  foreign  State  troops  to 
pass  through  her  soil  on  the  way  to  Washington.  Lin- 
coln, feeling  his  weakness,  suggested  that  the  troops  pass 
round  Baltimore  instead  of  through  it.  He  finally 
declared  that  troops  must  be  had  for  the  defence  of 
Washington,  and  as  they  could  come  by  no  other  route 
but  Maryland,  the  people  of  Maryland  must  be  content 
to  let  them  pass. 

On  April  20,  Robert  E.  Lee,  a  Virginian,  and  an 
engineer  officer  of  much  distinction,  connected  by  mar- 
riage with  the  family  of  Washington,  separated  himself 
from  the  Federal  service,  considering  the  claims  of  his 
State  paramount,  and  went  over  to  the  Confederacy,  and 
was  made  Commander  of  all  the  military  and  naval 
forces  in  Virginia. 

Maryland  was  reduced  to  submission  before  the  end 
of  April  by  an  expedition  of  Massachusetts  troops 
under  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  and  New  York's  famous 
Seventh  Regiment,  under  Colonel  Lefferts.  Butler  was 
a  lawyer,  not  trained  to  military  life,  but  possessed  of 
spirit,  resolution,  and  audacity.  He  was  placed  in  com- 
mand of  the  Department  of  Annapolis,  which  embraced 


!g  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

the  country  20  miles  on  each  side  of  the  railway  from 
Baltimore  to  Washington.  Lefferts  went  on  to  Wash- 
ington to  guard  the  capital. 

General  Scott,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  said  the  occu- 
pation of  Baltimore  was  made  without  his  knowledge 
or  approbation,  and  required  the  Government  to  recall 
Butler  from  his  post;  and  this  was  done.  The  President, 
however,  was  satisfied  with  the  operations  of  this  active 
leader,  and  immediately  commissioned  him  as  a  Major- 
General  of  Volunteers,  and  the  command  of  a  large 
military  district,  including  Eastern  Virginia  and  the 
two  Carolinas,  with  his  headquarters  at  Fortress 
Monroe. 

Every  day  the  movement  in  the  South  was  becoming 
more  formidable;  every  day  the  sympathizers  with 
Secession  in  the  border  States  were  growing  more 
dangerous  and  irreconcilable.  It  was  now  seen  that  the 
President's  call  for  militia  would  not  be  sufficient  to 
meet  the  attack  which  was  evidently  meditated  by  the 
South.  Lincoln  accordingly,  in  a  proclamation  issued 
on  May  3,  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States 
42,000  volunteers  for  three  years;  ordered  an  increase 
of  the  regular  army  to  the  extent  of  22,714  officers  and 
enlisted  men,  for  not  less  than  one  year,  nor  more  than 
three  years;  and  directed  the  enlistment  of  18,000  sea- 
men for  the  naval  service.  The  response  to  these 
demands  showed  how  thoroughly  in  earnest  were  the 
people  of  the  loyal  States  in  their  resistance  to  Secession. 
The  number  of  volunteers  exceeded  the  demands  of  the 
Government,  and  money,  amounting  to  more  than  forty 
millions  of  dollars,  was  subscribed  for  the  various  pur- 
poses of  the  war. 

The  Capitol  at  Washington  was  by  this  time  changed 
into  a  great  citadel.  Troops  occupied  the  legislative 
halls,  the  rotunda,  and  other  chambers  ;  the  basement 
galleries  were  converted  into  storerooms  for  the  army ; 


THE   CALL   FOR    TROOPS. 


19 


and  the  vaults  under  the  terrace  on  the  western  front  of 
the  edifice  were  used  as  ovens,  where  16,000  loaves  were 
baked  every  day.     Before  the  summer  had  fairly  set  in, 


BENJAMIN    F.    BUTLER. 


the  Federal  capital  had  been  protected  by  a  line  of  forti- 
fications and  entrenchments,  distributed  along  the 
neighboring  heights  on  the  Virginian  side  of  the  Poto- 


20  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION-. 

mac,  and  presenting  a  formidable  front  to  any  hostile 
force  coming  from  that  direction.  Major-General  Mc- 
Dowell, an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  was  placed  in 
command  of  the  troops  on  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
and  the  greater  portion  of  the  district  recently  under 
the  orders  of  General  Butler  was  transferred  to  him. 
The  Northern  forces  had  now  reached  a  total  of  about 
95,000  men,  divided  into  eight  distinct  bodies,  which 
were  stationed  in  various  parts  of  the  country.  Several 
of  the  men,  however,  were  not  yet  armed,  and  but  few 
of  the  regiments  had  acquired  anything  like  efficient 
discipline.  The  chief  rallying-place  of  the  Confederate 
Army  was  at  Manassas  Junction,  situated  on  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railway,  about  25  miles  west  from  the 
city  of  Alexandria,  and  thirty  in  a  direct  line  from 
Washington.  The  position  was  important,  as  com- 
manding the  great  Southern  railway  route  which  con- 
nects Washington  and  Richmond,  and  also  another  line 
leading  to  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  beyond  the 
Blue  Ridge.  Butler  had  at  an  early  period  recom- 
mended the  occupation  of  that  locality  ;  but  Scott,  whose 
measures  at  this  time  were  marked  by  the  extreme  cau- 
tion of  old  age,  took  a  different  view,  and  the  result 
was  that  the  Confederates,  acting  with  greater  enterprise, 
seized  the  position,  which  they  found  of  service  as  a 
menace  against  the  Federal  capital. 

Big  Bethel  (June  10,  1861).  After  fortifying  New- 
port News — a  point  of  land  at  the  junction  of  the  James 
River  and  Hampton  Roads — Butler  formed  a  design 
of  attacking  a  Confederate  force  which  had  been  sta- 
tioned at  Big  Bethel,  about  15  miles  off,  on  the  road  to 
Yorktown.  This  force  was  the  advanced  post  of  a 
rather  considerable  array  of  Southern  troops  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Magruder,  formerly  an  artillery 
officer  in  the  U.  S.  Army.  The  main  body  was  at  York- 
town,  whence   expeditions   were    frequently   sent   out, 


BIG  BETHEL.  21 

with  the  object  of  harassing  the  Union  Army  in  the 
vicinity  of  Fortress  Monroe.  From  observations,  it 
became  evident  that  Magruder  was  preparing  to  seize 
Newport  News  and  Hampton,  so  that  he  might  confine 
Butler  to  the  fortress  which  he  had  made  his  headquar- 
ters. It  was  therefore  resolved  to  take  the  initiative. 
The  Confederate  detachment  at  Big  Bethel  consisted  of 
800  North  Carolina  Volunteers,  and  360  Virginians, 
with  a  battery  of  five  howitzers  and  one  Parrott  rifle- 
gun.  Some  field-works  had  been  erected,  and  the  posi- 
tion was  naturally  strong,  owing  to  the  surrounding 
forest  and  the  presence  of  some  swampy  ground  which 
protected  the  Confederate  flanks.  In  front,  at  a  place 
called  Little  Bethel,  was  a  small  picket  of  cavalry ;  and 
the  whole  detachment  was  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  D.  H.  Hill.  The  attacking  force  sent  forward 
by  Butler  was  composed  of  four  regiments,  under  the 
direction  of  General  Peirce.  These  started  on  the  night 
of  June  9,  and  their  plan  of  operations  was  to  send  two 
regiments  directly  to  the  front,  along  the  Fortress  Mon- 
roe and  Yorktown  roads,  while  the  other  two  were  to 
endeavor  to  outflank  the  enemy.  An  unfortunate 
blunder  deranged  the  execution  of  the  scheme.  The 
supporting  regiments  coming  within  sight  of  each  other 
in  the  obscurity  of  the  early  morning,  mutually  mistook 
their  forces  for  those  of  the  enemy,  and  at  once  opened 
fire.  The  advanced  guard,  hearing  the  firing,  and  sup- 
posing that  the  enemy  had  got  into  their  rear,  fell  back 
upon  their  supports ;  and  by  the  time  the  mistake  was 
discovered,  and  the  forward  march  resumed,  all  hope 
of  surprising  the  enemy  was  at  an  end.  The  cavalry  at 
Little  Bethel  had  pressed  on  to  Big  Bethel,  and  nothing 
remained  but  to  make  a  direct  attack  upon  the  latter 
position,  in  the  hope  of  carrying  the  works  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  Big  Bethel  was  reached  by  ten  o'clock. 
To  take  an  entrenched  position  is  a  trying  task  even  for 

Union — a 


22        THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

well-seasoned  troops:  for  raw  and  undisciplined  volun- 
teers it  is  almost  an  impossibility.  The  men  were  led 
up  to  the  charge,  but  failed  to  make  any  way.  Though 
supported  by  the  artillery,  the  Union  regiments  flinched 
before  the  Confederate  batteries.  What  was  wanting 
on  their  part  was  not  courage — for  they  remained  in  the 
field  nearly  three  hours,  making  scattered  and  desultory 
attacks — but  coolness,  knowledge,  and  concentration. 
Their  losses  were  severe,  and  during  the  engagement  two 
additional  regiments  from  Fortress  Monroe  arrived  on  the 
spot,  while  four  others  were  held  in  readiness  to  march 
to  the  front.  On  the  right  of  the  attacking  force  the 
Vermont  companies  distinguished  themselves  by  great 
perseverance,  gaining  a  position  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy, 
and  silencing  one  of  his  batteries.  About  noon  the 
Union  troops  were  withdrawn.  The  retreat  has  been 
described  as  a  rout.  Doubtless  it  was  somewhat  pre- 
cipitate. The  Confederates  boasted  much  of  their  own 
valor  at  Big  Bethel,  and  were  unsparing  in  their  de- 
nunciations of  the  cowardice,  as  they  described  it,  ex- 
hibited by  the  Union  troops.  It  must  always  be  recol- 
lected, however,  that  it  is  one  thing  to  hold  a  fortified 
position,  and  quite  a  different  thing  to  attack  it. 

The  Shenandoah  Valley. — The  Federal  authorities 
determined  to  send  a  body  of  troops  up  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  in  conjunction  with  a  movement  of  McClel- 
lan  from  the  neighborhood  of  Grafton.  It  was  necessary 
to  the  protection  of  Washington  that  the  Confederates 
should  be  driven  from  Harper's  Ferry,  their  possession 
of  which  would  at  anytime  enable  them  to  execute  a  flank 
attack  on  the  capital.  To  effect  this  purpose,  an  army  of 
20,000  men,  under  the  command  of  General  Patterson, 
was  pushed  forward  from  its  camp  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  to  Greencastle  and  Get- 
tysburg; and  at  the  same  time  troops  were  marched  up 
The   north  bank  of  the  Potomac  to  Rockville.     These 


/Mm 

i  Wfesw 

hi 

V-'iI. .: 


24 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


movements  rendered  it  prudent  for  General  Joseph  E 
Johnston  to  withdraw  to  some  safer  locality.  His  forct 
was  about  7000  in  number,  and  he  feared  being  over- 
whelmed by  the  gathering  hosts.  He  therefore  began 
his  retreat  on  June  16,  but,  before  doing  so,  he  blocked 
up  the  railway  and  canal  near  the  ferry  by  blasting 
the  overhanging  rocks.  He  destroyed  the  great  bridge 
on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway  by  blowing  it  up. 
Whatever  guns  he  could  not  take  with  him  he  spiked; 
and,  having  burned  another  bridge  a  few  miles  higher 
up  the  Potomac,  he  marched  along  the  valley,  and  en- 
camped for  a  time  near  Charleston.  Patterson  imme- 
diately afterwards  crossed  from  Maryland  into  Virginia  ; 
and  was  met  with  a  demand  from  Scott  to  send  him  all 
the  troops  he  could  spare  for  the  defence  of  Washington. 
In  consequence  Patterson  was  left  with  so  small  a  force 
that  he  found  it  necessary  to  withdraw  them  at  once 
across  the  Potomac.  The  explanation  01  this  untoward 
event  is,  that  there  had  been  a  panic  at  the  capital. 
Immense  Confederate  forces  were  believed  to  be  at 
Manassas.  And  as  they  had  been  placed  under  the 
vigorous  control  of  Beauregard,  it  was  feared  an  attempt 
would  be  made  on  Washington  before  Congress  could 
meet  on  July  4.  The  danger  was  probably  exagge- 
rated, but  it  was  not  imaginary.  Washington  swarmed 
with  Secessionist  sympathizers,  who  were  ready  to  abet 
any  treason  that  might  be  plotted  from  without.  Still, 
Patterson's  forward  movement  had  had  the  effect  of 
driving  Johnston  to  a  more  remote  position,  and  he 
made  no  attempt  to  reoccupy  Harper's  Ferry.  He 
established  his  headquarters  at  Winchester,  and  entrusted 
the  task  of  watching  the  Potomac  to  Colonel  Jackson 
(the  officer  afterwards  known  as  "Stonewall"  Jackson, 
one  of  the  most  heroic  of  the  Southerners),  in  combina- 
tion with  the  cavalry  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Stewart.     On  July  2,  Patterson's  force  again  crossed  the 


RICH  MOUNTAIN. 


25 


Potomac,  and  occupied  Harper's  Ferry.  Shortly  after- 
wards, Johnston  moved  his  army  to  the  relief  of  Beau- 
regard at  Manassas,  and  nothing  of  importance  took 
place  between  himself  and  Patterson. 

Attention  was  now  directed  to  McClellan's  opera- 
tions. He  had  been  in  command  of  the  military  district 
which  included  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Western 
Virginia.  He  was  a  soldier  by  education,  and,  was 
joint-commissioner  with  Lee  to  report  on  the  warlike 
operations  in  the  Crimea.  Retiring  from  the  service 
after  that  date,  he  became  manager  of  the  Illinois  Central 
Railway,  but  resumed  his  original  profession  on  the 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War.  Having  by  midsummer  or- 
ganized a  force  of  15,000  soldiers,  principally  recruited 
in  the  Western  States,  he  advanced  against  the  Con- 
federate troops  in  Western  Virginia.  These  did  not 
count  more  than  6000  men,  with  a  small  proportion  of 
cavalry  and  artillery ;  the  whole  under  the  command  of 
General  Garnett.  The  country  occupied  by  the  Southern 
commander  was  well  adapted  to  defensive  operations, 
being  traversed  by  the  main  body  of  the  Allegha- 
nies  and  by  several  minor  ridges  running  in  the 
same  direction,  which  is  from  the  north-east  to  the 
south-west. 

Rich  Mountain  (July  11,  1861). — General  Garnett — 
an  officer  of  experience  and  talent — took  up  his  position 
on  an  eminence  called  Laurel  Hill,  situated  west  of  the 
chief  line  of  the  Alleghanies,  and  covering  the  high- 
road leading  from  Philippi  to  Beverley.  He  threw  for- 
ward a  detachment  under  Colonel  Pegram,  which  was 
to  station  itself  upon  an  isolated  and  forest-clad  hill 
named  Rich  Mountain,  a  few  miles  south  of  Laurel  Hill, 
from  which  it  is  separated  by  woody  country  and  a 
creek.  The  force  numbered  about  2000,  and  his  duty 
was  to  obtain  a  command  over  the  road  leading  in  a 
north-westerly    direction    from    Beverly    to    Weston. 


26  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Against  these  positions  McClellan  advanced  from  the 
north,  and  on  July  II  halted  at  a  short  distance  from 
Rich  Mountain.  Fighting  began  on  the  following  day, 
when  four  regiments,  commanded  by  Colonel  Rosecrans, 
were  sent  forward  by  a  circuitous  path  through  the 
woods,  to  turn  the  left  of  Colonel  Pegram's  position. 
Under  a  drenching  rain,  they  climbed  the  steep  side  of 
the  mountain,  and,  undeterred  by  a  heavy  fire  which 
was  opened  on  them  as  they  neared  the  summit,  com- 
pletely routed  the  defenders,  and  drove  them  down  the 
opposite  side  of  the  acclivity.  All  this  while  McClellan 
himself,  with  the  main  body,  was  in  front  of  the  position; 
but  no  occasion  arose  for  his  immediate  services.  Push- 
ing on  towards  the  east,  Rosecrans,  arrived  within  three 
miles  of  Beverly,  in  which  direction  Garnett,  who 
abandoned  Laurel  Hill  on  finding  his  position  turned, 
had  himself  proceeded,  until,  discovering  the  perilous 
proximity  of  the  enemy,  he  struck  northward  through 
the  mountains,  in  hope  of  gaining  St.  George,  on  the 
Cheat  River.  Pegram  had  by  this  time  surrendered, 
with  600  of  his  men;  the  remainder  joined  their  com- 
rades under  Garnett,  who  was  actively  pursued  by 
General  Morris.  The  line  of  retreat  was  rendered  diffi- 
cult by  rocks,  thickly  intertangled  woods,  and  streams 
swollen  by  the  summer  rains.  Here  and  there,  in  nar- 
row gorges,  the  fugitives  had  cut  down  large  trees,  and 
turned  over  great  boulders  of  stone,  with  a  view  to 
baffling  their  pursuers  ;  but  the  forces  of  General  Morris 
dashed  on  through  every  obstruction,  occasionally  en- 
gaged with  the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy,  and  at  other 
times  tracking  their  foes  by  the  knapsacks,  camp- 
equipage,  and  abandoned  wagons  which  they  had  left 
behind  them  in  their  headlong  flight.  McClellan  had 
given  orders  for  intercepting  the  retreating  columns; 
but  Morris,  on  July  13,  overtook  the  Confederate  gen- 
eral at  Carrick's  Ford,  on  the  Cheat,  and   inflicted   on 


WILLIAM    H.    SEWARD. 

'.'i'he  War  Secretary  of  State.) 


*7 


2$  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

him  a  severe  reverse.  While  exposing  himself  with  great 
courage,  Garnett  was  shot  dead,  and  the  shattered  rem- 
nants of  the  army  were  conducted  by  Colonel  Taliaferro 
to  Monterey,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Alleghanies, 
where  they  arrived  in  a  state  of  the  utmost  destitution 
and  fatigue. 

The  campaign  had  been  a  great  success.  With  the 
loss  of  only  fifty  men,  McClellan  had  routed  and  dis- 
persed the  forces  of  his  opponent,  had  taken  nearly  iooo 
troops,  and  had  captured  seven  guns,  1500  stand  of 
arms,  twelve  colors,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  equip- 
ments and  baggage  of  the  Confederate  camp.  McClellan 
was  disposed  to  take  a  very  sanguine  view  of  the  exist- 
ing situation;  and  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  Secession 
was  killed  in  that  part  of  the  country.  The  Confederates 
rallied  after  awhile,  and,  on  General  Lee  being  appointed 
to  the  post  lately  occupied  by  Garnett,  a  series  of  vigor- 
ous operations  took  place  on  the  western  side  of  the 
mountains.  Yet  the  results  obtained  by  the  Unionists 
were  really  important.  The  army  of  General  Garnett 
was  for  the  time  disorganized,  broken  up,  and  crest- 
fallen. The  Union  forces  had  certainly  made  a  fortunate 
commencement  of  the  war,  and  a  fortunate  conclusion 
lay  before  it;  but  between  those  two  extremes  many 
signal  disasters  were  to  be  endured  and  overcome. 

On  July  22,  General  George  B.  McClellan  was  called 
to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Lincoln  called  an  extra  session  of  Congress  to  con- 
vene on  July  4.  He  recommended  that  Congress 
should  grant  legal  means  to  make  the  existing  contest  a 
short  and  decisive  one,  by  placing  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Government  400,000  men,  and  $400,000,000.  The 
number  of  men,  he  remarked,  was  about  one-tenth  of 
those  of  proper  ages  within  the  regions  where  all 
seemed  willing  to  engage ;  and  the  sum  was  less  than 


BELLIGERENT  RIGHTS  ACCORDED. 


29 


one-twenty-third  part  of  the  money  value  owned  by 
men  who  appeared  ready  to  devote  the  whole. 

The  total  force  in  the  field  was  computed  at  230,000 
men,  after  abstracting  80,000  who  had  only  enlisted  for 
three  months,  then  on  the  eve  of  expiring. 

Th*:  Secretary  of  the  Navy  reported  that  the  total 
naval  force  of  the  United  States  was  42  vessels,  nearly 
all  of  them  on  foreign  stations ;  while  the  home  squad- 
ron consisted  of  but  12  vessels,  carrying  187  guns,  and 
about  2000  men. 

On  May  13,  1861,  the  English  Government  issued  a 
Proclamation  of  Neutrality,  by  which  belligerent  rights 
were  conferred  on  the  Confederates.  To  confer  this  po- 
sition of  a  belligerent  was  in  some  degree  to  recognize 
their  existence  as  an  independent  Power ;  and  this  was  an 
immense  gain  to  the  cause  of  Jefferson  Davis.  It  took 
the  Confederacy  out  of  the  category  of  rebels,  and 
placed  it  in  that  of  acknowledged  nations.  The  privi- 
lege was  one  which  the  Federal  Government  never  con- 
ceded, for  to  do  so  would  have  been  to  annihilate  the 
justification  for  the  war.  If  the  Confederacy  was  a  be- 
ligerent  in  the  technical  sense  of  the  word,  it  was  an  in- 
dependent nation ;  and  as  an  independent  nation  there 
was  no  reason  for  attacking  it.  Only  as  a  rebel  could  it 
fairly  be  made  amenable  to  the  law  force.  This  view 
was  sustained  throughout  the  long  struggle  by  William 
H.  Seward,  one  of  the  ablest  of  our  Secretaries  of  State. 

The  Confederate  privateers  (numbering  about  twenty) 
were  by  this  time  very  active,  and  although  their  opera- 
tions did  not  commence  until  the  early  part  of  May, 
they  had  by  the  end  of  July  captured  vessels  and  prop- 
erty valued  at  several  millions  of  dollars. 

The  military  position  in  the  early  part  of  July  was  such 
as  to  create  great  confidence  in  the  minds  of  the  North- 
ern people.  The  cry  "  On  to  Richmond  !  "  was  raised 
in  many  quarters,  and  it  was  believed  that  means   had 


3Q 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


been  obtained  for  making  the  war  as  sharp,  short,  and 
decisive  as  the  President  desired  it  to  be.  The  line  of 
the  Potomac  was  held  by  the  Union  troops  from  its 
mouth  to  the  Cumberland,  in  Maryland.  The  adjacent 
seacoast  was  patrolled  by  armed  vessels,  and  the  Vir- 
ginia bank  of  the  river  was  carefully  watched,  though 
the  troops  had  not  been  able  to  prevent  the  erection 
of  Confederate  batteries.  The  Union  cause  was  repre- 
sented in  Virginia  itself  by  McDowell's  army  (45,000 
strong),  and  by  the  large  force  under  Patterson.  Be- 
tween the  latter  force  and  McClellan's  army  was  a  gap 
in  the  line,  indicating,  of  course,  a  weakness  in  that 
particular  direction.  But  the  Union  position,  on  the 
whole,  was  good. 

The  main  Confederate  Army  was  under  the  orders  of 
Beauregard,  ar.d  was  probably  somewhat  less  numerous 
than  McDowell's.  It  was  stationed  at  and  near  Manas- 
sas Junction,  a  strong  and  important  military  position 
between  Washington  and  Richmond,  with  which  it  was 
connected  by  rail.  All  around  were  wooded  hills  and 
frequent  streams,  and,  in  addition  to  the  natural  defences 
of  the  position,  which  were  great,  Beauregard  had 
thrown  up  several  artificial  fortifications.  A  second  Con- 
federate Army  was  stationed  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
under  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  whose  headquarters  were 
at  Winchester.  This  position  also  was  strongly  en- 
trenched, and  the  duty  of  Johnston  was  to  check  the  ad- 
vance of  Patterson,  and  prevent  his  junction  with  Mc- 
Clellan.  The  question  now  to  be  determined  was 
whether  the  Unionists  were  strong  enough  to  advance 
on  Richmond,  or  the  Confederates  strong  enough 
to  take  Washington,  or  whether  neither  was  strong 
enough  to  affect  its  manifest  intention,  and  could  only 
nullify  the  operations  of  the  other.  General  Scott,  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  was  suffering  from  the  accumulated 
infirmities  of  age.     He  was  not  the  man  who,  14  years 


"ON  TO  RICHMOND!" 


31 


earlier,  had  led  his  forces  to  victory  in  Mexico.  For 
three  years  he  had  been  unable  to  mount  a  horse ;  and 
dropsy  and  vertigo  rendered  it  difficult  for  him  to  transact 
the  ordinary  business  of  his  office.  It  was  impossible 
that  he  should  take  the  field  in  person  ;  and  accordingly 
the  active  direction  of  the  troops  was  confided  to 
Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Irwin  Mc- 
Dowell^ native 
of  Ohio,  who 
had  graduated 
at  the  Military 
Academy  at 
WestPoint.and 
had  served  un- 
der General 
Wool  in  the 
Mexican  War. 
Since  May  27 
he  commanded 
the  Depart- 
ment of  Vir- 
ginia, with  his 
headquarters 
at  Arlington 
Court  House, 
and  had  worked 
hard  at  the  or- 
ganization    of 

the  army.  He  had  done  much,  but  had  not  had 
time  to  do  sufficient.  Popular  clamor,  however,  de- 
manded a  headlong  rush  against  the  Confederates ; 
and  in  this  mood  of  uninstructed  confidence,  of  pas- 
sionate enthusiasm,  and  of  ill-grounded  hope,  the  nat'™ 
laid  itself  open  to  the  serious  reverse  which  was  about 
to  hapo^n. 


GENERAL    IRWIN    MCDOWELL. 


32 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


Bull  Run  (July  21,  1861). — All  things  being  sup- 
posedly in  readiness  for  the  assault  upon  the  Confederate 
lines,  the  forward  movement  of  the  Union  troops  began 
on  the  afternoon  of  July  16.  The  enterprise  would  have 
been  one  of  grave  difficulty,  even  had  the  attendant  cir- 
cumstances been  more  favorable  than  they  really  were. 
But  there  were  particular  facts  which  added  largely  to 
the  perils  of  the  campaign.  Not  only  were  the  troops 
unacquainted  with  the  actual  operations  of  war,  but  the 
Union  plans  were  seriously  disturbed  by  the  conduct  of 
the  army  under  Patterson.  His  forces  were  relied  upon 
for  holding  Johnston  in  check,  and  preventing  his  junc- 
tion with  Beauregard,  whose  division  was  about  50  miles 
off,  but  with  the  advantage  of  railway  and  telegraphic 
lines  between.  Patterson,  however,  was  unable  to  carry 
out  his  part  of  the  programme,  owing  to  the  determina- 
tion of  his  men,  who  had  been  enlisted  for  three  months, 
to  disband  at  the  very  earliest  opportunity.  They  were 
implored  to  re-engage,  if  only  for  ten  days ;  but,  with 
the  exception  of  four  regiments,  they  refused.  Their 
conduct  was  precisely  that  of  large  numbers  of  troops 
engaged  in  the  revolutionary  war;  and  the  embarrass 
ment  from  which  Washington  so  frequently  suffered 
was  now  once  more  experienced.  Patterson  had  ad- 
vanced towards  Winchester,  where  Johnston  was  posted; 
but,  on  the  very  day  when  the  rest  of  the  troops  moved 
against  the  enemy,  he  was  compelled  to  recede  towards 
the  Potomac,  owing  to  the  unpatriotic  spirit  of  his  regi- 
ments. The  force  under  Patterson  was  originally  in- 
ferior in  numbers  to  that  of  his  adversary,  besides  being 
ill-provided  with  artillery ;  it  would  now,  in  the  course 
of  a  very  few  days,  be  reduced  to  the  most  slender  pro- 
portions. It  therefore  seemed  prudent  to  withdraw  in 
the  direction  of  Maryland,  where  he  could  still  assist  in 
blocking  Johnston's  advance  on  Washington,  although 
he  was  unable  to  fight  a  regular  action. 


BULL   RUN.  33 

Massed  into  five  divisions,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
to  the  number  of  about  53,000,  sought  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  in  the  middle  of  July.  Only  3000  of  the  entire 
number  were  regulars ;  the  rest  were  raw  and  inex- 
perienced soldiers,  and  in  many  instances  the  officers 
were  not  much  better  instructed  than  the  troops  they 
commanded.  16,000  men,  under  General  Mansfield, 
remained  at  Washington,  to  guard  the  city  against  sur- 
prise; and  the  others  moved  forward  along  four  roads, 
all  converging  in  the  vicinity  of  Centreville.  The  right 
column,  under  the  orders  of  General  Tyler,  began  its 
march  at  two  p.  m.  on  the  16th,  and  was  followed,  at 
eight  A.  M.  on  the  following  morning,  by  the  remaining 
divisions.  The  Confederate  force  was  posted  along 
Bull  Run — a  small  stream  rising  in  a  chain  of  hills  to 
the  west  of  Alexandria,  and  falling  into  the  river  Occo- 
quan,  about  twelve  miles  from  the  Potomac.  The  line 
extended  some  eight  miles,  from  Union  Mill,  where  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway  crosses  the  stream,  to 
the  Stone  Bridge  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike-road.  The 
banks  of  the  little  river  are  steep  and  rocky;  thick 
woods  offered  admirable  covert  for  soldiers ;  and  the  sur- 
rounding country,  from  its  irregularity  and  abundance 
of  foliage,  presents  favorable  opportunities  for  defence. 
Confederate  reserves  were  held  in  readiness  near 
Manassas  Junction;  and  not  far  off,  Beauregard  had  his 
headquarters.  An  outpost  with  fortifications,  at  Centre- 
ville, protected  that  part  of  the  line,  and  strong  pickets 
were  thrown  forward  to  Fairfax  Court  House,  a  village 
ten  miles  from  the  main  army,  in  the  direction  of  Wash- 
ington. The  division  under  Johnston,  to  the  left  of  the 
other  Confederates,  gave  additional  strength  to  the 
Southern  line  of  battle,  and  Patterson's  unavoidable 
retreat  contributed  in  a  serious  degree  to  the  disaster 
which  ensued. 

Some  obstructions  on  the  road,  in  the  shape  of  felled 


24  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

trees  thrown  across  the  path,  delayed  the  progress  ot 
the  Union  forces,  but  did  not  prevent  the  van  from 
reaching  Fairfax  Court  House  by  noon  on  the  17th. 
Here  there  was  a  slight  skirmish  with  the  Confederate 
pickets;  but  the  place  was  occupied  by  the  Union  Second 
Division,  while  the  other  divisions,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Fourth,  which  was  kept  behind  to  guard  the 
communications  with  Washington,  were  stationed  be- 
tween Germantown  and  Centreville,  at  two  points  on 
the  Alexandria  and  Richmond  Railway,  and  on  the 
approaches  to  Centreville  from  the  south-east.  On  the 
morning  of  the  18th,  it  was  found  that  the  Confederates 
had  evacuated  Centreville,  which  they  had  roughly 
fortified  only  eight  hours  previously.  They  were  seen 
to  be  posted  on  the  right  or  southern  bank  of  Bull  Run, 
and  Tyler,  who  had  command  of  the  First  Union  Divi- 
sion, resolved  on  making  an  immediate  attack.  The 
country  was  thickly  covered  with  wood,  and  the  Con- 
federate brigades  of  Generals  Longstreet  and  Bonham 
took  advantage  of  the  fact.  The  Union  point  of  attack 
was  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  situated  between  the  Warren- 
ton  Road  and  the  Richmond  and  Alexandria  Railway. 
Tyler,  however,  did  not  attempt  to  cross  the  stream,  but 
opened  fire  with  his  heavy  guns  at  a  distance  of  a  mile 
and  a  half,  and  afterwards  somewhat  nearer.  His  ad- 
versary replied  with  spirit,  and  a  brisk  duel  went  on  for 
some  time.  At  length,  several  of  the  New  York  troops 
broke  and  fled,  throwing  away  their  arms;  the  other 
regiments  retired  in  fairly  good  order.  A  small  force 
of  Confederates  then  crossed  the  stream  at  Mitchell's 
Ford,  and,  taking  up  a  position  on  high  ground  to  the 
east  of  the  road  to  Centreville,  poured  a  heavy  fire  into 
the  retreating  ranks.  The  object  of  Tyler  in  making 
his  movement  was  to  carry  out  a  reconnoissance;  and 
this  having  been  accomplished,  he  did  not  consider  it 
advisable  or  necessary  to  risk  any  further  conflict. 


BULL   RUN. 


35 


It  being  now  evident  that  the  Confederate  position 
was  too  strong  to  be  attacked  in  front,  it  was  resolved 
to  approach  the  enemy  on  his  left  flank.  No  fresh 
movement,  however,  could  be  made  for  a  couple  of 
days,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  moving  inexperienced 
troops,  with  their  accompanying  supplies  and  baggage ; 
and  those  two  days  were  of  the  greatest  value  to  the 
Con  federates. 
Johnston,  n  o 
longer  having 
the  dread  of 
Patterson  be- 
fore his  eyes, 
quitted  his  po- 
sition in  the 
Shenandoah 
Valley,  and  on 
July  20,  arrived 
by  rail  at  the 
headquarters  of 
Beauregard 
with  6000  men 
and  twenty 
guns,  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  the 
rest  of  his  force. 
Other  regi- 
ments were 
moved  up  from 

Richmond,  and  the  Confederates  now  believed  them- 
selves equal  to  any  attack  likely  to  be  made.  Their  left 
was  on  the  Centreville  and  Warrenton  Road,  a  little 
above  the  bridge  over  which  that  highway  crosses  Bull 
Run  ;  their  right  was  at  Union  Mills  Ford,  about  nine 
miles  farther  down  the  little  river,  near  the  railway  con- 
necting Alexandria  and  Richmond.     In   front  was  the 


GENERAL  PETER 


T.  BEAUREGARD. 


36 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


stream,  with  its  high  and  precipitous  banks ;  at  the  rear 
were  dense  woods,  capable  of  concealing  large  numbers 
of  marksmen.  The  general  character  of  the  country 
was  undulatory,  and  in  parts  extremely  rugged.  High 
hills  alternated  with  lower  elevations,  and  the  gorges 
between  were  often  so  narrow  that  a  small  force  could 
easily  stand  against  one  much  larger.  With  no  little 
confidence,  therefore,  did  Beauregard  and  Johnston 
draw  up  their  legions  on  Sunday  morning,  July  21. 
The  Confederates  were  disposed  in  three  lines,  watch- 
ing the  eight  fords  over  the  stream.  Beauregard  stated 
that  his  entire  army  amounted  to  27,833  men,  with  49 
guns  for  the  defence  of  the  Confederate  position. 

The  plan  of  attack  formed  by  McDowell  was  one 
unusually  sensible  and  soldierly  for  that  early  day,  and 
perfectly  worthy  of  commendation  at  the  present.  It  was 
to  turn  the  Confederate  left,  and,  if  possible,  to  destroy 
the  railway  leading  from  Manassas  Junction  to  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  remainder  of 
Johnston's  army.  With  this  view,  the  men  were  served 
with  three  days'  rations,  and  furnished  with  instructions 
as  to  how  they  were  to  proceed.  The  army  was  late 
in  starting,  owing  to  some  delay  on  the  part  of  the 
First  Division;  and  it  was  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  the  2 1st  when  the  advance  crossed  the  river  at 
Sudley  Springs.  Colonel  Evans,  the  Confederate 
officer  on  the  opposite  bank,  disputed  the  ground, 
but  the  Union  forces  made  way,  and  were  gradually 
reinforced  by  other  divisions  of  the  army.  McDowell 
was  commanding  in  person,  and  he  hurried  up  addi- 
tional regiments,  with  a  view  to  crushing  his  adversary. 
Matters  began  to  look  grave  for  the  Confederates,  and 
Beauregard  and  Johnston  rode  towards  the  scene  of 
contest,  to  give  immediate  direction  to  the  movements 
of  their  troops.  Some  hard  fighting  took  place  on  an 
elevated   plateau,  partly  covered  with  pine- woods,  and 


BULL  RUN. 


37 


intersected  by  water-courses.  The  Unionists  repeatedly 
drove  their  adversaries  down  the  eastern  slope  of  this 
eminence ;  and  at  noon  the  Confederates,  though  reply- 
ing with  firmness  to  the  opposing  fire,  and  doing  con- 
siderable execution  with  their  field-pieces,  had  undoubt- 
edly lost  ground.  During  one  of  these  charges,  the 
Confederate  officer,  General  Bee,  observed  rather 
excitedly  to  General  Jackson,  "  They  are  beating  us 
back  !  "  "  Well,  sir,"  replied  Jackson,  "  we  will  give 
them  the  bayonet."  Bee  turned  to  his  men,  and  en- 
deavored to  rally  them.  "  Form  !  form !  "  he  exclaimed. 
"  There  stands  Jackson  like  a  stone  wall."  In  this  way 
did  the  gallant  Confederate  leader  obtain  the  designa- 
tion which  clung  to  him  till  his  death.  The  courage 
and  self-possession  of  Jackson  did  wonders,  but  the  day 
was  still  going  in  favor  of  the  Union  men.  Towards 
the  centre,  the  brigade  under  Colonel  Richardson 
opened  fire  against  Jones  and  Longstreetat  Blackburn's 
Ford,  to  prevent  their  reinforcing  the  Confederate  left ; 
and,  by  order  of  Beauregard,  Longstreet  crossed  the 
stream,  and  detained  some  of  them  from  the  more 
important  field  of  conflict.  The  Confederate  right  and 
the  Union  left  were  hardly  engaged  at  ail- 
So  unpromising  did  the  aspect  of  affairs  seem  to 
Beauregard  and  Johnston  that,  shortly  after  twelve 
o'clock,  the  latter  hastened  to  Lewis  House,  in  the  rear 
of  the  Confederate  line,  to  see  whether  he  could  hurry 
forward  the  troops  which  were  expected  to  arrive  by  rail 
from  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  During  his  absence,  the 
Confederates  made  an  approach  towards  retrieving 
their  position  ;  but  they  were  still  very  hard  pressed. 
Jackson  executed  a  movement  by  which  he  was  enabled 
to  seize  one  of  the  Union  batteries — a  success  due 
to  the  mistake  of  the  officer  in  command,  who,  not  feel- 
ing sure  that  the  advancing  troops  were  those  of  the 
enemy,  abstained  from    firing.     About   this  time    Mc- 

Vnion — 3 


3§ 


THE   BATTLES  rOK    ThE  UNION. 


Dowell  ordered  Colonel  Sherman,  who  occupied  the 
centre  of  the  Union  line,  to  charge  the  opposing  bat- 
teries with  his  entire  brigade.  The  movement  was  be- 
gun with  a  good  deal  of  dash  and  energy ;  but  the 
brigade  ultimately  fell  back.  Again  and  again  the  des- 
perate attempt  was  renewed,  and  the  regiments  were 
terribly  cut  up ;  but  the  Confederate  batteries  were  ad- 
mirably handled,  and  Sherman  was  unable  to  carry  out 
his  orders.  Still,  the  Union  troops  were  having  the 
best  of  the  encounter.  The  Confederates  were  driven 
down  the  wooded  slopes,  and  the  ground  was  thickly 
strewn  with  the  dead  and  wounded.  -Many  of  the  Con- 
federate officers  had  by  this  time  fallen  ;  Jackson  was 
struck,  but  refused  to  quit  the  field ;  and  Beauregard, 
placing  himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  led  the 
charge.  Shortly  afterwards  he  was  slightly  wounded, 
but,  like  Jackson,  remained  with  his  regiments,  and  was 
in  time  rewarded  by  a  complete  change  in  the  fortunes 
of  the  day. 

Meanwhile,  Johnston  was  at  Lewis  House,  commonly 
called  "  the  Portico,"  from  which  he  could  scan  the 
country  all  round.  He  felt  extremely  anxious  as  to  the 
issue  of  the  struggle,  for  up  to  that  time  fortune  seemed 
likely  to  declare  itself  on  the  side  of  the  Union  forces. 
It  was  now  three  o'clock  and  the  looked-for  reinforce- 
ments had  not  yet  arrived.  "  Oh,  for  four  regiments  ! ' 
he  is  reported  to  have  exclaimed  to  one  of  his  officers ; 
and  not  long  afterwards  a  cloud  of  dust  was  seen  rising 
into  the  air  from  the  direction  of  the  Manassas  Gap 
Railway,  to  the  south  of  where  he  was  standing.  For 
the  moment,  Johnston  was  under  the  impression  that 
this  indicated  the  advance  of  Union  reinforcements. 
He  soon  discovered  his  error.  The  strangers  proved  to 
be  a  body  of  Confederates,  numbering  4000  and  com- 
manded by  General  E.  Kirby  Smith.  They  had  come 
by  rail  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  Smith,  on  hear- 


40 


THE   BATTLES  EOR    THE    UNION. 


ing  the  sound  of  cannon  on  his  left,  had  stopped  the 
train,  and  marched  his  men  across  the  country  in  the 
direction  of  the  battle  which  was  going  on.  At  the 
Portico  they  received  the  commands  of  Johnston,  who 
ordered  them  to  attack  the  right  flank  of  McDowell's 
line.  He  also  directed  Colonel  Cook's  brigade  to 
join  in  the  action.  Other  bodies  of  Southern  troops 
likewise  dashed  forward  to  the  plateau  where  Beaure- 
gard was  desperately  contending  against  the  Union  ad- 
vance; and  he  found  himself  so  heavily  reinforced  that 
the  relative  position  of  the  two  armies  was  entirely  re- 
versed. The  Confederate  ranks  were  now  far  more 
numerous  than  those  of  their  opponents,  and  the  new 
arrivals  were  fresh  and  vigorous.  Beauregard,  who  had 
ordered  an  advance  of  the  whole  line  shortly  before,  felt 
victory  almost  within  his  grasp.  The  reinforcements 
took  position  to  the  left  of  the  onward-sweeping  hosts, 
and  the  whole  accumulated  mass  fell  like  a  thunder- 
bolt upon  the  fatigued  Union  troops.  Very  soon 
they  were  outflanked,  and  driven  headlong  down  the 
opposite  side  of  the  plateau.  Sharpshooters  appeared 
in  the  woods  at  their  back ;  from  three  sides  a  storm 
of  shot  poured  into  their  staggering  ranks ;  and  the 
perils  of  the  time  were  aggravated  by  panic.  A  portion 
of  General  Stewart's  cavalry  joined  in  the  Confederate 
charge,  and  in  a  moment  the  battle  was  ended,  and  the 
Union  troops  gave  way  in  hopeless  and  miserable  flight. 
The  victorious  regiments,  however,  suffered  severely  in 
the  final  assault.  Kirby  Smith  fell  badly  wounded 
shortly  after  he  had  placed  his  troops  to  the  left  of  the 
main  body,  and  Generals  Bee  and  Barton  were  killed  a 
little  later.  But  the  day,  after  a  long  and  sanguinary 
fight,  had  been  won,  and  Jefferson  Davis,  who  had 
left  Richmond  in  the  morning,  arrived  in  time  to  see  the 
rout  of  the  Union  forces. 

The  flight  of  the  Union  troops  was  marked  by  every 


BULL    RUN. 


41 


sign  of  disorganization  and  military  incompetence. 
Flinging  away  their  arms,  ammunition,  knapsacks,  and 
other  incumbrances,  like  the  Confederates  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Rich  Mountain,  the  discomfited  soldiers  dashed 
pell-mell  from  the  scene  of  their  crushing  reverse,  scat- 
tering dismay  far  and  wide  by  their  cries  of  terror.  All 
pretence  of  order  and  method  was  at  an  end.  Each 
man  thought  only  of  himself,  and  the  honor  of  the 
army  was  entirely  lost  in  the  overwhelming  consideration 
of  personal  safety.  A  panic  once  begun  cannot  readily 
be  stopped.  The  unreasoning  apprehension  passes 
from  rank  to  rank,  and  from  regiment  to  regiment,  like 
wild-fire ;  and  the  contagion  of  fear  is  as  mysterious  in 
its  agencies  and  as  rapid  in  its  effects  as  any  other 
epidemic.  Where  veterans  have  lost  all  sense  of  mili- 
tary subordination  and  mutual  reliance,  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing if  inexperienced  and  half-disciplined  troops  should 
become  totally  disorganized,  and  even  for  the  time  un- 
manned. The  rush  from  Bull  Run,  with  all  its  dis- 
graceful incidents,  was  in  no  respect  surprising ;  it  was 
nevertheless  painful  in  the  highest  degree. 

McDowell,  on  perceiving  that  his  men  were  utterly 
defeated,  rode  off  to  Centreville,  ordered  General 
Blenker's  German  brigade  to  support  and  rally  the  flying 
troops,  and  directed  Colonels  Davies  and  Richardson  to 
take  up  a  position  to  cover  Centreville.  Johnston  had 
ordered  Ewell  to  cross  Bull  Run  in  force,  and  attack 
that  village ;  but,  in  attempting  to  execute  -the  move- 
ment, his  subordinate  was  so  warmly  received  that  he 
found  it  necessary  to  retreat,  his  men  being  thrown  into 
disorder  by  the  heavy  guns  of  the  enemy.  By  sunset, 
most  of  the  Union  troops  reached  the  farther  side  of 
the  Centreville  ridge,  and  it  became  a  question  whether 
an  attempt  should  there  be  made  to  reorganize  the  shat- 
tered army.  The  panic  had  not  spread  to  all  of  the 
regiments.     Blenker's  brigade,  the  regulars,  and  a  por- 


42  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

tion  of  the  reserves  at  Centreville,  retained  their  military 
form,  though  nearly  exhausted  by  thirty  hours'  march- 
ing and  fighting.  These  battalions  were  of  immense  ser- 
vice in  covering  the  confused  retreat,  and  in  checking 
the  pursuit.  But  they  could  not  infuse  any  better  spirit 
into  their  demoralized  comrades,  and  it  was  agreed  by 
all  the  commanders  that  there  was  no  choice  but  to  fall 
back.  The  men  had  been  fighting  for  hours  under  a 
blazing  sun  ;  they  were  tired,  hungry,  and  disheartened ; 
their  rations,  issued  the  day  before,  had  been  recklessly 
thrown  away ;  and  a  large  number  of  guns  and  smali 
arms,  together  with  stores  of  ammunition,  had  been 
lost.  It  appeared,  moreover,  that  Blackburn's  Ford  was 
by  that  time  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  that  he 
was  endeavoring  to  turn  the  Union  left.  Orders  were 
given  to  continue  the  retreat ;  but  the  troops  had 
taken  the  matter  into  their  own  hands,  and,  as  night 
came  on,  were  hurrying  along  the  road  to  Washington. 
In  the  fields  and  ways  from  the  battle-ground  to 
Centreville,  the  wounded  lay  in  hundreds.  Many 
dropped  with  fatigue,  and  were  crushed  by  the  artillery, 
or  ridden  over  by  the  horses.  A  dull,  deep  roar,  made 
up  of  many  cries  of  rage,  agony,  and  terror,  surged 
along  the  paths  by  which  the  troops  were  retreating, 
and  clouds  of  dust,  illuminated  by  the  western  sun, 
revealed  the  several  lines  of  flight.  It  was  not  until  the 
early  morning  of  the  22d  that  the  fugitives  reached 
Washington;  and  even  then  their  fears  did  not  desert 
them.  During  the  eventful  Sunday,  crowds  assembled 
round  the  telegraph  and  newspaper  offices,  reading  with 
eager  satisfaction  the  despatches  that  came  from  the 
field  of  battle  throughout  the  morning  and  the  early 
part  of  the  afternoon.  Everything,  it  was  then  reported, 
was  going  well.  The  Union  soldiers  were  successful  at 
all  points.  A  complete  and  overwhelming  victory  was 
certain.     But,  as  the  afternoon  wore  on,  the  telegrams 


BULL   RUN. 


43 


ceased  to  arrive.  An  ominous  silence  supervened,  and 
men  began  to  ask  one  another  what  it  meant.  Then 
came  placards  announcing,  "Utter  rout  of  the  troops!" 
"  Stampede  to  Washington !  "  "All  our  batteries  cap- 
tured ! "  and  so  on.  From  a  city  of  joy,  the  Federal 
capital  passed  into  a  city  of  mourning. 

The  losses  of  the  Union  army  were  stated  by  McDo- 
well at  19  officers,  and  462  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates,  killed ;  64  officers,  and  947  non-commissioned 
officers  and  privates,  wounded.  The  "missing"  were  very 
numerous  ;  many  went  off  altogether,  and  never  returned 
to  the  colors.  The  Confederate  loss  was  estimated  by 
Beauregard  at  378  killed,  and  1483  wounded.  Of 
prisoners,  including  wounded,  he  had  no  fewer  than 
1600  men,  and  among  the  captured  were  officers  and 
men  of  forty-seven  regiments  of  volunteers,  and  of  nine 
different  regiments  of  regular  troops,  detachments  of 
which  were  engaged.  The  gains  of  the  Confederates  in 
artillery,  small  arms,  ammunition,  accoutrements,  flags, 
military  appliances,  hospital  stores,  wagons,  horses,  etc., 
were  very  large,  and  Johnston  and  Beauregard  were  in 
a  better  position  for  pushing  a  vigorous  campaign  after 
the  battle  than  before.  It  was  subsequently  made  a 
ground  of  complaint  against  Jefferson  Davis  and  his 
colleagues  that  an  advance  on  Washington  was  not 
immediately  ordered.  But,  to  use  Davis'  own  words, 
"  It  was  a  hard-fought  field,  and  the  victors  were  in  no 
condition  to  pursue."  So  Washington  was  not  attacked, 
and  the  North  had  time  to  rally. 

In  his  report  on  the  battle,  General  McDowell  was 
compelled  to  make  many  complaints  of  his  men,  and  to 
point  out  many  defects  in  the  military  system.  But  it 
should  always  be  recollected,  in  considering  the  events 
of  this  unhappy  day,  that  the  Union  soldiers,  for  the 
most  part,  fought  well  for  long  hours,  drove  their  ad- 
versaries before  them  again  and  again,  and  at  one  time 


44 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


came  very  near  obtaining  a  decisive  victory.  It  was 
only  when  they  were  outnumbered  and  outflanked 
that  they  fled  in  uncontrollable  dismay.  Many  well- 
trained  armies  have  done  the  same.  Discreditable  as 
their  flight  was,  it  was  no  worse  than  that  of  Braddock's 
regiments  from  the  ambushed  French  and  Indians,  or 
that  of  Gage's  men  from  Concord.  Such  panics  are 
known  to  every  service,  and  should  not  be  alleged  as  a 
special  reproach  against  any  one  in  particular.  The 
Sadowas  of  history  are  few. 

Swinton,  in  his  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  thus  sum- 
marizes the  effect  of  this  eventful  action :  "  The  victory 
of  Bull  Run  gained  more  than  a  field ;  it  won  a  campaign. 
Midsummer  passed,  autumn  came  and  went,  winter  at 
last  found  the  Union  and  Confederate  troops  in  Virginia 
in  their  peaceful  log-camps.  The  year  1861  slipped 
entirely  away  without  another  forward  movement  in 
Virginia ;  the  next  year  opened  silently  there ;  spring 
came  again  before  the  spell  which  Bull  Run  had  thrown 
was  broken  up.  Nor  was  this  true  of  Virginia  alone, 
but  of  the  whole  West;  incessant  skirmishes  and  desul- 
tory engagements  by  detached  forces  occupied  the  time 
and  strength  which  had  been  designed  for  grand  opera- 
tions ;  for  these  latter  were  repressed  at  their  beginning, 
and  the  military  year  of  186 1,  from  which  so  much  had 
been  hoped,  came  to  its  end  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run." 

Ball's  Bluff  (October  21,  1861). — Near  the  end 
of  October,  McClellan  made  preparations  for  send- 
ing out  a  strong  reconnoissance  towards  Leesbnrg, 
to  ascertain  the  movements  and  intentions  of  the 
enemy.  About  2000  Union  troops  had  crossed  the 
Potomac  and  in  the  course  of  the  21st  a  collision  took 
place  in  the  woods  covering  the  banks  of  the  river. 
Being  devoid  of  artillery,  the  Confederates  charged 
with  fixed  bayonets,  and  the  opposing  line  gave  way. 
Colonel  Baker,  the  U.  S.  Senator  from  Oregon,  who 


4c 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


commanded  one  of  the  Union  brigades,  rallied  his 
men.  A  hot  musketry  engagement  ensued,  in  which 
they  were  much  galled  by  the  raking  fire  which  came 
from  out  the  forest.  Baker  was  at  length  mortally 
wounded,  and  fell ;  and  his  men  then  rushed  towards 
the  steep  banks  of  the  Potomac  without  the  slightest 
restraint,  pursued  by  their  adversaries,  who  slaughtered 
as  many  as  they  could  reach  by  bayonet «or  musket-shot. 
The  discreditable  incidents  of  the  2ist  of  July  were 
thus  repeated  three  months  later,  and  it  became  distress- 
ingly manifest  that  a  quarter  of  a  year  had  made  little 
difference  in  the  military  character  of  the  Union  army. 
Some  of  the  fugitives  swam  across  the  river;  others 
attempted  to  get  away  in  boats,  which  were  swamped 
by  the  numbers  who  crowded  into  them.  Several  were 
drowned ;  still  more  perished  at  the  hands  of  the  foe ; 
many  were  captured  in  their  efforts  to  escape.  Of  the 
whole  force,  half  were  killed,  wounded,  or  taken  ;  there 
was  an  admitted  loss  of  nearly  noo  men.  Telegrams 
were  despatched  during  the  action  to  General  Banks, 
who  sent  forward  fresh  troops  ;  but  the  day  was  by  that 
time  irretrievably  ruined.  The  disastrous  result  of  the 
movement  appears  to  have  been  attributable  partly  to 
the  misapprehension  of  orders,  by  which  McClellan's 
design  of  a  reconnoissance  was  changed  into  a  general 
action  without  proper  means  for  supporting  it ;  and 
partly  to  want  of  firmness  in  the  men.  The  Confed- 
erates were  superior  in  number  to  the  Union  forces,  and 
were  undoubtedly  better  disciplined  and  better  handled. 
An  upholder  of  the  Confederate  cause  has  remarked 
that  the  victory  at  Ball's  Bluff,  like  that  at  Bull  Run, 
"  bore  no  fruits  but  those  of  a  confidence  on  the  part  of 
the  South,  which  was  pernicious,  because  it  was  over- 
weening and  inactive,  and  a  contempt  for  its  enemy,  which 
was  injurious  in  proportion  as  it  exceeded  the  limits  of 
truth  and  justice  and  reflected  the  self-conceits  of  fortune." 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Campaigns  at  the  West  (1862). 

At  the  commencement  of  1862,  the  Union  forces 
were  upwards  of  640,000  volunteers,  and  more  than 
20,000  regular  troops.  The  quality  of  these  soldiers 
was  in  many  instances  very  indifferent;  but  every  day 
helped  their  education  in  their  new  trade.  When 
McClellan  was  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
armies,  he  prepared  at  Lincoln's  request  a  memoran- 
dum in  which  he  drew  out  a  scheme  of  operations,  and 
set  forth  the  means  by  which  his  conceptions  were  to 
be  carried  into  effect.  The  most  important  strategical 
point,  he  said,  was  in  Eastern  Virginia,  and  the  struggle 
must  be  fought  out  there.  Campaigns  in  other  direc- 
tions, however,  were  necessary  in  support  of  the  princi- 
pal movement.  An  advance  must  be  made  on  the 
Mississippi,  and  the  Confederates  must  be  driven  out 
of  Missouri.  Operations  should  likewise  be  con- 
ducted in  Eastern  Tennessee,  for  the  purpose  of  assist- 
ing the  Union  men  in  that  locality,  and  of  seizing  the 
railroads  leading  from  Memphis  to  the  east.  Efforts 
should  be  made  to  organize  and  equip  regiments  in 
Western  Virginia ;  and  the  importance  insisted  on  of 
occupying  Baltimore  and  Fortress  Monroe,  and  at 
the  same  time  ot  concentrating  a  large  army  in  the 
vicinity  of  Washington.  For  the  carrying  out  of  these 
various  projects,  McClellan  demanded  250  regiments  of 

(47) 


48  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

infantry;  ioo  field-batteries  of  six  guns  each;  28  regi 
nients  of  cavalry;  and  5  regiments  of  engineers:  giv 
ing  altogether  a  total  273,000  men.  This  was  for  the 
active  operations  alone.  Another  large  body  would  be 
needed  for  holding  Washington  and  the  line  of  the 
Potomac,  for  furnishing  garrisons  to  various  towns,  and 
for  performing  the  routine  military  duties  required  by  a 
state  of  war.  A  strong  naval  force,  it  was  suggested, 
should  act  in  conjunction  with  a  fleet  of  transports; 
and  the  railway  service  of  the  country  was  to  be  turned 
to  advantage  by  every  available  means.  "  We  must 
endeavor,"  said  McClellan,  "  to  seize  places  on  the  rail- 
ways in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  points  of  concentra- 
tion ;  and  we  must  threaten  their  seaboard  cities,  in 
order  that  each  State  may  be  forced,  by  the  necessity 
of  ics  own  defence,  to  diminish  its  contingent  to  the 
Confederate  Army."  To  him  it  appeared  possible  that 
by  a  combination  of  vigorous  movements  the  war 
might  be  terminated  in  one  more  campaign.  He  hoped 
to  occupy  Richmond,  Charleston,  Savannah,  Mont- 
gomery, Pensacola,  Mobile,  and  New  Orleans,  and  in 
this  was  to  "  crush  out  the  rebellion  in  its  very  heart." 
Some  of  the  earliest  encounters  of  1862  took  place 
in  Kentucky.  The  Western  Military  District  was  at 
that  time  commanded  by  General  Halleck,  who  had  his 
headquarters  at  St.  Louis.  Under  his  orders  were 
Generals  Grant  and  Buell  ;  the  first  in  Western 
Kentucky,  the  second  in  Eastern.  The  army  under 
Buell  occupied  Somerset  and  Columbia,  near  the  upper 
part  of  the  Cumberland  River,  and  was  opposed  by 
General  Zollicoffer,  whose  camp  was  at  Mill  Springs, 
on  the  southern  bank  of  the  same  river.  Crossing 
to  the  northern  bank,  he  was  joined  by  General  Critten- 
den, his  superior  in  rank;  at  midnight  on  January  18, 
the  troops  began  their  march  with  the  design  of 
surprising,  ere   it  was   yet  light,  the  Union  army  who 


CAMPAIGNS  AT  THE  WEST. 


49 


were  stationed  about  ten  miles  north  of  the  Confederate 
entrenched  camp. 

The  Confederate  approach  was  discovered  at  6  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  and  the  action  commenced 


GENERAL    ULYSSES    S.    GRANT. 


shortly  afterwards.  At  first  the  Union  forces  were 
repulsed ;  but  after  awhile  they  regained  the  ground 
they  had  lost,  and  at  8  o'clock,  a  furious  encounter  was 
taking  place  between  the  forces,  which  appear  to  have 
been  pretty  evenly  matched.     It  was  at  this  time  that 


5° 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


Zollicoffer,  riding  forward  in  front  of  his  men,  was  shot 
dead  ;  and  his  men  were  so  much  disheartened  by  this 
unexpected  event  that  they  began  to  lose  form,  and  to 
fall  back  confusedly,  and  finally  gave  way  in  disorderly 
flight.  General  Thomas  ordered  a  pursuit  of  the 
Southerners,  who  were  accordingly  followed  as  far  as 
their  entrenchments.  During  the  ensuing  night,  shells 
were  thrown  into  the  Confederate  camp,  and  the  dis- 
comfited troops,  fearing  they  might  be  cut  off,  and  being 
very  ill-provided  with  food  in  the  situation  they  had 
taken  up,  determined  to  retreat  across  the  Cumberland. 
The  men  succeeded  in  effecting  their  passage,  but  it 
was  found  impossible  to  carry  with  them  the  wagons, 
horses,  artillery,  and  camp  equipments,  which  fell  into 
the  Union  hands.  General  Crittenden's  regiments 
retreated  first  to  Monticello,  and  afterwards  to  Gains- 
borough, in  Tennessee.  Their  sufferings  on  the  route 
were  extreme,  for  they  had  been  obliged  to  leave  behind 
them  all  their  stores,  and  were  compelled  to  make  their 
way  through  a  tract  of  country  so  thinly  populated 
that  it  could  afford  no  adequate  support  for  a  large 
army. 

Fort  Henry  (February  6,  1862). — Crittenden's  re- 
treat placed  Eastern  Kentucky  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Union  forces  ;  but  the  western  division  of 
the  State  still  remained  to  the  Confederates.  General 
Sidney  Johnston,  the  Southern  commander,  held  a 
line  of  defence  which  extended  from  Bowling  Green, 
on  the  right,  to  Columbus,  on  the  left — a  position 
rendered  unusually  strong  by  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers,  and  by  a  railway 
system  connecting  the  ends  of  the  line,  and  giving  a 
command  over  the  adjacent  country.  Johnston  had 
protected  himself  by  the  erection  of  two  forts,  one, 
called  Fort  Henry,  was  situated  on  the  right  bank  of 
the   Tennessee,  in    the   State  of  Kentucky,  while   the 


FORT  HENRY. 


51 


other,  Fort  Donelson,  was  planted  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Cumberland,  15  miles  to  the  south-east  of  the 
other,  and  within  the  borders  of  Tennessee.  The 
defences  of  Fort  Henry  were  formidable,  and  the  posi- 
tion was  strengthened  by  the  creeks  and  swamps 
among  which  the  works  had  been  constructed.  Never- 
theless, Grant  determined  to  attack  the  fortifications,  in 
combination  with  the  fleet  under  Commodore  Foote. 
The  expedition  embarked  at  Cairo,  on  February  1,  and 
the  troops  were  landed  about  five  miles  below  Fort 
Henry  on  the  5th.  The  fort  was  to  be  assaulted  on  the 
land  side  by  the  soldiers,  and  from  the  river  by  the  fleet. 
All  being  prepared,  the  march  of  the  land  forces  began 
on  the  morning  of  the  6th.  The  first  division,  under 
General  McClernand,  proceeded  along  the  right  bank 
of  the  river,  with  orders  to  take  up  a  position  on  the 
road  from  Fort  Henry  to  Fort  Donelson.  Two  brigades 
of  the  second  division  under  General  Smith  proceeded 
at  the  same  hour  along  the  left  bank,  so  as  to  occupy 
the  heights  commanding  Fort  Henry  ;  and  to  the  third 
brigade  of  the  second  division  was  assigned  the  duty  of 
moving  directly  against  the  fort,  and  assaulting  the 
works  when  the  proper  moment  should  have  arrived. 
Unfortunately  the  roads  were  heavy  with  mud,  owing  to 
a  great  fall  of  rain  a  few  days  previously,  so  that  the 
army  was  not  in  a  position  to  co-operate  with  the  fleet 
when  the  latter  opened  fire.  The  first  naval  line  was 
composed  of  four  gunboats,  partially  protected  with  iron 
armor,  but  hastily  adapted  to  their  present  purpose  out 
of  river-steamers  or  ferry-boats ;  the  second  line  con- 
sisted of  three  wooden  vessels.  A  vigorous  cannonade 
was  interchanged  between  the  ships  and  the  fort,  and 
the  gunboats,  getting  nearer  in  shore,  directed  an  effec- 
tive fire  against  the  works ;  but,  before  the  action  had 
lasted  quite  an  hour,  an  unlucky  casualty  occurred  in 
the  fleet.     A  shot  struck  the  gunboat  Essex,  entering 


52 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


the  starboard  boiler  and  filling  the  boat  with  steam. 
Many  of  the  crew  were  badly  scalded,  and  the  Essex, 
unable  to  do  anything  more,  was  forced  to  drop  astern. 
The  other  gunboats,  however,  continued  to  advance  ; 
and  when  they  had  got  within  600  yards  of  the  fort,  the 
Confederate  flag  was  lowered,  and  signal  was  made  that 
General  Tilghman,  the  commandant  of  Fort  Henry,  was 
prepared  to  surrender.  On  his  asking  what  terms  would 
be  accorded  him,  the  commodore  formulated  the  terms 
in  two  words,  "  Unconditional  surrender."  The  action 
had  lasted  an  hour  and  a  quarter,  and  the  Union  success 
was  due  entirely  to  the  naval  force,  as,  owing  to  the 
obstructions  to  which  allusion  has  been  made,  the  land 
forces  were  unable  to  reach  the  positions  to  which  they 
had  been  assigned.  The  defenders  of  the  fort  were 
made  prisoners  of  war ;  but  the  derangement  of  the 
Union  plans  enabled  the  main  body  of  the  Confeder- 
ates to  escape  behind  the  bulwarks  of  Fort  Donelson. 
Grant's  cavalry  pursued  for  some  distance,  and  a  por- 
tion of  the  field-artillery  was  abandoned ;  yet  the  men 
got  safely  to  their  place  of  refuge.  By  possessing 
Fort  Henry,  the  Union  forces  were  able  to  take  up  a 
position  in  the  rear  of  Columbus,  on  the  Mississippi, 
and  within  ten  miles  of  a  bridge  crossing  the  railway 
which  connects  that  town  with  Bowling  Green.  The 
Tennessee  River  was  now  open  to  the  Union  gunboats, 
and  the  three  wooden  vessels  were  sent  up  the  channel, 
with  orders  to  destroy  the  railway  bridge,  and  to  cap- 
ture or  sink  such  of  the  enemy's  vessels  as  they  might 
encounter.  These  directions  were  completely  carried 
out.  Lieutenant  Phelps,  who  commanded,  penetrated 
as  far  as  Florence,  in  Alabama,  and  succeeded  in  cap- 
turing three  steamers  and  an  unfinished  gunboat.  Six 
other  river-steamers  were  burned  by  the  Confederates 
themselves,  to  save  them  from  the  adversary,  and 
scarcely  any  opposition  was  offered  to  the  lieutenant. 


FORT  DO  NELSON. 


53 


who  possessed  himself  of  a  large  amount  of  camp 
equipage  and  other  stores,  with  which  he  returned  to 
Fort  Henry  on  February  IO. 

Fort  Donelson  (February  19,  1862). — The  success 
of  the  Union  forces  in  reducing  that  work  en- 
couraged Grant  to  prosecute  operations  against  Fort 
Donelson.  On  February  12,  he  set  out  with  the  divi- 
sions of  McClernand  and  Smith,  consisting  of  15,000 
men.  Six  regiments  were  at  the  same  time  detached, 
with  orders  to  proceed  by  water,  and  under  convoy  of 
a  gunboat,  to  the  Cumberland  River.  Preparations  for 
the  investment  of  Fort  Donelson  were  at  once  begun, 
and  the  operations  were  conducted  with  so  much  vigor 
as  to  promise  a  speedy  success.  The  garrison  was 
strong  in  numbers  ;  but  the  troops  who  had  fled  from 
Fort  Henry  were  in  a  mood  of  depression  which  augured 
ill  for  their  steadiness.  The  works  in  themselves  were 
not  contemptible.  Heavy  batteries  commanded  the 
river,  while,  on  the  land  side,  rifle-pits  and  entrench- 
ments offered  resistance  to  the  Union  advance.  The 
entrenchments,  however,  formed  the  weakest  part  of 
the  defences,  for  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  they  were 
still  unfinished.  The  hilly  nature  of  the  country, 
covered  with  dense  oak  woods,  and  intersected  by  a 
broad,  deep  valley,  which  almost  divided  the  Confederate 
position  into  two  distinct  parts,  presented  opportunities 
of  which  both  sides  could  equally  avail  themselves. 
The  army  within  the  fort,  and  in  the  external  works 
connected  with  it,  was  augmented,  on  the  13th,  by  the 
troops  under  General  Floyd,  who  had  marched  from 
the  city  of  Cumberland.  The  Confederate  force  now 
amounted  to  about  14,000  men,  who  were  under  the 
general  direction  of  Floyd,  as  the  senior  officer.  The 
right  wing  was  commanded  by  General  Buckner,  and 
the  left  by  General  Pillow.  Among  the  three  com- 
manders, and   in   the   several  divisions    of  the  army, 


54 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


there  was  but  little  unity  of  feeling  or  design,  and  a 
disaster  was  insured  by  the  inefficient  character  of  the 
troops,  and  the  ignorant  blundering  of  the  officers.  At 
three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  Commodore 
Foote  began  the  attack  with  four  ironclad  gunboats 
and  two  wooden  vessels.  These  advanced  in  a  crescent 
shape,  and  opened  fire  at  a  distance  of  a  mile  from  the 
batteries.  The  Confederates,  however,  did  not  reply 
until  the  boats  had  got  within  a  distance  of  400  yards. 
A  hot  encounter  then  ensued,  and  continued  for  nearly 
five  hours,  when  the  ironclad  gunboats  were  so  much 
injured  as  to  be  obliged  to  withdraw,  with  a  loss  of  54 
men.  Foote  hereupon  retired  to  Cairo,  determining  to 
wait  until  a  competent  force  should  be  brought  up  from 
that  place  to  attack  the  fort.  The  land  forces  under 
Grant  had  previously  taken  their  positions  in  front  of 
the  works,  and  the  whole  of  the  Confederate  left,  with 
the  exception  of  a  strip  of  swampy  ground  near  the 
river,  was  by  this  time  invested.  Some  skirmishing 
had  occurred,  but  to  no  very  serious  extent,  and  the 
Union  troops  were  now  suffering  rather  from  the 
severity  of  the  cold  than  from  the  guns  of  their  enemies. 
The  weather  had  for  some  time  been  unusually  warm 
for  the  season ;  and  the  troops  had  recklessly  thrown 
away  their  coats  and  blankets.  When  a  change  came, 
and  they  were  surprised  by  frost  and  snow,  an  im- 
mense amount  of  suffering,  which  might  have  been 
avoided,  was  experienced  by  the  troops  in  the  open 
field. 

The  Confederates  were  not  much  better  off,  and  their 
position  in  all  respects  was  so  critical  that,  at  a  council 
of  war  held  on  the  night  of  the  14th,  it  was  re- 
solved to  reopen,  if  possible,  the  communication  with 
Nashville  by  Charlotte,  and  to  save  the  greater  por- 
tion of  the  army  by  abandoning  the  position  at  Fort 
Donelson.     The  plan  proposed  was  to  attack  the  Union 


FORT  DO  NELSON. 


55 


right  next  day,  in  order  that  while  the  action  was  pro- 
ceeding the  rest  of  the  army  should  cut  their  way 
out  by  the  most  available  of  two  roads  leading  to  Nash- 
ville.    The  operations  of  the  15th  were  embarrassed  by 


COMMODORE  A.    H.   FOOTE. 

delays  consequent  on  the  icy  condition  of  the  roads, 
and  a  want  of  sufficient  preparation  on  the.  part  of  the 
men.  Nevertheless,  an  animated  encounter  was  pro- 
ceeding by  nine  A.  m.,  when  General  Pillow  attacked  the 
Union  troops  in  front,  and  General  Buckner,  who  was 


56 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


to  conduct  the  rear-guard  of  the  retreating  army,  opened 
fire  on  their  left  with  artillery.  The  Union  troops  soon 
found  their  ammunition  exhausted,  and  gave  way  with 
some  precipitation.  Pillow  now  pushed  forward  with 
rapidity  and  vigor,  supported  by  Buckner  on  his  right, 
and  by  the  cavalry  under  Colonel  Forrest.  For  a 
moment,  the  Confederates  seemed  to  be  prevailing,  but 
their  enthusiasm  was  short-lived,  and  their  commanders 
were  totally  inadequate  to  the  demands  of  the  situation. 
Pillow  and  Buckner  misunderstood  one  another;  Gen- 
eral Floyd  appears  to  have  done  nothing;  the  inferior 
officers  were  left  without  instructions;  confusion  speed- 
ily supervened,  and  Buckner,  who  had  full  possession 
of  the  road  by  which  he  proposed  to  escape,  was  per- 
plexed and  bewildered  as  to  the  proceedings  of  his  col- 
leagues. In  the  course  of  the  day,  he  received  a  mes- 
sage from  Pillow,  bidding  him  return  to  his  entrench- 
ment, arid  while  in  full  retreat  was  met  by  Floyd,  who 
expressed  surprise  at  what  he  was  doing,  but  afterwards 
confirmed  the  directions  of  Pillow.  Buckner  accord- 
ingly struggled  back  to  the  Confederate  lines ;  but  be- 
fore the  whole  of  his  force  could  get  within  them, 
Smith's  division  attacked  his  right,  and  in  a  little  while 
burst  into  the  entrenchments.  After  two  hours'  fight- 
ing, the  Confederates  were  completely  defeated,  and 
Smith's  division  retained  possession  of  the  works 
Grant  had  lost  upwards  of  IOOO  men,  of  whom  nearly 
300  had  been  captured  by  the  Confederates,  placed  on 
board  steamers,  and  sent  up  the  river ;  but  he  had 
achieved  a  great  success,  and  the  Southerners  were  now 
in  so  serious  a  position  that  it  was  a  question  whether 
they  would  not  be  entirely  overwhelmed.  The  attempt  to 
break  through  the  lines  had  been  an  utter  failure.  Com- 
munication with  Nashville  was  cut  off.  The  troops 
were  suffering  much  from  the  inclemency  of  the 
weather;    and  they  had  now  on  their  hands    a    large 


58 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


number  of  wounded,  for  whose  necessity  no  adequate 
provision  could  be  made.  Another  council  of  war 
was  held  on  the  night  of  the  15th,  when  several  of  the 
officers  met  at  the  headquarters  of  General  Floyd,  in 
the  little  town  of  Dover.  Floyd  having  requested  the 
views  of  Buckner  and  Pillow  as  to  what  should  be  done 
under  existing  circumstances,  Buckner  spoke  very  em- 
phatically to  the  effect  that  another  sortie  would  result 
in  nothing  but  a  massacre;  and  it  was  understood  that 
Pillow  was  of  the  same  opinion.  After  some  further 
discussion,  from  which  it  appeared  that  General  Sidney 
Johnston  had  effected  his  removal  from  Bowling  Green 
to  Nashville,  and  that  consequently  there  was  no  longer 
any  necessity  for  covering  his  operations,  it  was  agreed 
that  negotiations  should  be  opened  for  the  surrender  of 
the  army,  together  with  the  fort. 

Floyd,  speaking  on  personal  grounds,  observed  that 
he  "  would  rather  die  than  surrender."  *  Hereupon 
Pillow  remarked  that  there  were  no  two  persons 
in  the  world  whom  the  Unionists  would  be  better 
pleased  to  capture  than  himself  and  Floyd ;  and  he 
proposed  that  they  should  endeavor  to  escape.  Buck- 
ner undertaking  to  remain  and  conduct  the  negotia- 
tions, it  was  resolved  that  that  officer  should  assume 
the  chief  command.  As  daylight  was  by  this  time  near 
at  hand,  and  the  Union  attack  would  certainly  recom- 
mence in  a  little  while,  Buckner  drew  up  his  missive  to 
Giant  and  sent  it  off.  Arrangements,  however,  were  at 
the  same  time  made  for  the  escape  of  Floyd  and  Pillow 
and  Colonel  Forrest,  with  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
army.  In  the  early  dawn,  these  got  away  from  their 
perilous  position — the  infantry  in  boats,  and  the  cavalry 
on  the  lower  road  to  Nashville.     The  letter  from  Buck- 

*  Floyd  was  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  dismantled  all 
the  Northern  arsenals  before  the  "  unpleasantness.'  It  would  probably 
have  gone  hard  with  him  if  he  had  been  captured. 


FORT  DO  NELSON.  59 

ner  to  Grant  proposed  an  armistice  until  twelve  o'clock 
that  day  (the  16th),  in  order  to  arrange  terms  of  capitu- 
lation. Grant  replied  by  insisting  on  "  unconditional 
and  immediate  surrender,"  and  added  that  "  he  proposed 
to  move  at  once  upon  the  Confederate  works."  In  re- 
sponding to  this  communication,  Buckner  observed  that 
the  existing  distribution  of  his  forces  (incident  to  an  un- 
expected change  of  commanders),  and  the  overwhelm- 
ing strength  of  his  opponent,  compelled  him,  notwith- 
standing the  brilliant  success  of  the  Confederate  arms, 
to  accept  the  "  ungenerous  and  unchivalrous  terms  " 
which  were  proposed.  The  capitulation  was  then 
effected.  Nine  thousand  men  laid  down  their  arms,  and 
the  stars  and  stripes  floated  over  the  stronghold  of  the 
Cumberland.  Fort  Donelson  was  now  occupied  by  the 
Union  troops,  and  the  river  by  the  gunboats.  The 
Confederates  had  lost,  during  the  four  days'  fighting, 
nearly  1200  men,  and  the  blow  thus  inflicted  on  their 
cause  in  that  part  of  the  country  was  of  the  most  dis- 
heartening nature.  On  the  same  day,  Bowling  Green, 
from  which  Sidney  Johnston  had  just  withdrawn,  was 
occupied  by  the  Union  officer,  General  Mitchell,  at  the 
head  of  a  division  from  Buell's  army. 

Floyd  was  at  once  deprived  of  his  command.  Pillow 
was  not  again  employed  ;  but  Buckner,  who  had  cer- 
tainly acted  in  a  creditable  spirit  of  self-abnegation,  was 
once  more  placed  at  the  head  of  a  Confederate  army,  as 
soon  as  he  had  been  exchanged.  The  position  of  the 
Confederates  was  at  this  time  far  from  hopeful.  The 
Union  gunboats  having  advanced  up  the  Columbia 
River  to  Clarksville,  General  Johnston  considered  it  ad- 
visable to  abandon  Nashville,  and  take  up  a  position 
farther  south.  The  people  of  Nashville  were  wild  with 
rage  and  apprehension  at  Johnston's  departure.  Many 
of  them  took  flight  by  any  conveyance  they  could  ob- 
tain, and    crowded  the  roads  leading  southward  with 


6o       THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

disorderly  mobs.  Two  unfinished  steamers  on  the 
wharf  were  burned  ;  and  nothing  but  rapacity,  fear,  and 
outrage  prevailed  for  some  days.  Order  was  not  re- 
stored until  the  arrival  of  the  first  brigade  of  the  Union 
army  on  February  25.  The  mayor  then  surrendered 
the  place  into  the  hands  of  General  Buell,  who  took 
measures  to  calm  the  popular  excitement  and  re-estab- 
lish the  forms  of  government. 

In  the  meanwhile  Johnston  pursued  the  line  of  his 
retreat  without  being  followed,  and  took  up  a  posi- 
tionin  the  vicinity  of  Murfreesboro'.  The  whole  of 
Northern  Tennessee,  with  the  entire  line  of  the  Cum- 
berland River,  was  now  abandoned  by  the  Confeder- 
ates. Columbus,  on  the  Mississippi,  was  evacuated  by 
General  Polk,  who  removed  his  army,  guns,  and  stores 
to  a  line  of  defence  situated  forty  miles  to  the  south,  near 
the  small  town  of  New  Madrid,  on  the  western  bank  of 
the  great  river.  On  March  3,  the  day  following  the  de- 
parture of  the  Confederates — the  Union  cavalry  from 
Paducah,  followed  by  the  gunboats  under  Foote,  arrived 
at  Columbus  and  took  possession  of  it.  General  Beau- 
regard was  now  established  at  Jackson,  Tennessee.  His 
army  formed  the  center  of  the  Confederate  line  of  de- 
fence for  the  Western  States.  Polk  was  to  the  left,  at 
New  Madrid,  and  Johnston  to  the  right,  at  Murfrees- 
boro'. The  Confederates  had  been  compelled,  by  the 
recent  course  of  events,  to  make  a  great  retrogression 
towards  the  south,  to  give  up  the  whole  of  Kentucky, 
and  to  leave  the  northern  part  of  Tennessee  open  to 
attack.  They  had  lost  the  command  of  important 
rivers  and  railway  communications  ;  had  beheld  their 
ranks  thinned  by  fatigue  and  want,  as  well  as  by  the 
operations  of  war;  and  were  now  dispirited,  not  merely 
by  the  calamities  which  had  occurred,  but  by  the  pros- 
pect of  others  which  seemed  imminent.  The  Union  re- 
verses in   the  East  had  been  amply   comDensated   by 


ISLAND  NO.   10.  6 1 

their  successes  in  the  West,  and  the  development  of 
events  placed  the  fortunes  of  Washington  far  above 
those  of  Richmond. 

Generals  Grant  and  Buell  continued  their  advance, 
and  prepared  for  fresh  attacks  upon  the  Confederate 
armies.  The  line  of  defence  taken  up  by  the  Southern- 
ers, after  their  retrogressive  movement,  was  one  of  ex- 
treme length,  extending  from  New  Madrid,  in  Missouri, 
and  Island  No.  IO,  on  the  Mississippi,  in  the  north- 
western part  of  the  State  named  after  that  river,  to 
Murfreesboro'  and  Cumberland  Gap,  in  the  north- 
east, with  the  center  at  Jackson,  to  the  south  of  both 
extremities.  The  left,  at  Island  No.  IO,  was  supported 
by  an  outpost  at  New  Madrid;  and  the  defence  of  the 
island  depended  to  a  great  extent  on  the  possession  by 
the  Confederates  of  that  small  town.  General  Pope, 
therefore,  led  an  expedition  against  the  latter  place, 
while  Commodore  Foote,  with  his  gunboats,  made  a 
demonstration  in  front  of  the  insular  position.  These 
proceedings  began  on  February  28;  batteries  were  after- 
wards erected,  which  were  used  principally  against  the 
gunboats  and  shipping  in  the  river;  and  on  the  night 
of  March  13,  in  the  midst  of  a  violent  storm  of  rain, 
thunder,  and  lightning,  the  Confederate  garrison  of 
New  Madrid  retired  to  Island  No.  10,  and  to  the  works 
on  the  left  or  eastern  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  within 
the  State  of  Kentucky.  The  town  was  at  once  occu- 
pied by  the  Union  forces,  who  came  into  possession  of 
large  quantities  of  stores,  and  were  enabled  to  cut  off 
the  island  from  any  communication  by  the  Lower 
Mississippi. 

Encouraged  by  their  success,  the  Union  forces  next 
brought  their  batteries  to  bear  against  the  main  body 
of  the  Confederate  left,  stationed  on  Island  No.  IO. 
But  these  operations,  though  prosecuted  with  vigor, 
were   unproductive  of  any  decided  effect,  and  it  was 


62  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 

then  determined  by  Pope  and  Foote  to  resort  to  other 
measures.  They  resolved  to  cross  to  the  opposite 
shore,  and  seize  the  batteries  which  commanded  the 
channel  from  that  side.  To  do  this  it  was  first  neces- 
sary to  cut  a  canal  across  the  narrow  neck  of  land  sep- 
arating New  Madrid  from  the  upper  attacking  force,  so 
as  to  enable  the  gunboats  to  get  a  greater  command 
over  the  insular  defences  than  the  winding  course  of 
the  Mississippi  would  allow,  and  to  give  increased  fa- 
cility to  the  transports  engaged  in  carrying  troops  from 
New  Madrid  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  river.  The 
length  of  this  canal  would  be  twelve  miles,  and  its  exe- 
cution would  necessarily  be  a  work  of  prodigious  labor, 
seeing  that,  if  done  at  all,  it  would  be  indispensable 
to  finish  it  with  the  utmost  rapidity.  The  work  was 
undertaken,  and  successfully  carried  out.  Half  of  the 
distance  was  through  a  swampy  forest,  where  the  trees 
had  to  be  cut  off  four  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  water ; 
the  rest  of  the  way  was  less  difficult,  but  still  such  as  to 
require  a  great  expenditure  of  toil.  By  the  first  week 
in  April,  the  canal  was  fully  made,  and  the  work  had 
not  at  any  time  been  interrupted  by  the  Confederates, 
their  attention  having  been  fully  engaged  by  the  heavy 
fire  of  the  Union  gunboats  and  mortar-batteries,  and  by 
a  few  naval  actions  which  succeeded  in  keeping  the  be- 
sieged in  continual  alarm.  On  the  night  of  April  6, 
four  steamers  and  a  large  number  of  transports  were 
brought  through  the  canal,  of  the  very  existence  of 
which,  beneath  the  shadow  of  its  luxuriant  trees,  the 
Southerners  were  ignorant.  A  division,  commanded  by 
General  Payne,  was  sent  across  the  river  in  the  trans- 
ports, and  the  men,  landing  without  opposition  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  drove  back  the  defenders 
of  the  batteries,  who  seem  to  have  been  completely 
taken  by  surprise.  The  defences  on  Island  No.  10  were 
at  once  abandoned,  and  the  position  was  surrendered 


SHILOH. 


63 


to  Commodore  Foote,  together  with  a  large  amount  of 
warlike  material.  Extraordinary  want  of  spirit  and 
resolution  was  shown  by  the  Confederates  throughout 
the  whole  proceedings.  It  was  important  to  their  po- 
sition in  the  West  that  they  should  retain  New  Madrid, 
the  island,  and  the  batteries  on  the  Kentucky  shore; 
but  these  were  abandoned  almost  without  a  blow. 


BUILDING    A   CANAL. 


Shiloh  (April  6,  7,  1862). — After  the  capture  of  Nash- 
ville, Grant  proceeded  with  his  forces  down  the  Ten- 
nessee River  to  Pittsburg  Landing.  Buell  prepared  to 
march  on  foot  to  the  same  locality ;  and  the  Union 
army,  being  thus  divided,  was  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  its  enemy.  The  Confederates  could  now  reckon  on 
the  services  of  two  armies,  both  numerically  strong, 


64 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


and  commanded  by  officers  of  ability.  At  the  head  of 
one  was  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  ;  Beauregard  was  at 
the  head  of  the  other.  To  strike  a  concentrated  blow 
at  Grant,  Johnston  united  his  whole  force  with  that  of 
Beauregard  on  April  I,  and  on  the  3d  the  army  began 
its  march  towards  Pittsburg  Landing.  Altogether,  the 
commanders  had  under  their  control  rather  more  than 
40,000  men,  divided  into  three  corps  and  a  reserve;  but 
the  regiments  were  defective  both  in  organization  and 
discipline.  The  march  was  very  slow,  partly  owing  to 
the  inexperience  of  the  men,  partly  on  account  of  the 
thickly  wooded  country.  The  neighborhood  of  Grant's 
position  was  not  reached  until  the  afternoon  of  the  5th, 
and  the  attack  was  deferred  until  the  next  day.  Grant, 
with  singular  want  of  prudence,  had  omitted  to  throw 
up  any  defences,  and  his  divisions  were  scattered  about 
the  ground  without  any  concentration  or  method.  Sep- 
arated by  numerous  creeks,  and  covered  with  woods, 
the  ground  offered  several  facilities  for  a  sudden  attack, 
and  made  the  difficulty  of  an  improvised  defence  all  the 
greater;  though,  with  a  little  care  beforehand,  such  a 
position  should  have  been  very  awkward  to  assault. 
At  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  Confeder- 
ates advanced  in  four  lines,  and  the  Union  pickets  were 
driven  in  so  rapidly  that  their  respective  divisions  had 
no  time  to  get  under  arms.  The  division  of  General 
William  T.  Sherman  was  among  the  first  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  the  attack,  and  nothing  was  in  readiness  for 
such  a  catastrophe.  Many  of  the  officers  were  in  bed ; 
of  the  men,  some  were  preparing  their  breakfast,  while 
others  were  cleaning  their  rifles. 

The  astonishment  and  dismay  of  the  Union  troops 
were  for  a  time  overwhelming.  A  portion  of  General 
Prentiss's  division  struggled  into  order,  but  was  speedily 
driven  back  by  the  terrific  fire  which  came  blazing  out 
of  the  woods.     Prentiss  himself  was  soon  taken  pris- 


66  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

oner,  together  with  three  of  his  regiments ;  but  in  a 
little  while  some  of  Sherman's  brigades  got  into  line, 
and  offered  a  brief  resistance  to  the  advancing  foe. 
Nevertheless,  the  Confederates  continued  to  gain 
ground,  and,  pursuing  the  forces  of  Prentiss  and  Sher- 
man, now  in  full  retreat,  passed  through  their  deserted 
camps,  and  captured  the  greater  part  of  their  field-ar- 
tillery. Presently,  they  came  in  sight  of  General 
McClernand's  division,  posted  upon  some  rising  ground. 
These  troops  for  a  time  made  a  stand,  and,  though 
some  among  them  gave  way  at  the  first  onset,  the 
others  were  sufficiently  steady  to  check  the  Confederate 
advance,  and  to  induce  General  Braxton  Bragg,  who 
commanded  one  of  the  supporting  bodies,  to  bring  his 
troops  into  action.  In  conjunction  with  a  few  of  the 
other  brigades,  he  attacked  the  Union  troops  with  much 
animation,  driving  them  back  from  their  positions,  and 
creating  the  utmost  confusion  among  the  opposing 
lines.  When  the  Confederate  left  had  been  reinforced 
by  General  Polk's  corps,  McClernand's  division,  which 
formed  the  second  Union  line,  was  completely  routed, 
and  very  little  chance  of  retrieving  the  day  reiiained  to 
them.  Two  divisions  of  Grant's  army,  however, 
still  retained  their  positions ;  and  these,  being 
well  planted  and  amply  provided  with  artillery,  with- 
stood the  Confederate  assaults  from  half-past  ten  in  the 
morning  till  four  in  the  afternoon.  The  attack  was  led 
by  Bragg  in  person,  and  was  again  and  again  renewed, 
but  with  no  other  effect  than  to  strew  the  field  with 
dead  and  wounded,  mowed  down  by  the  continual  fire, 
both  of  rifles  and  artillery,  which  the  Union  troops 
kept  up  from  out  the  woods  where  many  of  their  num- 
ber were  posted.  Towards  the  end  of  the  engagement, 
General  Johnston,  while  superintending  the  right  of  the 
line,  was  struck  in  the  leg  by  a  rifle  bullet;  but  he  re- 
fused to  dismount,  and  continued  to  give  his  directions 


SHILOH.  67 

until  a  feeling  of  extreme  weakness  showed  that  an 
artery  had  been  cut,  and  that  death  was  close  at  hand. 
The  centre  of  the  Confederate  line  was  still  held  in 
check  by  the  two  Union  divisions  commanded  by  Gen- 
erals Hurlbut  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace ;  yet  victory,  on 
the  whole,  lay  with  the  attacking  force.  It  seemed  as 
if  with  one  more  effort  the  Union  troops  would  be  com- 
pletely crushed ;  but  that  effort  was  not  made.  The 
Confederate  troops  were  exhausted,  and  it  is  admitted 
by  Beauregard  that  the  men  were  engaged  towards 
evening  in  plundering  the  deserted  camps,  and  loading 
themselves  with  spoil.  Beauregard  had  succeeded  to 
the  chief  command  on  the  death  of  Johnston;  and,  feel- 
ing doubtful  whether  his  army  was  in  a  condition  to  do 
more  that  day,  he  ordered  the  several  divisions  to  re- 
tire. The  number  of  the  Union  troops  was  about  the 
same  as  that  of  the  Confederates,  and  with  the  natural 
advantages  of  their  position  they  should  have  done 
better.  But  want  of  generalship  had  been  conspicuous, 
and  the  day  was  lost  for  lack  of  reasonable  foresight. 

On  the  night  of  April  6,  the  disordered  masses  of  the 
Union  army  were  scattered  about  the  immediate  vicin- 
ity of  Pittsburg  Landing,  under  shelter  of  the  ironclad 
gunboats  drawn  up  in  the  Tennessee  River.  The  Con- 
federates held  the  greater  portion  of  the  battle-field. 
They  had  taken  all  the  enemy's  encampments  but  one, 
together  with  nearly  all  his  field-artillery,  about  thirty 
flags,  colors  and  standards,  more  than  3000  prisoners, 
several  thousands  of  small  arms,  an  immense  supply  of 
subsistence,  forage,  and  munitions  of  war,  and  a  large 
amount  of  means  of  transportation.  The  struggle,  how- 
ever, was  not  yet  concluded.  The  next  morning,  the 
Union  troops  were  again  seen  ranged  in  order  of  battle. 
Buell  had  arrived  during  the  previous  day  on  board  a 
steamer  and  had  at  once  proceeded  to  Grant's  head- 
quarters.    Some  of  hi-s  troops  had  even  reached   the 


68  THE  BATTLES  EOR    THE    UNION. 

ground  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  final  stand  made  by 
the  Union  forces  on  the  evening  of  the  6th.  Others 
crossed  the  river  during  the  night,  and  four  divisions 
marched  into  camp  early  on  the  morning  of  the  7th. 
The  Union  forces  were  thus  reinforced  to  the  extent  of 
about  20,000  men,  several  of  whom  might  be  described 
as  veterans.  Fighting  was  resumed  at  five  a.  m.,  when 
the  fresh  troops,  having  placed  themselves  in  front  of 
their  disorganized  comrades,  advanced  to  the  attack. 
Buell  was  the  officer  in  command  and  he  made  his  dis- 
positions with  great  ability.  Grant's  forces  were  so 
completely  dispirited  by  the  combat  of  the  previous  day 
that  they  were  not  able  to  render  effective  assistance, 
and  on  neither  occasion  does  Grant  himself  appear  to 
have  done  much  in  the  way  of  personal  supervision. 
General  Nelson  was  sent  forward  with  the  regiments 
under  his  direction,  and  the  contest  was  general  by  seven 
o'clock.  The  battle  was  maintained  for  some  hours 
with  considerable  spirit,  but  the  Confederates  aimed  at 
nothing  more  than  holding  their  opponents  at  bay  while 
they  effected  their  own  retreat.  The  Union  forces  con- 
tinued to  recover  the  positions  they  had  lost  on  the  6th, 
and  to  repossess  themselves  of  the  guns  and  colors  cap- 
tured by  the  Confederates.  When  the  main  body  of  the 
Southern  forces  had  got  safely  away,  the  front  line, 
which  had  been  keeping  the  Union  forces  in  check,  also 
quitted  the  ground,  and  rejoined  their  comrades,  who 
had  retreated  to  Corinth.  Several  rallies  had  occurred 
during  the  day,  and  there  had  been  moments  when  the 
Confederates  seemed  as  if  they  were  about  to  achieve 
another  victory ;  but  they  were,  in  truth,  quite  unfitted 
to  meet  the  fresh  and  unwearied  troops  which  Buell  had 
brought  into  the  field,  and,  notwithstanding  a  few  tem- 
porary gains  at  various  points,  they  were  compelled, 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  to  leave  the  ground 
in  entire  possession  of  the  enemy  whom  they  had  van- 


7o 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


quished  not  many  hours  before.  No  regular  pursuit 
was  attempted  until  the  8th,  and  even  then  but  little 
was  done.  The  Union  loss  on  the  two  days  had  been 
1735  killed,  7882  wounded,  and  4044  missing.  The 
Confederates  lost  1728  killed,  8012  wounded,  and  959 
missing.  The  battle  has  been  variously  called  by  the 
names  of  Shiloh  and  of  Pittsburg  Landing.  It  was  one 
of  the  most  hard-fought  encounters  that  had  yet  taken 
place. 

Success  crowned  the  Union  arms,  at  this  period,  in 
other  regions  besides  the  West.  At  the  beginning  of 
1862,  it  had  been  observed  to  be  a  part  of  the  Confed- 
erate design  to  shut  up  the  Union  troops  in  Port  Royal 
Island,  South  Carolina,  by  placing  obstructions  in  the 
neighboring  rivers,  by  erecting  batteries  in  the  vicinity, 
and  by  massing  troops  so  as  to  be  able  to  throw  a 
large  force  on  the  most  vulnerable  points  whenever  it 
should  be  considered  advisable  to  do  so.  These  plans 
it  was  determined  to  frustrate.  The  river  approaches 
to  the  city  of  Savannah  are  defended  by  Fort  Pulaski, 
a  casemated  work  situated  at  the  mouth  of  the  river 
Savannah,  and  by  Fort  Jackson,  a  barbette-work  on  the 
mainland,  only  four  miles  below  the  city.  The  left  or 
northern  bank  of  the  river  is  formed  by  a  succession  of 
islands,  which,  dividing  the  stream  into  a  number  of 
creeks  and  bays,  render  navigation  difficult.  On  one 
of  these  islands  stands  Fort  Pulaski,  distant  about 
eighteen  miles  from  the  city  of  Savannah.  At  the 
period  in  question,  it  was  armed  with  47  guns,  and  gar- 
risoned by  a  force  of  300  men,  under  Colonel  Olmstead. 
Before  the  invention  of  rifled  cannon,  it  had  unquestion- 
ably been  a  place  of  great  strength  ;  but  the  changed 
conditions  of  warfare  had  left  it  comparatively  weak. 
For  the  reduction  of  this  position,  four  regiments  from 
the  Eastern  States,  and  some  companies  of  engineers, 
were  detached    from    the  Union    Army  of  the  South. 


FOR  T  PULASKI. 


71 


Batteries  were  placed  on  Tybee  Island,  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Savannah  River  was  occupied  by  a  force 
sufficient  to  intercept  communication  with  the  city,  and 
to  prevent  the  Confederate  gunboats  from  carrying  suc- 
cor to  the  fort.  The  batteries  were  not  completed  until 
April  9,  owing  to  the  great  labor  involved  in  convey- 
ing the  guns  to  their  insular  position,  and  there  erect- 
ing them.  When  the  works  were  completed,  however, 
36  pieces  of  artillery  were  ready  to  open  fire  on  the 
fort.  During  the  time  that  these  guns  were  being 
placed  in  position,  the  garrison  made  not  the  slightest 
attempt  to  interrupt  the  work.  The  bombardment 
commenced  on  April  10,  and  a  hot  artillery-duel  con- 
tinued during  that  day  and  the  next.  So  large  a  breach 
had  been  effected  in  the  walls  by  noon  on  the  1  ith,  that 
preparations  were  made  for  storming  the  fort ;  but  about 
two  hours  afterwards,  before  active  operations  could  be 
commenced,  the  commander  surrendered.  By  the  de- 
struction of  the  wall  on  the  south-eastern  face  of  the 
fortress,  the  magazine  had  become  exposed  to  the  fire 
of  the  batteries,  so  that  further  defence  was  impossible, 
and  the  only  choice  lay  between  immediate  submission 
and  instant  death  in  the  ruins  of  the  structure.  Great 
vexation  was  experienced  in  the  South  at  the  fall  of 
Fort  Pulaski.  The  capture  of  Savannah  did  not  follow 
the  exploit,  as  was  expected,  and  the  interior  parts  of 
Georgia  were  not  reduced.  The  defences  of  the  city 
were  increased,  and  a  sufficient  force  was  stationed  in 
the  neighborhood  to  repel  any  attack  that  might  be  de- 
signed, The  possession  of  Pulaski  prevented  any  fur- 
ther attempts  to  run  the  blockade  into  Savannah  by  the 
mouth  of  the  river ;  so  that  the  siege  was  not  entirely 
barren  of  results.  Other  expeditions  about  the  same 
period  were  directed  against  various  positions  on  the 
coast  of  Georgia,  and  these  were  attended  by  a  degree 
of  success  which  sufficiently  repaid  the  labor  expended 


72 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


in  conducting  them.  In  North  Carolina,  Fort  Macon 
was  taken  on  April  25,  by  a  force  sent  out  by  Burnside 
from  the  town  of  Newbern.  The  fort  was  defended 
with  great  determination,  but  it  was  at  length  com- 
pelled to  succumb  to  the  superior  fire  of  the  Union 
forces.  The  capture  of  this  fort  gave  Burnside  a  safe 
port  of  entry  for  the  vessels  employed  in  furnishing 
supplies  to  his  army  of  occupation.  The  Union  arms 
had  now  obtained  complete  command  over  the  coast  of 
North  Carolina;  but  the  loyal  sentiment  alleged  to  ex- 
ist among  the  people  was  found  to  be  entirely  absent. 

Burnside  was  not  wanting  in  activity.  About  the 
time  that  Fort  Macon  surrendered,  a  reconnoisance  was 
made  in  the  direction  of  Norfolk,  Virginia,  from  Eliza- 
beth City,  North  Carolina.  A  body  of  Confederate 
troops  was  encountered  at  a  distance  of  35  miles  from 
that  town,  and,  after  an  indecisive  action,  the  forces  of 
both  belligerents  drew  back.  Norfolk  thus  remained 
untouched ;  but  the  Confederates  were  doubtful  as  to  its 
safety,  and  its  evacuation  occurred  shortly  afterwards. 
These,  however,  were  small  results  in  comparison  with 
the  capture  of  New  Orleans,  which  took  place  during 
the  spring.  It  was  a  very  important  matter  to  secure 
this  city,  which  is  by  far  the  greatest  port  in  the  South- 
ern States  of  America.  The  people  of  Louisiana  gene- 
rally had  given  a  most  enthusiastic  support  to  the  Con- 
federacy, and,  both  from  diversity  of  descent  and  dis- 
tinction of  interests,  entertained  a  hearty  detestation  of 
the  North.  The  commerce  of  New  Orleans  was  ruined 
by  the  blockade,  and  nowhere  did  a  more  intense  feel- 
ing of  animosity  towards  the  Union  prevail  than  in  that 
fine  emporium  of  the  Mississippi  which  Jackson  had  so 
successfully  defended  against  the  British.  The  river- 
fleet  employed  against  the  blockading  squadron  had  re- 
cently been  increased;  but  two  additional  ironclads, 
commenced  some  time  before,  still  remained  unfinished 


74 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


at  the  beginning  of  April.  It  was  believed  by  the  citi- 
zens that  the  forts  near  the  mouth  of  the  river  would  be 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  passage  of  ships  ;  and  it  was 
thought  by  many  that  New  Orleans  was  imperilled 
rather  from  the  north,  by  a  fleet  which  might  possibly 
descend  the  stream,  than  from  the  south,  by  one  ap- 
proaching from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  the  latter  di- 
rection, the  city  was  protected  by  two  lines  of  defence. 
The  outer  line  consisted  of  Forts  Jackson  and  Philip, 
built  on  opposite  banks  of  the  river. 

New  Orleans  was  in  no  condition  for  repelling  an 
attack  when  the  Union  forces  determined  to  reduce  it. 
The  city  had  been  almost  denuded  of  troops,  to  aug- 
ment the  Confederate  army  in  Tennessee  under  Beaure- 
guard.  Forts  Jackson  and  Philip  (situated  about 
75  miles  below  New  Orleans,  and  25  from  the  mouth 
of  the  river),  were  garrisoned,  for  the  most  part,  with 
regular  troops,  many  of  whom  had  formerly  belonged 
to  the  United  States  Army ;  but  in  the  city  itself  only 
one  company  remained.  Three  thousand  volunteers 
for  ninety  days  were  raised  as  a  substitute  for  the  regi- 
ments that  had  been  withdrawn  ;  but  the  newcomers 
were  insufficiently  armed.  Still,  something  had  been 
done  to  meet  impending  dangers.  A  few  heavy  guns 
had  recently  been  sent  to  the  forts  from  Richmond,  at 
the  urgent  request  of  Brigadier-General  Lovell,  who 
had  the  principal  command  in  Louisiana.  A  boom  had 
been  thrown  .across  the  river  from  fort  to  fort,  and, 
when  carried  away  by  the  spring  floods,  had  been  suc- 
ceeded by  another  of  more  elaborate  construction. 
The  river  was  further  protected  by  a  fleet  of  seven 
steamers,  provided  with  iron  prows  to  act  as  rams,  and 
covered  with  cotton  bulkheads  so  as  to  ward  off  the 
action  of  shot ;  and  the  steam  ram  Manassas  was  sta- 
tioned a  short  distance  above  Fort  Jackson.  Yet  the 
defences    of  New   Orleans,  though  good  in  some  re- 


NEW  ORLEANS. 


75 


spects,  were  on  the  whole  insufficient  to  resist  the 
extraordinary  resources  of  the  Union  forces.  Louisiana 
was  so  distant  from  the  chief  seats  of  war  that  the 
inhabitants  do  not  seem  to  have  very  seriously  con- 
cerned themselves  about  their  safety.  It  was  only 
when  news  had  been  received  as  to  the  probability 
of  an  immediate  attack  that  any  extra  measures  were 
adopted. 

The  combined  naval  and  military  expedition  now 
sent  forth  had  been  in  preparation  for  some  months. 
The  fleet  was  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Fara- 
gut,  and  included  30  armed  steamers  and  21  mortar 
vessels,  the  direction  of  which  was  confided  to  Com- 
modore Porter.  General  Butler  was  at  the  head  of  the 
land  forces,  which  had  been  recruited  chiefly  from  the 
Eastern  States.  The  first  instalment  of  troops  arrived 
at  Ship  Island,  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  off  the  coast  of 
Mississippi,  on  December  3,  1861  ;  the  second  instal- 
ment reached  the  same  spot  in  January,  1862;  and  the 
squadron  under  Farragut  followed  shortly  after. 
While  the  united  forces  were  staying  at  Ship  Island,  a 
reconnoissance  was  undertaken  to  determine  the  best 
mode  of  approaching  New  Orleans.  It  was  determined 
to  proceed  by  way  of  the  river.  This  proved  to  be  a 
work  of  difficulty.  It  took  nearly  three  weeks  to  get 
all  the  ships  over  the  bar  at  the  south-west  entrance 
to  the  Mississippi,  and  Farragut  found  the  depth  con- 
siderably less  than  had  been  indicated  on  the  official 
maps — a  difference  which  had  been  accounted  for  by 
the  suggestion  that  the  channel  had  been  partly  filled 
up,  owing  to  the  absence  of  traffic  since  the  blockade. 
When  at  length  the  vessels  got  fairly  into  the  stream, 
some  of  the  gunboats  and  mortar-vessels  crept 
cautiously  up,  making  observations  as  they  went,  and 
concealing  their  presence  by  wreathing  their  masts, 
rigging  and  hulls  with  bushes,  reeds  and  willows,  which. 


76 


THE  BATTLES  TOR    THE    UNION. 


mingling  in  appearance  with  the  thick  woods  on  the 
left  side  of  the  advancing  squadron,  would  be  likely 
to  deceive  any  Confederate  observers  who  might  be  in 
the  neighborhood.  A  station  for  the  fleet  was  selected 
22  miles  below  the  forts,  and  the  gunboats  were  sent 
farther  up  the  river,  with  orders  to  oppose  any  of  the 
enemy's  vessels  which  might  be  visible,  and  to  shell  the 
woods,  so  as  to  clear  them  from  Confederate  sharp- 
shooters. This  was  in  April ;  and,  the  channel  having 
been  thus  surveyed  and  protected,  the  troops  were  con- 
veyed in  transports  to  a  position  12  miles  in  the  rear  of 
Fort  Philip,  on  the  north-eastern  bank  of  the  stream. 
Two  schooners  from  the  mortar-fleet  occupied  a  bayou, 
or  creek,  in  the  rear  of  Fort  Jackson  soon  afterwards  ; 
and  on  April  13  several  of  the  Union  gunboats  were 
within  two  miles  of  the  latter  fortification.  The  boom 
which  the  Confederates  had  stretched  across  the  river 
had  been  damaged  shortly  before,  partly  by  the  action 
of  a  storm,  and  partly  by  the  breaking  loose  of  some 
fire-rafts  which  drifted  against  the  obstruction.  Every- 
thing being  now  in  readiness,  the  bombardment  com- 
menced on  the  1 8th,  the  mortar-vessels  taking  the  lead, 
and  the  gunboats  assisting  whenever  the  others  re- 
quired relief.  A  terrible  fire  was  in  this  way  concen- 
trated-on  the  forts,  but  especially  on  Fort  Jackson,  the 
citadel  of  which  was  in  flames  on  the  very  first  day. 
On  the  following  day  the  officers'  quarters  were  entirely 
consumed  and  the  artillerists  driven  from  the  parapet- 
guns.  Owing  to  the  soft  and  spongy  nature  of  the  soil, 
the  shells  penetrated  eighteen  or  twenty  feet  into  the 
ground  where  they  exploded  with  a  muffled  noise  and 
convulsion  suggestive  of  an  earthquake.  The  levee — 
that  elevated  portion  of  the  river-bank  which  is  artifi- 
cially made — was  broken  in  more  than  a  hundred 
places,  and  the  water,  rushing  into  the  fort,  flooded  the 
parade-ground  and  casemate. 


NEW  ORLEANS. 


77 


During   six   days   this    horrible    bombardment  con- 
tinued, and  the  forts  could   do  little   in   reply,  owing 


COMMODORE   DAVID   G.    FARRAGUT. 


to  the  short  range  of  their  guns.     Fire-barges  were  fre- 
quently sent  down  the  river  by  the  Confederates ;  but 


78  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

these,  while  doing  no  harm,  inflicted  considerable  injury 
upon  the  Southerners  themselves,  by  setting  the 
wharves  of  Fort  Jackson  on  fire  and  enabling  the 
enemy,  after  dark,  to  point  his  guns  with  greater  ac- 
curacy. On  the  night  of  the  20th,  no  fire-ships  were 
sent  down  from  the  forts,  and  the  Union  squadron, 
taking  advantage  of  the  obscurity,  despatched  some  of 
their  gunboats,  under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire,  to  com- 
plete the  destruction  of  the  boom,  and  drag  off  the  re- 
maining schooners  which  still  impeded  the  channel. 
The  feat  was  one  of  much  difficulty  and  peril,  for  the 
guns  of  Fort  Jackson  opened  fire  on  the  gunboats  with 
great  animation ;  nevertheless,  it  was  safely  accom- 
plished. Attempts  were  made  to  blow  up  the  boom  by 
means  of  a  galvanic  current  acting  on  petards ;  but  the 
explosives  failed  to  ignite.  Lieutenant  Caldwell  there- 
upon boarded  one  of  the  hulks,  slipped  the  chain,  and 
made  an  opening  large  enough  for  the  fleet  to  pass. 
His  vessel  was  swept  ashore  by  the  current ;  but  she 
was  afterwards  got  off,  in  spite  of  the  cannonade  from 
Fort  Jackson,  and  the  river  was  now  free  to  the  invading 
force.  The  bombardment,  however,  continued  three  days 
longer,  and  it  was  not  until  the  early  morning  of  the 
24th  that  the  squadron  moved  up  the  Mississippi  in 
two  columns.  The  previous  day  had  been  occupied  by 
preparations  for  passing  the  forts;  and  while  these  were 
going  on,  the  enemy's  positions  were  still  vigorously 
shelled.  Much  ingenuity  was  shown  in  protecting  the 
engines  and  machinery  of  the  vessels  from  the  action 
of  the  hostile  artillery.  The  signal  to  get  under  way 
was  given  at  two  o'clock  A.  M.  on  the  24th,  and  on  ap- 
proaching the  fort  a  terrific  cross-fire  was  opened  on 
them.  The  Hartford,  in  which  Farragut  was  leading  the 
left  column,  caught  fire  from  one  of  the  combustible 
rafts,  and  for  a  time  got  aground ;  but  the  flames 
were  speedily  extinguished,  and   the  guns  were  so  well 


79 


g0  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

worked  that  in  a  little  while  Fort  Philip  was  nearly 
silenced.  Some  of  the  other  vessels  became  entangled 
in  the  remains  of  the  barrier,  and  were  not  extricated 
without  difficulty. 

Before  the  Union  squadron  had  quite  passed  the 
forts,  the  Confederate  fleet  of  gunboats  and  rams  ap- 
peared in  sight  and  took  part  in  the  conflict.  The  ad- 
vance was  much  facilitated  by  the  darkness  of  the  night 
and  the  dense  vapor  from  the  guns  ;  for,  although  Gen- 
eral Duncan,  who  commanded  the  coast  defences,  had 
sent  instructions  to  the  naval  officers  to  keep  the  river 
lighted  with  fire-barges,  in  anticipation  of  an  immediate 
attack,  nothing  of  the  kind  was  done  until  the  Union 
vessels  were  off  the  forts.  It  was  now  that  the  river-fleet 
did  its  utmost  to  oppose  the  advancing  enemy.  The 
Manassas,  and  an  ironclad  called  the  Morgan,  attacked 
some  of  the  Union  vessels,  one  of  which  was  run  down, 
though  not  with  such  suddenness  but  that  her  crew 
were  enabled  to  escape.  The  Morgan,  being  much 
damaged  by  the  collision,  shortly  afterwards  surren- 
dered;  three  other  Confederate  ships  were  captured; 
and  the  Manassas,  in  aiming  a  blow  at  one  of  her  ad- 
versaries, ran  ashore,  was  abandoned  by  her  crew,  and 
finally  blew  up,  after  floating  some  distance  down  the 
current.  All  this  while,  the  Union  fleet  was  progress- 
ing up  the  river,  to  a  greater  extent  even  than  the  com- 
manders were  aware ;  for,  when  morning  dawned,  they 
discovered  to  their  surprise  that  the  vessels  had  passed 
the  forts,  and  that  the  Confederate  flotilla  had  been 
nearly  destroyed.  It  was  therefore  determined  to  push 
on  at  once  to  New  Orleans.  A  regiment  of  troops  en- 
camped on  the  banks  of  the  river  was  compelled  to  sur- 
render; and  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  the  advanced 
guard  encountered  the  batteries  of  the  second  line 
of  defence,  at  Chalmette,  which,  however,  was  too 
weak   to  offer  much  resistance.     As  the  Union  vessels 


NEW  ORLEANS.  8 1 

drew  near  to  the  grand  object  of  their  attack,  burning 
steamers,  fire-rafts,  and  cotton-ships  in  flames,  came 
floating  down  the  tide.  It  was  evident  that  the  people 
of  New  Orleans  were  in  a  mood  of  angry  desperation, 
and  that  everything  was  being  destroyed  which  could 
be  harmed  by  fire. 

At  one  o'clock  on  the  25th,  the  Union  squadron 
anchored  in  front  of  the  city.  A  terrible  spectacle 
presented  itself.  Black  clouds  of  smoke  rose  for  miles 
along  the  levee,  indicating  that  the  vast  stores  of  cotton 
in  the  neighborhood  were  being  consumed.  The  river 
was  covered  with  burning  ships,  which  threatened  the 
Union  vessels  with  conflagration.  An  excited  crowd 
was  drawn  up  en  shore,  and  all  Union  sympathizers, 
who  ventured  to  give  expression  to  their  feelings,  were 
at  once  shot  down  with  pistols.  For  a  long  time,  the 
people  had  believed  the  lower  defences  of  the  river  to 
be  absolutely  impregnable.  When  they  discovered 
their  mistake,  and  plainly  heard  the  enemy's  guns 
engaging  the  upper  defences,  astonishment,  despair,  and 
rage  filled  the  hearts  of  the  citizens.  The  town  itselt 
was  completely  open  to  attack,  and  the  hopelessness  of 
maintaining  it,  with  not  more  than  3000  raw  troops, 
was  so  apparent  to  General  Lovell  that  he  retired  at 
once  to  Camp  Moore,  on  the  Jackson  Railway,  together 
with  a  few  of  the  volunteers,  though  the  greater  number 
disbanded,  and  returned  to  their  homes.  The  civil 
authorities  having  practically  resumed  their  control 
over  the  city,  Captain  Bailey,  of  the  Cayuga,  which 
headed  the  right  column  of  the  squadron,  went  ashore 
to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  place.  He  was  at  once 
threatened  by  a  violent  mob,  but,  being  protected  by 
the  more  respectable  citizens,  made  his  way  to  the 
mayor's  office,  where  he  demanded  the  submission  of 
New  Orleans  to  the  forces  of  the  United  States.  Far- 
ragut  had  by  this  time  stationed  his  ships  at  intervals 


32  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

off  the  levee,  with  their  guns  pointed  against  the  city; 
and  the  Confederates  had  no  force  with  which  to  en- 
counter the  strength  of  their  enemies.  Farragut  was 
aware  that  his  own  situation  was  not  devoid  of  peril. 
He  had  in  his  rear  two  strong  forts  and  some  war- 
vessels.  He  was  separated  from  all  other  Union  forces, 
and  was  surrounded  by  a  violently  hostile  population. 
It  was  therefore  very  advisable  to  proceed  with  caution. 
A  sharp  controversy  took  place  between  the  commodore 
and  the  mayor,  mainly  on  the  question  whether  the 
city  authorities  themselves  should  haul  down  the  Con- 
federate flag,  and  substitute  that  of  the  United  States 
(as  Farragut  demanded),  or  whether  the  Union  troops 
should  do  it.  A  detachment  of  sailors  and  marines 
went  on  shore  on  April  26,  hauled  down  the  symbol  of 
rebellion,  and  ran  up  the  stars  and  stripes.  By  about 
the  close  of  the  month,  the  Union  flag  was  floating  from 
all  the  public  buildings  ;  but  the  exasperation  of  the 
people  found  vent  in  acts  of  insult  which  sorely  tried 
the  patience  of  the  Union  officers.  At  one  time,  Farra- 
gut considered  it  necessary  to  menace  the  city  with 
bombardment;  and  the  mayor  replied  in  a  high-flown 
communication,  assuming  that  the  commodore  desired 
to  murder  women  and  children,  though  he  had  requested 
that  they  might  be  at  once  removed.  No  bombardment, 
however,  followed  ;  and  New  Orleans,  conquered,  but 
not  submissive,  set  itself  to  the  invention  of  new  forms 
of  annoyance,  as  the  only  solace  remaining  to  its 
wounded  pride. 

Louisiana  lost  heart  with  the  fall  of  New  Orleans. 
If  Farragut  had  any  anxiety  with  regard  to  the  forts  in 
his  rear,  the  occasion  for  such  a  feeling  was  very  soon 
removed.  When  morning  dawned  on  that  memorable 
24th  of  April  which  witnessed  the  passage  up  the  river 
of  Farragut's  squadron,  Porter,  whose  detachment  of 
gunboats  and  mortar-vessels  still  lay  below  the    two 


NEW  ORLEANS. 


83 


forts  occupying  the  right  and  left  banks  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, prepared  to  engage  those  works,  as  well  as  the 


COMMODORE    DAVID    D.    PORTER. 


remains  of  the  Confederate  fleet,  with  the  force  at  his 
disposal.     Some  steps  towards  reducing  the  forts  had 


84 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


already  been  taken.  The  army  under  Butler  had  been 
sent  round  to  the  rear  of  Fort  Philip,  and  plans  had 
been  commenced  for  cutting  off  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Jackson.  But  it  was  obviously  desirable  that  the  two 
positions  should  be  taken  as  speedily  as  possible,  and, 
on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  Porter  sent  a  demand  for 
their  surrender.  This  being  refused,  the  bombardment 
was  again  opened  on  the  26th,  and  next  day  the  demand 
for  surrender  was  repeated.  The  terms  proposed  by 
the  commodore  were  honorable  to  his  adversaries.  The 
officers  were  to  retain  their  sidearms ;  both  officers  and 
men  were  to  be  paroled ;  and  private  property  was  to  be 
respected. 

The  officers  in  the  forts  were  desirous  of  continued 
resistance;  but  the  soldiers  were  mutinous,  and  their 
superiors  saw  that  they  had  no  longer  the  means  of 
fighting  at  command.  When  intelligence  arrived  that 
New  Orleans  was  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  when 
it  was  seen  that  Butler  had  cut  off  the  garrison  from 
retreat,  the  troops  refused  any  longer  to  obey  orders, 
and,  seizing  the  guns,  turned  them  from  the  ramparts. 
Some  of  the  cannon  were  spiked,  and  officers  who 
ventured  to  interfere  were  fired  at.  Several  of  the  men 
deserted  with  their  arms,  and  surrendered  to  Butler's 
pickets;  and  the  aspect  of  affairs  grew  alarming  during 
the  night  of  the  27th.  A  capitulation  was  consequently 
inevitable,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  a  boat  was 
sent  off  to  Porter,  with  a  letter  stating  that  the  forts 
would  be  given  up  on  the  terms  proposed.  Porter  went 
to  Fort  Jackson,  and,  while  discussing  the  terms  of 
capitulation,  observed  the  Confederate  ironclad,  Louis- 
iana, drifting  on  fire  towards  the  Union  ships.  The 
Confederate  naval  officers  had  in  fact  towed  the  ram  to 
a  point  above  the  forts,  had  set  her  in  flames,  and  then 
turned  her  adrift  with  guns  shotted,  apparently  in  the 
expectation  of  her  blowing  up  in  the  midst  of  the  Union 


NEW  ORLEANS. 


8S 


squadron.  Just  before  the  discovery  of  this  fact,  Porter 
had  been  informed  that  the  articles  of  capitulation  would 
not  include  the  naval  force ;  but  he  regarded  the  firing 
of  the  Louisiana  as  a  breach  of  faith.  He  asked 
whether  there  was  any  powder  on  board,  but  could 
obtain  no  satisfactory  answer.  Sending  word  therefore, 
to  the  captains  of  his  ships  to  be  on  their  guard,  he 
continued  the  negotiations.  The  catastrophe  on  board 
the  Louisiana  came  sooner  than  was  anticipated  by 
those  who  prepared  it.  As  the  ironclad  got  abreast 
of  Fort  Philip,  it  exploded  with  a  terrific  report,  and 
the  guns,  as  they  became  red-hot  with  the  flames,  which 
had  been  burning  for  some  time,  scattered  shot  and 
shell  in  various  directions.  It  is  marvelous  that  wide- 
spread injury  was  not  the  result;  but  the  only  casualty 
was  to  a  Confederate  soldier  in  the  fort,  who  was  killed 
by  one  of  the  fragments.  The  capitulation  having  been 
completed,  Porter  took  measures  against  the  three 
Confederate  steamers  which  were  lying  about  half  a 
mile  above  the  forts.  One  of  these  had  already  been 
scuttled ;  the  others  surrendered  without  resistance. 
Considering  that  he  had  been  treacherously  dealt  with 
in  the  matter  of  the  Louisiana,  Porter  made  prisoners 
of  the  naval  officers  and  crews,  and  sent  them  to  the 
North.  It  was  the  opinion  of  General  Duncan,  the 
Confederate  commander  of  the  coast-defences,  that  the 
ironclad  was  set  on  fire  previous  to  the  Union  boats 
coming  to  anchor  abreast  of  the  fort;  but  the  facts 
looked  suspicious  of  a  sinister  design. 

Before  the  actual  surrender  of  the  forts,  General  Lov- 
ell,  the  Confederate  chief  in  Louisiana,  had  received  an 
incorrect  intimation  that  the  event  had  already  taken 
place.  He  accordingly  ordered  the  evacuation  of  the 
forts  on  Lake  Ponchartrain ;  and  when  this  order  was 
afterwards  countermanded,  the  troops  had  left  the 
works,  and  some  had  deserted  the  flag.     The  gunboats 


Univn — 6 


86  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 

and  armed  steamers  on  the  lake  were  destroyed,  and 
the  Confederate  power  almost  ceased  to  exist  in  that 
region.  At  New  Orleans  Farragut  observed  several 
ironclad  rams  in  course  of  building ;  but  the  principal 
of  these  soon  came  floating  by  in  flames,  and  another 
was  sunk  in  front  of  the  Custom  House.  Eight  miles 
above  the  city,  Farragut  found  two  forts,  where  the 
guns  had  been  spiked,  and  the  gun-carriages  set  on 
fire.  A  mile  higher  up  were  two  earthworks,  not 
armed ;  and  at  this  fort  a  boom  of  enormous  dimensions 
was  discovered,  so  fashioned  as  to  stop  the  passage  of 
gunboats,  but  not  yet  placed  in  its  position  across  the 
stream.  The  Confederates,  therefore,  had  evidently  ex- 
pended a  good  deal  of  time  and  labor  in  the  defence  of 
the  Mississippi,  but  had  postponed  many  of  their  works 
until  it  was  too  late  to  complete  them.  On  May  I  for- 
mal possession  of  New  Orleans  was  taken  by  General 
B.  F.  Butler,  at  the  head  of  the  land  forces  of  the  U.  S. 

Butler's  measures  were  only  such  as  are  usual  in 
conquered  cities  which  are  evidently  determined  to 
continue  an  irregular  resistance  after  a  formal  and 
hated  submission.  He  established  what  was  in  fact 
the  rule  of  martial  law.  In  his  proclamation  he  plainly 
intimated  that  all  acts  of  violence  against  Union  soldiers, 
and  all  disorders,  disturbances  of  the  peace,  and  crimes 
of  an  aggravated  nature,  interfering  with  the  forces  or 
laws- of  the  United  States,  would  be  referred  to  a  mili- 
tary court  for  trial  and  punishment.  Other  matters 
(including  civil  causes)  would  be  left  to  the  ordinary 
courts.  The  transmission  of  communications  by  tele- 
graph was  placed  under  military  supervision  ;  and  in 
short  a  complete  censorship  over  the  publication  of 
news  or  opinions  was  established  together  with  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  civil  power  to  that  of  the  sword.  The 
assembling  of  persons  in  the  streets  was  prohibited,  and 
the   police   arrangements   of  the   city  passed   into   the 


NEW  ORLEANS. 


*7 


hands  of  the  occupying  force.  For  all  this,  Butler  had 
abundant  justification  in  the  state  of  popular  opinion, 
and  it  is  clear  that  he  could  not  have  discharged  his 
duties  in  any  other  way. 

The  submission  of  New  Orleans  being  secured,  the 
Union  steamers  ascended  the  river  as  far  as  Baton 
Rouge,  the  capital  of  the  State,  which  was  given  up 
without  a  struggle.  The  town  had  in  fact  no  means  of 
resistance  and  simply  yielded  to  necessity.  Its  sym- 
pathies were  wholly  with  the  Confederacy,  and  out  of  a 
population  of  about  5428  it  had  contributed  875  men 
to  the  Confederate  Army,  and  240  to  the  Home  Guard. 
But  it  was  impossible  to  encounter  the  naval  force  by 
which  it  was  threatened,  and  with  its  submission  a  large 
tract  of  cotton-bearing  and  sugar-producing  country 
fell  under  Union  power.  Still  pursuing  their  career  of 
conquest  up  the  Mississippi,  the  Union  vessels  received 
the  submission  of  Natchez,  and  the  fortunes  of  the  Con- 
federates in  all  the  Western  States  were  rendered  criti- 
cal by  the  subjection  of  Louisiana.  The  raising  of  the 
blockade  of  the  Mississippi  made  it  advisable  for  the 
Confederates  to  evacuate  the  forts  and  navy-yard  of 
Pensacola,  on  the  south  coast  of  Florida ;  for,  with  the 
Union  fleet  at  liberty  to  pursue  other  operations  after 
its  recent  successes,  it  seemed  very  doubtful  whether 
that  exposed  position  could  be  maintained.  The  com- 
mandant, General  Jones,  had  for  some  time  been  in- 
vested with  discretionary  power  to  abandon  the  place 
whenever  such  a  step  appeared  to  him  advisable ;  and 
that  time  he  considered  had  now  come.  He  trans- 
ported to  Mobile  whatever  weapons,  stores,  and  ma- 
chinery he  could  manage  to  get  off,  and  then  resolved 
to  fire  the  public  buildings  of  Pensacola.  But  the  act 
of  removal  was  no  easy  matter  in  view  of  the  hostile 
flotilla  which  was  known  to  be  lying  off  Fort  Morgan, 
at  the  entrance  to  Mobile  Harbor.     The  task,  however. 


88  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

was  accomplished  with  great  ingenuity.  Sham  guns 
were  mounted  on  the  works,  and  other  arrangements 
made  for  deceiving  the  enemy ;  many  valuable  mate- 
rials were  sent  by  rail,  or  in  a  small  river-steamer  to  a 
place  of  safety;  and  on  the  night  of  May  9  the  infantry 
were  marched  out  of  the  town.'  Three  companies  of 
cavalry  were  charged  with  the  duty  of  setting  fire  to 
the  public  buildings;  and  it  was  not  until  the  flames 
burst  out  simultaneously  from  many  quarters  that  the 
Union  forces  had  any  suspicion  of  what  was  being  ef- 
fected. The  garrison  of  Fort  Pickens  then  commenced 
a  furious  bombardment ;  and  on  Porter  arriving  with 
his  vessels,  the  military  and  naval  officers  de- 
manded the  surrender  of  Pensacola.  The  demand  was 
at  once  complied  with  by  the  civil  authorities,  and  a 
force  under  General  Arnold  endeavored  to  save  what 
remained  of  the  forts  and  navy-yard.  To  some  extent 
the  endeavor  was  successful  ;  but  the  destruction  of 
public  property  was  very  large. 

With  five  exceptions,  the  harbors  along  the  coast  of 
the  Confederate  States  had  now  fallen.  The  South- 
erners were  therefore  compelled  to  carry  on  their  com- 
mercial transactions  with  Europe  in  an  irregular  way. 
Nassau,  one  of  the  Bahama  Islands,  and  a  British  pos- 
session, became  the  port  of  entry  for  the  commerce  of 
the  Confederate  States  with  England  ;  and  steamers 
proceeded  from  thence  to  Charleston  or  Mobile,  run- 
ning the  blockade  with  frequent  success.  In  this  way 
the  South  was  furnished  with  several  of  the  necessaries 
and  luxuries  of  life.  Yet  the  blockade  kept  out  a  great 
many  things  which  the  Confederates  wanted,  and 
almost  destroyed  the  export  trade  of  the  planters. 
During  the  spring  of  1 862,  the  prospects  of  the  Rebel 
Government  looked  so  black,  that  President  Davis 
ordered  a  fast-day,  and  directed  that  prayers  should  be 
offered    up  on   Friday,  May    16,  for  the  strengthening 


NEW  ORLEANS. 


89 


and  protecting  of  the  armies.  In  his  proclamation  he 
admitted  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  "  Recent  dis- 
aster," he  observed,  "  has  spread  gloom  over  the  land, 
and  sorrow  sits  at  the  hearthstones  of  our  countrymen." 

Butler's  position  continued  to  be  onerous  and  difficult. 
The  markets  were  so  insufficiently  supplied  with  food, 
that  the  people  stood  in  danger  of  starving.  Butler 
gave  orders  for  the  safe  conduct  of  cargoes  of  flour, 
live  stock,  and  other  necessaries,  from  Mobile  and 
various  places  in  the  interior.  He  had  captured  a 
quantity  of  beef  and  sugar  intended  for  the  rebels  in 
the  field  and  1000  barrels  of  stores,  which  he  dis- 
tributed among  the  deserving  poor — "  even  though 
some  of  the  food  will  go  to  supply  the  craving  wants 
of  the  wives  and  children  of  those  now  herding  at 
Camp  Moore  and  elsewhere,  in  arms  against  the  U.  S." 

Whatever  his  faults,  Butler  had  certainly  restored 
the  State  to  the  Union.  He  was  superseded  on  Decem- 
ber 14,  by  General  Banks,  who  at  first  tried  a  more 
lenient  mode  of  administration,  but  was  soon  compelled 
to  give  up  the  attempt,  on  finding  that  his  clemency 
produced  no  other  effect  than  riotous  demonstration, 
cries  for  President  Davis,  and  threatening  language 
towards  the  military.  New  Orleans  was  like  a  pas- 
sionate and  wayward  child,  which  mistakes  generosity 
for  weakness,  and  can  only  be  kept  in  decent  order  by 
the  use  of  the  strong  hand.  Butler  acknowledged  this 
from  the  first;  Banks  preferred  to  buy  his  experience. 

Beauregard's  position  at  Corinth  became  extremely 
perilous  after  the  capture  of  Island  No.  10,  the  Con- 
federate defeat  at  Shiloh,  and  the  fall  of  New  Orleans. 
The  Union  forces  had  now  possession  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  large  forces  were  gathering  in  different  direc- 
tions to  crush  the  rebels.  Annoyed  at  the  discomfiture 
of  the  Western  Army  on  April  6  (though  the  reverse 


90 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


had  been  repaired  on  the  following  day),  General  Grant 
was  superseded  in  his  command,  and  the  army  was 
strengthened  by  Pope's  division.  An  advance  on 
Corinth  was  commenced  at  the  close  of  April,  and 
each  successive  camp  on  the  road  was  fortified  at  an 
immense  expenditure  of  labor.  Seven  of  these  lines  of 
fortifications — one  of  them  12  miles  in  length — were 
erected  between  Pittsburg  Landing  and  Corinth;  and 
towards  the  end  of  May  the  town  was  evacuated  by 
the  Confederates.  Halleck,  who  commanded  the  Union 
troops,  entered  Corinth  on  the  29th  ;  but  the  enemy 
had  escaped.  Pope  was  sent  forward  to  pursue  the 
retreating  columns.  Beauregard  had  suffered  some 
losses  on  the  road  of  his  retreat ;  but  he  succeeded  in 
saving  by  far  the  greater  part  of  his  army,  and  in 
establishing  himself  at  Tupelo,  about  50  miles  south  of 
Corinth.  The  Union  forces  had  acquired  a  command 
over  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railway,  and  were  thus  in  a 
much  better  position  than  before.  Fort  Pillow,  on  the 
Mississippi,  was  abandoned  by  the  Confederates  on 
June  4,  and  the  Union  gunboats  at  once  descended  the 
river,  and  anchored  next  day  off  Island  No.  45,  close  to 
the  city  of  Memphis.  Here  the  Confederate  fleet 
engaged  the  naval  forces  of  the  enemy  on  the  morning 
of  June  6,  and,  after  a  sharp  encounter,  was  defeated 
with  heavy  loss.  The  surrender  of  Memphis  followed 
as  a  matter  of  course,  for  the  city  had  now  no  means 
of  defence.  It  was  one  of  the  principal  places  of 
export  for  the  produce  of  those  regions ;  but  its  pros- 
perity was  ruined  for  a  time,  and  it  was  evident  that 
there  had  been  a  great  destruction  of  cotton  before  the 
entry  of  the  conquerors. 

The  Union  forces  now  determined  to  attack  Vicks- 
burg,  situated  on  a  sharp  bend  of  the  Mississippi,  in  the 
State  similarly*  named.  The  position  was  important,  as 
it  enabled  those   holding   it  to  bar  the  passage  of  the 


VICKSBURG.  O! 

river ;  it  was  also  strong,  not  merely  by  reason  of  its 
fortifications,  but  because  of  the  vast  swamps  and 
forests,  and  the  numerous  creeks  and  tributary  streams, 
which  presented  so  many  obstacles  to  a  land  force  pro- 
ceeding against  it.  On  the  present  occasion,  however, 
it  was  to  be  attacked  from  the  river.  Farragut,  advanc- 
ing up  the  Mississippi  after  the  surrender  of  New 
Orleans,  had  by  June  24,  come  within  sight  of  Com- 
modore Davis,  descending  the  stream  from  Memphis. 
With  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  the  river  would  be  opened 
to  the  commerce  of  the  Western  States  ;  but  as  long  as 
the  town  and  fortifications  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates,  the  great  water-highway  would  be 
effectually  blocked.  Siege  was  therefore  laid  to  the 
place,  and  the  bombardment  opened  on  the  25th.  It 
continued,  with  occasional  intermissions,  for  a  month ; 
yet  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell  failed  to  produce  any 
serious  effects.  By  the  labor  of  more  than  1000 
negroes,  a  canal  was  dug  through  the  small  peninsula, 
formed  by  the  bend  of  the  river,  which  fronts  the  town. 
It  was  hoped  in  this  manner  to  open  a  channel  by 
which  ships  could  pass  up  and  down,  out  of  reach  of 
the  batteries  ;  but  the  work  proved  a  failure.  An  excit- 
ing incident  occurred  on  July  15.  The  small  Con- 
federate steamer,  Arka?isas,  which  had  been  roughly 
and  hastily  coated  with  iron,  and  had  for  some  time 
been  lying  hidden  in  the  Yazoo — an  affluent  of  the 
Mississippi,  which  it  enters  a  little  above  Vicksburg — 
issued  forth  from  its  place  of  concealment,  drove  away 
three  Union  gunboats  which  had  been  sent  to  make  a  re- 
connoissance,  and,  entering  the  larger  river,  boldly  passed 
through  the  whole  fleet,  inflicting  much  damage,  and 
finally  anchored  under  the  guns  of  Vicksburg.  The 
Arkansas  was  itself  a  good  deal  injured  by  the  fire  ; 
but  a  subsequent  attempt  to  sink  her  failed  in  its  object. 
On  the  24th,  the  siege  of  Vicksburg  was   abandoned 


92  THE  BATTLES  FOR  THE  UNION. 

for  a  time,  and  Farragut's  vessels  returned  to  Baton 
Rouge. 

The  summer  and  autumn  of  1862  did  not  pass  with- 
out some  operations  in  the  West,  by  which  the  Con- 
federates hoped  to  recover  the  ground  they  had  lost  in 
that  part  of  the  country.  A  scheme  of  gigantic  dimen- 
sions was  elaborated :  it  was  proposed  to  attack  the 
Union  forces  at  Baton  Rouge,  at  Corinth  (Mississippi), 
and  in  Eastern  Kentucky.  These  three  localities 
formed  the  two  extremities  and  the  center  of  the  line ; 
and  three  armies  were  assembled  under  the  orders  of 
Breckinridge,  Van  Dorn,  and  Bragg,  in  Louisiana,  in 
Upper  Mississippi,  and  in  Eastern  Tennessee.  Bragg 
had  by  this  time  succeeded  Beauregard  in  the  com- 
mand of  the  West,  and  by  far  the  largest  of  the  three 
armies  was  that  which  the  Southern  Government  con- 
fided to  his  care.  He  had  been  an  officer  of  the  U.  S. 
Army,  and  was  well  known  as  a  strict  disciplinarian. 
Van  Dorn  had  on  previous  occasions  given  signs  of 
ability ;  but  of  Breckinridge  there  was  not  much  to  be 
said.  The  campaign  was  opened  by  some  dashing 
incursions  made  by  Generals  Morgan  and  Forrest  into 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  Morgan  had  already 
acquired  distinction  as  a  species  of  guerilla  chief.  He 
was  a  purely  amateur  soldier,  but  had  won  the  respect 
of  his  superiors  by  enterprise  and  skill.  His  force  con- 
sisted of  volunteers,  raised  principally  among  the 
wealthy  classes  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee ;  and  their 
number  was  small. 

At  the  time  that  Morgan  was  making  his  way  through 
Kentucky,  Forrest  was  marching  with  a  cavalry  force 
into  Western  Tennessee.  His  methods  of  procedure 
were  similar  to  those  of  other  guerilla  chiefs.  Detached 
posts  were  attacked  with  success ;  convoys  were 
captured ;  and  Murfreesboro'  was  surprised,  together 
with  the  garrison,  who  were  all  taken  prisoners.     Gen- 


GUERILLA   WARFARE. 


93 


eral  Crittenden,  who  had  lately  been  appointed  to  the 
command,  was  one  of  those  who  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.     Scarcely  any  resistance  was  offered  to  the 
Confederate 
forces,  nor  had 
anyprecaution 
been     taken 
against       sur- 
prise.     Buell, 
who     was     in 
command     of 
that      district, 
reflected   very 
strongly       on 
the  conduct  of 
the    officers 
and        men 
whose  duty  it 
was  to  defend 
Murfreesboro'  j 
and  his   stric- 
tures  do    not 
appear  to  have 
gone    beyond^ 
the  justice  ofy 
the  case. 

B  r  eck  i  n- 
ridge  engaged 
in  an  attempt 
to  gain  pos- 
session of 
Baton  Rouge. 

The  design  was  to  obtain  some  position  on  the 
Lower  Mississippi,  that  the  river  might  not  be  so 
much  in  the  hands  of  the  Union  forces.  The  land 
operations  were  to  be  facilitated  by  the  action  of  the 


GENERAL  JOHN   C.    BRECKINRIDGE. 
(  Vice-President  with  Buchanan.} 


94 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ironclad  Arkansas,  which  had  been  repaired  aftet 
her  engagement  with  the  Union  gunboats  at  Vicks- 
burg.  It  was  hoped  that  a  simultaneous  attack  by 
land  and  water  would  take  place  on  August  5,  but  the 
Arkansas  broke  down  when  about  15  miles  above 
Baton  Rouge.  The  regiments  under  Breckinridge  had 
suffered  terribly  from  heat  and  scarcity  of  water  in  the 
sandy  regions  through  which  they  had  marched,  and, 
when  they  reached  the  object  of  their  attack,  were  not 
in  the  best  condition  for  fighting.  The  Union  forces 
also  had  been  reduced  by  sickness ;  but  they  had 
obtained  some  information  as  to  the  movements  of  their 
adversary,  and  Breckinridge,  on  arriving  at  Baton 
Rouge,  found  them  drawn  up  in  force  outside  the  town. 
The  invaders  attacked  with  great  spirit  in  the  early 
morning  of  August  5 ;  overwhelmed  the  first  of  the 
Union  lines,  captured  the  camp,  and  were  proceeding  to 
attack  the  second  line,  when  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
batteries  checked  their  advance.  The  pause,  however, 
was  only  momentary.  Forming  their  ranks  afresh, 
they  dashed  forward,  and  drove  the  Union  troops  into 
the  town.  General  Williams  was  killed  at  the  head  of 
his  troops,  and  many  other  officers  were  stretched  upon 
the  field.  The  assailants  had  the  best  of  the  encounter, 
but,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  ironclad,  were  unable 
to  maintain  their  position.  The  Union  gunboats  in  the 
river  severely  galled  their  ranks,  and  from  the  houses 
came  a  continual  fire  of  rifles.  Breckinridge  was  there- 
fore compelled  to  order  a  retreat,  which,  however,  was 
not  commenced  until  the  enemy's  camp  had  been  set 
on  fire.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  Arkansas  had  been 
attacked  by  the  opposing  gunboats,  but  was  too  much 
disabled  to  offer  any  resistance.  She  was  therefore  run 
ashore,  fired,  and  abandoned,  when  she  blew  up  and 
reached  the  termination  of  her  career  after  a  somewhat 
inglorious    fashion.      On    August    10,   Farragut    bom- 


RICHMOND  ASSAILED. 


95 


barded  and  partially  destroyed  the  town  of  Donaldson- 
ville,  between  New  Orleans  and  Baton  Rouge;  but  the 
Confederates  afterward  fortified  a  position  at  Port  Hud- 
son, nearer  Vicksburg,  and  were  thus  enabled  to  exercise 
some  control  over  the  great  water-highway  for  which 
both  parties  were  contending. 

The  campaign  of  Eastern  Kentucky  began  early  in 
August,  when  Kirby  Smith  issued  from  the  passes  of 
the  Cumberland  Mountains,  pushed  forward  through  a 
difficult  country,  and  appeared  in  front  of  Richmond 
on  the  29th.  The  town  was  defended  by  a  force  of 
8000  men,  under  command  of  General  Manson.  They 
were  mostly  raw  levies,  and  had  been  so  recently  sup- 
plied with  arms,  that  it  might  fairly  be  a  matter  of  doubt 
whether  they  knew  how  to  handle  them  properly. 
Manson  had  posted  them  upon  rising  ground,  crossed 
by  the  road  from  Barboursville  to  Richmond ;  and  here 
they  were  attacked  at  daybreak  of  the  30th,  and  com- 
pelled, after  some  temporary  success,  to  shift  their  posi- 
tion to  a  line  somewhat  nearer  the  town.  The  Con- 
federates renewed  the  assault  with  fresh  energy,  and  the 
Union  troops  were  driven  in  confusion  to  a  line  of  hills 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Richmond.  Though 
rallied  for  awhile,  and  covered  by  artillery,  they  con- 
tinued to  lose  ground,  and  a  vehement  attack  of  the 
adversary  finally  swept  them  into  the  town  itself.  At 
the  same  time,  a  body  of  Confederate  cavalry,  marching 
round  Richmond,  fell  upon  the  wagons  which  had 
been  sent  to  the  rear,  and  captured  almost  the  whole 
train.  Finding  themselves  encountered  by  enemies  on 
two  sides,  the  unhappy  soldiers  of  the  Union,  whose 
experience  of  war  had  in  numerous  instances  com- 
menced that  day,  saw  no  choice  before  them  but  to  sur- 
render. The  triumph  was  sufficient  to  intoxicate  the 
Confederates  with  a  sense  of  their  own  invincibility. 
As  the  result  of  this  one  conflict,  they  had  taken  5000 


96 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


prisoners,  and  had  possessed  themselves  of  nine  pieces 
of  artillery,  io.OOO  stand  of  arms,  and  a  large  amount 
of  supplies.  The  capture  of  Richmond  was  followed 
by  that  of  Lexington  on  September  2,  and  that  of 
Frankfort  on  the  17th.  Louisville  and  Cincinnati  were 
now  hastily  fortified  by  General  Wright,  the  Union 
officer  commanding  the  Department  of  the  Ohio. 
Frantic  endeavors  were  made  to  organize  volunteeer 
corps  to  meet  the  victorious  legions  of  Kirby  Smith. 
But  the  prospects  of  the  Union  in  that  Western  State 
were  extremely  dark ;  for  the  main  army,  under  Bragg, 
was  now  moving  forward  in  prosecution  of  the  general 
scheme  of  the  campaign,  and  Munfordsville,  with  about 
4000  men,  surrendered  to  the  advanced  divisions  on 
the  17th.  Buell  hurried  from  Nashville  to  the  relief  of 
his  colleagues  in  the  northern  part  of  the  State ;  but 
Bragg  was  already  between  him  and  those  whom  he 
desired  to  assist.  By  ordinarily  good  management  on 
the  part  of  Bragg,  Buell  might  have  been  disastrously 
defeated ;  but  he  with  singular  imbecility,  turned  aside 
from  the  road  by  which  he  might  have  stopped  his 
adversary,  and  suffered  him  to  recapture  Munfordsville, 
and  to  relieve  Louisville.  Bragg,  who  had  been  closely 
followed  and  in  some  degree  harassed  by  Buell,  seems 
to  have  been  apprehensive  of  being  overwhelmed  by 
superior  numbers.  Turning  to  the  west,  he  marched 
first  to  Bardstown,  and  then  to  Frankfort,  where  he 
inaugurated  a  provisional  government  of  Kentucky. 
Thus  Louisville  was  saved,  and  at  the  same  time  a  Union 
detachment  stationed  at  Cumberland  Gap,  which  in  the 
first  instance  had  been  cut  off  by  the  advance  of  Kirby 
Smith,  was  enabled,  by  the  latter  operations  of  that 
commander,  to  escape  to  Cincinnati. 

The  bad  management  of  the  Confederates,  after  their 
first  striking  successes,  changed  the  whole  character  of 
the  war  in  those  parts.     The  Union  troops  now  re* 


98 


THE  BATTLES  EOR    THE  UNION. 


sumed  the  offensive,  and  Bragg  saw  that  he  must  retire 
into  Tennessee.  Buell  started  in  pursuit  on  October  I, 
and  fell  in  with  the  greater  portion  of  the  Confederate 
army  on  the  road  from  Lebanon  to  Harrodsburg.  By 
this  time  Bragg  had  discovered,  as  Morgan  had  dis- 
covered before  him,  that  the  people  of  Kentucky,  with 
a  few  exceptions,  were  not  inclined  to  support  the  Con- 
federates. He  was  naturally  very  anxious  to  quit  the 
State,  but  thought  it  necessary  to  fight  an  action  be- 
fore doing  so,  in  order  to  redeem  his  credit,  and  to  save 
from  capture  the  large  amount  of  stores  which  he  had 
seized  during  his  incursion.  He  therefore  drew  up  his 
army  in  a  position  where  he  considered  it  probable  that 
he  should  be  encountered  by  the  Union  troops.  His 
forces  were  divided  into  two  portions,  posted  on  two 
distinct  roads,  distant  from  one  another  about  twenty 
miles.  Bragg's  headquarters  were  fixed,  on  the  6th,  at 
the  town  of  Harrodsburg,  situated  at  the  point  of  junc- 
tion of  the  two  roads,  which  were  being  simultaneously 
watched.  Polk,  who  was  stationed  on  the  road  from 
Lebanon  to  Bardstown  with  three  divisions,  was  di- 
rected to  offer  battle  to  the  Union  forces  at  Perryville, 
where  a  very  warmly-contested  action  took  place  on 
the  8th. 

The  Union  forces,  who  were  marching  from  the  west, 
appear  to  have  been  taken  by  surprise,  not  knowing, 
until  roughly  undeceived,  that  the  Confederates  were  so 
close  at  hand.  Bragg  had  already  sent  orders  to  his 
other  divisions,  planted  on  the  Louisville  and  Lawrence- 
burg  road,  to  march  with  all  haste  towards  Harrods- 
burg, so  that  he  felt  tolerably  secure  of  being  well  sup- 
ported. Immediately  on  the  Union  forces  being  seen 
advancing,  the  Confederate  infantry  rushed  forward,  and 
a  number  of  Buell's  raw  troops  who  unfortunately  hap- 
pened to  be  in  the  front  line,  fled  in  dismay.  The 
older  regiments  maintained  their  ground ;  and  when  the 


IOo  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Union  troops  had  been  largely  reinforced,  the  strength 
of  the  opposing  parties  became  more  evenly  balanced. 
The  Union  men  resolved  to  act  on  the  defensive  until 
the  whole  of  their  division  should  reach  the  field. 
Polk,  however,  renewed  his  attacks  with  great  fury ; 
the  Union  troops  were  driven  back,  losing  several  of 
their  officers ;  and  the  action  might  have  ended  in  a  de- 
cided reverse  for  Buell's  army,  had  not  night  put  an  end 
to  the  combat.  Further  reinforcements  reached  the 
Union  forces  during  the  evening ;  and  Bragg  considered 
it  prudent  to  retreat.  He  had  gained  his  object  in 
fighting,  and  had  now  to  consider  how  he  could  best 
secure  his  withdrawal  into  Tennessee.  In  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  the  Union  troops  had  lost  more 
than  4000  men.  The  Confederate  loss  was  estimated 
at  about  2500;  and  this  large  expenditure  of  life  had 
resulted  in  no  positive  advantage  to  the  one  side  or  the 
other.  Buell  blamed  the  conduct  of  some  of  his  of- 
ficers in  command  of  the  less  experienced  troops;  the 
Government  blamed  Buell,  and  he  was  shortly  after- 
wards removed  from  his  command,  and  succeeded  by 
General  Rosecrans.  It  must  certainly  be  admitted  that 
Buell  had  not  distinguished  himself;  yet,  whether  owing 
to  good  fortune,  or  to  the  bad  management  of  his  op- 
ponent, Kentucky  had  been  cleared  of  invaders.  Ac- 
companied by  long  lines  of  wagons,  laden  with  plunder, 
by  vast  herds  of  cattle  and  horses,  and  by  private  car- 
riages conveying  those  families  who  preferred  to  throw 
in  their  lot  with  the  South,  the  Confederates  retired 
with  deliberation,  and  passed  safely  through  Cumber- 
land Gap.  The  Union  troops  were  in  no  mood  to  press 
them  closely,  and,  with  their  rear  well  guarded  by  cav- 
alry, they  gained  the  safer  regions  of  Tennessee. 

Mississippi,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  year,  was  the 
scene  of  some  important  events.  Sherman  was  in  com- 
mand at  Memphis ;  Rosecrans,  not  yet  appointed  as  the 


HOSECRANS'  DEFENCE    OF  CORINTH.  1Qi 

successor  of  Buell  in  Kentucky,  was  at  Corinth,  with 
directions  to  check  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, should  any  attempt  be  made  to  cross  the  Ten- 
nessee River  and  harrass  Buell  in  the  operations  just 
described.  Price,  commanding  the  Confederates,  con- 
centrated his  forces  at  Iuka,  30  miles  to  the  south  of 
Corinth,  and  on  being  attacked  by  Rosecrans,  retreated 
in  good  order.  Rosecrans  had  hoped  to  overwhelm 
his  enemy,  but,  failing  in  his  design,  fortified  himself  at 
Corinth.  Price  waited  till  he  was  joined  by  Van  Dorn 
and  Lovell,  and  then  attacked  Corinth.  The  Union 
pickets  were  driven  in  on  October  2,  and  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  3d  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  army  ap- 
peared in  sight.  Before  the  Union  troops  could  be 
withdrawn  behind  the  inner  line  of  defence,  they  were 
attacked  by  the  Southerners,  and  compelled  to  retire. 
Rosecrans,  in  the  course  of  the  night,  made  such  excel- 
lent arrangements,  that  early  next  morning,  he  was 
ready  to  renew  the  fight.  The  Confederates  had  ap- 
proached from  the  south,  but  believing  the  northern 
side  to  be  more  exposed,  they  marched  round  to  that 
point,  only  to  find  that  Rosecrans  had  fortified  his  po- 
sition with  great  enterprise  and  skill.  The  Union 
troops  were  now  fronting  towards  the  north,  when  they 
were  attacked  on  the  4th.  Stationed  behind  their 
works,  they  managed  their  artillery  with  resolution,  and 
in  a  few  hours  they  silenced  the  Confederate  batteries. 
Price  now  prepared  to  storm  the  defences.  His  troops 
rushed  impetuously  forward,  captured  some  redoubts, 
and  drove  the  defenders  into  the  town.  There  the 
Union  troops  rallied,  and  Price's  division,  not  being  sup- 
ported by  that  of  Van  Dorn,  which  had  been  delayed 
by  the  difficult  nature  of  the  country,  was  hurled  back 
by  a  vigorous  effort,  and  compelled  to  abandon  what  it 
had  won.  When  Van  Dorn's  columns  arrived,  they 
were   too    late   to   help   their   comrades-     The   Union 

Union---, 


102 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


troops  were  again  in  possession  of  their  batteries  and 
breastworks;  but  Van  Dorn  concluded  to  attempt  to  take 
one  portion  of  the  defences.  His  men  advanced  with 
extraordinary  courage,  making  their  way  up  a  rugged 
ravine  under  a  tremendous  fire  from  the  forts.     Numbers 

dropped  on 
that  painful 
and  deadly 
path ;  the 
ranks  were 
formed  anew 
to  fill  the 
gaps  that  had 
been  formed 
in  them  ;  the 
guns  still 
played  with 
terrible  in- 
tensity on 
those  devo- 
ted men; 
but  the  acl- 
vancecontin- 
ued.  When 
the  attacking 
force  had 
gained  the 
edge  of  the  ditch,  the  Union  troops  themselves  slack- 
ened fire,  as  if  overcome  by  the  heroism  which  they 
could  not  subdue.  The  pause,  however,  was  only 
momentary ;  and  when  the  guns  once  more  opened 
at  short  range,  the  Confederates  for  the  first  time 
faltered,  and  reeled  back.  Then  two  regiments  from 
the  garrison  leaped  from  the  works,  and  rushed  at 
their  enemies  with  a  furious  charge.  The  exhausted 
Southerners  staggered  down  the  side  of  the  hill,  fol- 


GENF.RAl.   W.    S.    ROSECRANS. 


<;iir»i.KAL    iosepii    E.    fOHNSTUM 


103 


10y«  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

lowed  by  the  Union  troops ;  and  Corinth  was  once 
more  safe. 

The  losses  on  both  sides  had  been  fearful,  and  the 
disappointment  of  the  Confederates  was  all  the  greater 
on  account  of  their  preliminary  success.  Van  Dorn  re- 
tired behind  the  lagoons  and  marshes  from  which  he 
had  issued  forth,  followed  for  many  miles  by  the  Union 
troops,  who,  however,  ultimately  retired  to  their  former 
position.  The  desperately  contested  Western  campaign 
had  resulted  in  both  parties  reassuming,  with  but  few 
exceptions,  the  positions  they  had  held  at  the  beginning. 
In  many  respects  the  efforts  of  the  South  had  been 
amazing;  in  many  respects  the  blunders  of  the  North 
had  been  remarkable;  yet  the  North  was  still  in  the 
position  of  command,  and  the  independence  of  the  South 
was  still  a  doubtful  dream. 

On  the  defence  of  Port  Hudson  and  of  Vicksburg, 
the  hopes  of  the  Confederacy  in  the  West  now  mainly 
depended.  If  the  Southerners  could  retain  possession 
of  the  river  between  those  places,  they  would  probably 
be  able  to  hold  the  State  of  Mississippi,  and  in  that  case 
their  position  would  be  much  stronger  than  if  they  lost 
every  portion  of  the  river,  and,  as  a  consequence,  the 
vast  provinces  through  which  it  runs.  The  command 
of  the  West  was  given  to  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
who  commanded  the  Confederate  Army  at  Bull  Run,  but 
who  had  for  some  time  been  incapacitated  for  active 
service  by  the  serious  wounds  he  had  received  at  the 
battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  The  Mississippi  Army,  which 
included  the  garrisons  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson, 
was  placed  under  General  Pemberton,  who  acted  in 
subordination  to  Johnston;  the  Tennessee  forces  came 
also  under  the  supervision  of  that  able  commander. 
The  Union  forces  were  well  represented  in  the  Western 
States  by  two  large  armies,  one  commanded  by  Grant, 
and  the  other  by  Rosecrans.     The  main  body  of  Grant's 


MURFREESX  OR  0\ 


I05 


force  was  engaged  during  the  late  autumn  in  an  expedi- 
tion from  Western  Tennessee  into  Mississippi,  and  a 
detachment  was  being  organized  for  an  attack  on  Vicks- 
burg.  The  army  under  Rosecrans  was  stationed 
partly  at  Nashville,  and  partly  along  the  line  of  the 
Cumberland  River;  and  in  this  position  it  was  watched 
by  the  Confederates  under  Bragg,  who  was  assisted 
by  the  irregular  operations  of  his  guerilla  chieftains, 
Morgan  and  Forrest.  Rosecrans  did  not  at  that  time 
feel  himself  strong  enough  for  offensive  operations ; 
indeed,  it  was  as  much  as  he  could  do  to  defend  his 
position  against  the  frequent  incursions  of  his  active 
enemies.  It  was  found  necessary  to  fortify  Nashville, 
and  in  the  month  of  December  the  movements  of 
General  Morgan  were  such  as  to  excite  some  uneasi- 
ness. Hartsville,  a  small  town  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Cumberland,  was  taken  by  Morgan  in  the  early 
morning  of  December  7,  after  a  march  of  forty  miles 
through  snow  and  ice.  The  Union  troops  were  sur- 
prised by  the  sudden  appearance  of  the  enemy  on 
their  side  of  the  river,  which  they  had  considered  it 
impossible  to  cross  at  that  point.  Their  resistance 
was  slight,  and,  in  the  result,  about  1800  troops 
surrendered.  After  being  sent  as  prisoners  to  Mur- 
freesboro',  they  were  paroled,  and  permitted  to  de- 
part for  Nashville,  though  not  before  they  had  paid 
a  large  ransom  in  arms,  blankets,  and  overcoats. 
Shortly  afterwards,  Morgan  was  instructed  to  seize  the 
railway  between  Nashville  and  Louisville,  so  as  to 
isolate  some  of  the  Union  detachments,  while  Forrest 
threatened  Grant's  communications  with  Columbus. 

Rosecrans  abandoned  his  defensive  position  as  the 
year  was  drawing  to  a  close,  and  on  the  26th  advanced 
towards  his  opponents  at  the  head  of  a  large  and 
well-appointed  army.  Less  than  forty  miles  interposed 
between  Nashville  and  Murfreesboro' ;  but  the  progress 


io6  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

of  the  Union  troops  was  rendered  difficult  by  the 
Confederate  skirmishers  who  thronged  the  woods  on 
both  sides  of  the  road.  It  was  not  until  the  30th 
that  Rosecrans  reached  the  vicinity  of  Murfreesboro'. 
Fighting  took  place  that  day,  and  the  pickets  of  the 
Southern  commander,  Polk,  were  driven  in.  The  two 
armies  bivouacked  that  night  within  sight  of  each 
other's  fires,  and  Rosecrans  disposed  his  troops  for  the 
operations  of  the  morrow  as  well  as  the  difficult 
nature  of  the  country  would  permit.  The  land  was 
broken  up  into  a  number  of  low  hills,  which  concealed 
the  positions  of  the  enemy;  and  the  several  divisions 
of  the  Northern  force  were  so  hidden  from  one  another 
in  the  density  of  the  forest,  that  anything  in  the  nature 
of  general  supervision  became  almost  impossible.  The 
adversaries  were  now  fronting  one  another  on  the  banks 
of  a  stream  called  the  Stone  River,  and  portions  of  both 
forces  stood  on  both  sides  of  the  channel.  The  night 
of  the  30th  did  not  pass  in  perfect  inactivity  as  far  as 
the  Confederates  were  concerned.  A  brigade  of  their 
cavalry  moved  round  the  enemy's  rear  during  the  hours 
of  darkness,  and  made  so  vigorous  an  assault  on  the 
wagon-trains  that  stores  to  a  large  amount  were  cap- 
tured. The  movement  was  as  daring  as  it  was  success- 
ful— the  cavalry  actually  passing  round  the  whole  body 
of  the  Union  army,  so  that  they  rejoined  their  comrades 
on  the  opposite  flank  from  that  which  they  had  quitted. 
The  action  of  the  31st  was  commenced  by  Bragg,  who 
ordered  his  left  wing  to  advance,  when  the  Union  forces 
were  again  taken  by  surprise,  and  driven  back  in  so 
much  confusion  that  several  guns  were  captured  before 
the  horses  could  be  harnessed.  Two  of  the  Union 
divisions  were  dispersed  in  rapid  succession,  and  word 
was  sent  to  Rosecrans  to  inform  him  of  the  misfortunes 
that  had  already  occurred.  Other  portions  of  the  army 
made  a  more  determined  stand,  and  the  Confederate 


MURFREESB  OR  O' 


107 


attack  was  finally  checked,  though  it  had  succeeded 
sufficiently  to  compel  the  whole  of  the  Union  right  and 
center  to  recede,  and  to  take  up  positions  very  different 
from  those  which  they  had  held  in  the  morning.  The 
right-hand  portion  of  the  left  wing  still  kept  its  ground 
between  the  Stone  River  and  the  railway  from  Nashville 
to  Murfreesboro';  but,  on  the  whole,  the  Union  forces 
had  been  seriously  injured  by  these  vigorous  operations. 
The  Confederates  had  not  purchased  their  success, 
such  as  it  was,  without  a  considerable  expenditure  of 
life.  The  Northern  troops,  driven  to  bay,  had  fought 
with  great  resolution,  and  their  opponents  had  suffered 
terribly.  A  brigade  of  Polk's  corps  had  lost  a  third  of 
its  number  in  attacking  the  division  commanded  by 
General  Sheridan;  and  in  other  quarters  the  destruction 
of  life  among  the  field  and  staff  officers  had  been  im- 
mense. The  new  positions  taken  up  by  the  Union  forces 
were  such  as  to  render  a  fresh  attack  extremely  difficult. 
Both  flanks  were  protected  by  streams,  with  bridges  and 
fords  in  the  rear;  and  the  spirit  of  the  troops  was  for 
the  most  part  good.  The  Union  left  was  planted  on  a 
hill  near  the  Stone  River,  and,  as  this  was  the  key  to 
the  whole  position,  the  partial  triumph  of  the  Con- 
federates was  not  of  much  value.  If  all  their  efforts 
were  not  to  be  thrown  away,  the  attack  must  be  renewed ; 
but  the  majority  of  the  Confederates  were  in  too 
exhausted  a  condition  to  resume  the  combat.  The 
change  in  the  Union  position  had  been  effected  early  in 
the  afternoon.  An  hour  or  two  later,  a  fresh  division, 
under  Breckinridge,  arrived  on  the  ground,  and  advanced 
against  the  enemy.  With  great  spirit  the  men  rushed 
up  a  rising  ground,  upon  the  top  of  which  the  Union 
forces  had  planted  a  powerful  line  of  batteries.  The 
contest  was  maintained  with  admirable  courage  ;  but  the 
Confederates,  notwithstanding  their  devotion,  could  make 
no  head  against  the  obstacles  to  which  they  were  op- 


io8  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

posed.  After  losing  many  of  their  number,  they  retired 
to  the  point  from  which  they  had  started ;  and,  as  dark- 
ness had  now  closed  in,  little  more  could  be  done  till 
the  morrow.  A  clear  moonlight  enabled  some  of  the 
Union  batteries  to  continue  their  fire,  but  with  this 
exception  the  night  passed  in  quiet.  Owing  to  the 
right  wing  of  the  Northern  Army  having  been  driven  in 
upon  the  left,  the  Confederates  were  now  in  possession 
of  a  large  part  of  the  field  which  in  the  morning  had 
been  occupied  by  the  Union  troops.  During  the  prog- 
ress of  the  battle,  the  communication  with  Nashville 
had  been  often  cut  off,  and  the  ammunition-train  of  the 
Union  right  wing  was  twice  captured  by  the  Southerners, 
and  twice  retaken  by  their  antagonists.  Thus,  on  the 
hard-fought  field  of  Murfreesboro',  the  old  year  came 
to  an  end,  and  on  the  following  day — January  i,  1863 
— both  armies  were  too  worn  out  by  what  they  had 
already  undergone  to  do  much  more  than  recombine 
their  shattered  ranks.  Detachments  were  sent  out  by 
the  Confederates  to  threaten  the  Union  communications, 
to  capture  supplies,  and  to  reconnoitre  the  condition  of 
the  enemy's  forces.  Rosecrans  withdrew  his  army  a 
short  distance  to  the  rear,  and  the  Southerners  then 
occupied  the  ground  between  the  river  and  the  railway. 
The  Union  troops,  who  were  reinforced  by  two  brigades, 
entrenched  themselves  where  they  stood ;  the  wounded 
were  sent  to  the  rear,  and  every  preparation  was  made 
to  dispute  any  renewed  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Con- 
federates to  get  possession  of  the  road  to  Nashville. 

On  the  morning  of  January  2,  demonstrations  were 
made  along  the  whole  Union  line;  but  operations  on  a 
large  scale  were  not  commenced  until  three  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  when  a  numerous  body  of  Confederates 
burst  upon  a  Union  division  which,  at  an  early  hour  of 
the  morning,  had  been  sent  bv  Rosecrans  to  take  ground 
once  more  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  river.     The  attack- 


MVRFREESB  ORO>. 


109 


mg  force  consisted  of  the  entire  right  wing,  and  for  a 
time  the  Union  troops  were  repulsed.  On  receiving  an 
addition  to  their  numbers,  however,  they  pressed  forward 
with  so  much  impetuosity  that  the  Confederates  gave 
way,  and,  leaving  many  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field, 
retired  to  their  own  lines.  In  this  conflict,  which  was 
obstinately  disputed  for  a  considerable  length  of  time, 
the  Southern  troops  lost  a  battery  and  a  stand  of  colors. 
Soon  afterwards,  Rosecrans  gave  the  order  for  the  entire 
line  to  advance,  when  the  Confederate  right  wing  was 
broken,  and  the  flank  so  seriously  menaced  that  Bragg 
considered  it  advisable  to  withdraw  the  whole  of  his 
forces.  Breckinridge's  division  had  been  completely 
mobbed,  and  but  for  the  interposition  of  a  brigade  from 
Polk's  corps,  which  checked  the  pursuit  and  saved  some 
of  the  abandoned  artillery,  the  disaster  might  have  been 
even  worse  than  it  was.  Night  fell  once  more  upon  a 
bloody  and  tumultuous  plain ;  and  next  day  each  army 
held  the  other  in  such  dread  that  very  little  was  even 
attempted.  Rosecrans  managed  so  skilfully  as  to  induce 
his  opponent  to  believe  that  large  reinforcements  had 
arrived  during  the  night.  This  finally  determined  the 
action  of  the  Confederate  general.  He  felt  that  he  was 
no  longer  able  to  maintain  his  position,  and  that  Mur- 
freesboro'  must  be  abandoned  if  Tennessee  was  to 
be  retained  at  all.  The  prisoners  and  baggage-wagons 
were  accordingly  sent  to  the  rear ;  at  eleven  o'clock  at 
night  the  army  commenced  its  retreat;  and  a  new  posi- 
tion was  soon  afterwards  taken  up  behind  the  Duck 
River,  some  fifty  miles  to  the  south  of  Murfreesboro*. 
That  town  was  occupied  by  the  Union  forces  on  the  5th, 
and  1500  of  the  Confederate  sick  and  wounded  were 
found  there  by  the  conquerors,  It  is  a  remarkable  fact 
that  in  this  series  of  battles  the  two  combatants  are 
thought  to  have  lost  about  the  same  number  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners.     Rosecrans,  in  his  report,  con- 


HO  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

fesses  to  having  been  deprived  of  8778  men.  If  we  are 
to  set  down  a  similar  number  on  the  Confederate  side, 
we  reach  a  total  loss  of  more  than  17,000.  Both  armies 
had  fought  with  singular  determination,  and,  being 
equally  matched,  they  had  inflicted  upon  one  another  a 
frightful  amount  of  injury.  Such  an  action  should  have 
been  a  turning-point  of  the  war;  but  unfortunately  its 
results  bore  little  proportion  to  the  cost. 

At  about  the  same  period,  the  guerilla  chief,  Forrest, 
had  been  unfortunate  in  his  attempts  to  sever  the  com- 
munications of  Grant's  army  in  Mississippi.  In  the 
latter  part  of  December,  1862,  he  effected  a  good  deal 
of  damage  to  the  various  bridges  and  lines  of  rail,  and 
captured  several  Union  detachments,  but  on  returning 
to  the  Confederate  lines,  was  attacked  on  two  sides  by 
separate  bodies  of  Northern  troops.  After  a  sharp  en- 
gagement, his  force  was  utterly  routed,  and  it  was  with 
difficulty  that  he  and  his  men  escaped  across  the 
river  into  Tennessee.  Morgan  was  rather  more  success 
ful,  but  the  amount  of  damage  inflicted  by  these  two 
leaders  was  of  a  petty  and  vexatious,  rather  than  a 
serious  character.  The  general  position  of  the  Union 
troops  in  the  West  was  not  materially  affected  by  the 
incursions  of  Morgan  and  Forrest,  and  the  minor  suc- 
cesses which  they  gained  were  accounted  very  poor 
compensation  for  the  Confederate  reverse  at  Murfrees- 
boro'.  Engagements  of  this  trivial  nature  continued 
to  occur  from  time  to  time ;  but  their  importance  is  not 
sufficient  to  merit  a  detailed  account. 

In  the  latter  days  of  1862,  Grant,  whose  headquarters 
were  at  Oxford,  Mississippi,  was  preparing  to  advance 
on  Granada,  the  point  of  junction  between  the  Memphis 
and  Mobile  and  the  Corinth  and  Mobile  Railways. 
While  doing  so,  his  depot  at  Holly  Springs  was 
vehemently  attacked,  on  December  19,  by  General  Van 
Dorn,  at  the  head  of  some  Texan  cavalry.     The    town 


GUERILLA   DEPREDATIONS.  m 

appears  to  have  been  badly  guarded ;  and  when  Van 
Dorn  dashed  into  it,  the  Union  troops  were  so  over- 
come by  surprise  that,  after  the  merest  pretence  at 
fighting,  the  garrison  laid  down  their  arms,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  few  cavalry,  who  escaped.  The  torch  was 
then  applied  to  the  vast  accumulations  of  flour,  cotton, 
and  other  stores  which  the  place  contained ;  the  rail- 
way, the  station  and  the  rolling  stock,  were  set  on  fire  ; 
and  the  explosion  of  the  magazine  caused  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  large  part  of  the  town.  Having  effected  his 
purpose,  Van  Dorn  got  safely  away,  and  Grant,  con- 
sidering that  his  plans  had  been  seriously  affected  by 
this  disaster,  abandoned  his  advance  into  Mississippi. 
Not  many  days  after,  Sherman,  who  commanded  a  de- 
tachment of  Grant's  army,  was  unfortunate  in  a  renewed 
attack  on  Vicksburg.  He  had  under  his  direction  four 
divisions,  commanded  by  Generals  Steele,  Morgan,  M. 
L.  Smith  and  A.  J.  Smith.  His  force  embarked  at 
Memphis,  Tennessee,  on  December  20,  and  next  day 
was  joined  by  Porter,  with  two  gunboats.  The  main 
body  of  the  fleet  was  at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Yazoo, 
wh'ch  flows  into  the  Mississippi  a  few  miles  above 
Vicksburg.  The  expedition  now  descended  the  larger 
stream,  exposed  occasionally  to  the  attacks  of  sharp- 
shooters on  the  banks,  whose  assaults  were  revenged  by 
the  burning  of  houses,  and  the  destruction  of  much 
property.  The  discipline  of  the  men  was  extremely 
defective.  The  scene  of  confusion  at  the  embarkation 
was  such  as  to  reflect  discredit  on  all  concerned.  On 
the  night  of  the  24th,  and  early  morning  of  the  25th, 
the  detachment  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo. 
The  fleet  consisted  of  more  than  60  transports,  with  a 
number  of  ironclads  and  other  gunboats  and  several 
mortar-boats.  On  the  26th,  the  expedition  moved  up 
the  Yazoo,  and  troops  were  landed  at  various  points  ex- 
tending  over  a  distance  of  about   three   miles.     The 


H2       THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

assailants  were  now  eight  miles  from  the  point  of  attack, 
for  it  was  proposed  by  Sherman  to  assault  Vicksburg 
in  the  rear — that  is  to  say,  from  the  north-eastern  side. 
The  Confederates,  however,  had  already  erected  defences 
and  were  prepared  for  a  vigorous  resistance.  A  battery, 
reared  upon  a  bank  known  as  Haines'  Bluff,  barred  the 
progress  of  the  Union  gunboats  up  the  Yazoo;  and  be- 
tween that  bluff  and  the  threatened  city  itself  a  large 
number  of  Confederates  were  posted  on  a  line  of  low 
hills  stretching  along  Chickasaw  Bayou,  which  connects 
the  lower  part  of  the  Yazoo  with  a  bend  of  the  Missis- 
sippi a  little  above  Vicksburg.  Additional  batteries 
and  lines  of  breastworks  were  constructed  by  the 
Southern  forces  as  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  the 
Union  army  had  landed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Yazoo. 
Reinforcements  were  hurried  up  by  rail  from  Jackson, 
and  the  defenders  of  the  city  felt  so  confident  of  success 
that  several  of  the  civilians,  including  ladies,  stationed 
themselves  on  the  higher  bluffs,  to  watch  any  engage- 
ment that  might  occur. 

The  Union  troops  being  now  ranged  in  order  of  attack, 
the  division  under  Gen.  Steele  was  sent  to  a  point  above 
Chickasaw  Bayou,  to  operate  against  the  battery  which 
enfiladed  that  point  from  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line. 
Fighting  ensued  on  the  27th,  but  the  battery  was  not 
taken.  The  action  was  renewed  on  the  28th,  and  the 
Union  troops  then  attempted  to  cross  the  bayou,  so  as 
to  bring  their  left  and  center  into  combination.  Still  no 
impression  could  be  made  on  the  Confederate  position, 
which  every  hour  grew  stronger,  as  fresh  works  were 
thrown  up,  and  fresh  reinforcements  arrived  from  Jack- 
son. Nevertheless,  they  held  grimly  to  their  purpose 
and,  some  military  bridges  having  been  extemporized 
on  the  29th,  two  companies  of  the  6th  Missouri  Regi- 
ment crossed  the  bayou,  with  instructions  to  under- 
mine   the   bank    on    which    the    Confederates    stood. 


114 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


The  enterprise  was  one  of  great  peril ;  but  the  Mis- 
sourians  set  to  work  with  quiet  determination,  and  their 
spades  and  pick-axes  made  an  impression  on  the 
crumbling  earth.  The  sharpshooters  of  the  13th 
Regulars  opened  fire  on  the  defenders  of  the  bank,  to 
prevent  those  firing  on  the  men  below  ;  but  in  some 
instances  their  aim  was  inaccurate,  and  two  Union  men 
were  shot  dead  by  their  own  comrades.  The  Mis- 
sourians  called  out, "  Fire  higher  !  "  and  the  Confederates 
above  responded  with  the  exclamation,  "  Fire  lower !  " 
The  opposing  ranks  were  so  close  together  that  con- 
versation was  carried  on  between  the  two  lines.  "  What 
regiment  is  below  ?  "  asked  one  of  the  Confederates. 
"The  6th  Missouri,"  was  the  reply;  to  which  the 
Southerner  responded,  "  It  is  too  brave  a  regiment  to  be 
on  the  wrong  side."  These  Missourians  had  had  no 
food  for  several  hours,  and  one  of  them  called  out, 
"  Have  you  got  anything  to  eat  up  there  ?  I  am 
hungry."  A  large  loaf  of  bread  was  immediately 
thrown  down  to  them.  At  the  same  time  that  this 
attempt  was  being  made  to  undermine  the  bank,  the 
division  on  the  right  attacked  some  other  bluffs  beyond 
the  bayou.  An  advance  over  the  center  bridge  was  to 
have  been  made  at  this  juncture  ;  but,  owing  to  a  mis- 
take, the  order  was  not  given.  This  error  caused  the 
failure  of  the  whole  operation.  The  right  division,  not 
being  properly  supported  by  the  center,  was  repulsed 
with  great  loss,  and  night  came  on,  accompanied  by 
torrents  of  rain.  The  ground,  at  the  best  low  and 
marshy,  was  converted  in  a  little  while  into  a  muddy 
swamp,  where  the  wounded  dropped  in  their  exhaus- 
tion, and,  being  beyond  the  reach  of  assistance, 
perished  miserably  in  the  ooze,  dying  either  of  exposure 
to  the  cold,  or  of  absolute  suffocation  in  the  slough. 
The  Union  forces  had  lost  3000  men,  and  were  no 
nearer  the   realization  of  their  project  than  when  they 


GAL  VESTON. 


115 


had  begun.  At  one  time  during  the  30th,  it  was 
designed  to  attack  Haines'  Bluff;  but  a  heavy  fog 
came  on,  and  it  was  apparent  that  the  expedition  must 
be  abandoned.  The  troops  re-embarked  that  evening, 
and  returned  up  the  Mississippi.  Shortly  afterwards, 
Sherman  was  superseded  in  the  command  of  the 
detachment  by  McClernand,  and  the  force  was  divided 
into  two  corps,  under  Sherman  and  Morgan. 

The  failure  at  Vicksburg  took  place  in  the  final  days 
of  the  old  year.  On  the  first  day  of  the  new  year 
(1863),  the  Union  forces  experienced  another  misfortune 
in  the  recapture  of  Galveston,  Texas.  General  Ma- 
gruder,  having  collected  artillery  at  Houston,  marched 
towards  the  neighborhood  of  the  town  which  he 
designated  to  take,  and  occupied  in  force  the  works 
erected  opposite  the  island  on  which  that  town  is 
situated.  Two  steam-packets  he  converted  into  gun- 
boats, which  he  rendered  shot-proof  by  bulwarks  of 
cotton-bales.  The  boats  were  manned  by  Texan 
cavalry,  and  were  accompanied  in  their  expedition  by 
tenders  and  yachts,  filled  with  spectators  and  volunteers. 
As  the  troops  crossed  the  railway  bridge  which  con- 
nected the  island  with  the  continent,  the  gunboats 
steamed  up,  and  engaged  the  Union  gunboat  called  the 
Harriet  Lane.  The  latter  soon  drove  off  one  of  the 
Confederate  vessels  ;  but  the  other,  named  the  Bayou 
City,  continued  the  contest  with  great  determination. 
By  this  time,  the  land  troops  had  obtained  possession  of 
the  town,  and  the  Union  forces,  being  unprovided  with 
artillery,  surrendered  at  discretion.  The  blockade  in 
that  locality  was  at  once  raised,  and  the  port  was  re- 
opened to  commerce.  The  conclusion  of  1862  and  the 
commencement  of  1863  were  marked  by  serious  re- 
verses to  the  Union  arms.  The  future  was  involved  in 
clouds  and  darkness ;  yet  the  spirit  of  the  Northern 
people  did  not  fail  one  jot. 


CHAPTER    III. 

The  "Merrimac"  and  "Monitor"  (March  8,  1862). 

"At  the  outbreak  of  the  Rebellion,"  says  Swinton, 
"  an  enormous  disparity  was  visible  between  the  naval 
strength  of  the  Union  and  that  of  the  Confederacy.  The 
regular  war  steamers  of  the  United  States,  though 
scanty  in  number,  contained  some  of  the  finest  ships 
in  the  world.  On  this  navy  was  imposed  the  task  of 
blockading  3000  miles  of  seacoast,  stretching  from  Cape 
Henry  to  the  harbor  of  Galveston.  The  department 
bought  up  everywhere  the  vessels  of  the  mercantile 
marine,  and  every  floating  object  propelled  by  steam 
which  could  be  converted  into  a  war  vessel. 

"  The  Confederates  had  to  get  along  with  scantier 
means  of  provision.  They  wanted  to  break  up  the 
blockade,  to  repel  naval  forays  on  their  rivers  and 
coasts,  and  to  send  out  ocean  guerillas  to  cripple  the 
vast  commerce  of  the  Union.  For  this  purpose,  and 
for  most  of  the  blockade-runners,  they  relied  upon  the 
English  shipyards.  From  thence  came  the  Alabamas, 
the  Shenandoahs,  the  Sumters,  and  all  their  famous 
cruisers,  which  were  built,  furnished,  armed,  equipped, 
and  manned  in  English  ports." 

Shortly  before  McClellan's  temporary  advance  toward 

Manassas,  a    naval     action    took    place     in     Hampton 

Roads,  off  Fortress  Monroe,  which  was  a  perfectly  new 

experience  in  marine  warfare,  and  it  attracted  great  at- 

(116) 


Xt8  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

tention,  not  only  here,  but  throughout  the  world.  It 
revolutionized  the  mode  of  righting  at  sea,  and  rendered 
the  ships,  the  armaments,  and  the  tactics  of  Trafalgar  as 
obsolete  as  those  of  Actium.  Since  then,  all  maritime 
nations  have  been  compelled  to  arm  their  ships  with 
iron  plates  of  enormous  thickness,  to  invent  artillery  of 
ever-increasing  size  and  power,  and  to  depend  more  on 
revolving  turrets  than  on  the  old-fashioned  tiers  of 
guns.  There  has  been  no  great  naval  war  since  1862, 
and  we  are  still  ignorant  of  the  ultimate  effects  likely  to 
ensue  from  these  new  methods  of  warfare.  But  the 
combat  of  the  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor  drew  a  deep 
line  between  the  past  and  the  future  ;  and  the  naval 
heroes  of  days  to  come  will  have  to  fight  under  condi- 
tions the  nature  of  which  has  not  yet  been  fully  tested. 
The  Union  fleet  stationed  in  Hampton  Roads  con- 
sisted of  five  vessels,  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Marston,  of  the  Roanoke  ;  and  it  would  be  a  great  gain 
to  the  Southern  cause  if  these  could  be  destroyed  or 
taken.  The  Confederates  had  raised  and  refitted  the 
frigate  Merrimac,  which  had  been  sunk,  as  we  have 
seen,  on  the  evacuation  of  the  Navy  Yard  at  Norfolk. 
This  vessel  had  been  converted  into  a  shot-proof  steam- 
battery.  Its  proportions  had  been  cut  down,  and  its 
sides  plated  with  iron,  which  had  been  subjected  to  va- 
rious experiments,  calculated  to  show  the  resisting 
power  of  the  armor,  and  the  best  methods  of  manag- 
ing such  a  ship  when  in  actual  conflict  with  an  enemy. 
A  ram  had  also  been  added  to  its  appointments,  and 
the  Merrimac  was  now  in  a  condition  to  inflict  the 
maximum  of  injury  on  her  opponents,  while  receiving 
the  minimum  of  injury  herself.  Under  her  new  desig- 
nation of  the  Virginia,  the  Merrimac  bore  ten  guns — 
eight  at  the  sides,  one  at  the  bow,  and  one  at  the  stern  ; 
and  she  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Buchanan,  an  officer  who,  previously  to  the  Civil  War, 


THE   "MERRIMAC"  AND  "MONITOR." 


119 


had  been  in  charge  of  the  Washington  Navy  Yard. 
Towards  noon  on  March  8,  the  vessel  was  seen 
approaching  the  fleet  in  Hampton  Roads,  coming  from 
the  direction  of  Norfolk.  The  Union  ships  were  imme- 
diately prepared  for  action,  and  the  Cumberland  was 
laid  across  the  channel,  so  that  her  broadside  could  be 
brought  to  bear  on  the  Merrimac.  The  latter,  owing 
to  her  heavy  structure,  which  assimilated  her  appear- 
ance to  that  of  a  sunken  house,  with  the  chimney  just 
appearing  above  the  water,  could  not  move  with  much 
rapidity  ;  but  this  was  not  the  object  for  which  she  was 
designed.  At  the  distance  of  about  a  mile,  the  pivot- 
guns  of  the  Cumberland  opened  on  her,  but  without  the 
slightest  effect.  Not  deigning  to  reply  to  the  attack, 
she  continued  on  her  course,  receiving  a  broadside  from 
another  ship,  as  well  as  from  the  Cumberland,  but  giv- 
ing no  sign  that  she  was  at  all  injured  by  this  powerful 
cannonade.  She  now  fired  in  return,  and  again  received 
several  broadsides,  with  the  same  result  as  before.  The 
pilot  of  the  Cumberland,  in  a  statement  which  he 
afterwards  made,  spoke  of  the  balls  bouncing  from  her 
sides,  as  if  the  vessel  had  been  made  of  India-rubber. 
A  shot  from  one  of  her  guns  killed  five  marines  on 
board  the  Cumberland,  and  that  vessel,  being  unable  to 
escape,  was  soon  crushed  by  the  iron  horn  of  the  Mer- 
rimac, which  knocked  a  hole  in  her  side  near  the  water- 
line,  as  large  as  the  mouth  of  a  hogshead,  and  drove 
the  unfortunate  ship  back  upon  her  anchors  with  great 
force.  Although  the  water  came  rushing  into  the  hold 
with  the  utmost  violence,  the  Cumberland  replied  with 
spirit,  and  the  action  continued  for  half  an  hour.  The 
broadsides  of  the  Merrimac  were  doing  fearful  execu- 
tion on  the  deck  of  the  Union  ship,  which  caught  fire 
in  the  forward  part.  The  flames  were  soon  extinguished, 
but  the  water  proved  a  more  formidable  enemy.  Noth- 
ing could  keep  it  from  pouring  in  at  the  horrible  gash 


l2o  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

which  the  ram  had  torn  in  the  side  of  the  Cumberland, 
and,  although  the  guns  were  still  served  with  persist- 
ency, notwithstanding  that  the  dead  and  dying  layabout 
in  large  numbers,  the  bow  kept  sinking  deeper  and 
deeper  into  the  sea,  and  it  was  plain  that  the  injured 
ship  must  speedily  succumb  to  the  superior  power  of 
her  foe.  She  went  down  with  the  flag  still  flying;  and 
even  after  her  hull  had  grounded  on  the  sands,  54  feet 
below  the  surface  of  the  water,  the  pennant  was  yet 
seen  fluttering  from  the  topmast  above  the  waves. 
None  of  the  men  were  captured,  but  many  perished  as 
the  vessel  sank.  Of  the  400  on  board,  nearly  half 
were  killed  during  the  fight,  or  drowned  as  the  waters 
closed  above  the  wreck.  Some  of  the  crew  swam 
ashore,  and  others  were  rescued  by  small  boats;  but 
the  list  of  dead  was  lamentable.  The  only  consolation 
to  the  people  of  the  Union  was  to  be  found  in  the 
splendid  gallantry  which  had  been  exhibited,  and  the 
noble  sense  of  duty  which  kept  the  flag  flying  to  the 
last. 

The  Merrimac  now  attacked  the  Congress  at  a  distance 
of  240  yards,  and  getting  astern,  raked  her  fore  and  aft 
with  shells,  while  one  of  the  steamers  attending  on  the 
ironclad  kept  up  a  fire  on  the  starboard  quarter.  All 
this  while,  the  Merrimac  ranged  slowly  backwards  and 
forwards,  firing  broadside  after  broadside,  to  which  the 
Congress  replied  with  resolution,  but  with  scarcely  any 
effect  on  the  mailed  vessel  by  which  she  was  attacked. 
After  100  men  had  been  killed,  and  the  ship  had  taken 
fire  in  several  places,  and  with  no  relief  possible,  the 
Union  flag  was  hauled  down,  and  the  stubborn  contest 
ended.  The  remaining  officers,  and  a  portion  of  the 
crew,  escaped  on  shore;  the  others  were  taken  off  by  a 
Confederate  gunboat;  and  during  the  night  the  van- 
quished ship  was  burned  to  the  water's  edge,  and  sank. 
The    Congress  had   been   even  less  able  to    resist  her 


I22  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

opponent  than  the  Cumberland.  Her  only  means  of 
defence  were  two  guns  at  the  stern,  and  these  were  soon 
disabled.  The  Merrimac  was  accompanied  by  five 
armed  steamers,  which  took  part  in  the  action,  and 
placed  the  Union  ships  at  a  still  greater  disadvantage. 
To  make  matters  worse,  the  steamship  Minnesota,  which 
had  left  Fortress  Monroe  shortly  after  the  appearance 
of  the  Merrimac,  got  aground,  and  was  unable  to  render 
any  assistance.  The  frigate  St.  Lawrence,  which  fol- 
lowed her,  was  equally  unfortunate ;  and  the  Roanoke, 
which  also  made  an  attempt  to  reach  the  spot,  was 
obliged  to  return,  owing  to  the  shallowness  of  the  water. 
On  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  the  Merrimac,  ac^ 
companied  by  two  other  vessels,  proceeded  towards 
the  Minnesota,  which  lay  some  three  miles  below  New- 
port News,  quite  unable  to  stir,  having  grounded  while 
the  tide  was  running  ebb.  The  commander  of  the  iron- 
clad, wishing  to  capture  the  grounded  vessel  without 
inflicting  any  serious  injury,  made  no  attempt  to  run 
her  down,  but,  standing  off  about  a  mile,  threw  shot 
and  shell  into  her.  The  Minnesota  replied  with  so 
much  animation  that  one  of  the  steamers  attending 
the  Merrimac  caught  fire,  and  was  towed  off  by  her 
companion.  At  nightfall,  the  Minnesota  still  remained 
untaken,  and  the  Merrimac  steamed  in  behind  Sewall's 
Point.  The  effect  of  the  day's  operations  was  alarming 
to  the  Unionists  in  the  neighborhood  of  Hampton 
Roads.  They  anticipated  that  the  terrible  stranger 
would  again  appear  on  the  following  morning,  and 
resume  its  work  of  destruction,  to  which,  it  seemed, 
no  effective  resistance  could  be  offered.  It  was  only 
too  probable  that  the  Minnesota  would  be  taken  ;  that 
all  the  other  ships  would  be  sunk  or  driven  off;  that 
the  stores  and  warehouses  on  the  beach  would  be  fired; 
and  that  the  troops  would  be  compelled  to  seek  refuge 
in   the    fortress.     A    great    surprise,  however,    was    in 


THE  "MERRIMAC"  AND  "MONITOR. 


123 


preparation,  both  for  the  Union  men  and  for  the  Merru 
mac.  An  ironclad,  called  the  Monitor,  had  just  been 
completed  at  New  York,  and  was  taken  in  tow  by  a 
steam-tug  on  the  6th  of  March.  Her  destination  was 
Hampton  Roads,  and  it  was  intended  that  she  should 
be  used  against  the  Confederate  ironclad,  of  which  the 
Government  had  received  some  information.  The 
Monitor  was  a  small  vessel,  more  like  a  raft  than  a 
ship-of-war ;  she  was  derisively  called  "  A  Yankee 
cheese  box;"  but  her  construction  admirably  fitted  her 
for  the  kind  of  naval  encounters  which  now  seemed 
likely  to  be  general.  She  was  built  in  two  parts,  form- 
ing an  upper  and  a  lower  vessel.  The  length  of  the 
upper  vessel,  which  was  shot-proof  above  the  water- 
mark, was  172  feet;  that  of  the  lower  vessel,  124  feet. 
Of  these  two  vessels,  the  depth  of  the  former  was  five 
feet,  and  of  the  latter  six  feet  six  inches;  with  a  breadth, 
in  the  one  case,  of  41  feet  4  inches,  and,  in  the  other,  of 
36  feet  at  the  top,  and  18  feet  at  the  bottom.  The  sides 
of  the  upper  vessel  were  constructed  of  25-inch  thick- 
ness of  oak,  coated  with  iron  plates  of  5-inch  thickness. 
The  turret,  built  of  8-inch  plates  of  rolled  iron,  increased 
in  thickness  near  the  portholes  to  II  inches.  The  deck, 
which  was  of  8-inch  thickness  of  oak,  was  coated  with  2- 
inch  plates  of  wrought  iron.  The  pilot-house  was  built 
of  9-inch  plates  of  forged  iron,  but  in  the  event  it  was 
found  to  be  of  insufficient  strength.  The  vessel  drew 
10  feet  of  water ;  the  height  of  her  turret  was  9  feet,  the 
diameter  21  feet.  She  was  armed  with  two  Dahlgren 
guns,  carrying  shot  or  shell  of  from  162  to  168  pounds' 
weight.  The  deck  was  from  two  to  three  feet  above 
water ;  the  cabins,  which  were  below  the  water,  were 
lighted  artificially  day  and  night;  and  the  commander's 
post  was  in  the  pilot-house,  whence  he  directed  the 
steering  of  the  vessel  and  the  movement  of  the  turret. 
The  architect  of  this  remarkable  ship  was  Captain  Erics- 


124 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


son,  and  great  reliance  was  placed  on  its  power  to  meet 
any  floating  battery  which  the  Confederates  could  bring 
into  the  water. 

At  ten  o'clock  on  the  night  of  March  8,  shortly 
after  the  disappearance  of  the  Merrimac,  the  Monitor 
entered  Hampton  Roads,  and  took  up  a  station  near  the 
Minnesota.  The  crew  of  that  vessel  were  greatly  re- 
lieved in  the  appearance  of  this  much-needed  friend  ; 
but  the  powers  of  the  Monitor  had  yet  to  be  tried  ;  and 
it  was  still  uncertain  whether  she  would  be  able  to  cope 
with  the  Confederate  ironclad.  Her  appearance  was 
so  unwonted  that  it  was  impossible  for  ordinary  sea- 
men to  form  any  precise  idea  as  to  her  powers.  Her 
deck  was  unprotected  by  any  bulwarks,  and  stood  not 
more  than  two  feet  above  the  water.  The  heavy  tur- 
ret and  the  dwarfish  pilot-house  were  strange  features 
in  a  sea-going  vessel ;  indeed,  the  structure  of  the  Mon- 
itor was  so  novel  that,  before  she  was  launched,  doubts 
were  entertained  as  to  whether  she  would  float  at  all. 
Nevertheless  there  she  was  in  Hampton  Roads ;  and, 
although  she  had  encountered  a  heavy  gale  on  her 
passage,  and  had  suffered  not  a  little  from  the  effects  of 
the  storm,  she  had  proved  herself  seaworthy.  What- 
ever the  result  of  the  morrow's  action,  she  would  un- 
doubtedly fight ;  and  the  surprise  in  preparation  for  the 
Merrimac  had  a  character  that  was  truly  dramatic. 

During  the  night  the  Monitor  lay  between  the  Minne- 
sota and  Fortress  Monroe  ;  so  that  when  the  Confederate 
vessel  approached  in  the  early  morning,  the  presence  of 
the  new-comer  was  entirely  concealed.  The  Merrimac 
had  been  a  good  deal  damaged  in  the  action  of  the  pre- 
vious day.  In  men  she  had  indeed  lost  only  two  killed 
and  eight  wounded,  though  among  the  latter  was  her 
commander,  Captain  Buchanan  ;  but  the  vessel  itself 
was  much  the  worse  for  the  encounter.  Two  of  the 
guns  were  disabled  ;  the  anchor  and  the  flag-staff  were 


r26  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

shot  away  ;  the  smokestack  and  steam-pipes  were  rid- 
dled; the  prow  was  twisted;  the  armor  was  battered, 
and  the  ram  was  wrenched.  The  officers,  nevertheless, 
felt  perfect  confidence  in  the  ability  of  their  vessel  to 
dispose  of  all  the  Union  ships  which  they  expected  to 
fight.  At  six  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  the 
ironclad  was  observed  rounding  the  point  of  land  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Elizabeth  River,  accompanied  by  two  of 
her  satellites.  It  must  have  been  with  some  astonish- 
ment that  the  crew  of  the  Merrimac,  shortly  afterwards, 
saw  emerging  from  the  further  side  of  the  Minnesota  a 
small  dark  vessel,  with  an  ironclad  turret  which  rose 
almost  sheer  out  of  the  water.  The  two  floating  bat- 
teries approached  one  another,  and  the  Monitor  was  the 
first  to  open  fire,  which  she  did  at  the  distance  of  a  hun- 
dred yards.  Her  antagonist  at  once  replied,  and  a 
vigorous  interchange  of  shots  went  on,  at  first  with 
rapidity,  but  afterwards  with  slowness  and  caution.  The 
distance  between  the  two  combatants  varied  from  fifty  to 
two  hundred  yards,  and  it  was  found  that  the  Monitor 
could  move  with  greater  speed  than  her  opponent,  and 
was  more  easily  turned.  The  Merrimac  soon  discovered 
that  she  had  her  match  in  the  strange-looking  craft 
which  had  so  suddenly  started  out  of  the  waves.  She 
had  begun  by  attacking  the  Minnesota  ;  but  it  was  now 
evident  that  she  had  quite  enough  to  do  in  holding  her 
own  against  the  Monitor.  For  a  little  while  the  Merri- 
mac ran  aground,  but,  on  getting  afloat  again,  steamed 
up  the  harbor  towards  Elizabeth  River,  followed  closely 
by  the  Monitor.  Her  shot  produced  no  effect,  and  the 
Merrimac  now  made  an  attempt  to  run  down  her  formi- 
dable antagonist.  Five  times  did  these  two  ironclads 
come  into  collision ;  but  the  Merrimac  s  ram,  already 
injured  by  the  first  day's  action,  was  by  this  time  en- 
tirely broken,  and  her  engines  were  of  insufficient 
strength  to  propel  her  with  the  necessary  speed.     Each 


THE   "MERRIMAC"   AND    THE   "MONITOR." 


127 


time  that  the  vessels  struck  one  another,  one  of  the 
guns  of  the  Monitor  was  discharged  directly  against 
the  plated  sides  of  the  Merrimac,  and  the  latter  replied 
by  bringing  her  guns  to  bear  on  the  turret  and  pilot- 
house of  her  adversary. 

The  Monitor  withdrew  between  one  and  two  P  M.,  owing 
to  her  commander  having  been  injured  in  the  eyes  by 
a  shot  which  struck  the  pilot-house.  The  disappearance 
of  the  Union  ironclad  was  viewed  by  the  captain  of  the 
Minnesota  with  dismay  ;  but  he  was  shortly  afterwards 
relieved  by  seeing  the  Merrimac  and  her  companions 
steam  up  the  river  towards  Norfolk.  The  great  misfor- 
tune the  Monitor  experienced  in  the  loss  of  her  deter- 
mined commander  prevented  her  from  pursuing,  and 
forcing  the  battle  to  a  surrender.  No  one  had  been 
killed  on  board  either  vessel.  The  Merrimac  was  a 
good  deal  damaged.  During  the  fight,  the  working  of 
the  Monitor  guns  had  been  directed  from  the  pilot- 
house by  signals  to  the  first  lieutenant  stationed  in  the 
turret ;  and  the  action  proved  that  vessels  of  this  char- 
acter were  capable  of  effective  handling. 

Concerning  this  eventful  action,  Swinton  remarks : 
"  Had  the  Merrimac  continued  the  triumphant  career 
which  she  began,  it  is  difficult  to  compute  her  possible 
devastation.  Beginning  with  the  Minnesota,  which  she 
would  quickly  overcome,  she  would  have  burst  through 
the  Union  fleet  in  Hampton  Roads  like  an  avenging 
fury,  destroying  everything  in  her  course,  and  scatter- 
ing all  she  did  not  destroy.  The  wooden  fleet  would 
have  been  powerless  against  this  one  mailed  monster, 
as  the  story  of  the  first  day's  battle  tells."  There  cer- 
tainly was  a  Providence  in  the  timely  arrival  of  this 
David  before  the  modern  naval  Goliath. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Peninsula  Campaign,  from  Yorktown  to  Get- 
tysburg  ( 1 862-1 863). 

Inspired  by  the  better  condition  of  their  armies,  the 
Northern  people,  in  the  early  days  of  1862,  became 
eagerly  desirous  for  another  advance  on  the  Potomac. 
The  Confederate  position  was  unquestionably  strong; 
the  troops  who  had  conquered  at  Bull  Run  and  Ball's 
Bluff  seemed  capable  of  conquering  again ;  and  the 
country  undoubtedly  presented  many  difficulties  to  an 
invading  force.  McClellan  had  spent  eight  months 
organizing  and  disciplining  his  army;  and  the  people 
wearied  of  his  cautious  tactics,  and  murmured  at  his 
"  masterly  inactivity." 

In  order  to  give  a  clear  account  of  the  campaigns 
about  Washington  and  Richmond,  down  to  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  we  shall  present  all  these  operations  as 
one  continuous  narrative. 

McClellan's  plan  was  to  march  against  Richmond 
from  the  lower  part  of  Chesapeake  Bay,  by  way  of 
Urbana,  on  the  Rappahannock.  The  town  was  not  far 
from  Richmond,  and  could  be  approached  by  vessels 
of  heavy  draught.  Its  occupation  would  compel  the 
enemy  to  abandon  his  positions  near  Manasses,  so  as  to 
cover  Richmond  and  Norfolk.  The  President  did  not 
approve  of  this  scheme  ;  he  thought  it  would  be  safer  to 
march  around  Alexandria,  or  the  entrenchments  at 
(128) 


130 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


Bull  Run.  He,  therefore,  ordered  a  general  movement, 
on  February  22,  1862,  of  the  land  and  naval  forces 
against  the  enemy's  positions  on  the  Potomac.  But  the 
early  weeks  of  the  year  slipped  by  without  anything 
decisive  being  done. 

On  March  10,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  withdrew 
from  his  lines  near  Manasses,  and  took  up  a  new  posi- 
tion better  adapted  to  support  the  defences  on  the 
Yorktown  peninsula.  Washington  being  full  of  spies, 
Johnston  had  been  informed  of  the  contemplated  move- 
ment. Great  disappointment  was  felt  in  the  North  that 
it  was  no  longer  possible  to  avenge  the  defeat  of  Bull 
Run  on  the  very  ground  where  it  had  been  suffered. 

At  length  the  main  body  of  the  Union  army  crossed 
the  Potomac  into  Virginia.  Now  came  tremendous 
downfalls  of  rain  which  rendered  the  fords  on  the  large 
rivers  impassable,  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  inter- 
posed another  obstacle  to  any  advance,  and  it  was 
speedily  seen  that  the  route  by  the  sea  was  the  only 
route  open.  The  army  was  countermarched  ;  and  owing 
to  the  insufficiency  of  transports  a  fortnight  elapsed 
before  the  85,000  men  could  be  conveyed  to  Fortress 
Monroe. 

Winchester. — General  Banks  was  to  open  communi- 
cations with  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  where  the 
Confederates  were  still  in  force.  He  occupied  Win- 
chester, on  March  12,  and  General  Shields  advanced  to 
Strasburg,  where  a  strong  body  of  Confederates  were 
posted  under  "  Stonewall  "  Jackson.  Here,  on  the  23d, 
Shields  was  attacked  by  Jackson,  and  he  retreated  to 
Winchester.  The  Confederates  were  driven  back,  but 
the  battle  was  obstinately  contested. 

A  little  before  the  advance  towards  Manasses,  took 
place  the  naval  action  between  the  Monitor  and  the 
Merrimac.  McClellan  felt  free  to  change  his  base  of 
operations  when  the  ability  of  the  Monitor  to  encounter 


YORKTOWN. 


131 


the  Merrimac  became  known  to  him.  On  April  1,  he 
reached  Fortress  Monroe,  and  then  learned  that  the 
naval  fleet  could  render  but  little  assistance.  The 
Merrimac  still  kept  the  forces  in  terror,  and  the  James 
River  was  practically  closed  by  its  lurking  presence. 
It  was  too  late  to  draw  back,  and  56,000  men,  and  IOO 
guns,  forming  the  first  detachment,  began  their  march 
to  Yorktown. 

Yorktown  (May  4,  1862). — General  Magruder,  who 
opposed  McClellan,  had  defended  the  Yorktown  Penin- 
sula by  a  line  of  entrenchments,  extending  13  miles. 
Yorktown  was  very  slightly  fortified,  but  the  York 
River  was  dominated  by  powerful  water  batteries,  and 
by  various  works  on  Gloucester  Point.  Magruder  had 
but  11,000  men;  of  these  6000  were  at  Yorktown,  and 
5000  were  strung  along  this  long  line  of  defence. 

McClellan  had  90,000  infantry,  iopoo  cavalry,  330 
field-guns,  and  a  siege  train  of  103  guns.  It  seems 
remarkable  that  he  should  not  have  struck  a  telling 
blow  at  an  adversary  so  slenderly  supported,  and  owing 
his  safety  to  the  line  of  works  by  which  he  was  covered. 

On  May  16,  General  Smith  forced  a  passage  across 
Warwick  Creek,  and  18  pieces  of  artillery  were  brought 
to  play  on  the  Confederate  trenches.  These  troops 
were  attacked,  and  after  a  sharp  combat,  they  were 
driven  back  with  considerable  loss.  McClellan's  hesi- 
tating nature  again  declared  itself.  He  gave  up  the 
direct  attack  on  the  enemy's  works,  and  undertook  the 
slower  operations  of  a  siege. 

At  the  beginning  of  May,  it  was  generally  believed 
in  the  Union  ranks  that  all  the  batteries  would  open  fire 
on  the  Confederate  works  in  a  very  few  days.  This 
would  probably  have  been  the  case  but  that  the  enemy, 
losing  heart,  determined  to  evacuate  his  positions.  In 
the  early  morning  of  May  4,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
Confederate  Army  had  retired,  and  McClellan  ordered 


132 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


a  vigorous  pursuit.  The  Union  forces  had  antici- 
pated a  signal  victory  at  Yorktown,  and  this  sudden 
disappearance  of  the  foe  was  a  great  and  bitter  disap- 
pointment. The  capture  of  the  place  was  a  gain  of  a 
certain  kind,  but  it  was  not  the  brilliant  success  desired 
and  expected  by  the  country.  The  Southerners  had 
accomplished  their  object.  They  had  delayed  the  ap- 
proach to  Richmond;  had  given  the  authorities  time  foi 
increasing  the  defences  of  the  city;  and  brought  the 
hot  season  nearer.  The  tedious  work  of  crushing  out 
the  Confederacy  at  its  capital  had  to  be  begun  afresh. 
The  pursuit  of  the  Confederates  was  conducted  by  a 
strong  force  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  under 
General  Stoneman.  It  was  hoped  to  cut  off  a  portion 
of  the  rear-guard ;  but  the  hope  proved  delusive.  The 
retreaters  were  conducting  their  movement  in  good  order. 

Stoneman's  advance-guard  at  length  caught  up  with 
the  Confederate  rear-guard,  close  to  Fort  Magruder. 
The  fort  opened  fire,  and  a  gallant  attempt  was  made 
by  the  Union  forces  to  take  the  position ;  but  it  was 
impossible  for  a  mere  force  of  cavalry  to  take  a  fortified 
post,  and  Stoneman  was  obliged  to  retire.  The  infantry 
did  not  arrive  till  after  the  skirmish  had  terminated,  and 
the  conflict  could  not  be  renewed.  During  the  night 
rain  fell  to  such  an  extent  that  in  the  morning  the  roads 
were  converted  into  channels  of  mud,  which  rendered 
necessary  the  laying  down  of  planks.  The  delay  thus 
created  was  very  prejudicial  to  the  Union  forces  and 
equally  advantageous  to  the  Confederates.  The  latter 
had  now  reached  the  narrowest  part  of  the  peninsula 
between  the  James  and  York  Rivers,  and  had  there 
fortified  themselves  in  the  city  of  Williamsburg ;  which 
it  was  now  proposed  to  attack. 

Williamsburg. — On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  General 
Hooker's  division  attacked  the  Confederates'  forces  with 
infantry  and  artillery.     The  forts   opened  fire,  and  the 


GENERAL    GEORGE    B.    MCCLELLAN. 


Union — 9 


*33 


*34 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


advancing  columns  were  driven  back  after  nine  hours 
of  hard  fighting.  They  retired  to  the  woods  and  held 
their  ground  till  other  divisions  came  up.  Deluging 
rains  descended  on  the  men  hurrying  to  Hooker's  relief. 
The  sound  of  the  cannon  was  heard  in  front,  but  the 
advancing  divisions  could  not  hasten  their  pace.  On 
McClellan's  arrival,  new  dispositions  were  ordered, 
which  soon  produced  their  effect.  The  enemy  was 
attacked  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  and  driven  back. 
In  two  hours  the  battle  was  over.  The  Confederates 
evacuated  Williamsburg  during  the  night,  and  Mc- 
Clellan's army  entered  unopposed. 

The  Southern  troops  were  now  on  their  way  to  Rich- 
mond, and  the  Union  forces  were  not  in  a  condition  to 
pursue  at  once.  Some  desultory  fighting  occurred,  but 
the  Confederates  reached  Richmond,  with  their  bag- 
gage, and  their  supply  train.  They  found  it  necessary 
to  evacuate  Norfolk.  Some  of  the  stores  were  saved  ; 
the  rest,  together  with  several  steamers  and  other  ves- 
sels, were  destroyed ;  and  the  Confederate  force 
marched  for  Richmond  on  May  10.  Norfolk  was  at 
once  occupied  by  General  Wool.  Both  shores  of  the 
James  River  were  now  occupied  by  the  Union  troops, 
and  Commodore  Tatnall,  who  now  commanded  the 
Merrimac,  believing  he  could  not  save  the  vessel, 
ordered  hei-  to  be  run  ashore,  set  fire  to,  and 
blown  up.  Delivered  from  their  enemy,  the  Union  gun- 
boats pushed  on  to  within  twelve  miles  of  Richmond, 
but  on  May  15  were  worsted  in  an  encounter  with  some 
Confederate  batteries  at  Drury's  Bluff.  In  the  mean- 
while McClellan's  forces  were  moving  on  Richmond  by 
the  line  of  the  Pamunkey,  and  on  the  2 1st  the  advance- 
guard  had  reached  the  River  Chickahominy.  The  Con- 
federate capital  was  now  near  at  hand,  but  the  most 
difficult  and  dangerous  part  of  the  expedition  remained 
to  be  accomplished. 


SHENANDOAH   VALLEY. 


135 


Shenandoah  Valley. — About  the  middle  of  April 
Banks  had  advanced  along  the  Shenandoah  River,  and 
established  himself  at  Newmarket.  To  his  right  was 
Fremont  (at  Franklin) ;  to  his  left  McDowell,  who  had 
occupied  Fredericksburg,  after  its  surrender.  Stonewall 
Jackson  commanded  the  Confederate  forces  in  the 
Valley.  He  had  fewer  men  at  his  disposal,  but  his 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  country,  combined  with  his 
military  tact,  gave  him  great  advantage  over  his  Union 
opponents. 

Banks  incautiously  advanced  up  the  Valley,  and  Jack- 
son retreating,  drew  Banks  after  him.  Banks  saw  that 
Jackson  was  in  a  dangerous  position.  He  was  placed 
between  the  regiments  of  Banks,  moving  from  the  east, 
and  the  advance-guard  of  Fremont's  army,  under  Mil- 
roy,  coming  from  the  west.  By  rapid  marches  he  got 
away  from  Banks,  and  hastened  to  the  relief  of  a  Con- 
federate detachment  menaced  by  Milroy's  division. 
Having  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  on  that  body,  he 
turned  back  with  masterly  suddenness  on  Banks.  A 
detachment  of  1200  men,  under  Colonel  Kenly,  were 
overpowered  and  nearly  all  killed,  wounded  or  captured. 
Banks,  fearing  to  be  cut  off,  retreated  to  Winchester. 
An  encounter  with  the  Confederates  on  the  25th,  out- 
side the  town,  ended  in  the  defeat  of  the  Union  troops, 
who  were  driven  as  far  as  Martinsburg;  whence  they 
continued  their  course  to  the  Potomac.  Since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  retreat  they  had  marched  53  miles  (35 
miles  of  which  were  performed  in  one  day).  Jackson 
was  not  strong  enough  to  pursue,  and  did  not  venture 
upon  crossing  the  Potomac. 

The  fears  prevailing  at  Washington  calmed  down 
after  a  few  days,  when  it  was  found  nothing  more  was 
attempted ;  and  reinforcements  were  sent  to  Banks  at 
Harper's  Ferry.  He,  with  Fremont  (at  Franklin),  and 
McDowell  (at  Fredericksburg),  were  ordered  to  capture 


1 36 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


Jackson.  His  position  was  now  extremely  dangerous ; 
but  by  the  excellence  of  his  arrangements,  and  the  cool- 
ness and  audacity  of  himself  and  his  men,  he  escaped. 
He  rapidly  retreated,  burning  the  bridges  as  he  passed 


GENERAL   THOMAS    J.    JACKSON-   ("STONEWALL"). 


Fremont  stopped  him  at  Cross  Keys  (June  8).  The 
losses  on  both  sides  were  heavy,  but  Jackson  had  the 
best  of  the  action,  and  the  Union  troops  were  not  in  a 
position  to  prevent  Jackson  falling  upon  Shields,  who 
struck  at  him  at  Port  Republic  the  next  day,  but  was 


FAIR    OAKS. 


1 37 


driven  back,  and  Jackson  made  good  his  escape  from  the 
Valley,  having  burned  the  bridges  behind  him. 

With  15,000  men  Jackson  occupied  the  attention  of 
three  generals  and  60,000  men,  prevented  McDowell's 
junction  with  McClellan,  alarmed  Washington,  and 
saved  Richmond. 

Fair  Oaks  (May  31,  1862). — Jackson's  success  in 
the  Valley  embarrassed  McClellan's  operations  in  his 
advance  on  Richmond.  It  deprived  him  of  the  assist- 
ance of  McDowell's  corps,  and  introduced  an  element 
of  uncertainty  into  the  whole  campaign.  Lincoln  in- 
sisted on  the  immediate  attack  of  Richmond.  McClellan, 
therefore,  ordered  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to  be  pushed 
forward  in  the  direction  of  Hanover  Court  House.  On 
May  27,  General  Porter  marched  at  the  head  of  the 
Fifth  Corps.  The  Confederates  were  attacked,  and  re- 
treated, followed  by  the  Union  cavalry  and  a  portion  of 
the  infantry.  The  bridges  over  the  Pamunkey  were 
burned,  and  the  adjacent  railway  was  destroyed,  after  an 
action,  in  which  700  of  the  Confederates  were  brought 
in  prisoners.  The  main  body  of  McClellan's  army  was 
thus  enabled  to  advance,  and  at  the  close  of  May  the 
several  corps  were  stationed  on  a  curved  line  not  far 
from  Richmond.  Two  of  these  corps  had  been  pushed 
beyond  the  Chickahominy  River,  and  were  exposed  to  a 
dangerous  attack  in  the  absence  of  their  comrades,  from 
whom  they  were  separated  by  the  stream  at  their  back. 
Johnston  had  under  his  orders  an  army  consisting  of  four 
divisions,  commanded  by  Generals  Longstreet,  Smith, 
D.  H.  Hill  and  Huger,  all  of  whom  had  formerly  served 
in  the  U.  S.  Army.  It  was  determined  to  attack  the 
left  wing  of  the  Union  forces  on  the  morning  of  May  31  ; 
but  the  rains  made  the  roads  so  heavy  and  difficult  that 
one  division  of  the  Southern  army  was  unable  to  reach 
the  post  to  which  it  had  been  assigned,  and  was  there- 
fore prevented  from  taking  part  in  the  action.     Long- 


j 38  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

street  nevertheless  ordered  Hill's  division  to  commence 
the  attack  at  2  P.  m.  Casey's  division  of  the  Union  Army 
bore  the  brunt  of  the  assault.  Several  of  the  troops  fell 
back,  and  the  camp  was  captured,  together  with  the 
hospital  and  baggage-wagons.  A  stand  was  subse- 
quently made,  and  Casey  sent  word  that  he  was  being 
hard  pressed,  and  needed  reinforcements.  Some  time 
elapsed  before  Sumner  could  effect  the  passage  of  the 
the  stream  ;  but  he  at  length  did  so  by  means  of  two 
hastily-constructed  bridges.  The  battle  in  the  meanwhile 
had  become  hot,  and  the  right  of  the  Union  left  wing 
was  driven  back  with  great  loss.  Johnston  personally 
directed  the  attack  until,  wounded  by  the  splinter  of  a 
shell,  he  fell  from  his  horse,  and  broke  two  of  his  ribs, 
when  the  command  devolved  on  General  Smith.  Sum- 
ner's arrival  did  little  to  change  the  relative  positions  of 
the  combatants.  The  Unionists  continued  to  fall  back  ; 
the  Confederates  continued  to  advance  ;  and  it  was  only 
night  which  put  an  end  to  the  combat. 

The  two  armies  bivouacked  that  night  on  the  field  for 
which  they  had  so  furiously  contended,  and  the  Confed- 
erates were  reinforced  by  Huger's  division,  which  had 
overcome  the  difficulties  of  the  muddy  and  forest-cum- 
bered roads.  The  engagement  was  renewed  early  next 
morning.  It  was  now  the  Unionists  that  attacked,  and 
the  Confederates,  finding  themselves  opposed  by  large 
bodies  of  fresh  troops,  fought  with  considerable  languor 
and  hesitation,  and,  after  a  struggle  of  five  hours'  dura- 
tion, were  repulsed  along  the  whole  line.  The  Union 
troops  again  stood  on  the  ground  they  had  occupied 
before  the  first  day's  operations.  McClellan  arrived 
towards  the  close  of  the  battle.  There  was  little  for  him 
to  do ;  but  much  for  him  to  see,  and  that  of  the  most 
distressing  nature. 

The  Confederates  had  suffered  equally  with  their 
adversaries,    and    endured    the    mortification    of  losing 


THE  SEVEN-DAYS  BATTLES. 


139 


the  battle.  Their  retreat  was  facilitated  by  the  forests 
which  covered  the  face  of  the  country ;  and  even  had  the 
land  been  more  open,  it  is  probable  that  little  would 
have  been  done  in  the  way  of  pursuit,  owing  to  the 
exhausted  state  of  the  conquerors.  The  Union  troops 
lay  down  on  the  ground  which  they  had  won.  The 
contest  had  bean  of  a  very  sanguinary  nature.  During 
the  two  days'  fighting  the  North  lost  7000  men  ;  the 
South  also  suffered  terribly ;  yet  this  obstinately  con- 
tested battle  was  attended  by  no  definite  or  decisive 
result. 

Both  armies  entrenched  themselves  in  the  positions 
they  had  assumed  at  the  close  of  the  battle,  which  had 
been  designated  from  two  localities  on  the  field,  that  of 
Fair  Oaks,  or  Seven  Pines.  McClellan  applied  to 
Washington  for  reinforcements  ;  but  the  necessity  of 
checking  Jackson  in  the  Valley  prevented  the  President 
from  sending  any  fresh  troops  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Richmond. 

Johnston's  injuries  were  so  severe  as  to  compel  his 
retirement  till  he  had  recovered  from  their  effects.  The 
chief  command  now  devolved  on  Lee,  an  officer  of 
high  reputation  and  known  ability. 

The  Seven-Days  Battles. — Lee,  who  had  taken  the 
command,  was  anxious  to  assume  the  offensive.  About 
the  middle  of  June  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were 
startled  by  a  sudden  exploit  of  the  Confederates  under 
General  J.  E.  Stuart.  McClellan  had  not  expected  any 
attack  on  his  rear.  The  watchful  Confederates  knew 
where  he  was  weakest,  and  Stuart,  after  leaving  Rich- 
mond, on  June  13,  moved  along  the  line  of  rail  com- 
municating with  Fredericksburg.  Having  penetrated 
as  far  as  Kelby's  Station,  the  forces  turned  eastward, 
and  bivouacked  in  the  vicinity  of  Hanover  Court 
House,  22  miles  north  of  Richmond.  The  expedition 
was  conducted  with  entire  secrecy.     The  thickness  of 


140 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


the  forest  favored  their  designs,  and  at  daybreak  on  the 
14th  the  troops  marched  on  Hanover  Court  House, 
where  they  drove  in  a  small  force  of  cavalry,  and  after- 
wards defeated  another  and  a  large  body  of  mounted 
troops.  The  camp  was  burned,  and  then  Stuart  deter- 
mined to  get  into  the  rear  of  the  Union  army,  by  mak- 
ing a  circuitous  march.  In  another  direction,  the  main 
body  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  captured  a  large  train 
of  forty  wagons,  took  several  prisoners,  burned  a  rail- 
way bridge,  and  then,  about  midnight,  made  for  the 
Chickahominy  on  their  homeward  march.  It  was 
necessary  to  construct  an  extemporary  bridge  over  that 
river ;  but,  notwithstanding  all  obstacles,  Richmond 
was  safely  gained  in  about  two  days  after  the  expedi- 
tion had  set  forth.  The  incursion  had  inflicted  a  cer- 
tain loss  on  the  Union  army,  and  at  the  same  time  in- 
creased the  self-reliance  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  ;  and 
all  had  been  obtained  with  the  loss  of  only  one  man. 

Jackson  now  excited  uneasiness.  His  position  and 
designs  were  shrouded  in  mystery,  but  it  seemed  prob- 
able that  he  was  concentrating  a  force  at  Gordonsville, 
on  the  railway  leading  to  Richmond,  and  that  he  was 
preparing  to  attack  the  Union  rear  on  June  28.  McClel- 
lan  determined  to  anticipate  any  such  movement  by 
advancing  along  the  Williamsburg  road  in  the  vicinity 
of  Seven  Pines.  This  was  done  on  the  25th,  by  which 
time  the  bridges  overthe  Chickahominy  were  completed, 
and  the  lines  of  entrenchment  finished.  After  a  very 
arduous  engagement,  the  Union  forces  at  the  close  of 
the  day  found  themselves  half  a  mile  in  advance  of  the 
positions  they  had  quitted  in  the  morning.  It  was 
determined  to  make  the  grand  attack  on  the  enemy's 
lines  next  day;  but  that  night  McClellan  received 
a  confirmation  of  the  rumors  respecting  Jackson.  He 
wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  stating  that  the  rebel 
force  was   believed  to  be  200,000  in  number,  including 


THE  SEVEN-DAYS  BATTLES. 


141 


Jackson  and  Beauregard ;  and  that  he  would  have  to 
contend  against  vastly  superior  odds,  if  those  reports 
were  true.  So  apprehensive  did  McClellan  feel  for  the 
safety  of  his  position,  that,  on  June  26,  he  abandoned 
his  base  of  operations  on  the  Pamunkey  for  one  on  the 
James  River.  Jackson  was  marching  through  the 
country  lying  between  the  Chickahominy  and  the 
Pamunkey,  while  other  divisions  had  crossed  the 
former  of  those  rivers,  and  were  proceeding  down  the 
stream  on  the  left  or  north-eastern  bank — that  is,  on  the 
side  farthest  from  Richmond.  Hill,  in  command  of  one 
of  these  divisions,  attacked  the  village  of  Mechanics- 
ville,  and,  taking  possession  of  it,  posted  himself  on  the 
road  to  the  Confederate  capital.  In  conjunction  with 
General  Branch,  he  then  assaulted  the  Union  lines  at 
Beaver  Dam  Creek.  Descending  the  right  bank  of 
that  creek,  which  runs  into  the  Chickahominy,  the  two 
commanders  confronted  the  ranks  of  their  enemies, 
who  were  stationed  on  the  opposite  side.  The  attack- 
ing forces  endeavored  to  cross,  but  were  driven  back  by 
the  terrific  fire  opened  on  them  from  the  breastworks 
crowning  the  left  bank.  Foiled  in  this  attempt,  they 
occupied  a  position  on  the  right  bank,  and  at  nine 
o'clock  at  night  the  combat  terminated  without  any 
definite  results.  Lee,  who  commanded  in  person 
intended  to  cut  off  that  portion  of  the  Union  army 
which  was  encamped  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy ;  but  he  failed  in  his  design.  Still  McClellan  felt 
insecure,  and  during  the  night  withdrew  his  troops  to  a 
position  some  two  miles  lower  down  the  Chickahominy. 
He  was  mistaken  in  assuming  that  he  had  200,000  men 
in  his  front.  The  Confederate  forces  were  not  more 
than  half  that  strength  ;  and,  as  McClellan  himself  had 
command  of  about  95,000  troops,  his  inferiority  to  the 
enemy  was  but  slight. 

On  the  night  of  June  26,  General  McCall,  on  the  ex 


142 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


treme  right  of  the  Union  position,  was  ordered  to  fall 
back  on  the  bridges  across  the  Chickahominy  near 
Gaines'  Mill,  to  join  Porter's  corps,  and  to  make  a 
stand  in  that  locality,  in  order  to  give  the  army  time  to 
carry  out  its  change  of  position.  Porter  was  not  to 
cross  the  bridges  until  evening,  and  was  then  to  destroy 
them.  Early  on  the  27th,  the  Confederate  division 
under  Hill,  which  had  been  held  in  check  the  previous 
day,  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  on  the  front  ranks 
of  McCall,  who  retreated  farther  down  the  stream. 
Other  Confederate  troops  now  crossed  the  Chickahom- 
iny near  Mechanicsville,  and  shortly  afterwards  the 
whole  of  the  Southern  line,  except  the  right  wing,  under 
General  Magruder,  was  ordered  to  advance. 

Porter's  retreating  corps  were  presently  assaulted,  but 
they  stood  firm,  and,  after  a  fierce  and  doubtful  en- 
counter, the  Confederates  gave  way  in  considerable  dis- 
order. Being  reinforced  and  formed  anew,  they  again 
advanced  to  the  attack,  but  as  yet  with  no  better  suc- 
cess than  before.  Towards  nightfall,  they  brought  up 
large  bodies  of  reserves,  and  the  Union  left,  where  the 
men  had  been  fighting  all  day,  and  were  exhausted,  re- 
ceded with  precipitation.  The  alarm  soon  extended  to 
the  centre  of  the  Union  lines,  which  also  fell  back  in 
confusion,  until  supported  by  fresh  brigades  under 
Generals  Meagher  and  French.  The  presence  of"  these 
troops,  and  the  opening  of  a  battery  which  had  been 
placed  in  position,  checked  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
and  darkness  soon  afterwards  closed  over  the  scene. 

During  the  night,  the  train  of  5000  wagons,  the  siege- 
train,  2500  oxen  and  other  material  were  in  motion  for 
the  James  River.  The  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy 
were  then  destroyed,  and  Keyes'  corps  took  posses- 
sion of  the  road  across  the  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  of 
the  principal  lines  of  communication  by  which  the 
Union  army  could   be    annoyed    by  the  enemy.     The 


THE  SEVEN-DAYS  BATTLES. 


H3 


wounded  were  abandoned  where  they  lay,  and  many 
perished  in  the  woods  and  swamps.  The  Confederates 
flattered  themselves  that  McClellan  would  be  cut  off 
from  all  power  of  retreat,  and  that  the  capture  or  de- 
struction of  the  entire  Union  army  was  certain.  They 
were  disapointed  on  finding  that  the  immense  stores  ac- 
cumulated at  the  White  House  had  been  partly  removed 
and  partly  destroyed  by  McClellan's  instructions,  and 
that  the  several  divisions  had  crossed  the  river.  No 
further  steps  could  be  taken  on  the  28th,  owing  to  the 
necessity  of  burying  the  dead,  attending  to  the  wounded, 
and  allowing  an  interval  of  repose  to  the  others ;  but  it 
was  hoped  to  pursue  the  retreating  adversary  on  the 
following  day.  The  two  armies  were  now  divided  by 
the  line  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  greater  number  of 
the  Confederates  were  on  the  left  bank,  and  the  whole 
of  McClellan's  army  had  been  united  on  the  right  bank. 
It  was  the  afternoon  of  the  28th  before  Lee  understood 
that  his  opponent  was  on  his  road  to  the  James  River, 
to  form  a  junction  with  the  fleet.  It  was  believed,  how- 
ever, that  this  design  could  be  frustrated,  and  measures 
were  taken  for  intercepting  the  Union  army,  and  cut- 
ting off  its  communications  with  the  river.  The  morn- 
ing of  the  29th  was  spent  by  McClellan's  troops  in  de- 
stroying all  that  could  not  be  carried  away.  The  corps 
of  Sumner  and  Franklin  were  left  at  Fair  Oaks,  with 
instructions  to  protect  the  baggage  and  supply-trains  on 
their  way  to  the  James  River;  and  McClellan  pursued 
his  course  with  the  main  body  of  the  army.  He  was  in 
a  position  of  much  gravity ;  but,  strange  to  say,  the 
Confederates  at  Richmond  were  equally  exposed  to  a 
reverse.  After  the  action  of  the  27th,  the  Union  troops 
were  much  nearer  to  the  Southern  capital  than  the 
chief  divisions  of  the  Confederates.  The  latter  were 
posted  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Chickahominy ;  the 
Union  troops  had  been  compelled  to  cross  the  stream, 


144 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


and  were  now  on  the  side  where  Richmond  itself  is  sit- 
uated. The  corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  acting  as  a 
rear-guard,  were  attacked,  on  the  30th,  by  Jackson,  but 
maintained  their  ground,  and  prevented  the  further  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy.  Later  in  the  day  a  battle  was 
fought  with  the  main  body  of  the  Confederates,  who 
were  attempting  to  advance  so  as  to  cut  off  the  Union 
retreat.  They  were  led  by  Longstreet,  Hill,  and  Huger, 
and  a  conflict  of  the  most  furious  and  desperate  nature 
took  place  between  the  opposing  armies.  Hill  charged 
the  Union  masses  several  times;  and  it  seemed  as  if  the 
Northern  troops  would  have  driven  their  opponents 
back  upon  Richmond,  and  have  entered  that  city  at  the 
head  of  their  victorious  legions.  The  cry  of  "  On  to 
Richmond!"  was  raised  by  them,  and  the  imminent 
danger  of  losing  their  metropolis  excited  the  Confeder- 
ates to  the  pitch  of  madness.  The  contending  ranks 
were  mixed  together  in  a  dark,  bloody  and  tumultuous 
affray.  Fighting  hand  to  hand,  in  the  rage  of  mortal 
hate,  they  neither  asked  nor  gave  quarter,  but  seemed 
bent  on  mutual  extermination,  if  that  were  a  thing  pos- 
sible. On  no  previous  occasion  had  the  two  sides 
fought  with  such  unmitigated  ferocity.  The  hot  and 
murderous  encounter  swayed  to  and  fro  with  varying 
success ;  the  ground  was  strewn  with  dead ;  and  the 
horrible  conflict  did  not  terminate  even  with  the  ap- 
proach of  night.  When  at  length  the  combatants 
ceased  from  sheer  exhaustion,  no  substantial  advantage 
had  been  obtained  by  either.  The  Confederates  were 
checked,  but  not  repulsed;  the  Unionists  held  their 
ground,  but  were  not  delivered  from  the  threatened 
peril.  On  the  30th,  the  long  lines  of  baggage-wagons 
reached  the  height  called  Malvern  Hill;  and  here  they 
were  in  a  position  of  some  strength,  and  in  commu- 
nication with  their  transports  and  supplies. 


146 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


All  the  Union  divisions  were  united  at  Malvern  Hill 
during  the  night,  and  the  worst  dangers  had  now  been 
overcome.  The  Confederates  were  still  close  at  hand ; 
but  the  position  occupied  by  the  Northern  troops  was 
favorable  to  defence,  and  in  any  case  the  river  was 
available  for  retreat. 

The  several  corps  had  their  backs  to  the  river,  and 
the  left  flank,  held  by  Porter,  was  strengthened  as  much 
as  possible,  since  it  was  in  that  direction  that  the 
enemy  would  be  most  likely  to  attack,  supposing  him  to 
resolve  on  any  further  movement.  That  such  was  his 
intention  became  manifest  as  the  day  proceeded.  Some 
skirmishing  took  place  before  noon,  but  nothing  like  a 
a  general  action  occurred  until  three,  when  the  Con- 
federate artillery  opened  on  Kearney's  division  of  Heint- 
zelman's  corps,  and  on  other  portions  of  the  army  sta- 
tioned towards  the  right  of  the  line.  The  Confederates 
advanced  at  the  charge,  but  were  driven  back  by  the 
steady  fire  which  was  poured  into  their  columns.  The 
attempt  to  carry  the  position  was  frequently  renewed, 
and  the  Confederates  reformed  their  shattered  ranks  in 
the  shelter  of  the  surrounding  woods.  In  this  en- 
counter, the  troops  engaged  on  the  Southern  side  were 
from  Magruder's  corps,  which  on  the  previous  night 
had  supported  the  divisions  of  Longstreet,  Hill,  and 
Huger,  in  their  desperate  attack  on  Heintzelman's 
forces.  Toward  the  evening  of  July  I,  Magruder's 
regiments  were  reinforced  by  those  of  Jackson,  who  ar- 
rived from  the  White  Oak  Swamp,  but  too  late  to  ren- 
der any  important  service.  When  darkness  put  an  end 
to  the  strife,  the  Union  forces  were  still  in  undisturbed 
possession  of  the  ground  and  the  Confederates  had 
been  worsted,  with  a  serious  loss  in  dead  and  wounded. 
The  latter,  finding  that  the  adversary  was  now  beyond 
their  power,  withdrew  to  Richmond  and  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  took  up  a  position  at  Harrison's  Landing, 


CEDAR  MOUNTAIN. 


147 


which  had  been  selected  by  the  engineers  and  naval 
officers  as  the  most  favorable  spot  for  defence  and  for 
receiving  supplies.  By  the  night  of  July  3  all  McClel- 
lan's  divisions  were  in  safety,  and  the  general  believed 
he  had  acquired  a  base  of  operations  from  which  an- 
other advance  on  Richmond  might  in  time  be  made. 

The  movements  executed  by  McClellan  from  June  25 
to  July  I,  had  cost  him  dear,  and  left  him  in  a  worse 
position  than  before.  He  estimated  his  losses  at  15,249 
men,  and  25  guns  ;  Lee,  in  a  proclamation  from  Rich- 
mond, issued  on  July  9,  said  that  the  immediate  fruits 
of  the  Confederate  triumph  were — "  the  relief  of  Rich- 
mond from  a  state  of  siege ;  the  rout  of  the  great  army 
that  so  long  menaced  its  safety ;  many  thousand  prison- 
ers, including  officers  of  high  rank  ;  the  capture  and 
destruction  of  stores  of  the  value  of  millions ;  and 
the  acquisition  of  thousands  of  arms,  and  fifty-one 
pieces  of  superior  artillery."  It  is  probable  that  the 
truth  lay  somewhere  between  the  two  statements,  but  in 
any  case  it  is  clear  that  McClellan  had  reaped  nothing 
but  disaster.  Still,  it  must  be  recollected  that  his  oppo- 
nents were  unfortunate  as  well  as  himself.  The  Con- 
federates had  lost  20,000  men,  and  although  the  enemy 
had  withdrawn  farther  from  the  threatened  capital,  he 
was  not  vanquished,  nor  completely  driven  away,  and 
it  seemed  probable  that  the  operations  of  the  last  few 
months  would  be  renewed,  with  a  more  resolute  deter- 
mination than  before. 

Cedar  Mountain. — Secretary  Stanton  visited  Mc- 
Clellan to  learn  whether  there  was  any  possibility  of  an 
advance  on  Richmond  in  the  position  which  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  then  held.  McClellan  demanded  50,000 
additional  troops  for  any  ulterior  operations.  These 
could  not  be  sent  without  leaving  Washington  and 
Baltimore  defenceless.  McClellan  was  then  ordered  to 
unite  with  General  Pope,  and  to  act  under  his  command. 


148 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


Pope's  main  divisions  were  at  Culpepper,  about  70 
miles  from  both  Washington  and  Richmond ;  and  at 
Fredericksburg,  which  was  connected  with  Washington 
by  steamboat  and  railway.  He  had  about  38,000  men, 
and  one  part  of  his  design  was  to  cover  Washington, 
while  at  the  same  time  he  diverted  a  portion  of  the 
Confederacy  then  threatening  McClellan. 

Early  in  August,  the  Union  out-pickets  reported  that 
the  enemy  was  advancing  towards  Culpepper  Court 
House.  On  the  8th,  Jackson  crossed  the  Rapidan,  and 
took  up  a  position  near  the  main  road  from  Gordonsville 
to  Culpepper.  Fighting  did  not  occur  until  next  day, 
when  an  obstinately-contested  action  took  place  in  the 
vicinity  of  a  hill  called  Cedar  Mountain.  The  battle 
commenced  at  five  p.  m.,  and  continued  until  late  in  the 
evening,  by  which  time  the  Union  troops  had  been 
driven  back  about  a  mile.  The  action  might,  perhaps, 
have  been  resumed  next  morning  but  for  a  disastrous 
incident  which  occurred  late  at  night.  The  light  of  a 
bright  moon  showed  the  Confederate  artillerymen  that 
their  adversaries,  as  they  bivouacked  on  the  ground, 
were  within  range  of  their  guns.  They  at  once  opened 
fire,  and  a  panic  spread  through  a  portion  of  the 
Union  army.  Some  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  then 
charged  the  weary  and  dispirited  troops,  and  Pope 
himself,  with  the  officers  of  his  staff,  narrowly  escaped 
capture.  The  loss  on  both  sides  was  very  serious, 
especially  on  that  of  the  Unionists;  but,  the  latter 
having  been  reinforced,  Jackson  retreated  during  the 
night  of  the  nth,  and,  recrossing  the  Rapidan,  got 
safely  off  The  Government  was  so  much  alarmed  at 
this  exploit  of  Jackson,  that  McClellan  was  ordered 
to  detach  the  divisions  under  Burnside  (who  had  re- 
cently been  recalled  from  North  Carolina),  and  send 
them  to  Aquia  Creek.  At  the  same  time,  McClellan 
himself  was  to  retreat  to  Yorktown  and  Fortress  Mon- 


THOROUGHFARE    GAf. 


1 49 


roe  with  a  view  to  ulterior  movements.  The  stores, 
baggage,  and  sick,  belonging  to  the  sometime  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  were  shipped  on  board  the  transports  at 
Harrison's  Landing,  and  from  the  17th  to  the  20th  of 
August  the  army  marched  by  way  of  Williamsburg  to 
Yorktown  and  Newport  News.  The  defences  at  York- 
town  were  strengthened,  and  the  campaign  in  the  Penin- 
sula was  now  at  an  end,  after  a  series  of  operations 
extending  over  four  months,  involving  an  immense 
expenditure  of  life,  yet  productive  of  no  results  com- 
mensurate with  the  efforts  that  had  been  made. 

Great  activity  and  boldness  were  evinced  by  the 
Southern  troops,  and  on  August  22  Stuart  marched 
into  the  rear  of  the  Union  troops,  seized  a  good  deal  of 
the  headquarters'  baggage  (including  letters  and  plans 
of  the  commander),  and  got  safely  off.  It  was  now 
determined  to  execute  a  flank  march  round  the  right 
wing  of  Pope's  army.  The  corps  under  Jackson  was 
concentrated  at  Jefferson,  opposite  the  Sulphur  Springs, 
and  on  August  21  set  out  for  Thoroughfare  Gap. 
The  men  were  badly  clothed,  and  so  ill-provided  with 
food  that  they  were  compelled  to  feed  on  grain  which 
they  plucked  in  the  open  fields,  and  on  the  offerings  of 
the  peasantry.  But  they  had  confidence  in  themselves 
and  in  their  commander,  and  thus  inspirited  they  made 
their  way  through  the  mountain-pass  which  conducted 
them  to  the  rear  of  their  opponents.  Pope  had  by  this 
time  been  joined  by  most  of  the  divisions  under 
McClellan,  and  the  combined  army  was  both  numerically 
strong  and  well  appointed.  But  the  soldiers  were  not 
pleased  with  their  chief,  and  were  wanting  in  the  mili- 
tary qualities  of  subordination  and  self-reliance.  These 
facts  will  explain  the  disasters  which  ensued. 

Jackson  was  favored  with  his  usual  success  in  the 
the  daring  enterprise  on  which  he  had  entered. 
Thoroughfare  Gap  was  so  entirely  free  of  Union  soldiers 

Union — 10 


150 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


that  his  troops  encountered  no  opposition  in  passing 
through  it,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  they  struck 
the  line  of  rail  in  Pope's  rear  at  Bristow  Station.  The 
great  depot  at  Manassas  Junction  was  captured  and  set 
on  fire,  and  the  Union  commanders  seem  to  have  been 
bewildered  as  to  the  exact  locality  of  their  opponents, 
and  the  precise  combinations  they  ought  to  make  in 
order  to  repel  so  threatening  a  movement.  Taking 
advantage  of  this  perplexity  on  the  part  of  the  Northern 
chiefs,  the  Southerners  continued  to  advance,  and  to 
get  still  farther  in  Pope's  rear.  Some  of  them  pushed 
forward  to  the  old  battle-ground  of  Bull  Run,  while 
others  proceeded  to  Centreville.  Jackson's  corps  was 
now  actually  between  the  Union  army  and  Washing- 
ton. A  large  amount  of  stores  had  been  destroyed  ; 
the  telegraph  wires  had  been  severed,  and  the  rails 
torn  up  ;  so  that  Pope's  forces  were  at  once  discomfited 
and  cut  off  from  succor.  When,  however,  they  had 
recovered  from  their  astonishment,  they  took  measures 
for  attacking  the  enemy,  and,  if  possible,  crushing  him 
in  his  exposed  position.  Hooker's  division  had  an 
encounter  with  Jackson's  rear-guard,  at  Bristow  Station, 
on  the  evening  of  the  27th.  Pope  marched  along  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway,  while  McDowell,  at 
the  head  of  another  large  force,  moved  from  Warren- 
ton,  with  the  intention  of  interposing  between  Jackson 
and  his  line  of  retreat  by  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Jackson 
was  certainly  in  danger  of  being  annihilated.  It  is  true 
that  the  remainder  of  Lee's  army  was  marching  to  his 
assistance;  but  it  was  still  in  the  defiles  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  Mountains,  and  might  not  arrive  in  time.  The 
efforts  of  the  Union  forces  were  thwarted  by  the  want 
of  concentrated  supervision,  by  the  scattered  positions 
of  the  several  corps,  and  by  the  confused  and  con 
tradictory  orders  sent  out  from  headquarters. 

Jackson  appeared  still  confident  of  success.     He  now 


POPE'S  DISASTER. 


151 


reversed  his  course,  and  moved  south,  to  meet  the 
Union  troops  who  were  following  on  his  track.  On  the 
28th,  General  Kearney  attacked  the  rear  of  Jackson's 
corps,  and,  occupying  Centreville,  reopened  the 
communication  with  Alexandria,  which  the  Southerners 
had  momentarily  closed.  Towards  the  end  of  the  day, 
a  portion  of  Sigel's  corps  had  an  engagement  with  the 
Confederates,  which  resulted  in  the  latter  gaining  pos- 
session of  a  ridge  of  hills  near  Sudley  Springs,  on  the 
north-eastern  bank  of  Bull  Run.  By  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  a  large  part  of  Jackson's  corps  had  reached 
the  other  side  of  the  stream,  and  he  took  up  a  position 
similar  to  that  of  McDowell  when,  in  the  same  locality, 
he  advanced  against  the  rebels  on  July  21,  1861.  The 
left  of  the  Confederate  line  was  now  stationed  near 
Centreville,  on  the  ridge  of  hills  which  had  been  seized 
the  previous  night ;  the  right  and  centre  were  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  little  river,  and  stretched  along 
the  Manassas  Gap  Railway  towards  the  main  road  from 
Warrenton.  The  several  divisions,  consequently,  faced 
towards  the  south-east,  and  from  that  direction  were 
attacked  during  the  day  by  the  Union  troops,  who  had 
united  their  forces  on  the  old  battle-ground  of  a  year 
before.  Pope  reached  the  field  about  noon,  after  the 
action  had  been  going  on  for  some  time  ;  but  he  doubted 
the  propriety  of  ordering  an  advance  along  the  whole 
line,  as  many  of  his  troops  had  suffered  severely  from 
the  fire  of  their  antagonists.  He  was  expecting  the 
arrival  of  McDowell  and  Porter ;  but  Jackson  himself 
was  reinforced  by  the  appearance,  towards  sunset,  of 
the  leading  division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  which,  after 
overcoming  the  resistance  offered  to  its  progress 
through  the  defile  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  joined  the 
regiments  that  had  been  contending  since  morning  on 
the  banks  of  Bull  Run.  Previous  to  this  welcome 
advent,  the  Confederates,  though  inflicting  serious  loss 


152 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


on  their  opponents,  had  been  compelled  to  give  ground 
slightly;  and  Pope  telegraphed  a  victory  to  Washing- 
ton. In  the  afternoon  he  had  been  reinforced  by 
McDowell ;  but  Porter's  corps  did  not  arrive  during 
the  29th.  Its  commander  was  afterwards  tried  for  dis- 
obedience of  orders,  and  dismissed  the  service  ;  and 
certainly  he  appears  to  have  done  nothing  towards  help- 
ing the  operations  of  the  day.  When  darkness  put  an 
end  to  the  combat,  no  decisive  result  had  been  achieved. 
The  advantage,  on  the  whole,  was  with  the  Union 
forces,  for  the  Southerners  had  receded  ,  but  the 
Northern  troops  had  been  very  sharply  received,  and 
were  out  of  spirits  with  respect  to  their  commanders. 
The  Confederates  were  full  of  confidence,  and  eager  for 
renewed  action  on  the  morrow. 

Early  next  morning  the  remaining  divisions  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  which  had  been  arriving  all  through 
the  night,  had  joined  the  corps  under  Jackson,  and  the 
Confederate  army  was  now  very  strong.  Longstreet 
took  the  right  of  the  line,  and  the  united  forces  covered 
a  distance  of  five  miles.  Porter's  corps  was  in  position 
on  this  second  day,  and  indeed  commenced  the  battle 
by  attacking  some  of  the  forces  under  Longstreet.  A 
general  action  followed,  and  continued  for  several 
hours,  with  terrible  slaughter  on  both  sides ;  and. 
toward  evening,  Lee,  who  was  now  commanding  in 
person,  ordered  an  advance.  The  Union  troops  who 
had  already  begun  to  lose  form  under  the  devastating 
fire  of  some  batteries  of  artillery  posted  in  command- 
ing positions,  were  driven  back  in  confusion,  and,  under 
cover  of  darkness,  crossed  Bull  Run,  and  took  refuge 
behind  the  field-works  at  Centreville,  where  they  were 
supported  by  the  corps  under  Sumner  and  Franklin, 
which  had  arrived  from  Alexandria  and  the  lines  round 
Washington.  The  losses  of  the  two  previous  days  had 
been  immense,  and  they  were  not  due  solely  to  death 


POPE'S  REMOVAL. 


153 


and  injury  in  the  field.  Skulking  had  gone  on  to  an 
extraordinary  extent,  and  in  many  instances  these 
fugitives  could  not  be  recovered.  Banks,  who  had 
lingered  behind  at  Bristow  Station,  in  order  to  guard 
the  railway,  now  hastily  marched  to  join  his  comrades, 
having  previously  destroyed  large  quantities  of  stores 
and  railway  stock.  When  all  Pope's  divisions  were 
concentrated  behind  the  entrenchments  at  Centreville, 
the  army  felt  tolerably  secure  against  further  mis- 
chances, though  its  confidence  soon  proved  to  be  mis- 
placed. Lee  hesitated  about  attacking  the  enemy  in 
front,  now  that  he  occupied  so  strong  a  position ;  but  a 
demonstration  against  the  right  flank  was  made  on 
September  i,and  Pope,  finding  the  Confederates  on  the 
road  to  Fairfax  Court  House,  and  actually  threatening 
Washington,  begun  to  retreat  with  precipitation. 
Night  closed  in  on  the  disheartened  and  scared  ranks  of 
the  Union  army ;  a  violent  thunderstorm  broke  over 
them  ;  and  the  rear  was  harassed  by  frequent  attacks. 
On  the  morning  of  the  2d,  the  whole  of  the  Union 
legions  (including  the  divisions  at  Fredericksburg  and 
Aquia  Creek)  entered  the  fortifications  immediately 
protecting  Washington,  where  they  were  a  year  before. 
One  thing  was  clear — that  Pope  must  be  removed 
from  the  position  to  which  he  had  been  appointed  un- 
der a  total  misapprehension  of  his  abilities.  McClellan 
was  reinstated  in  his  command  and  assigned  to  the  pro- 
tection of  Washington.  For  this  purpose  no  better 
man  could  have  been  selected.  His  genius  lay  much 
more  in  defence  than  in  attack.  Where  an  enemy  was 
to  be  assaulted  or  out-manceuvred,  a  certain  timidity 
always  restrained  him,  so  that  his  opportunities  slipped 
by  again  and  again.  But  he  was  an  admirable  organ- 
izer, a  strict  disciplinarian,  a  watchful  observer  of  what 
was  going  on  in  his  front.  He  had  saved  Washington 
before,  and  might  save  it  again  by  his   prudence  and 


154 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


caution.  In  conferring  on  McClellan  the  control  of  the 
Washington  Army  the  President  did  not  restore  him  to 
the  position  he  had  held  from  the  beginning  of  Novem- 
ber, 1 86 1,  to  the  early  part  of  March,  1862.  Halleck 
still  remained  at  the  head  of  the  military  forces,  and 
McClellan  came  under  his  directions. 

Pope  was  sent  off  to  Minnesota  to  look  after  the 
predatory  Indians. 

The  Invasion  of  Maryland. — Flushed  with  success, 
Lee  now  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  entered  Maryland, 
hoping  to  secure  volunteers  and  incite  an  insurrection. 
Jackson's  corps  entered  Frederick  City,  on  September  6, 
while  Lee  continued  his  march  into  Maryland.  Jack- 
son advanced  up  the  northern  bank  of  the  river,  and  re- 
crossing  into  Virginia  he  occupied  Martinsburg,  where 
he  seized  a  large  quantity  of  stores.  Harper's  Ferry 
was  invested  by  Jackson,  and  on  both  sides  of  the  Po- 
tomac squadrons  of  cavalry  guarded  the  direct  road  to 
Pennsylvania.     So  far  Lee  had  been  entirely  successful. 

McClellan  was  ordered  to  pursue  the  invaders.  He 
had  nearly  100,000  men  under  him,  beside  the  garrisons 
at  Harper's  Ferry  and  Washington.  To  meet  this  im- 
mense army,  the  Confederates  had  about  75,000  men. 
Lee  was  put  to  great  difficulty  in  avoiding  the  conse- 
quence of  his  spirited  and  daring  movements.  He 
abandoned  the  line  of  the  Monocacy,  sent  a  portion  of 
Longstreet's  forces  to  Boonesboro',  north-west  of  Fred- 
erick ;  and  directed  Hill  to  guard  the  passes  of  South 
Mountain,  and  to  cover  the  siege  of  Harper's  Ferry. 

Lee's  order  to  Hill  fell  into  McClellan's  hands.  From 
this  it  appeared  that  Lee's  aim  was  to  obtain  possession 
of  the  ferry,  where  a  garrison  of  1 1,000  men  were  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Miles.  The  position  was 
strongly,  entrenched  on  heights  overlooking  the  ferry, 
and  commanding  the  main  road  from  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  to  Frederick  and  Baltimore.     Three  distinct  por- 


THE  INVASION  OF  MARYLAND. 


155 


tions  of  Lee's  army  made  a  vehement  attack  on  Miles 
on  the  13th.  Powerful  batteries  were  erected,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  15th  a  cross  fire  of  terrible  intensity 
was  poured  into  the  Union  entrenchments.  Miles  felt 
obliged  to  surrender.  A  small  body  of  cavalry  escaped 
into  Pennsylvania;  but  the  rest  were  made  prisoners 
of  war,  and  73  pieces  of  artillery,  13,000  small  arms, 
and  other  stores  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors. 

McClellan's  troops  were  moving  to  the  relief  of 
Harper's  Ferry ;  but  they  had  obstacles  to  overcome. 
The  passage  of  South  Mountain  was  stoutly  disputed 
by  the  Confederates.  McClellan's  subordinates  showed 
extreme  dilatoriness  in  bringing  up  their  respective  di- 
visions, and  the  afternoon  had  arrived  before  the  main 
body  could  come  into  action.  Ultimately,  however,  the 
Confederates  were  driven  back.  They  were  reinforced 
by  Longstreet,  and  the  contest  was  resumed  with  much 
energy.  At  nightfall  no  great  advantage  had  been 
gained  on  either  side,  but  the  Confederates  had  suc- 
ceeded in  delaying  the  progress  of  the  Union  troops. 

Lee  was  in  a  dilemma,  although  he  had  sustained  no 
decided  reverse.  Different  portions  of  his  force  were 
separated  from  each  other,  not  only  by  the  Potomac, 
but  by  McClellan's  army,  which  was  moving  forward  in 
a  north-westerly  direction  by  roads  leading  from  the  two 
passes  through  ^hich  the  troops  had  forced  their  way. 
Hut  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  On  withdrawing 
from  South  Mountain,  Lee  took  up  a  position  on  a 
a  range  of  hills  extending  in  a  semi-circle  from  the 
lower  part  of  Antietam  Creek  to  an  angle  of  the  Poto- 
mac, a  little  nearer  to  the  north-west.  Lee  was  now  es- 
tablished on  the  western  side  of  Antietam  Creek,  the 
lower  part  of  which,  near  its  junction  with  the  Potomac, 
protected  the  right  of  his  line.  He  had  his  back  to  a 
bend  of  the  Potomac,  with  his  face  turned  to  the  north- 
cast  ;  and  the  centre  of  his  line  was  at  Sharpsburg.     The 


156 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


Antietam  is  crossed  by  four  bridges,  and  at  that  part  of 
its  course  is  too  deep  to  be  forded  by  troops.  Jackson 
was  summoned  from  Harper's  Ferry.  Lee's  object  was 
to  concentrate  nearly  all  his  forces  on  the  hills  about 
Antietam  Creek,  as  he  knew  he  would  soon  be  attacked 
by  a  superior  force.  Jackson's  troops  were  so  much 
exhausted  by  their  previous  exertions  that  many  of  them 
straggled  and  fell  out,  and  only  a  portion  of  their  num- 
ber reached  Lee  on  the  16th.  Fortunately  for  the 
Southerners,  the  Union  troops  also  were  slow  in  their 
proceedings.  Their  movements  were  extremely  slug- 
gish, and  McClellan  waited  for  the  arrival  of  all  his  di- 
visions on  the  eastern  side  of  the  creek  before  he  ven- 
tured on  offering  battle.  As  they  came  up  he  massed 
them  on  both  sides  of  the  road  leading  to  Sharpsburg. 
Three  of  the  bridges  across  the  creek  were  in  front  of 
him ;  but  they  were  covered  by  Lee's  batteries.  Mc- 
Clellan planted  his  own  batteries,  and  fighting  began  on 
the  17th. 

In  the  early  morning  the  Union  batteries  on  the  left 
bank  opened  fire  on  the  opposing  lines  drawn  up  be- 
yond the  bridges.  Thus  aided,  three  divisions  crossed 
the  stream,  and  facing  to  the  west,  began  a  vigorous 
attack  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  that  being  the 
weakest  point.  Excepting  as  regarded  position,  McClel- 
lan was  the  better  off.  He  had  nearly  95,000  men  at 
his  disposal.  Lee,  owing  to  the  non-arrival  of  a  large 
part  of  his  army,  had  no  more  than  35,000  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  engagement.  That  small  force,  however, 
was  animated  by  the  courage  of  desperation.  Hooker's 
three  divisions  established  themselves  upon  the  other 
side  of  the  creek,  and  erected  field-batteries  in  a  belt  of 
wood  which  at  that  part  covered  the  land.  A  sanguin- 
ary conflict  ensued ;  but  the  Confederates  held  their 
ground  for  some  hours,  though  more  than  half  the 
brigades  forming  the   first    line  were   either  killed   01 


THE  ENGAGEMENT  AT  SHARPSBURG.  ^7 

wounded,  together  with  nearly  every  regimental  com- 
mander. At  length  they  were  borne  down,  and  the 
Union  troops  pressed  forward,  cleared  the  woods  of 
their  opponents,  and  took  possession  of  Dunker  Church, 
situated  to  the  north  of  Sharpsburg.  Beyond  this 
point  the  Confederates  made  a  fresh  stand,  and  changed 
their  defence  into  an  attack,  causing  the  Union  line  in 
some  places  to  break  and  recede.  Reinforcements  to 
Lee's  army  arriving,  the  attack  was  renewed  with  con- 
fidence and  energy,  and  nearly  all  the  lost  ground  was 
in  time  regained. 

Hooker's  corps  was  completely  routed.  Portions  of 
Sumner's  corps  were  also  considerably  shaken ;  but  the 
artillery  in  the  first  line  of  woods  now  came  once  more 
into  play,  and  the  Confederate  pursuit  was  checked. 
Fresh  Union  divisions  were  hurried  up  to  retrieve  the 
fortunes  of  the  day ;  but  they  did  little  to  alter  the  gen- 
eral posture  of  affairs.  During  the  action  on  the  left, 
McClellan  visited  the  field  in  person,  and  felt  uneasy  as 
to  the  result  of  the  several  operations.  The  attack 
made  by  his  right  had  to  a  great  extent  failed,  and  he 
feared  the  enemy  would  attack  his  center,  and  break 
his  whole  line  of  battle  into  fragments. 

On  the  Union  left,  Burnside's  corps  at  an  early  hour 
of  the  day  had  been  given  the  very  difficult  task  of 
carrying  the  lower  bridge  over  the  Antietam.  The  ap- 
proaches were  swept  away  by  the  enemy's  batteries, 
and  it  was  only  after  a  severe  struggle  that  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  creek  was  gained.  The  heights  were  not 
in  Burnside's  possession  until  the  afternoon  ;  but  by  that 
time  the  Confederates  had  been  driven  back.  After  a 
while  they  rallied,  and  bringing  up  fresh  troops,  re- 
commenced the  combat.  Burnside's  advance  had  car- 
ried him  almost  to  Sharpsburg,  near  the  center  of  the 
Confederate  line ;  but  the  Southerners  on  the  arrival  of 
their  reinforcements,  opened  new  batteries  on  the  hills, 


!58       THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

and  drove  back  Burnside  from  the  position  he  had  car- 
ried, so  that  it  was  all  he  could  do  to  hold  the  bridge. 
McClellan  ordered  Burnside  to  hold  the  bridge  at  all 
risks,  but  did  nothing  to  help  him  by  sending  up  fresh 
troops.  Porter's  reserves  were  posted  between  the  two 
wings;  but  McClellan  feared  to  employ  them,  lest  the 
Confederates  should  break  through  his  center  in  their 
absence.  Burnside  maintained  his  ground,  and  when 
night  came  on,  both  wings  of  the  attacking  force  were 
still  on  that  side  of  the  stream,  though  in  positions  not 
so  far  advanced  as  those  occupied  earlier  in  the  day. 
The  troops  bivouacked  on  the  ground  that  night  and 
McClellan  telegraphed  to  Washington  that  he  had 
gained  a  victory.  McClellan  had  been  in  a  specially 
good  position  for  overwhelming  his  antagonists.  When 
the  action  began  his  numbers  were  more  than  two  to 
one ;  and  even  after  the  arrival  of  the  Confederate  rein- 
forcements, Lee  had  not  nearly  so  many  men  as  his  op- 
ponent. Moreover,  McClellan  had  by  a  rare  stroke  of 
luck  acquired  a  knowledge  beforehand  of  Lee's  designs, 
and  of  the  disposition  of  his  several  corps  ;  and  the  com- 
ponent parts  of  the  Confederate  army  had  for  a  time 
been  separated  by  the  advancing  forces  of  the  North. 
Yet,  owing  to  that  extraordinary  hesitation  which  neu- 
tralized all  McClellan's  better  qualities,  every  oppor- 
tunity had  been  thrown  away,  and  the  general  result 
was  little  short  of  failure.  There  had  been  no  attack 
along  the  whole  line,  and  the  right  and  left  wings  had 
been  checked  in  detail  by  operations  which  the  Con- 
federates had  had  time  to  transfer  from  one  part  of  the 
field  to  another,  as  occasion  required. 

The  losses  of  the  day  were  severe.  On  the  Union 
side,  the  killed  and  wounded  amounted  to  about  12,500, 
and  among  them  were  many  general  and  superior 
officers.  The  Confederates  had  to  mourn  the  loss  of 
9000  men,  together  with  some   of  their  divisional  com- 


!6o  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

manders ;  and  for  all  this  expenditure  of  life  neither  side 
could  show  any  result  of  equal  value.  The  following 
day  was  passed  in  inactivity,  for  both  armies  were  too 
much  exhausted  to  renew  the  battle.  The  Southerners 
were  sadly  weakened  by  the  fighting,  and  it  appears  that 
their  total  strength  was  now  reduced  to  less  than  60,000 
men.     Disorganization  existed  on  both  sides. 

The  invasion  of  Northern  territory,  although  daringly 
conceived  and  ably  conducted,  had  entailed  consider- 
able losses  on  Lee's  army,  and  had  brought  home  to 
the  Confederates  the  unwelcome  knowledge  that  the  re' 
bellion  had  no  chance  of  spreading  north  of  the  Potomac. 

McClellan's  Removal.  On  November  7,  1862, 
McClellan  was  ordered  to  surrender  the  command  of 
his  army  to  General  Burnside,  and  to  report  at  Tren- 
ton, New  Jersey  (his  home).  Halleck  alleged  that  he 
had  needlessly  delayed  his  movements  ;  that  he  was 
constantly  complaining  of  want  of  supplies,  clothing, 
and  horses  ;  and  that  there  had  been  no  such  want  as 
to  prevent  his  compliance  with  the  order  of  October  6, 
to  cross  the  Potomac  at  once,  and  give  battle  to  the 
enemy,  or  drive  him  south.  Burnside  was  a  personal 
friend  of  McClellan,  and  possessed  his  confidence.  He 
had  on  two  or  three  occasions  exhibited  a  fair  amount 
of  skill  as  a  general,  and  had,  before,  been  requested  to 
take  the  position  of  McClellan,  but  refused,  and  now 
accepted  the  command  only  on  the  peremptory  order 
of  the  War  Department. 

The  position  of  the  Union  army  rendered  Lee 
anxious  for  the  safety  of  Richmond.  He  feared  that 
his  communications  with  that  city  might  be  severed, 
and  he  had  an  extensive  tract  of  country  to  watch  with 
a  comparatively  small  force.  While  he  was  consider- 
ing what  he  should  do,  Burnside  was  reorganizing  his 
army  with  a  view  to  active  measures.     He  now  arranged 


BURNSIDE  IA   COMMAND. 


161 


It  in  three  grand  divisions,  under  the  orders  of  Sumner, 
Hooker,  and  Franklin ;  and  a  body  of  reserves  was 
formed,  under  the  command  of  General  Sigel.  It  was 
decided  to  make  a  demonstration  on  the  Rappahannock, 
to  march  rapidly  down  the  north-eastern  bank  of  that 
river,  to  cross  by  means  of  pontoons  at  Fredericksburg, 
and  to  advance 
on  Richmond 
by  Hanover 
Court  House. 
Accordingly,  a 
few  days  later, 
Sumner  was  or- 
dered to  march 
on  Fredericks- 
burg, followed 
by  Franklin  and 
Hooker.  The 
right  rear  of 
the  army  was  to 
be  protected  by 
the  cavalry  un- 
der General 
PI  ea  sa  n ton, 
while  Sigel  was 
to  guard  the 
Upper  Poto- 
mac, and  to  oc- 
cupy the  direct 
route     between 

Gordonsville  and  Washington.  The  success  of  the  plan 
depended  on  the  rapidity  with  which  it  was  carried  out ; 
but  there  proved  to  be  delays  that  were  not  anticipated. 
Burnside  calculated  on  Jackson  being  still  west  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  on  Lee  having  no  knowledge  of  the 
scheme  by  which  he  was  to  be  out-manceuvred.     In 


:xVi^.Jr,F^5crr 


AMBROSE    E.    BURNSIDE. 


1 62  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

these  respects  he  was  mistaken ;  and  the  consequence 
was  another  miscarriage,  in  addition  to  those  which  had 
gone  before. 

Fredericksburg. — Lee  had  received  information  of 
Burnside's  projects,  and  a  portion  of  his  army  had  con- 
sequently moved  on  a  parallel  line  to  that  of  the  Union 
forces.  The  movements  of  his  detachments  were 
executed  with  greater  quickness  than  those  of  Sumner 
and  his  colleagues,  and  the  Confederate  batteries  were 
already  posted  at  Fredericksburg,  on  the  southern  side 
of  the  Rappahannock,  when,  on  November  20,  Sum- 
ner's troops  arrived  at  Falmouth,  on  the  northern  side. 
It  was  evident,  therefore,  that  Fredericksburg  could  not 
be  occupied  without  an  engagement,  and  that  the 
undisputed  advance  on  Richmond,  which  it  had  been 
hoped  to  accomplish,  was  no  longer  possible.  Still, 
something  might  have  been  done  had  Burnside  been 
able  to  cross  the  river  at  once ;  but  the  necessary  pon- 
toons had  not  arrived,  and  he  was  obliged  to  wait. 
The  delay  was  much  to  the  advantage  of  the  Con- 
federates, for  it  gave  time  to  Jackson  to  join  the  other 
forces,  so  that  by  the  25th  the  whole  Confederate  Army- 
was  in  position  on  the  heights  overlooking  Fredericks- 
burg. It  was  the  policy  of  the  Southerners  to  await 
attack;  it  was  equally  Burnside's  policy  to  eject  them 
from  their  posts  by  a  vigorous  assault.  But  for  the 
present  no  movement  was  possible.  Three  weeks 
passed  in  this  state  of  compulsory  inaction.  Burnside 
at  length  felt  compelled  by  the  stress  of  popular  opinion 
to  do  something.  He  determined  to  cross  the  river  as 
soon  as  he  could  complete  his  pontoon  bridges.  The 
passage  was  to  be  effected  at  two  points — immediately 
opposite  Fredericksburg,  and  a  mile  and  a  half  lower 
down  the  stream.  Burnside  had  now  no  fewer  than 
150,000  men  ;  his  line  extended  over  four  miles  on  the 
northern  side  of  the  river;  his  guns,  which   were  ex- 


FREDERICKSB  UR  G. 


163 


tremely  numerous,  commanded  the  town  of  Fredericks- 
burg, and  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Rappahannock ; 
and  he  was  therefore  able  to  make  a  powerful  demon- 
stration, with  fair  probabilities  of  success.  Lee's  forces 
did  not  amount  to  more  than  80,000  men ;  but  they 
held  a  strong  position  on  a  semicircle  of  hills  sweep- 
ing round  from  the  river  to  the  vicinity  of  Newport. 
Lee  also  was  well  provided  with  artillery,  which  he 
massed  towards  his  center.  To  the  right  of  his  line 
he  had  the  little  river  Massaponax ;  other  small  rivers 
ran  through  the  hills  on  which  his  divisions  had 
been  drawn  up ;  and  in  every  respect  his  position 
was  one  which  a  resolute  army  would  be  likely  to 
maintain. 

During  the  night  of  December  10,  the  Union  pon- 
toons were  carried  down  to  the  river,  and  the  artillery 
was  so  placed  as  to  be  capable  of  being  brought  to  bear 
immediately  on  the  town.  Next  morning  the  men  com- 
menced building  four  extemporary  bridges.  For  some 
hours  the  work  of  construction  was  not  perceived  by 
the  Confederates  on  the  opposite  bank,  but  when  it  was 
discovered  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  opened  from  vari- 
ous positions  on  the  shore,  and  from  the  houses  in  the 
town.  The  Union  troops  were  for  a  time  driven  away, 
but,  having  been  rallied,  they  again  proceeded  with  their 
task.  Once  more  they  were  compelled  to  abandon  the 
attempt,  and  orders  were  then  given  to  the  artillery  to 
open  fire  on  the  city.  This  dispersed  the  Confederate 
sharpshooters,  and  did  great  damage  to  the  city  itself. 
The  operation  of  throwing  over  the  pontoon  bridges  was 
once  more  resumed,  and  although  the  Confederates  for 
a  time  interrupted  the  progress  of  the  work,  they  were 
unable  to  prevent  its  completion  in  the  course  of  a  day. 
Before  dusk,  Sumner's  division  had  got  over,  together 
with  a  section  of  Hooker's.  The  transit  was  resumed 
early    on    the    12th,  without    further    molestation;  and 


164  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Burnside   massed  his   corps  near  the  river,  in  readiness 
for  an  advance  when  the  proper  moment  had  arrived. 

Very  little  of  importance  took  place  that  day  ;  but  the 
battle  known  as  that  of  Fredericksburg  began  at  an  early 
hour  on  December  13,  1862.  Franklin  misunderstood 
Burnside's  orders,  and,  instead  of  making  a  vigorous 
attack  on  the  Confederate  right,  did  nothing  more  than 
execute  a  feint,  though  he  had  two  army  corps  under 
his  command,  and  might  therefore  have  struck  a  telling 
blow  against  the  adversary.  Burnside  had  hoped  to 
cut  the  Confederate  army  into  two  portions,  and,  having 
taken  the  heights  beyond  Fredericksburg,  to  destroy 
the  right  wing  of  his  enemy  ;  but  he  had  entirely  miscal- 
culated the  knowledge  possessed  by  Lee  of  the  manner 
in  which  he  was  to  be  assailed.  Lee  declined  to 
weaken  his  line,  so  as  to  repel  a  false  attack  which 
Burnside  had  ordered  to  be  made  some  miles  below 
Fredericksburg.  Had  he  fallen  into  the  trap  thus  laid 
for  him,  it  is  possible  that  he  might  have  been  beaten  in 
detail  ;  but  he  kept  his  troops  well  together.  On  the 
left  of  the  Union  line  an  attempt  was  made  to  drive  the 
Confederates  across  the  Massaponax,  by  turning  their 
position  ;  but,  although  the  Southern  troops  were  forced 
back  nearly  a  mile,  no  decided  advantage  was  gained. 
Franklin  misapprehended  his  orders,  and  failed  to  bring 
up  all  his  divisions,  and  to  press  the  attack  with  vigor. 
On  the  right  of  the  line,  the  fighting  was  desperate  the 
whole  day.  The  Confederates  were  posted  among  the 
woods  and  hills  at  the  back  of  Fredericksburg,  and  two 
Union  divisions  were  ordered  to  expel  them  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  In  the  face  of  a  tremendous  artillery 
fire,  the  assault  was  renewed  again  and  again  ;  but  as 
often  as  the  endeavor  was  made,  the  regiments  were 
shattered  and  driven  back  in  extreme  confusion.  Sum- 
ner ordered  up  his  artillery  in  support  of  the  attacking 
force,  and  the  contest  continued  until  dark,  without  the 


r66  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Union  troops  winning  a  single  yard,  or  their  opponets 
being  dispossessed  of  the  positions  they  had  assumed 
in  the  morning.  During  this  terrible  combat,  which 
strewed  the  plain  with  dead  and  wounded,  Lee  person- 
ally superintended  the  operations  of  his  men.  Towards 
the  close  of  the  attempt  to  carry  this  strong  position — 
made  all  the  stronger  by  a  stone  wall  behind  which  the 
Confederates  were  entrenched — Burnside  sent  instruc- 
tions to  Hooker,  who  with  a  larger  part  of  his  division 
was  still  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  to  hasten  his 
men  over  the  bridges,  so  that  he  might  support  Sumner 
and  his  lieutenants.  Hooker  proceeded  to  the  scene  of 
action,  but  soon  afterwards  sent  word  to  his  superior 
that  the  heights  were  impregnable.  Burnside  insisted 
on  the  movement  being  carried  out,  and  Hooker  then 
sent  forward  one  of  his  divisions,  with  orders  to  assault 
the  position.  Nothing,  however,  could  be  done.  The 
men  staggered  back  before  the  terrible  fire  of  their  op- 
ponents, and,  leaving  a  third  of  their  number  on  the 
ground,  sought  shelter  in  the  rear.  At  half-past  five  in 
the  evening,  the  musketry  fire  ceased  ;  that  of  the  artil- 
lery continued  until  long  after  dark. 

Next  day  was  Sunday,  and  both  armies  remained 
comparatively  quiet.  It  was  a  day  of  great  misery  and 
depression.  The  shattered  houses  of  Fredericksburg 
were  crowded  with  the  dead  and  dying,  and  there  were 
numerous  stragglers,  who  would  have  crossed  the  bridges 
to  the  northern  side  of  the  river,  had  they  not  been 
driven  back  by  the  guards  posted  there.  In  many  in- 
stances the  men  refused  to  be  led  forward  again,  so 
that  Burnside  felt  that  he  was  in  no  position  to  renew 
the  struggle.  Personally,  he  was  desirous  of  once 
more  advancing  against  the  enemy  ;  but  his  lieutenants 
saw  that  in  the  existing  temper  of  the  troops  such  a 
movement  could  entail  none  but  the  most  fatal  conse- 
quences.    To  many    it  was  a  subject  of  surprise  that 


FREDERICKSB  UR  G. 


167 


Lee  did  not  assume  the  offensive  on  the  14th,  and  by  a 
determined  onslaught  drive  his  enemy  into  the  river. 
It  appeared  that  Lee  expected  to  be  himself  attacked  ; 
at  any  rate,  he  made  no  preparations  for  an  advance, 
but  on  the  contrary  threw  up  fresh  works  of  defence. 
His  army  was  inferior  to  that  of  Burnside,  and  the  bat- 
teries on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Rappahannock  were 
sufficiently  powerful  to  suggest  caution.  Probably  for 
these  reasons,  combined  with  ignorance  of  the  real  con- 
dition of  the  Union  troops,  the  Confederates  remained 
inactive  and  so  allowed  the  Northerners  to  repair  the 
disaster  they  had  suffered.  There  was,  in  truth,  only 
one  way  of  repairing  it,  and  that  was  by  a  retreat  across 
the  river.  Influenced  by  the  advice  of  his  generals, 
Burnside  determined  to  withdraw  from  the  perilous 
position  in  which  he  found  himself.  The  greater  number 
of  the  wounded  were  removed  on  the  15th,  and  during 
the  ensuing  night  the  army  evacuated  Fredericksburg, 
and  retired  to  its  former  lines.  Lee  was  astonished,  on 
the  16th,  at  beholding  nothing  before  him  but  a  deserted 
land,  a  ruined  town,  a  winding  river,  and  a  line  of  bat- 
teries frowning  from  the  opposite  shore. 

The  Union  loss  was  certainly  great.  It  probably 
amounted,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  to  13,771 
men.  The  "  missing"  are  said  to  have  been  2078.  The 
Southerners,  having  been  sheltered  by  their  works,  lost 
comparatively  few  men;  the  total  is  stated  at  1800. 
The  affair  altogether  was  most  disastrous  to  the  Union 
cause;  but  Burnside  took  upon  himself  the  entire  re- 
sponsibility of  the  movement.  He  attributed  his  re- 
verses to  the  fog  on  the  morning  of  the  11th,  and  to 
the  unexpected  and  unavoidable  delay  in  building  the 
pontoon  bridges,  which  gave  the  enemy  24  hours  to 
concentrate  his  forces  in  a  strong  position.  "As  it 
was,"  he  said,  in  his  report  to  Halleck,  "  we  came  very 
near     success.      Failing    in   accomplishing    the    main 


x68  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

object,  we  remained  in  order  of  battle  two  days — long 
enough  to  decide  that  the  enemy  would  not  come  out 
of  his  strongholds  to  fight  us  with  his  infantry."  Burn- 
side  was  perhaps  hardly  to  be  blamed  for  the  misfor- 
tune by  which  he  had  been  overtaken.  His  plan  of 
operations  had  a  reasonable  chance  of  success,  and  it 
failed  partly  because  the  Confederates  were  in  a 
stronger  position  than  had  been  supposed,  and  partly 
because  the  Union  troops  were  not  so  well  handled  by 
the  subordinate  generals  as  had  been  hoped.  Never- 
theless, the  ruin  of  Burnside's  scheme  proved  the  ruin 
of  Burnside  himself.  He  had  now  entirely  lost  his  hold 
on  the  officers  and  men  under  his  command.  Desertions 
were  increasing  to  an  alarming  extent,  and  he  found 
himself  confronting  a  powerful  enemy  with  a  weapon 
which  was  almost  broken  in  his  hand.  The  army  before 
Fredericksburg  accordingly  remained  inactive  for  several 
weeks. 

Chancellorsville  (May  2,  3,  1863). — Burnside,  after 
his  defeat  at  Fredericksburg,  was  succeeded  by  General 
Hooker,  on  January  26,  1863.  Winter  passed  away 
without  any  actions  of  importance.  Nothing  on  a  large 
scale  could  be  begun  because  the  roads  at  this  season 
are  flooded  with  rains  so  as  to  make  the  movement  of 
large  bodies  of  men  almost  impossible.  From  the 
commencement  of  hostilities  till  the  beginning  of  1863 
there  had  been  about  2000  battles  and  skirmishes.  The 
expenditure  of  men  and  money  had  been  appalling, 
and  the  end  seemed  still  distant.  The  Confederate 
Army  was  at  its  strongest  about  the  beginning  of  1863  ; 
its  numbers  soon  afterwards  diminished  to  a  considerable 
extent,  owing  to  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  enlist- 
ment of  several  of  the  men.  In  the  spring  of  that 
year,  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  Northerners  was 
marked. 

Longstreet  and  his  corps  had  been  sent  off  to  Ten- 


CHANCEL  LORS  VI L  LE.  1 69 

nessee  to  assist  General  Bragg.  This  left  Lee  with  but 
60,000  men  to  oppose  the  Potomac  army  of  over 
100,000  men,  and  offered  a  favorable  opportunity  for  an 
attack. 

In  this  condition  of  affairs,  it  became  known  that 
Hooker  was  contemplating  a  renewed  attack  on  Rich- 
mond. The  Confederate  capital  was  at  the  same  time 
being  threatened  by  General  Foster,  operating  from 
North  Carolina,  by  General  Peck  from  South-eastern 
Virginia,  and  by  General  Key  from  the  vicinity  of  the 
Pamunkey.  Lee  was  therefore  compelled  to  divide  his 
forces  among  several  localities,  and  the  numbers  at  his 
disposal  were  small  in  comparison  with  those  of  his 
opponent.  Hooker  determined  to  make  his  attack  in 
two  places.  To  cross  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan 
some  distance  west  of  Fredericksburg,  and  so  fall  on 
the  left  wing  of  the  Confederates,  while  at  the  same  time 
his  own  left  wing  should  occupy  the  heights  above  the 
same  city,  and  seize  the  Richmond  Railway.  The 
cavalry  was  to  co-operate  with  these  movements  by 
getting  round  the  Confederate  position,  cutting  off  the 
retreat  of  Lee's  army  on  Richmond,  destroying  the 
railways  and  burning  the  bridges  over  the  North  and 
South  Anna  Rivers.  Crossing  the  Rapidan  on  the 
30th,  the  Union  troops  entered  an  uncultivated  and 
almost  deserted  country  called  the  Wilderness.  Here 
they  camped  near  Chancellorsville,  and  were  presently 
joined  by  two  more  corps.  Sedgwick  made  a  simulta- 
neous movement  across  the  Rappahannock  below 
Fredericksburg,  and  Lee  was  thus  perplexed  as  to  the 
precise  direction  in  which  he  was  to  be  attacked. 

In  a  little  while  it  became  evident  that  the  brunt  of 
the  battle  would  be  at  Chancellorsville,  and,  on  the 
night  of  April  30,  Lee  massed  the  greater  number  of 
his  divisions  on  the  roads  leading  from  Fredericksburg 
to  that  town.     A  detachment  under  Early  was  left  to 


170 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


guard  the  lower  position,  and  Lee  threw  up  some  earth- 
works on  the  roads  which  would  be  traversed  by  the 
enemy.  The  Union  cavalry  were  already  in  possession 
of  the  Richmond  Railway,  a  portion  of  which  had  been 
destroyed ;  so  that,  in  the  event  of  the  Confederates  be- 
ing vanquished,  their  retreat  would  be  seriously  en- 
dangered. The  position  was  undoubtedly  very  perilous, 
and  some  of  the  Confederate  officers  looked  upon  it 
with  gloomy  forebodings.  Lee  himself,  however,  was 
cheerful  and  self-possessed. 

Hooker  directed  an  advance  to  be  made  from  the 
vicinity  of  Chancellorsville  towards  Fredericksburg. 
Immediately  after,  on  ascertaining  that  Lee  was  march- 
ing against  him  with  his  whole  army,  he  drew  back  on 
a  line  of  earthworks  and  felled  trees  which  he  had 
hastily  constructed  in  the  forest,  and  which  he  strength- 
ened during  the  evening  and  night.  His  front  was 
towards  the  east,  and  Fredericksburg  was  the  objective 
point  at  which  he  aimed.  He  desired  to  choose  his 
own  ground  for  fighting,  and  force  his  opponent  into 
accepting  it;  but  Lee  was  too  wary  to  be  thus  en- 
trapped. Hooker  was  endeavoring  to  outflank  the 
Confederate ;  the  latter  determined  that  he  should  him- 
self be  outflanked.  Lee  therefore  sent  the  corps  under 
Jackson  round  the  right  rear  of  the  Northern  army, 
while  with  but  two  divisions  he  kept  the  army  engaged 
in  front.  The  chances  were  very  much  against  the 
Southerners ;  but  the  desperate  nature  of  their  situation 
required  a  bold  and  daring  policy.  Nothing  could  be 
better  suited  to  secret  operations  than  the  character  of 
the  land  where  the  contending  armies  were  now  watch- 
ing one  another.  The  whole  of  the  country  is  covered 
with  dense  forests,  and  in  the  midst  of  these  tangled 
thickets  the  Union  pioneers  had  thrown  up  very  strong 
entrenchments  at  right  angles  to  the  turnpike  and 
plank-roads  which  connect  Chancellorsville  with  Fred- 


CHANCEL  L  ORS  VILLE. 


171 


ericksburg.  Drawn  up  within  the  line  of  their  en- 
trenchments, with  their  artillery  massed  on  some  high 
ground  a  little  in  the  rear,  the  Northerners  presented  a 
formidable  appearance,  and  it  was  at  once  evident  to 
Lee  that  any  attempt  to  carry  the  position  from  the 
front  must  be  attended  by  a  fearful  loss  of  life,  and 
would  probably 
end  in  failure. 

Fighting  oc- 
curred on  May  1, 
though  not  to 
any  serious  ex- 
tent. It  was  nec- 
essary to  the  suc- 
cess of  Lee's 
plans  that  he 
should  conceal 
the  flank  move- 
ment of  Jackson, 
and  he  therefore 
made  a  series  of 
feigned  attacks 
on  his  front. 
Hooker  was  thus 
led  to  suppose ; 
that  the  Confed- 
erates were  in  full 
strength  immedi- 
ately before  his  position,  and,  conceiving  it  advisable  that 
he  should  be  supported  by  nearly  the  whole  of  his  forces, 
he  ordered  Reynolds'  division  to  cross  the  Rappahan- 
nock, and  join  the  main  army  about  Chancellorsviile. 
While  this  movement  was  being  carried  out,  Jackson 
was  commencing  his  flank  march.  He  started  on  the 
night  of  May  I,  taking  with  him  three  divisions,  com- 
manded by  Hill,  Coulson,  and  Rhodes.     The  thickness 


GENERAL  JOSEPH    HOOKER. 


172 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


of  the  forest  was  favorable  to  his  design,  and  by  the 
afternoon  of  the  2d,  he  had  gained  the  road  from 
Orange  to  Fredericksburg,  south  of  the  Rapidan. 
Having  deployed  his  columns,  he  suddenly  poured 
down  like  a  torrent  on  the  rear  of  Hooker's  position, 
where  he  unexpectedly  appeared  about  five  o'clock  in 
the  evening.  The  first  part  of  Hooker's  army  to  feel 
the  brunt  of  Jackson's  attack  was  Howard's  corps,  which 
was  bivouacking  in  the  forest  with  so  complete  an  un- 
consciousness of  danger  that  in  this  direction  no  defen- 
sive works  had  been  thrown  up.  The  Confederates 
burst  upon  their  antagonists  with  a  tremendous  yell, 
and  the  Union  divisions  on  the  right  fell  back  in  panic. 
Nearly  the  whole  of  the  nth  corps  was  routed,  and 
driven  in  towards  Chancellorsville.  Some  gallant  at- 
tempts were  made  to  rally  the  fugitives,  and  Hooker 
himself  did  his  utmost  to  inspire  confidence  in  the 
troops.  At  the  same  moment  a  vigorous  atack  in  front 
was  being  made  by  Lee,  and  a  feeling  of  terror  spread 
through  the  masses  of  the  Union  army.  There  was  one 
exception  to  this  rule  of  fear  and  disorganization.  The 
reserves,  under  General  Sickles,  exhibited  the  qualities 
of  good  soldiers.  Sickles  himself,  his  staff,  and  a  body 
of  cavalry  under  Pleasanton,  took  post  near  a  stone  wall 
directly  in  the  line  of  retreat,  and  placing  themselves 
boldly  in  a  gap  of  that  wall,  through  which  alone  the 
road  could  be  pursued,  succeeded  in  rallying  some  of 
the  artillery,  though  the  infantry,  overcoming  all  ob- 
structions, managed  to  continue  their  discreditable 
flight.  Howard,  who  was  in  command  of  the  corps 
that  had  been  first  surprised,  strove  hard  to  rally  the 
flying  troops.  Hooker  himself  spared  no  pains,  and 
freely  exposed  his  life  where  his  presence  appeared 
specially  needed ;  for,  whatever  his  deficiencies  as  a 
commander,  he  undoubtedly  possessed  great  courage. 
Towards  nightfall,  something  like  order  was  restored  to 


CHANCELL  ORSVILLE. 


1 73 


the  shattered  divisions.  The  Union  guns  were  turned 
on  the  advancing  enemy,  and  the  pursuit  was  checked ; 
but  the  Northern  army  was  now  in  a  contracted  posi- 
tion between  Chancellorsville  and  the  fork  of  the  two 
rivers,  and  it  became  doubtful  whether  Hooker's  plans 
were  not  damaged  beyond  the  hope  of  recovery. 

The  Confederates  had  so  far  attained  a  marked  suc- 
cess ;  but  they  also  suffered  a  great  personal  misfortune 
in  the  death  of  General  Jackson.  In  the  evening  after 
his  successful  onslaught,  while  riding  back  to  camp 
from  a  reconnoissance  of  the  front,  Jackson  was  fired 
upon  by  his  own  men,  who  mistook  his  escort  for  Union 
calvary.  This  heroic  officer  died  on  May  10, 
bequeathing  to  his  country  generally,  a  reputation  for 
prowess,  gallantry,  and  military  genius  which  the 
Western  Continent  has  never  surpassed. 

The  battle,  cut  short  by  darkness  on  the  night  of  the 
2d,  was  resumed  next  morning  (Sunday).  To  drive 
the  Union  forces  back  towards  the  rivers,  and  thus 
sweep  them  out  of  the  advantageous  ground  which  they 
held,  was  the  difficult  task  now  undertaken  by  the 
Confederate  commander.  The  three  divisions  of  Jack- 
son's corps  had  been  placed  under  Stuart's  command, 
and  these  veteran  troops  began  the  renewed  attack. 
They  were  received  with  so  hot  a  fire  from  the  Union 
entrenchments  that  the  advancing  ranks  wavered  and 
hung  back,  but,  on  being  rallied  and  inspirited  by 
General  Rhodes,  again  pushed  forward  with  energy, 
and  drove  their  opponents  towards  Chancellorsville. 
At  another  part  of  the  field,  the  strongly  fortified  posi- 
tion held  by  Slocum  was  attacked  with  equal  spirit. 
The  outer  defences  was  carried  after  a  fierce  struggle, 
and  the  Union  forces  were  compelled  to  take  refuge 
behind  a  second  line  of  breastworks,  in  the  rear  of 
Chancellorsville.  Some  time  before  noon,  the  Northern 
troops  had  been   compelled   to   recede   about   a  mile 


174 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


towards  the  river,  and  Hooker,  beaten  out  of  his  first 
entrenchments,  was  obliged  to  create  a  second  line  with 
as  much  expedition  as  he  could. 

Satisfied  with  what  he  had  accomplished,  Lee  directed 
his  attention  toward  the  neighborhood  of  Fredericks- 
burg, where  events  of  importance  were  proceeding. 

It  has  already  been  related  that  when  the  Union  troops 
began  their  movement  south  of  the  Rappahannock, 
Sedgwick's  division  crossed  below  Fredericksburg,  in 
order  to  divert  a  portion  of  the  Confederate  army. 
After  parting  with  several  of  his  troops  to  reinforce 
Hooker,  he  was  still  left  with  about  25,000  men.  He 
soon  ascertained  that  Lee's  division  had  vacated  the 
whole  of  their  works,  except  Marye's  Heights,  and  had 
gone  to  encounter  the  Union  ranks  at  Chancellorsville. 
The  Southern  garrison  on  the  heights  was  a  very  small 
one,  as  Sedgwick  knew  from  balloon  reconnoissances. 
Yet,  though  his  numbers  were  superior,  he  took  no 
action  at  the  very  time  when  action  would  probably 
have  ensured  success.  Although  his  position  was  as- 
sumed on  April  28,  he  did  not  attempt  to  aid  his 
Chief  until  the  evening  of  May  2.  Throughout  the 
whole  of  the  1st  and  2d,  had  he  marched  upon  the 
rear  of  Lee,  who  had  only  half  as  many  troops  as  his 
opponent,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  he  would  have  given  a 
totally  different  character  to  that  memorable  affair.  When 
at  length  he  moved,  his  advance  was  slow,  and  un- 
necessarily cautious.  Not  more  than  four  miles  of 
ground  divided  him  from  the  two  regiments  drawn  up 
behind  a  wall  on  Marye's  Heights;  but  it  was  not  until 
midday  of  the  3d,  that  he  came  within  sight  of  his 
enemy.  The  elevated  ground  was  then  surrounded, 
the  works  were  carried  with  a  loss  of  about  1,000  killed 
and  wounded,  and  at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  Sedgwick 
sent  forward  a  column  four  miles  on  the  road  towards 
Chancellorsville.     Lee,  on  hearing  of  the  capture  of 


CHANCELL  ORS  VILLE. 


175 


Marye's  Heights,  despatched  McLaws  to  check  any 
further  advance  of  the  Union  detachment,  which  he  did 
by  a  rough  breastwork.     An  attempt  to  carry  the  posi- 


GENERAL   J.    E.    B.    STUART. 


tion  resulted  in  the  loss  of  numerous  troops.  Nothing 
more  was  done  at  that  time,  and  Sedgwick's  division 
spent  the  night  loosely  scattered  about  the  road  leading 


176 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


from  Marye's  Heights  to  Salem  Church.  The  battle 
was  renewed  next  morning;  but  Sedgwick's  troops 
fought  with  so  much  languor  that  the  Confederates,  on 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  under  Early,  had  but  little 
trouble  in  defeating  them.  They  were  speedily  out- 
flanked by  the  Confederates,  who  re-took  Marye's 
Heights,  and  captured  a  Union  convoy.  Fearing  that 
his  communications  with  Fredericksburg  would  be  cut 
off,  Sedgwick  hastily  withdrew,  leaving  behind  him 
numerous  supply-wagons,  mules,  and  horses.  The 
retreat  was  no  better  than  a  disorderly  flight,  and  after 
dark  the  Union  detachment  recrossed  the  river  on 
pontoon-bridges,  their  movement  accelerated  by  a  re- 
newed attack  of  the  Confederates,  which  spread  con- 
fusion and  dismay  through  several  regiments.  A  diver- 
sion which  might  have  been  attended  by  the  happiest 
results,  had  it  been  vigorously  and  boldly  pushed,  had 
ended  in  nothing  but  disaster,  rout,  and  loss. 

Lee  lost  no  time  in  pursuing  the  advantages  he  had 
already  gained.  Having  disposed  of  Sedgwick,  whose 
advance  had  for  some  time  threatened  his  rear,  he  once 
more  turned  on  the  main  body  of  the  Union  forces 
cramped  within  their  narrow  lines  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Chancellorsville.  But  a  change  in  the  weather 
occurred  on  the  5th.  A  deluge  of  rain  caused  the 
waters  of  the  Rapidan  and  Rappahannock  to  rise  so  as 
to  threaten  the  bridges  at  the  United  States  Ford,  by 
which  alone  the  Union  army  could  retreat.  To  withdraw 
from  their  desperate  position  was  now  the  only  course 
open  to  them.  Hooker  consulted  with  his  chief  subordi- 
nates, and  determined  upon  relinquishing  his  enterprise. 

Preparations  for  the  retreat  began  immediately  after 
dusk,  and  at  daybreak  on  the  6th,  the  whole  army  stood 
in  safety  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  and 
commenced  marching  back  to  its  former  camps  at  Fal- 
mouth. 


CHAtiCELL  ORS  VILLE. 


1 77 


Again  had  the  Union  troops  been  defeated  in   their 
endeavors   to   march  on  Richmond;  again  had   there 


GENERAL    ROHERT    E.    LEE. 


been  an  enormous  expenditure  of  life  without  any  cor- 
responding   advantage.     The   number    of    killed    and 


i78 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


wounded  in  that  week  of  fighting  has  been  variously 
stated;  but  Hooker  admitted  a  loss  of  nearly  11,000 
men.  The  prisoners  were  numerous  :  no  fewer  than 
4600  were  sent  back  from  Richmond  upon  exchange, 
within  a  fortnight  after  the  battle.  In  Sedgwick's  force 
alone,  5000  men  were  returned  as  killed,  wounded  and 
missing.  The  Confederate  loss  was  about  io.OOO;  so 
that  altogether  nearly  30,000  men  must  have  been 
removed  from  the  ranks  of  the  combatants.  The  dis- 
aster to  the  Union  cause  was  so  extreme  that  Lincoln 
and  Halleck  visited  Hooker  at  his  camp,  to  investigate 
th°  causes  of  so  grave  a  misfortune.  On  their  return 
to  Washington,  they  announced  that  Hooker's  demon- 
stration was  not  a  disaster,  but  simply  a  failure.  This 
opinion  did  not  find  acceptance  with  the  public.  It  was 
seen  that  Hooker  had  been  completely  beaten,  and'  it 
was  certain  that  his  removal  from  command  could  not 
be  long  delayed.  The  spring  campaign  in  Virginia  was 
now  at  an  end  ;  for  the  Union  ranks  were  weakened, 
not  merely  by  the  casualties  of  battle,  but  by  the  de- 
parture of  many  regiments  whose  terms  of  service  had 
expired,  and  who  showed  no  readiness  to  re-enlist. 

The  Southerners,  induced  by  these  successes,  would 
have  assumed  the  offensive,  had  their  strength  been 
equal  to  such  a  feat;  but  their  numbers  were  compara- 
tively small,  and  they  feared  at  that  time  to  risk  a  repe- 
tition of  the  ill  luck  which  had  attended  their  invasion 
of  Maryland  the  year  previous.  Frequent  cavalry  skir- 
mishes occurred  in  the  open  country,  and  in  the  passes 
of  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains;  but,  though  characterized 
by  great  gallantry  on  both  sides,  and  by  varying  fortune, 
they  produced  no  lasting  or  important  effects. 

The  two  Presidents  now  put  into  effect  in  their 
respective  sections  the  laws  for  obtaining  soldiers  by 
enrolment  and  draft. 


GETTYSBURG. 


179 


Gettysburg  (July  1-3,  1863). — Lee  now  planned  to 
conquer  upon  the  soil  of  the  loyal  States.  Swinton 
tells  us  that  the  official  records  show  that  "  the  Southern 
agents  near  the  leading  governments  of  the  Old  World 
were  at  this  time  able  to  announce  that  should  Lee, 
after  the  astonishing  successes  he  had  achieved  in  Vir- 
ginia, carry  his  army  into  the  North,  and  there  make  a 
lodgment  promising  some  degree  of  permanancy,  the 
South  could  receive  the  long-coveted  boon  of  foreign 
recognition." 

Since  the  time  when  Lee  had  been  forced  to  abandon 
Maryland,  two  great  battles  had  been  fought.  At 
Fredericksburg,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  an 
incompetent  leader  (Burnside),  was  hurled  in  reckless 
slaughter  against  a  fortified  position  of  impregnable 
strength,  and  after  a  fearful  carnage,  was  repulsed, 
terribly  shaken  in  morale.  At  Chancellorsville,  Hooker, 
after  a  successful  passage  of  the  river,  contrived  by 
unskilful  combination  to  be  thoroughly  beaten  in  de- 
tail by  a  greatly  inferior  force  acting  on  the  offensive, 
and  was  forced  to  recross  the  Rappahannock,  leaving 
his  reputation  as  a  General  behind  him.  In  these 
two  actions  the  Confederates  killed  nearly  30,000 
men,  and  their  experience  in  these  battles  inspired 
them  with  a  sense  of  invincibility.  The  Union  forces, 
distraught  by  repeated  disaster  and  change  of  com- 
mander, had  sunk  in  energy,  and  lapsed  from  their  faith 
of  victory. 

These  two  causes  conspiring  together  determined  the 
Richmond  authorities  to  assume  the  offensive,  carry  the 
war  into  the  Northern  States,  and  dictate  terms  of  peace 
in  Philadelphia  or  New  York. 

The  Confederate  forces  now  in  Virginia  amounted  to 
75,000  men — irrespective  of  Stuart's  Cavalry  They 
were  divided  into  three  corps  of  equal  size,  and  the 
ability  of  Lee,  Longstreth,  and  Ewell  was  a  guarantee 


!8o  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

that  they  would  be  handled  in  the  most  effective  manner. 
Lee  rapidly  moved  down  the  Shenandoah,  crossing  the 
Potomac,  and  advanced  to  Chambersburg. 

Hooker,  though  he  exhibited  dashing  qualities  as  a 
subordinate,  was  no  match  for  these  men.  He  requested 
to  be  relieved  of  the  command,  and  was  succeeded  by 
General  George  G.  Meade. 

Towards  the  end  of  June  Lee's  headquarters  were  at 
Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania.  Ewell,  who  preceded 
him  there,  was  then  ordered  to  send  Early's  division  to 
the  eastern  side  of  South  Mountain,  so  as  simul- 
taneously to  threaten  Harrisburg  and  Baltimore.  Other 
divisions  were  sent  in  various  directions,  charged  with 
the  task  of  burning  bridges,  and  destroying  railways 
and  canals,  so  as  to  hinder  the  advance  of  the  Union 
troops.  Orders  for  a  forward  movement  were  issued  by 
General  Meade  the  day  he  assumed  command  (June 
28).  Maryland  was  entered  on  that  day,  and  the  garri- 
son at  Harper's  Ferry  was  called  in,  under  an  incorrect 
impression,  on  Meade's  part,  that  it  was  destitute  of 
provisions.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  then  con- 
centrated in  and  around  the  city  of  Frederick,  Maryland. 
On  June  29,  Lee's  forces  moved  in  an  easterly  direction 
towards  Gettysburg.  With  the  exception  of  two  corps, 
Meade's  army  was  moved  northward  at  the  same  time ; 
but  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  Meade  changed  his 
line  of  march,  and  directed  the  whole  of  his  corps 
towards  Gettysburg.  Thus  the  two  hostile  armies  were 
moving  in  parallel  lines  on  the  same  place.  Gettysburg 
was  indeed  a  position  of  importance  to  both ;  for  it  is  a 
central  point  to  which  many  roads  converge.  Lee  was 
ill-supplied  with  information  as  to  his  adversary's  move- 
ments. The  cavalry  had  not  yet  rejoined  him,  and  it 
was  only  by  a  difficult  march  round  the  right  flank  of 
the  Union  forces,  and  therefore  between  them  and 
Washington,  that  Stuart  was  able,  on  July  2,  to  recom* 


GETTYSBURG. 


181 


bine  his  detachment  with  the  main  body  of  the  Con- 
federate army.  On  the  two  previous  days,  Lee  had 
scarcely  any  means  of  ascertaining  what  Meade  was 


GENERAL   GEORGE   G.    MEADE. 


doing ;  so  that  in  marching  on  Gettysburg  he  was 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  Union  commander  was 
marching  there  too. 


Union — 12 


X82  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

At  this  moment,  the  position  of  the  Southern  Con. 
federacy  was  one  of  extreme  peril.  Nearly  all  the  de- 
fenders of  Richmond  had  been  sent  to  join  Lee  in  his 
invasion  of  the  North;  and  the  naked  condition  of  the 
Confederate  capital,  and  of  the  country  surrounding  it, 
became  known  to  the  Federal  Government. 

Meade's  army  was  within  a  few  miles  of  Gettysburg 
on  June  30.  A  little  to  the  north,  but  moving  in  the 
same  direction,  was  Lee's  army.  Meade  ascertained 
the  proximity  of  his  adversaries  in  the  course  of  that 
day,  and,  pushing  forward  with  celerity,  entered  Gettys- 
burg on  the  morning  of  July  I.  In  the  meanwhile  the 
Confederates  continued  their  advance,  and  at  ten  a.  m. 
one  of  their  divisions  became  engaged  with  Reynold's 
corps  on  the  western  side  of  the  town,  a  little  beyond  a 
line  of  hills  called  Oak  Ridge.  Reynolds  rode  forward 
to  superintend  his  troops  in  person,  but  was  im- 
mediately killed  by  a  rifle-bullet.  The  command  of  the 
corps  then  devolved  on  General  Doubleday,  who  was 
enabled  to  bring  three  divisions  into  action  ;  yet  the 
Confederates  were  not  checked.  The  scene  of  the 
fighting  was  a  small  open  valley,  consisting  of  ploughed 
fields  bounded  by  thickly-wooded  uplands.  The  en- 
counter was  prolonged  and  desperate,  and  the  Southern- 
ers themselves  admitted  that  the  Union  troops  fought 
well.  Before  his  death,  Reynolds  had  sent  orders  to 
the  nth  corps,  under  Howard,  to  come  to  his  support 
as  quickly  as  possible.  This  body  was  to  the  south  of 
Gettysburg,  and  it  was  some  time  before  it  could  turn 
towards  the  north-west,  cross  the  Oak  Ridge,  and  de- 
ploy into  the  little  valley.  Its  arrival  was  eagerly  de- 
sired by  the  overmatched  Union  forces  in  the  latter 
position;  but  it  was  not  until  about  one  p.  m.  that 
Howard,  riding  in  advance  of  his  troops,  reached  thi 
field  of  action.  He  took  command  of  the  entire  force, 
and  his  men,  coming  up  shortly  afterwards,  occupied  a 


GETTYSBURG. 


183 


position  to  the  right  of  the  1st  corps.  Notwithstanding 
this  accession  of  strength  on  the  Northern  side,  the 
Southern  troops  continued  to  gain  ground.  The  nth 
Union  corps,  consisting  principally  of  Germans,  was 
driven  back  in  broken  heaps,  though  not  without  a  very 


GENERAL    W.    S.    HANCOCK. 


creditable  attempt  to  withstand  the  enemy.  The  dis- 
comfiture of  this  body  spread  dismay  through  the  rest, 
and  a  retreat  towards  Gettysburg  soon  afterwards  set  in. 
By  this  time  General  Hancock  had  been  sent  forward 
by  Meade  to  take  the  principal  command,  and,  with  the 


r84  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

assistance  of  Howard,  he  formed  the  broken  corps 
afresh  on  the  summit  of  the  rising  ground.  The 
Southern  Generals,  Hill  and  Ewell,  were  at  first  dis- 
posed to  resume  the  attack  at  once,  but  as  the  evening 
drew  near,  and  the  exact  strength  of  the  opposing  forces 
was  not  known,  it  was  considered  advisable  to  abstain 
from  further  action  for  the  present.  The  Confederates 
therefore  occupied  the  town,  and  prepared  for  renewed 
action  on  the  following  day.  In  the  course  of  the  night 
Meade  arrived,  and  posted  his  troops  in  a  semi-circular 
line,  of  which  the  convex  center  was  towards  Gettys- 
burg. The  hill  formed  part  of  a  curving  ridge,  which 
in  some  portions  was  rocky  and  thickly  wooded  ;  and 
Meade's  left  flank,  lying  to  the  south-west  of  Cemetery 
Hill,  rested  upon  an  almost  perpendicular  peak,  covered 
with  forest  trees,  called  the  Round  Top.  To  the  west 
and  north  of  this  ridge  was  a  narrow  valley,  between 
one  and  two  miles  in  width,  beyond  which  the  heights 
known  as  Oak  Ridge  ran  nearly  parallel  with  the  first 
line  of  hills.  On  the  morning  of  July  2  the  Confeder- 
ate line  of  battle  was  formed  on  the  slopes  of  the 
further  ridge,  its  right  facing  the  Round  Top,  its  left 
overlapping  Gettysburg,  and  turning  somewhat  to  the 
south.  Believing  that  the  whole  Confederate  army  was 
in  his  front,  Meade  had  on  the  previous  evening 
hastened  up  all  his  outlying  corps  ;  and  his  entire  force 
was  on  the  ground  by  seven  a.  m.  on  the  2d,  with 
the  exception  of  the  6th  corps,  which  did  not  arrive 
until  2  P.  m.  The  Confederates  had  concentrated  their 
divisions  by  about  the  same  time,  and  it  was  seen  on 
both  sides  that  an  action  of  a  desperate  character  would 
presently  ensue.  The  Union  troops  held  a  strong  posi- 
tion, the  advantages  of  which  they  augmented  by  throw- 
ing up  breastworks  and  other  defences.  Lee  ques- 
tioned the  prudence  of  attacking  an  enemy  so  formid- 
able in  numbers,  and  so  well  entrenched  on  command- 


GETTYSBURG. 


18$ 


ing  hills.  But  these  considerations  were  overruled  by 
the  suggestion  that  to  retreat  without  a  further  engage- 
ment might  have  been  attended  by  consequences  abso- 


GENERAL    LONGSTREET. 


lutely  fatal.  A  battle  thus  became  unavoidable ;  and 
Lee  determined  to  fight,  though  it  would  appear  that  he 
and  Longstreet  were  both  apprehensive  of  the  result,  and 
doubtful  as  to  the  propriety  of  an  offensive  movement. 


X86  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

The  key  of  the  Union  position  was  Cemetery  Hill, 
which  was  regarded  as  the  center  of  the  line,  though  it 
lay  much  more  to  the  right  than  to  the  left.  Here 
Meade  established  his  headquarters ;  and  at  about  a 
quarter  past  four  in  the  afternoon,  the  Confederate 
batteries  opened  fire.  Under  cover  of  their  guns,  the 
Confederates  then  advanced  simultaneously  against  the 
extremities  of  the  opposing  line,  and  the  Union  left, 
commanded  by  Sickles,  was  vehemently  assaulted  by 
Longstreet  in  person.  Sickles  was  an  amateur  soldier, 
but  his  courage,  as  he  had  shown  at  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville,  was  all  that  could  be  desired ;  and  he 
clung  to  his  position  with  grim  tenacity.  After  awhile, 
however,  he  was  badly  wounded,  and  carried  from  the 
field  ;  his  men  were  driven  back  with  terrible  loss  from 
the  advanced  position  which  he  had  taken  up;  and  the 
Southerners  pushed  on  towards  the  eastern  ridge. 
Meade  now  strengthened  his  left  by  the  5th  corps  under 
Slocum,  and  the  Union  guns  did  murderous  execution 
among  the  Confederates,  who  lost  some  of  their  best 
officers.  Longstreet  headed  the  attack  with  remarkable 
gallantry ;  fresh  troops  arrived  in  support  of  those 
whom  he  already  commanded  ;  and  at  one  time  the 
summit  of  the  ridge  was  nearly  gained.  But  the  Union 
forces  were  being  continually  reinforced,  and  the  South- 
ern troops  were  finally  compelled  to  retire  towards  the 
undulating  ground,  near  Emmetsburg  road.which  Sickles 
had  previously  occupied,  but  from  which  he  had  been 
expelled.  While  the  left  was  thus  assailed,  Ewell 
attacked  Cemetery  Hill,  and  demonstrations  were  also 
made  against  other  portions  of  the  Union  line.  These 
attempts,  however,  were  not  well  supported,  nor  sus- 
tained with  sufficient  spirit;  consequently,  although 
some  breastworks  were  temporarily  carried,  the  general 
result  of  the  day's  operation  was  that  the  Confederates 
were  driven  back  with  enormous  loss.     But  the  loss  was 


GETTYSBURG.  \%j 

not  wholly  on  one  side  :  Meade's  troops  also  had  suf- 
fered very  severely,  and  their  commander  was  doubtful, 
when  night  closed  in,  whether  his  army  could  bear 
another  attack.  Orders  were  drawn  up  by  the  chief 
of  the  staff  against  the  contingency  of  a  retreat ;  but, 
on  considering  all  the  circumstances  of  his  position — 
the  valor  which  his  men  had  shown,  and  the  formidable 
nature  of  the  rugged  hills  on  which  he  was  entrenched 
— Meade  determined  to  remain,  and  once  more  offer 
battle  on  the  following  day. 

The  struggle  began  again  on  the  morning  of  the  3d ; 
this  time  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line.  The 
assault  was  conducted  with  so  much  vigor  that  for 
awhile  Meade  was  apprehensive  lest  his  right  flank 
should  be  turned  ;  but,  after  a  desperate  effort,  the  Con- 
federate left  was  hurled  back,  and  the  fighting  was  then 
transferred  to  the  center  and  the  Union  left.  Great  de- 
lay, however,  ensued  in  carrying  out  these  later  move- 
ments, and  the  time  was  turned  to  good  account  by  the 
Union  troops  in  adding  to  their  outworks,  and  strength- 
ening the  batteries  which  were  to  sweep  the  intervening 
valley.  At  half-past  twelve  a  furious  cannonade  was 
opened  from  more  than  100  guns  forming  the  batteries 
of  Longstreet  and  Hill,  as  well  as  from  Ewcll's  artillery, 
stationed  in  the  neighborhood  of  Gettysburg,  and  di- 
rected against  the  slopes  of  Cemetery  Hill.  They  were 
replied  to  with  equal  vehemence,  and  for  two  hours  the 
narrow  valley  blazed  and  roared  with  this  infernal  in- 
terchange of  fire  and  death,  which  tore  great  limbs  from 
the  trees,  splintered  the  rocks,  and  scattered  destruction 
far  and  wide.  Then  the  Confederate  brigades  descended 
the  hill  on  which  they  had  been  posted,  and  moved 
against  the  Union  line.  The  slaughter  was  excessive, 
for  the  men  were  within  full  range  of  the  Union  guns 
— guns  of  enormous  size  and  power.  Nevertheless, 
they   pressed    forward   with    devoted    gallantry,   and 


!88  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UN  10 IV. 

Pickett's  Virginians  even  planted  their  colors  within 
the  hostile  works.  But  the  less  experienced  troops 
were  in  time  staggered  by  the  obstacles  before  them, 
and,  after  wavering  in  their  march,  halted,  and  then  fell 
back  in  confusion.  Pickett's  regiments,  composed  of 
men  who  were  justly  regarded  as  among  the  best  troops 
in  the  army,  were  exposed,  by  the  retreat  of  their  com- 
rades, to  the  utmost  fury  of  the  adversary.  Attacked 
both  in  front  and  flank,  these  courageous  men  were 
swept  off  the  works  they  had  captured,  and  at  length, 
though  unwillingly,  forced  to  retreat.  In  that  desperate 
struggle  every  brigadier  of  the  Virginian  division  was 
killed  or  wounded,  and,  out  of  24  regimental  officers, 
only  two  escaped  unhurt.  Leaving  an  enormous  pro- 
portion of  their  number  dead  or  wounded  on  the 
ground,  the  Virginians  retired  to  the  slopes  from  which 
they  had  started,  and  Longstreet,  apprehending  an  im- 
mediate advance  by  the  Union  forces,  made  hasty  prep- 
arations for  defending  his  position.  Lee  himself  rode 
amongst  the  shattered  ranks,  reassuring  the  soldiers  by 
his  calm  and  sympathetic  manner.  The  several  detach- 
ments were  formed  again,  under  cover  of  the  woods, 
and  the  men  were  ordered  to  lie  on  the  ground  until 
the  moment  when  they  should  be  attacked.  But  no 
attack  came.  The  Union  troops  were  exhausted, 
and  had  spent  nearly  all  their  ammunition.  The 
third  day's  battle,  therefore,  came  to  a  close  about 
six  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Detached  engagements 
of  a  desultory  nature  took  place  in  other  parts  of 
the  line,  but  were  attended  with  no  important  ef- 
fect. The  attack  had  not  been  well  planned,  and 
Longstreet  afterwards  admitted  that  the  Confederates 
had  made  a  mistake  in  not  concentrating  their  army 
more,  and  in  attacking  with  15,000  men,  instead  of 
30,000.  The  Southerners  had  found  the  position  of 
their  opponents  too  strong  to  be  carried,  and    't  was 


GETTYSBURG. 


189 


obvious  that  any  further  attempt  would  lead  only  to 
the  worst  results. 

On  the  other  hand,  Meade  saw  that  it  would  be 
highly  imprudent  on  his  part  to  follow  up  his  success 
by  any  attack  upon  the  enemy.  He  admitted  having 
lost  during  the  campaign  upwards  of  23,000  men  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  Meade  therefore  re- 
mained quietly 
within  his  lines, 
probably  expect- 
ing the  speedy 
retreat  of  his  ad- 
versary. Lee  had 
in  truth  deter- 
mined to  aban- 
don a  country  in 
which  little  could 
be  gained,  and 
everything  might 
be  lost;  but  it 
was  not  neces- 
sary to  act  with 
precipitation,  and 
the  greater  part  |i|| 
of  the  4th  was 
devoted  to  bury- 
ing the  dead,  and 
sending  the 
wounded  to    the 

rear.  At  night,  the  several  corps  began  their  retreat,  and 
by  the  morning  of  the  5th  the  whole  force  was  out  of 
view.  Sedgwick,  with  the  Sixth  corps,  was  sent  in  pur- 
suit, and  came  up  with  the  Confederate  rear-guard  on  the 
evening  of  the  6th.  The  position,  however,  could  not 
have  been  attacked  without  great  risk,  and  the  main  body 
of  the  Union  army  marched  on  Middletown  in  a  direc- 


GENERAL    GEORGE    E.    PICKETT. 


190 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


tion  parallel  with  that  of  the  Southerners.  Part  of  the 
Confederate  train  moved  by  the  road  through  Fairfield, 
and  the  rest  by  way  of  Cashtown,  guarded  by  Imboden. 
The  great  number  of  the  wagons  exposed  them,  while 
passing  through  the  mountains,  to  the  attacks  of  the 
Union  cavalry  ;  yet  they  succeeded  in  reaching  VVil- 
liamsport  without  serious  loss.  At  that  place  they 
were  attacked  on  the  6th,  but  the  assault  was  repelled 
by  Imboden,  and  detachments  of  Meade's  cavalry  were 
subsequently  defeated  by  Stuart,  and  pursued  for  several 
miles  in  the  direction  of  Boonesborough.  The  Union 
army  crossed  the  South  Mountain  on  the  9th,  and 
Meade  then  established  his  headquarters  at  Antietam 
Bridge. 

The  discomfited  army,  with  its  immense  train  of 
wagons  and  ambulances,  halted  at  Williamsport  and 
threw  up  entrenchments  and  batteries  to  guard  the  po- 
sition. The  Union  troops  lay  in  force  barely  two  miles 
off,  but  did  not  venture  to  attack.  Meade,  acting  on 
the  advice  of  his  generals,  decided  to  await  reinforce- 
ments. Late  on  July  13,  the  movement  into  Virginia 
commenced.  The  Union  cavalry  made  a  spirited  dash 
at  the  Confederate  rear-guard,  which  was  covering  the 
approaches  to  the  bridge  ;  but  the  assailants  were  driven 
back  with  considerable  loss,  and  by  one  p.  m.  the  whole 
of  Lee's  army  was  again  in  the  Old  Dominion. 

Thus  ended  the  second  invasion  of  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania.  It  had  entailed  a  loss  of  at  least  50,000 
men,  if  both  armies  are  taken  into  the  account ;  and  it 
had  been  unproductive  of  the  slightest  good  to  the 
Confederate  cause,  while  it  made  still  more  apparent  the 
ever-increasing  power  of  the  Union  Government,  and 
its  ability  to  encounter  the  Southerners  wherever  they 
dared  to  show  their  flag.  The  effect  of  this  battle  was 
to  put  an  end  to  the  idea  of  a  Northern  invasion. 


CHAPTER  V. 

VlCKSBURG   AND  THE  OPERATIONS    IN   THE  WEST  (1863). 

The  reduction  of  Vicksburg  was  determined  upon, 
and  no  pains  were  spared  to  bring  about  the  result. 
Grant  resolved  on  cutting  off  all  communication  with 
the  east  by  turning  the  defences  on  the  Mississippi  and 
the  Yazoo.  His  headquarters  were  at  Milliken's  Bend, 
on  the  western  shore  of  the  Mississippi — the  shore  op- 
posite to  that  on  which  Vicksburg  stands ;  and  on 
March  29  McClernand  was  sent  to  occupy  New  Car- 
thage, some  miles  to  the  south.  These  operations  were 
assisted  by  the  advance  of  Banks  from  New  Orleans,  so 
as  to  threaten  Port  Hudson  in  combination  with  the 
fleet.  The  movements  of  Banks  and  of  the  ships  were 
impeded  by  the  burning  of  bridges  and  the  placing  of 
obstructions  in  the  river.  Banks  passed  into  a  region 
west  of  the  Mississippi  called  Bayou  Teche.  Con- 
stantly driving  the  enemy  before  him,  he  advanced,  on 
April  20,  to  Opelousas,  a  town  lying  about  180  miles  to 
the  northwest  of  New  Orleans ;  after  which  he  estab- 
lished himself  for  a  few  weeks  at  Simmsport.  The  Red 
River,  another  tributary  of  the  great  stream,  which  it  en- 
ters between  Port  Hudson  and  Natchez,  was  blockaded 
by  Farragut  after  he  had  succeeded  in  passing  the  river- 
batteries  with  two  of  his  vessels.  Porter,  who  was  still 
above  Vicksburg,  made  frequent  attempts  to  join  his 
comrade,  but  for  a  long  time  without  success.  On  the 
(192) 


THE  ATTACK  ON   VICKSBURG. 


193 


night  of  April  16,  however,  the  feat  was  accomplished 
by  an  act  of  great  boldness  and  resolution. 

During  that  day  eight  gunboats,  three  transports  and 
several  barges  laden  with  supplies,  tried  to  descend  the 
Mississippi  after  dark.  The  movement  was  watched  in 
breathless  silence  by  the  Union  troops  stationed  about 
the  town,  and  the  passage  of  the  huge,  dim,  almost 
shapeless  vessels  through  the  wide  obscurity  was  most 
impressive  in  its  stealthy  mystery  and  lurking  possibilities 
of  harm.  Silently  and  darkly  they  passed  on,  and  drew 
near  to  Vicksburg.  Nearly  an  hour  elapsed  without  any- 
thing being  heard  ;  then,  two  bright,  sharp  lines  of  flame 
pierced  the  darkness,  and  in  another  moment  the  whole 
length  of  the  heights  was  ablaze.  The  forts  had 
opened  fire  on  the  vessels ;  the  vessels  were  not  long  in 
replying  to  the  forts.  It  was  a  part  of  Porter's  plan 
that  his  fleet  of  gunboats,  when  in  front  of  the  batteries, 
should  engage  them  with  their  broadside  guns,  and 
then  endeavor  to  descend  the  stream  under  cover  of  the 
smoke.  The  batteries,  however,  had  been  the  first  to 
fire.  Presently  all  down  the  river  the  bristling  guns  of 
the  Confederates  poured  forth  flame,  and  smoke,  and 
storm  of  deadly  missiles ;  and  the  roar  and  rush  of 
sound  added  another  terror  to  the  fierce  encounter. 
The  passage  of  the  fleet  was  visible  in  gliding  fire,  as 
point  after  point  was  reached,  and  battery  after  battery 
replied  to  the  moving  gunboats. 

After  the  cannonade  had  gone  on  for  some  time,  a 
gleam  of  light,  different  from  that  of  the  guns,  spread 
upward  into  the  heavens  immediately  above  the  city. 
This  grew  and  intensified  every  moment,  passing  from 
pallor  to  redness,  and  at  last  glaring  upon  the  night  with 
such  fulness  and  power  that  the  Union  on-lookers  ex- 
claimed, "Vicksburg  is  on  fire!"  But  the  light  pro- 
ceeded from  a  beacon-pile,  which  had  been  kindled  in 
order  to  illuminate  both  reaches  of  the  river  (at  that 


194 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


point  curving  with  a  rapid  bend),  and  thus  to  enable 
the  gunners  to  aim  with  greater  accuracy  at  the  Union 
vessels.  The  flame  burned  steadily  and  keenly,  without 
any  smoke,  and  served  its  purpose  well ;  but  it  also 
helped  the  gunboats  to  reach  the  batteries  with  more 
certainty  than  they  could  have  done  in  the  dark.  The 
vessels  were  still  pursuing  their  way  down  the  river, 
but  the  artillery  duel  continued  with  the  utmost  fury. 
It  was  a  duel  in  which  the  boats  necessarily  had  the 
worst  of  it.  The  Forest  Queen,  one  of  the  transports, 
received  a  shot  in  the  hull  and  another  through  the 
steam-drum,  which  at  once  disabled  her.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  accident  the  Henry  Clay,  another  trans- 
port, which  came  next,  was  stopped,  to  prevent  her  run- 
ning into  her  unfortunate  comrade.  The  result  was  dis- 
astrous. The  crew  of  the  second  vessel  became 
alarmed  by  the  stoppage,  which  left  them  exposed  to 
the  unmitigated  force  of  the  Confederate  fire ;  and  in  a 
little  while  they  launched  the  yawl,  sprang  into  it,  and 
made  for  the  shore.  Shortly  afterwards  the  Henry  Clay 
caught  fire,  owing  to  the  explosion  of  a  shell  amid  the 
cotton  with  which  the  engines  were  protected,  and, 
giving  out  great  volumes  of  smoke  and  flame,  floated 
down  the  stream  until  it  disappeared  below  Warrenton. 
The  Forest  Queen  was  taken  in  tow  by  a  gunboat,  and 
escaped  without  further  injury  ;  while  the  third  trans- 
port, the  Silver  Wave,  ran  past  without  being  touched. 
Before  the  approach  of  dawn,  the  whole  of  the  gun- 
boats had  got  beyond  the  uttermost  batteries  without 
any  material  damage.  On  the  Benton,  Porter's  flagship, 
one  man  was  killed,  and  two  were  wounded,  by  the 
bursting  of  a  shell;  but  this  was  the  utmost  injury  to 
life.  The  great  exploit  had  been  accomplished,  and 
Porter  was  now  safe  in  the  waters  below  Vicksburg. 

Grant    was  so    well  satisfied  with    what    had    taken 
place  that  he  ordered  six  more   transports   to  be  pre- 


1 95 


196 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


pared  to  run  the  batteries  in  the  same  manner.  These 
were  to  carry  supplies  for  the  army,  which  it  was  hoped 
would  soon  be  engaged  in  an  attack  on  the  southern  side 
of  Vicksburg,  and  ultimately  to  convey  the  army  itself 
across  the  river.  These  six  vessels,  towing  12  barges, 
set  out  on  the  night  of  April  22,  and  all  but  one  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  past  the  batteries,  though  six  of  the 
barges  were  either  sunk  or  injured.  By  this  time,  Grant 
had  arrived  with  two  army  corps,  at  New  Carthage, 
where  Porter's  gunboats  were  stationed.  He  had  been 
compelled  to  follow  a  very  circuitous  route, and  to  make 
his  way  through  a  country  rendered  peculiarly  difficult 
by  marshes  and  streams ;  but  the  obstacles  were  all 
overcome  after  much  delay,  and  he  was  in  a  favorable 
locality  for  ulterior  operations.  A  kw  days  later  he 
moved  his  forces  still  farther  south  to  a  place  called 
Hard  Times,  lying  on  the  Louisiana  shore  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  thus  took  up  a  position  just  opposite  Grand 
Gulf,  which  is  situated  a  little  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Big  Black  River.  It  was  essential  to  Grant's  plans  that 
Grand  Gulf  (which  was  strongly  fortified)  should  be 
quickly  taken  ;  and  he  had  repeatedly  instructed  McCler- 
nand,  when  at  New  Carthage,  to  make  the  attempt.  Mc- 
Clernand  always  hesitated,  making  perpetual  excuses  for 
his  delay;  and  Grant,  seeing  that  the  opportunity  was 
slipping  away,  went  to  the  front  himself  and  took  im- 
mediate command.  His  vigilance  during  the  whole  of 
these  operations  was  very  remarkable. 

On  April  29  Grant  embarked  a  portion  of  his  army 
on  board  the  transports  and  moved  to  the  front  of  Grand 
Gulf.  His  scheme  was  that  the  gunboats  under  Portet 
should  silence  the  fortifications,  and  that  the  troops 
should  then  land,  under  cover  of  the  gunboats,  and 
carry  the  place  by  storm.  The  attack  from  the  river 
began  early  in  the  morning,  and  lasted  nearly  six 
hours,  at  the  end  of  which  time  Porter  had  silenced  the 


THE  ATTACK  ON   VICKSBURG. 


197 


lower  batteries.  The  upper  battery,  however,  being 
high,  strongly  built,  and  mounted  with  guns  of  a  very 
heavy  calibre,  was  able  to  maintain  its  fire.  Grant, 
finding  that  the  enemy's  works  could  not  be  entirely 
neutralized,  and  fearing  to  risk  the  lives  of  his  men  in 
an  attempt  to  storm  them,  determined  to  land  lower 
down  the  stream,  and  take  the  position  in  reverse.  The 
army  was  disembarked,  and  ordered  to  march  down  the 
western  side  of  the  Mississippi,  and  be  ready  for  cross- 
ing opposite  Bruinsburg.  The  transports  were  to  run 
past  the  batteries  at  Grand  Gulf,  and  to  take  up  posi- 
tions such  as  would  enable  them  to  ferry  the  troops 
across.  As  soon  as  it  was  dark,  the  gunboats  again 
engaged  the  batteries,  and  all  the  transports  got  by 
without  much  injury.  Next  morning,  the  soldiers  em- 
barked, and  the  13th  corps  landed  on  the  eastern  bank 
of  the  river,  and  was  pushed  forward  towards  Port  Gib- 
son, situated  near  the  Bayou  Pierre,  and  connected  with 
Grand  Gulf  by  a  railway.  These  troops  were  followed 
by  others ;  but  no  action  took  place  that  day. 

The  position  of  Pemberton,  who  commanded  at 
Vicksburg,  was  becoming  grave.  He  telegraphed  for 
instructions  to  Johnston,  and  was  ordered  to  attack 
Grant  at  once.  Johnston  was  not  able  to  send  any  re- 
inforcements, being  himself  closely  pressed  by  Rose- 
crans  in  Tennessee.  Pemberton  was  therefore  obliged 
to  do  the  best  he  could  with  the  troops  at  his  disposal, 
and  he  directed  General  Bowen,  commanding  at  Grand 
Gulf,  to  cross  the  Bayou  Pierre,  and  oppose  the  march 
of  the  Union  troops  to  Port  Gibson.  At  two  on  the 
morning  of  May  1,  Bovven's  division  was  encountered 
four  miles  south  of  the  latter  place.  A  hotly-contested 
action  followed,  and  at  the  close  of  the  day  the  Confed- 
erates were  driven  towards  Port  Gibson.  The  country 
was  so  cut  up  by  ravines,  swamps,  canebrakes,  and 
jungles,  that  very  little  generalship  could  be  exhibited 

Union — 13 


198 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


on  either  side ;  but  the  hand-to-hand  fighting  was 
furious,  and  strewed  the  dismal,  solitary  ways  with  the 
bodies  of  the  fallen.  Grant  was  in  personal  command 
shortly  after  the  action  began.  Fresh  divisions  con- 
tinued to  arrive  throughout  the  combat,  and  they  were 
able  to  advance  in  force  on  the  morning  of  the  2d, 
when  it  was  found  that  the  Southerners  had  retreated 
across  the  two  forks  of  the  Bayou  Pierre,  on  the  road 
to  Grand  Gulf,  and  had  burned  the  bridges  behind 
them.  So  hurried  was  Bowen  that,  in  retreating,  he 
abandoned  his  hospitals  and  many  of  his  wounded.  A 
brigade  of  Logan's  division  was  sent  forward  on  the  2d, 
to  occupy  the  attention  of  the  Confederates  while  a 
floating  bridge  was  being  thrown  across  the  south  fork 
of  the  bayou  at  Port  Gibson  ;  and,  on  the  bridge  being 
completed,  McPherson's  corps  got  over,  and  pushed  on 
to  the  north  fork,  eight  miles  off  Here,  the  bridge  at 
the  Grindstone  Ford  was  found  still  burning ;  but  the 
fire  was  extinguished,  and  the  bridge  repaired  in  the 
night.  Early  next  morning  the  troops  passed  over,  and 
the  Southerners  were  pursued  to  Hankinson's  Ferry,  on 
the  Big  Black  River.  Skirmishing  continued  during 
the  whole  day,  and  many  prisoners  were  brought  in  ; 
but  the  fighting  in  itself  was  not  important.  Neverthe- 
less, the  Union  successes  were  such  as  to  make  their 
adversaries  doubt  the  possibility  of  defending  Grand 
Gulf.  They  accordingly  evacuated  the  position,  and 
Porter,  on  making  a  demonstration  during  the  3d,  dis- 
covered that  he  had  no  enemy  to  encounter. 

Grant  rode  into  the  town  and  found  Porter's  naval  force 
in  possession.  The  place  was  one  of  great  strength, 
and  was  in  course  of  being  made  still  stronger.  The 
Confederates,  however,  considered  it  advisable  to  con- 
centrate their  forces  at  Vicksburg ;  but  before  leaving 
Grand  Gulf  they  blew  up  their  magazines,  and  buried  or 
spiked    their    cannon.     Pemberton    said    that    Grant's 


THE  ATTACK  ON  VICKSBURG. 


199 


movements  were  so  rapid,  and  his  facilities  for  trans- 
portation so  great,  that  his  own  actions  had  been 
seriously  embarrassed  in  consequence.  He  had  been 
unable  to  withdraw  his  heavy  guns,  and  thirteen  pieces 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  conquerors.  The  Union  base 
of  operations  was  now  transferred  to  Grand  Gulf.  For 
three  days,  Grant  had  not  been  in  bed,  nor  had  his 
clothes  off;  but  his  energy  continued  unabated,  and  he 
wrote  to  his  subordinate  commanders  at  distant  points, 
giving  them  minute  instructions  as  to  what  they  should 
do.  To  Sherman  he  stated  that  the  road  to  Vicksburg 
was  open,  and  that  that  fortified  position  would  shortly 
fall  into  his  hands. 

When  the  major  part  of  the  Union  army  moved  from 
Milliken's  Bend,  Sherman  was  ordered  to  make  a  dem- 
onstration against  Haines's  Bluff,  in  order  to  prevent 
reinforcements  leaving  Vicksburg  for  Grand  Gulf. 
Sherman  crossed  the  Mississippi,  landed  his  forces  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Yazoo,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the 
gunboats,  made  an  attack  on  the  position  on  May  6. 
It  was  no  part  of  his  design  to  take  the  bluff,  and  on 
the  7th  the  expedition  returned.  The  Confederates 
had  been  prevented  from  sending  reinforcements  to  the 
south,  and  the  divisions  under  Sherman  now  prepared 
for  joining  Grant,  who  intended  to  collect  his  forces  at 
Grand  Gulf,  and  to  concentrate  at  that  spot  a  large  sup- 
ply of  provisions  and  ordnance  stores  before  moving 
against  Vicksburg.  An  army-corps  was  then  to  be  de- 
tached, to  co-operate  with  Banks  against  Port  Hudson, 
and  ultimately  a  recombination  of  the  forces  was  to  be 
effected  ;  but  as  Banks  could  not  return  to  Baton  Rouge, 
from  his  position  west  of  the  Mississippi,  before  the 
ioth,  Grant  was  compelled  to  abandon  this  portion  of 
his  scheme.  Delay  might  have  wholly  ruined  his 
chances  of  success.  Troops  were  to  be  sent  to  Jackson 
by    Beauregard ;    and    it    was    therefore    essential    that 


200  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Grant  should  act  with  promptitude,  so  as  to  strike  while 
the  adversary  was  at  his  weakest.  He  determined  to 
anticipate  the  arrival  of  the  Confederates  at  Jackson  by 
attacking  that  town  himself.  The  campaign  was  being 
managed  by  a  master,  and  all  the  collateral  arrange- 
ments conspired  to  a  happy  issue.  A  cavalry  expedi- 
tion in  the  rear  of  Vicksburg,  pursued  during  the  month 
of  April  by  Colonel  B.  H.  Grierson,  was  of  great  service 
in  destroying  the  enemy's  lines  of  communication,  and 
preventing  the  early  concentration  of  reinforcements  at 
the  chief  Confederate  position.  Grierson  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  first  cavalry  brigade  of  Grant's  army,  and 
the  descent  into  Mississippi  was  an  idea  originating 
with  himself.  At  the  head  of  three  regiments,  he  left 
La  Grange,  close  to  the  southern  frontiers  of  Tennessee, 
on  April  17,  and  crossing  the  Tallahatchie,  moved 
southward  until  he  struck  the  Macon  and  Corinth  Rail- 
way. He  tore  up  the  rails,  cut  the  telegraph-wires, 
burned  the  stores,  and  sent  out  detachments  in  various 
directions.  When  these  had  executed  their  several 
purposes,  all  tending  to  the  distraction  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  the  harassing  of  his  lines  of  communication,  the 
force  was  once  more  concentrated,  and  resumed  its 
principal  march.  Grierson  now  turned  towards  the 
south-west,  seized  the  bridge  over  the  Pearl  River,  and 
burned  a  number  of  locomotives  on  the  Jackson  and 
New  Orleans  Railway.  He  next  moved  along  the  line 
of  that  rail  in  a  southerly  direction,  crossing  many 
streams,  and  making  his  way  with  difficulty  through 
swamps  and  marshes.  On  May  2,  he  entered  Baton 
Rouge,  then  in  possession  of  the  Union  troops,  who 
were  astonished  at  the  feat  that  had  been  performed  by 
those  jaded  and  wayworn  men.  The  whole  of  this 
great  ride  had  been  accomplished  in  not  much  more 
than  a  fortnight,  and  in  the  course  of  that  brief  interval 
several  towns   had  been  attacked,   many  spirited  skir- 


THE  ATTACK  ON  VICKSBURG.  20I 

mishes  had  been  fought,  numerous  prisoners  had  been 
seized,  and  Confederate  supplies  to  a  large  amount  had 
been  destroyed. 

Sherman's  corps  having  arrived  at  Hankinson's  Ferry 
by  the  7th,  an  advance  was  ordered  by  Grant.  The 
united  army  moved  up  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Big 
Black  River;  McClernand's  corps  on  the  right,  McPher- 
son's  on  the  left,  and  Sherman's  in  the  rear.  All  the 
ferries  were  closely  guarded  against  surprise  until  the 
troops  had  got  well  on  their  road.  McClernand 
marched  on  Raymond,  a  small  town  18  miles  south-west 
of  Jackson,  and  connected  by  a  branch  line  with  the 
Jackson  and  Vicksburg  Railway.  Here  his  progress  was 
disputed  by  two  Confederate  brigades,  with  whom  a 
brisk  engagement  took  place  on  the  12th.  The  action 
resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the  Southern  troops,  and  the 
Union  forces  entered  the  town.  On  the  same  day,  Mc- 
Pherson's  and  Sherman's  corps  encountered  the  enemy 
near  Fourteen  Mile  Creek,  across  which  they  succeeded 
in  forcing  a  passage.  Grant  now  received  information 
that  Johnston  had  arrived  at  Jackson,  at  the  head  of  a 
force  with  which  he  hoped  to  relieve  Vicksburg.  Grant 
determined  to  make  sure  of  the  former  place,  and  to 
leave  no  enemy  in  his  rear.  On  the  13th,  McPherson 
was  ordered  to  move  on  Clinton.  Occupying  the  town, 
he  destroyed  the  railways  and  telegraphic  wires.  Mc- 
Pherson and  Sherman  advanced  towards  Jackson  on  the 
14th,  and  an  action  took  place  in  front  of  that  town. 
The  Confederates  occupied  a  strong  position  on  the  crest 
of  a  hill,  but,  after  a  fierce  encounter,  were  driven  back 
towards  the  city,  which  they  shortly  afterwards  evac- 
uated. Jackson  was  then  entered  by  McPherson,  who 
found  the  place  deserted  and  the  stores  on  fire.  Johns- 
ton had  not  been  in  sufficient  force  to  defend  the  posi- 
tion, and  he,  therefore,  retired  to  the  north. 

Shortly  after  arriving  at  Jackson,  Grant  learned,  from 


202  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

intercepted  despatches,  that  Johnston  had  ordered  Pem« 
berton  to  march  out  from  Vicksburg,  and  attack  the 
Union  rear.  Grant  resolved  to  meet  any  such  attack 
by  advancing  towards  the  enemy,  and  intercepting  him 
on  the  line  of  the  Vicksburg  and  Jackson  Railway; 
but,  for  the  present,  Sherman  was  left  at  Jackson,  to 
destroy  the  railway,  bridges,  factories,  workshops,  and 
arsenals,  the  obliteration  of  which  was  considered  neces- 
sary, as  Grant  had  no  intention  of  holding  the  place, 
and  feared  it  might  become  a  base  of  operations  for 
Johnston  while  he  himself  was  besieging  Vicksburg. 
The  orders  were  carried  out  with  unfaltering  severity 
on  the  15th,  and  very  little  was  left  of  the  town  after 
the  torch  was  once  applied. 

By  this  time,  Pemberton  had  crossed  the  Big  Black 
River ;  and  Grant  ordered  Sherman  to  evacuate  Jack- 
son, and  join  the  rest  of  the  forces.  Pemberton  was  at 
the  head  of  nearly  1 8,000  men,  whom  he  posted  on  the 
south-west  bank  of  Baker's  Creek,  across  the  Vicksburg 
and  Jackson  Railway.  On  the  morning  of  the  16th, 
Grant's  army  was  a  good  deal  scattered.  Three  divi- 
sions were  on  the  line  of  the  railway;  four  were  advanc- 
ing on  the  road  from  Raymond;  one  was  still  farther  to 
the  left  on  the  Big  Black  River,  and  two  were  under 
Sherman  in  the  neighborhood  of  Jackson.  The  Con- 
federates held  a  good  position  among  woody  hills,  and 
Grant  had  come  upon  them  sooner  than  he  expected. 
Seeing  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  he  sent  orders  to 
the  three  divisions  approaching  from  Raymond  to 
quicken  their  march  as  much  as  possible.  The  action, 
however  (which  has  received  the  title  of  the  battle  of 
Champion's  Hill),  had  proceeded  some  time  before 
these  reinforcements  could  reach  the  ground.  The 
division  of  General  Hovey,  which  had  begun  the  battle 
by  attacking  the  center  of  Pemberton \s  line,  was 
repulsed  with  some  loss,  but  was  again  sent  forward  by 


THE  ATTACK  ON  VICKSBURG. 


203 


Grant,  on  his  being  told  by  Logan,  commanding  on  the 
right,  that,  if  the  Confederates  could  be  again  attacked 
in  front,  he  could  act  with  advantage  against  their  left 
flank.  The  renewed  advance  was  attended  by  tem- 
porary success,  but  after  a  while  Hovey's  division 
was  once  more  driven  back  and  thrown  into  disorder. 
The  divisions  from  Raymond,  however,  had  now 
arrived,  and  the  whole  line  swept  onward  against  the 
Confederates.  The  southern  forces  were  completely 
shattered ;  panic  set  in  among  their  ranks,  and  a 
precipitate  flight  ensued.  Their  defeat  had  been 
rendered  still  more  extreme  by  Logan's  operations 
against  the  left  and  rear,  which  distracted  their  atten- 
tion and  divided  their  strength.  Thus  assailed  in  three 
directions  at  once,  the  Southern  line  was  broken  into 
fragments ;  the  regiments  became  mingled  in  tumultu- 
ous rout  and  for  a  time  all  military  order  was  at  an 
end.  Some  degree  of  discipline  was  afterwards  restored 
by  the  exertions  of  the  principal  officers ;  but  the 
fortunes  of  the  day  could  not  be  retrieved.  The 
greater  portion  of  the  army  retired  towards  the  Big 
Black  River;  but  one  division  was  cut  off  from  the  rest, 
and  compelled,  with  the  loss  of  its  artillery,  to  withdraw 
in  a  different  direction. 

On  finding  the  Confederates  in  full  retreat,  Grant 
ordered  Carr  to  pursue  them  with  the  utmost  speed  to 
Big  Black  River,  and  to  cross  that  stream  if  he  could. 
The  movement  continued  until  after  dark,  and  stores  to 
a  large  amount  were  captured ;  but  the  retreating 
columns  were  not  overtaken.  The  bridge  across  the 
river  was  strongly  guarded  by  the  Southerners,  who 
presented  so  formidable  a  front  of  artillery  and  infantry 
that  the  Union  forces  considered  it  prudent  not  to  push 
their  advantage  any  farther  for  the  present.  The 
pursuit  was  renewed  early  next  morning  when  the 
enemy  was   found  strongly  posted  on  both  sides  of  the 


204 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


Big  Black  River,  at  a  point  where  the  bluffs  on  the 
west  side  extend  to  the  water's  edge.  On  the  east  side 
the  land  was  open  and  cultivated,  surrounded  by  a 
bayou  of  stagnant  water,  and  protected  by  a  line  of 
rifle-pits,  to  which  the  bayou  served  as  a  species  of 
external  ditch.  This  difficult  position  was  at  once 
attacked  by  the  Union  troops,  who  afterwards  discovered 
that  by  moving  under  cover  of  the  river-bank  they 
could  gain  a  position  from  which  the  enemy  might  be 
successfully  assaulted.  The  attempt  was  made  ;  the 
ditch  was  passed,  and  in  a  few  minutes  the  entire  gar- 
rison laid  down  their  arms,  and  surrendered  17  pieces 
of  artillery  with  which  the  works  had  been  defended. 
On  the  1 8th,  Sherman  crossed  the  river,  and  after  a 
brief  rest,  began  his  march  on  Vicksburg  by  the  road 
from  Bridgeport.  When  within  three  miles  of  the  great 
object  of  attack,  he  turned  to  the  right,  in  order  to 
obtain  possession  of  Walnut  Hills  and  the  Yazoo  River. 
This  accomplished  he  occupied  a  strong  position  to  the 
north  of  Vicksburg,  and  the  other  corps,  on  arriving, 
placed  themselves  so  as  nearly  to  surround  the  town 
and  its  fortifications.  In  the  meanwhile,  Porter,  from 
his  station  in  the  Mississippi,  had  been  anxiously  look- 
ing out  for  the  approach  of  Grant's  army.  About  noon 
on  the  1 8th,  firing  was  heard  by  him  in  the  rear  of 
Vicksburg.  The  cannonading  continued  for  some 
time,  and  by  the  aid  of  a  telescope  he  discovered  a 
company  of  artillery  advancing,  taking  position,  and 
driving  the  Confederates  before  them.  Sherman's  divi- 
sion had  got  to  the  left  of  Snyder's  Bluff,  and  the 
Southerners  at  that  place  had  been  cut  off  from  joining 
the  forces  in  the  city.  Porter  accordingly  sent  a  num- 
ber of  gunboats  up  the  Yazoo,  to  open  communications 
with  Grant  and  Sherman.  The  vessels  and  the  troops 
arrived  at  Haines's  Bluff  about  the  same  time,  and 
found   that   the   works   had  been   evacuated,  and   the 


THE  ATTACK  ON   VICKSBURG. 


205 


place  abandoned.  The  garrison  had  withdrawn  within 
the  lines  of  Vicksburg.  Porter  described  the  works  at 
Haines's  Bluff  as  very  formidable.  Such  a  network  of 
forts,  he  declared,  he  had  never  seen  before,  and  the 
guns  were  supplied  with  ammunition  enough  to  last  a 
long  siege.  Fearing  that  the  position  might  again  fall 
into  the  enemy's  hands,  he  burned  the  gun-carriages, 
blew  up  the  magazine,  and  destroyed  the  works 
generally. 

After  receiving  intelligence  of  the  defeat  at  Baker's 
Creek,  Johnston  had  ordered  Pemberton,  in  the  event 
of  his  being  unable  to  hold  Haines's  Bluff,  to  evacuate 
Vicksburg,  and  to  form  a  junction  with  his  own  army, 
which  was  stationed  at  Canton,  some  way  to  the  north 
of  Jackson.  These  orders  it  was  now  impossible  to 
execute,  because  of  the  positions  assumed  by  the  Union 
army.  Pemberton  was  in  fact  completely  shut  up  in 
Vicksburg,  and  the  position  was  rendered  desperate  by 
his  having  only  sixty  days'  provisions  with  which  to 
feed  his  troops  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  town.  John- 
ston made  endeavors  to  bring  together  a  sufficient  force 
to  relieve  his  comrade,  and  to  break  up  the  Union 
investment;  but  this  was  no  easy  task,  for  the  Confed- 
erates in  that  part  of  the  country  were  nearly  exhausted, 
and  the  Union  forces  were  strong,  not  only  in  numbers, 
but  in  the  consciousness  of  success.  Pemberton's  men, 
however,  did  not  yet  despair.  The  works  were 
strengthened  wherever  they  seemed  weak,  and  the 
fortifications  were  manned  by  soldiers  who  were  at  least 
determined  that  any  further  triumph  should  be  dearly 
purchased.  Fearing  that  he  might  be  attacked  in  his 
rear  by  Johnston,  Grant  resolved  to  assault  the  position 
at  once.  At  two  a.  m.  on  May  19,  the  15th  army-corps 
advanced  to  the  attack,  followed  by  the  13th  and  17th 
corps.  The  ground  over  which  these  troops  had  to 
move  presented  many  obstacles  not  easy  to  overcome. 


2o6  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

The  clay  soil  had  been  rendered  muddy  by  the  over- 
flowing of  streams,  and  was  covered  with  a  dense  forest. 
Rugged  chasms  frequently  intervened,  and  a  large 
amount  of  timber  had  been  felled  by  the  Confederates 
to  obstruct  the  progress  of  any  attacking  force.  The 
difficulties  of  the  way  prevented  the  assaulting  parties 
from  reaching  the  trenches  in  good  military  form.  A 
body  of  infantry,  however,  got  up  to  the  external 
works,  and  planted  the  national  colors  upon  the  slope ; 
but  immediately  afterwards  the  commander,  Captain 
Washington,  was  mortally  wounded,  and  77  out  of  250 
men  were  either  wounded  or  killed.  The  troops 
maintained  their  position  during  the  whole  day,  keep- 
ing up  a  sharp  fire  on  the  defenders  of  Vicksburg,  who 
replied  with  equal  spirit ;  but  the  attempt  was  not  suc- 
cessful, and  after  nightfall  a  retreat  was  ordered. 

The  enterprise  was  renewed  on  the  22d.  This 
time  the  attack  was  to  extend  along  the  whole  line,  and 
all  the  commanders  of  corps  set  their  watches  by 
Grant's,  so  that  the  movement  should  be  absolutely 
simultaneous.  At  ten  A.  m.  the  three  army-corps  then 
in  front  of  the  Confederate  works  commenced  the 
assault.  Again  was  no  small  degree  of  gallantry 
exhibited  ;  again  were  Union  flags  planted  on  the  outer 
slopes  of  the  bastions  ;  again  did  the  troops  remain  in 
their  exposed  positions  till  nightfall  ;  but  the  attack  was 
no  more  successful  than  that  which  had  gone  before. 
The  best  soldiers  in  the  Union  army  flung  themselves 
repeatedly  against  the  Confederate  works,  and  were  as 
often  driven  back  with  grievous  loss.  For  a  moment 
they  gained  a  footing  in  the  rifle-pits,  but  were  swept 
out  of  them  by  the  fierce  recoil  of  the  Southerners. 
Their  fire  was  rapid  and  deadly  throughout,  and  the 
assailants  suffered  a  loss  of  2,500  men  before  they 
retreated  to  their  lines. 

During  the  attack,  Porter  had  engaged  the  defences  on 


THE  ATTACK  ON   VICKSBURG.  2Of 

the  river,  and  had  thrown  shells  into  the  town  from  his 
mortar-boats.  The  river-forts,  however,  replied  with  so 
much  effect  that  Porter  received  more  damage  than  he 
inflicted.  Several  of  his  vessels  were  struck  below  the 
water-line,  and  the  whole  fleet  dropped  down  the  river, 
and  got  beyond  the  range  of  fire.  Although  the  at- 
tempt to  carry  the  defences  had  been  unsuccessful,  the 
people  of  Vicksburg  had  all  that  day  endured  the 
utmost  anxiety  and  alarm.  They  had  excavated  caves 
in  the  hill  on  which  the  city  stands,  and  here  they  hid 
themselves  during  the  height  of  the  bombardment, 
expecting  every  moment  that  the  enemy  would  burst  his 
way  into  the  heart  of  the  town.  By  the  close  of 
the  day,  their  apprehensions  were  for  a  time  re- 
lieved; but  next  morning  the  bombardment  re- 
commenced, and  for  six  weeks  a  devastating  storm 
of  shot  and  shell  was  hurled  into  the  place.  Still,  the 
casualties  were  not  numerous,  and  people  in  time  grew 
familiar  with  the  appearance  of  the  bursting  shells,  and 
regarded  them  with  more  of  curiosity  than  fear.  After 
the  26th  the  firing  on  the  town  continued  day  and 
night,  and  it  was  estimated  at  Vicksburg  that  6,000 
mortar-shells  were  thrown  into  the  town  every  24  hours, 
and  4,000  on  the  line  in  the  rear  of  the  city.  The  month 
of  June  was  rainy,  and  the  civilians  were  compelled  by 
the  influx  of  water  to  abandon  the  caves  in  which  they 
had  for  some  weeks  shrouded  themselves.  In  addition 
to  their  other  sufferings,  the  prospect  of  famine  now  be- 
came imminent.  For  five  days  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  siege,  the  troops  had  been  allowed  full 
rations ;  but  the  daily  amount  of  food  for  each  man 
was  reduced.  By  the  middle  of  June,  Grant's  army 
had  been  reinforced,  and  this  enabled  him  to  make  his 
investment  more  complete,  and  at  the  same  time  to  ap- 
point a  large  reserve  for  watching  the  movements  of 
Johnston.     Haines's  Bluff  was  now  fortified  on  the  land 


208  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

side,  and  preparations  were  made  for  resisting  any  de« 
tachment  which  might  come  to  the  relief  of  Vicksburg. 
Sherman  was  placed  in  command  of  all  the  troops 
designated  to  look  after  Johnston,  who  on  June  25 
crossed  the  Big  Black  River  with  a  portion  of  his  force. 
Grant's  army  was  by  this  time  strongly  entrenched, 
and  Johnston  hesitated  to  attack  it.  The  siege  con- 
tinued in  regular  form.  Parallels  and  approaches  were 
constructed,  and  mines  were  sunk;  everyday  the  deadly 
coil  of  the  attacking  force  grew  closer  and  more  strict 
in  its  embrace ;  and  at  length  the  Union  works  were 
pushed  so  near  the  walls  that  the  sharpshooters  on  the 
opposing  sides  were  within  20  yards  of  one  another,  and 
the  contending  batteries  not  more  than  300  yards  apart. 
Some  feeble  and  desultory  attempts  to  reach  Vicks- 
burg were  made  by  the  Confederates  in  various  out- 
lying localities ;  but  Grant's  stubborn  grip  was  not  tc 
be  shaken  off  A  heavy  mine  was  fired  by  the  Uniok 
troops  on  June  25.  This  mine,  which  was  excavated 
in  the  cliff  on  which  one  of  the  forts  had  been  erected, 
extended  35  feet  from  the  point  of  starting;  and  1500 
pounds  of  powder  were  deposited  in  three  branch 
mines,  together  with  700  in  the  center  one.  Fuses 
were  arranged  so  as  to  explode  them  all  simultaneously, 
and  troops  were  held  in  readiness  for  ulterior  opera- 
tions. A  severe  artillery  fire  having  been  opened  along 
the  line,  so  as  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  besieged, 
the  mine  was  fired,  and  the  ground  was  rent  as  if  by 
an  earthquake.  A  red  glare  burst  forth,  and  a  few 
rebel  soldiers  were  hurled  into  the  air;  but  the  South- 
erners had  detected  the  making  of  the  mine,  and  had 
withdrawn  most  of  their  troops  beyond  the  reach  of 
harm.  The  cavity  thus  produced  was  large  enough  to 
hold  two  regiments;  and  before  the  smoke  had  cleared 
away,  a  column  of  Union  infantry,  which  had  laid  con- 
cealed in  a  hollow  near  the  fort,  rushed  forward   into 


THE  ATTACK  ON  VICKSBURG.  20Q 

the  breach  with  loud  and  repeated  cheers.  These  de- 
voted men  were  met  by  a  number  of  Southerners  of 
equal  gallantry,  and  a  desperate  fight  took  place  within 
the  crater  which  the  explosion  had  torn  in  the  earth. 
Hand  grenades  were  used  by  both  sets  of  combatants, 
and  the  gunners  in  the  rear  joined  in  this  infernal  con- 
flict, even  at  the  risk  of  killing  their  own  men.  With 
quiet  determination,  the  Confederates  erected  a  new  line 
of  breastworks  inside  the  gap,  so  that  the  Union  troops 
were  unable  to  force  their  way  into  the  town.  Never- 
theless, they  did  not  give  up  the  favorable  position 
they  had  won,  and,  on  the  night  succeeding  the  ex- 
plosion, fresh  troops  relieved  their  predecessors  in  the 
difficult  and  perilous  task  of  holding  the  chasm.  The 
sanguinary  struggle  was  prolonged  during  the  whole 
of  that  night ;  for,  although  the  Southerners  had  re- 
tired out  of  view,  they  continued,  from  a  distance,  to 
throw  grenades  into  the  attacking  force.  The  crater 
was  called  by  the  soldiers  "  the  death-hole ; "  yet  the 
Union  men  desperately  clung  to  the  ground,  and  the 
next  day  constructed  a  line  of  rifle-pits  across  the  aper- 
ture. A  covered  gallery  was  also  commenced,  from 
which  further  mines  could  be  made  to  open  out,  and 
one  of  these  was  sprung  on  July  I,  causing  the  demoli- 
tion of  an  entire  redan. 

The  condition  of  the  city  and  of  its  inhabitants  was 
fast  becoming  desperate.  Provisions  were  extremely 
scarce  ;  the  flesh  of  mules  and  dogs  was  eaten  by  all 
classes,  for  meat  of  any  other  kind  was  hardly  to  be 
obtained.  Bean-meal  was  made  into  bread,  and  corn- 
meal  served  in  place  of  coffee.  The  soldiers  were 
almost  worn  out  by  constant  duty  in  the  trenches ;  the 
weather  was  hot  and  oppressive,  and  the  numerous  un- 
buried  corpses  infected  the  air  with  horror.  Scarcely 
a  building  in  the  town  had  escaped  the  Union  shells  ; 
even  the  hospitals  were  occasionally  struck,  though  of 


2io  1H&   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

course  not  intentionally.  Fodder  was  exhausted,  and 
the  horses  were  reduced  to  subsist  wholly  on  corn-tops. 
Pemberton  was  able  to  communicate  now  and  then 
with  Johnston,  and  repeatedly  implored  relief;  but 
Johnston's  forces  were  not  strong  enough  to  encounter 
the  serried  ranks  of  Grant,  and  every  day  brought 
nearer  the  inevitable  catastrophe.  Grant  felt  assured 
that  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  was  certain,  and  it  had  be- 
come evident  to  the  Confederates  themselves  that  this 
was  the  case.  Sherman  was  informed  that  another  as- 
sault on  Vicksburg  would  be  made  at  daybreak  on 
July  6.  but  the  necessity  for  any  such  attempt  was  re- 
moved by  the  action  of  the  besieged  themselves. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  July  3,  a  flag  of  truce  was 
seen  on  the  crest  of  a  hill  outside  the  town.  A  mes- 
senger was  sent  to  bring  in  the  bearers  of  the  flag. 
They  carried  a  despatch  from  Pemberton  to  Grant,  in 
which  proposals  were  made  for  an  armistice,  with  a  view 
to  arranging  terms  for  the  capitulation  of  Vicksburg. 
Pemberton  said  he  made  this  proposition  to  save  fur- 
ther effusion  of  blood,  which  must  otherwise  be  shed 
to  a  frightful  extent,  but  added  that  he  felt  himself  fully 
able  to  maintain  his  position  for  a  period  still  indefinite. 
Grant  declined  to  appoint  commissioners,  because  he 
would  consider  no  other  terms  than  an  unconditional 
surrender  of  the  city  and  garrison.  An  interview  sub- 
sequently took  place  between  Grant  and  Pemberton. 
The  scene  was  an  orchard,  midway  between  the  con- 
tending forces.  Grant  said  he  would  put  his  proposi- 
tions into  writing,  and  after  some  interchange  of  notes, 
it  was  agreed  that  the  garrison  should  be  paroled,  and 
allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  not  to  serve  again 
until  properly  exchanged,  and  that  the  town,  stores, 
arms  and  trophies  should  become  the  prize  of  the 
victors.  The  negotiations  were  concluded  on  the  4th 
of  July — the  great  historical   day  now  rendered  more 


THE   ATTACK  ON  VICKSBURG.  21 1 

illustrious  by  the  surrender  of  a  fortified  city  for  the 
possession  of  which  both  sections  had  for  two  years 
fought  with  equal  valor,  devotion  and  military  skill. 
Grant  had  receded  from  his  demand  of  unconditional 
capitulation  ;  but  in  his  report  he  said  that  this  altera- 
tion saved  the  Government  the  trouble  of  sending  the 
garrison   all  the   way  to   the   North,   while   it   left  the 


INTERVIEW   BETWEEN   GRANT   AND    PEMBERTON. 

Union  troops  free  to  operate  against  Johnston.  At  10 
o'clock  on  the  4th,  the  Confederates  marched  out,  and 
stacked  arms  in  front  of  their  works ;  after  which  the 
city  was  occupied  by  three  divisions  of  the  Union 
troops.  *  At  night,  fireworks  were  let  off;  but  this  was 
done  in  celebration,  not  of  the  victory,  but  of  Inde- 
pendence Day.  By  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg,  the 
Confederates   lost  the  services  of  nearly  27.000  men, 


212  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

including  three  major-generals  and  nine  brigadiers, 
with  upwards  of  ninety  pieces  of  artillery,  and  about 
40,000  small-arms.  During  the  whole  of  the  campaign, 
Grant  had  captured  37,000  prisoners,  including  15 
general  officers;  and  arms  and  munitions  of  war  for 
60,000  men  had  fallen  into  his  hands.  Equally  impor- 
tant was  the  command  which  the  Union  forces  had  in 
this  way  obtained  over  the  great  Mississippi  River,  which 
enabled  them  to  divide  the  Confederate  States  into  two 
distinct  portions — that  to  the  east  and  that  to  the  west 
of  the  stream — and  to  render  it  very  difficult  for  either 
to  give  assistance  to  the  other.  The  fall  of  Vicksburg 
was  lamented  all  over  the  South  as  a  weighty  misfor- 
tune ;  and  certain  it  was  that  the  Confederate  cause 
was  materially  weakened  by  Grant's  splendid  success. 
•  After  the  capture  of  this  great  stronghold,  Grant  re- 
ported that  his  troops  were  so  much  fatigued  as  to 
require  several  weeks'  rest  before  undertaking  another 
campaign.  Those  who  were  the  least  exhausted  he 
sent  out  on  various  expeditions  ;  but  the  greater  number 
remained  at  Vicksburg,  the  defences  of  which  they 
strengthened  against  any  movement  which  the  Confed- 
erates might  undertake.  Sherman  went  in  pursuit  of 
Johnston,  who  was  menacing  the  rear  of  the  Union 
army  ;  and  his  operations  were  so  vigorously  carried 
out  that  Johnston  evacuated  Jackson  on  the  night  of 
July  16,  and  retreated  towards  the  east.  Grant  had 
become  the  hero  of  the  day.  He  had  proved  himself 
the  best  general  that  the  North  had  yet  produced,  and 
the  President  wrote  to  him  : — "  I  do  not  remember 
that  you  and  I  ever  met  personally.  I  write  this  now 
as  a  grateful  acknowledgment  for  the  almost  inestima- 
ble service  you  have  done  the  country."  Gralit  after- 
wards left  Vicksburg  to  assume  the  command  east  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  McPherson  then  moved  with  a 
part  of    his   force   to   Canton,  where  he   scattered  the 


THE  SURRENDER   OF  PORT  HUDSON: 


213 


Confederate  cavalry,  destroyed  a  large  amount  of  ma- 
terial, and  broke  up  all  the  roads  by  which  the  enemy 
might  annoy  the  Northern  forces. 

The  tide  of  success  was  now  running  completely  in 
favor  of  the  Northern  men,  and  the  capture  of  Port 
Hudson  on  the  Mississippi  was  an  event  second  in  im- 
portance only  to  that  of  Vicksburg.  Banks  quitted 
Simmsport  about  the  middle  of  May,  and,  having  crossed 
to  the  eastern  side  of  the  Mississippi,  advanced  towards 
the  object  of  his  attack  on  the  22d.  On  the  25th,  the 
defenders  of  Port  Hudson,  who  were  commanded  by 
General  Gardner,  were  driven  from  the  outer  works,  and 
a  powerful  assault  was  made  on  the  27th.  Banks  had 
a  large  army  with  which  to  conduct  his  attack,  and 
was  assisted  by  a  fleet  of  gunboats,  which  bombarded 
the  defences  from  the  river.  Gardner  could  not  place 
more  than  6,000  men  within  his  entrenchments,  and  the 
works,  which  had  been  hastily  constructed,  were  fur- 
nished with  but  feeble  artillery.  Nevertheless,  a  suc- 
cessful resistance  was  offered  to  the  attacking  force ; 
but  the  Union  troops  were  in  a  position  of  such  im- 
mense superiority  that  the  capitulation  of  the  city  was 
only  an  affair  of  time. 

The  assault  of  May  27  having  failed,  Banks  com- 
menced the  siege  in  regular  form.  Gardner  was  sum- 
moned to  surrender  on  June  13,  but  replied  by  a 
refusal.  Next  day,  another  assault  was  delivered. 
Several  storming  parties  were  led  against  the  works, 
and  a  few  men  even  got  within  them  ;  but  the  sup- 
porting column  did  not  arrive  in  time,  and  the  assail- 
ants, falling  back,  lay  down  for  hours  in  the  cotton- 
furrows,  as  their  only  protection  against  the  hail  of 
bullets  which  came  rushing  out  of  the  forts.  Banks 
now  resumed  his  siege  operations,  and  the  trenches 
were  pushed  forward  still  nearer  to  the  walls.  The 
garrison    were    getting    short    of  provisions,  and    the 

Union — 14 


214 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


probability  of  any  succor  arriving  grew  less  with  each 
succeeding  day.  When  at  length  it  came  to  Gardner's 
knowledge  that  Vicksburg  had  surrendered,  he  saw  that 
further  resistance  would  be  altogether  vain.  The  place 
was  surrendered  on  July  9,  and  the  Confederates  were 
treated  with  kindness  and  consideration  by  their  con- 
querors. Full  possession  of  the  Mississippi  was  now 
restored  to  the  Union  forces,  who  held  possession  of  that 
magnificent  stream  from  its  source  in  Minnesota,  down 
to  its  outfall  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  great  bulk 
of  the  Confederacy  was  split  in  two,  and  through  the 
rift  the  enormous  forces  of  the  Union  could  pass  to  and 
fro,  dealing  their  bolts  of  death  far  to  the  ri<rht  hand 
and  to  the  left — to  the  west  and  to  the  east. 

To  pursue  their  advantages  in  Tennessee  was  now 
one  of  the  chief  objects  of  the  Union  commanders. 
After  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro',  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year,  Rosecrans  refrained  for  several  months 
from  any  important  operations.  Detachments  from  his 
main  body  had  several  encounters  with  the  enemy ;  but 
for  the  most  part  the  Union  Army  of  the  West  main- 
tained an  observant  attitude.  Early  in  June  Rosecrans 
was  requested  to  take  measures  for  driving  Bragg  into 
Georgia,  and  thus  securing  Eastern  Tennessee.  It  was 
believed  that  Bragg's  ranks  had  been  greatly  weakened 
by  the  despatch  of  reinforcements  to  Johnston,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Vicksburg ;  and  it  was  therefore 
thought  that  the  time  was  singularly  propitious  for  an 
advance.  Rosecrans  himself  did  not  share  this  view. 
He  represented  that  his  army  was  not  then  prepared  for 
a  forward  movement,  and  that  his  subordinates  doubted 
the  advisability  of  active  operations  until  the  fate  of 
Vicksburg  had  been  determined.  Notwithstanding  these 
opinions,  Halleck  considered  that  something  should  be 
done,  and  expressed  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  President 
with  the  inactivity  that  had  so  long  prevailed.     Influ- 


OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE. 


215 


enced  by  Halleck's  representations,  Rosecrans,  on  June 
24,  commenced  a  series  of  movements  from  Murfrees- 
boro',  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  Bragg  to  retreat 
from  his  position  on  the  Duck  River.  In  this  design 
he  was  successful.  Some  scattered  actions  occurred  on 
various  parts  of  the  line,  and  Bragg,  finding  himself  in 
danger  of  being  outflanked  by  his  adversary's  occupa- 
tion of  some  of  the  mountain  passes,  retired  to  Chat- 
tanooga, on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  not 
far  from  the  borders  of  Georgia  and  Alabama,  though 
nearer  to  the  former  than  the  latter.  The  town  was  a 
place  of  some  importance  as  a  seat  of  industry,  and  as 
a  meeting-point  of  several  lines  of  rail ;  and  here  Bragg 
determined  to  make  a  stand.  He  fortified  his  position, 
and  constructed  defensive  works  at  the  crossing  of  the 
river.  His  retreat  had  been  much  vexed  by  the  Union 
cavalry,  and  his  operations  were  hampered  by  the  de- 
sertion of  several  of  his  men  belonging  to  Tennessee, 
who,  now  that  their  State  was  about  to  be  abandoned, 
considered,  according  to  the  true  Southern  view  of  Con- 
federate claims,  that  they  had  done  everything  which 
could  in  reason  be  demanded  of  them.  But  as  soon  as 
he  had  entrenched  himself  at  Chattanooga,  Bragg  felt 
tolerably  secure  against  attack. 

That  Rosecrans  might  have  every  assistance  in  his 
movement  against  Bragg,  Burnside  was  directed  to 
march  from  the  Ohio  into  Eastern  Tennessee.  Great 
slowness,  however,  continued  to  mark  the  proceedings 
of  the  Union  troops,  owing  partly  to  the  prevalence  of 
heavy  rains.  On  July  4  Bragg  withdrew  to  Chattanooga ; 
it  was  not  until  August  16  that  Rosecrans  commenced 
his  advance  on  that  town,  and  that  Burnside  left  Camp 
Nelson,  in  Kentucky,  for  the  scene  of  his  ulterior  op- 
erations. The  progress  of  Burnside  was  scarcely  dis- 
puted by  the  Confederates,  who  retired  before  him,  and 
united  their  small  scattered  forces  with  those  of  Bragg. 


2i6  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

General  Buckner  was  among  the  Confederate  officers 
who  retreated  towards  Chattanooga ;  but  two  of  his 
brigades  were  cut  off  from  the  main  body.  One  of  these 
held  Cumberland  Gap,  and  Jefferson  Davis  was  greatly 
incensed  at  the  readiness  with  which,  on  September  9, 
the  position  was  yielded  to  two  Union  detachments, 
without  a  shot  being  fired  in  its  defence.  Cumberland 
Gap  commands  one  of  the  principal  roads  from  Ken- 
tucky into  Tennessee,  and  its  surrender  exposed  Eastern 
Tennessee  and  Southwestern  Virginia  to  hostile  inva- 
sion, besides  breaking  the  line  of  communication  be- 
tween the  Confederate  seat  of  government  and  the 
region  where  Bragg  was  desperately  contending  against 
superior  odds.  In  his  march  through  Eastern  Ten- 
nessee, Burnside  was  received  with  enthusiasm,  and  the 
populace  displayed  their  attachment  to  the  old  Union 
and  the  old  flag.  The  inhabitants  of  that  mountainous 
land  had  never  been  well-affected  to  the  Confederacy, 
and  Burnside  was  hailed  as  a  deliverer  wherever  his 
forces  penetrated. 

The  delay  in  Burnside's  march,  caused  by  his  turning 
aside  to  reduce  the  Confederate  position  in  Cumberland 
Gap,  prevented  his  joining  Rosecrans  as  early  as  was 
desirable.  In  the  meanwhile  Bragg  was  receiving  rein- 
forcements from  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  from  Lee's 
Virginian  Army,  and  from  other  sources,  and  was  ulti- 
mately enabled  to  present  a  much  more  formidable  front 
to  his  adversaries  than  would  have  been  possible  a 
short  time  before.  The  army  under  Rosecrans  reached 
the  northern  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  opposite 
Chattanooga,  on  August  20,  and  preparations  for  pass- 
ing the  stream  were  completed  by  September  4,  when  a 
large  part  of  the  army  crossed  over  to  the  southern 
shore,  and  threatened  the  communications  of  Bragg 
with  the  country  in  his  rear.  The  position  became  un- 
tenable, and   on   the   7th   it  was  abandoned.     Chatta- 


OPERATIONS  IN   TENNESSEE. 


217 


neoga.  was  then  occupied  by  a  Union  corps,  and  Bragg 
retreated  to  Lafayette,  in  Georgia.  Here  he  concen- 
trated his  divisions,  and  matured  his  plans  for  resisting 
the  enemy.  The  forces  of  Rosecrans  were  now  divided 
into  three  columns,  widely  separated  from  one  another 
by  the  defiles  of  a  mountainous  region,  extending  in  a 
south-westerly  direction  from  the  southern  side  of  the 
Tennessee  River 
towards  Alabama. 
Rosecrans  sup- 
posed the  enemy 
to  be  weaker  than 
he  really  was,  and 
that  he  might  safe- 
ly advance  in  loose 
order  against  a  fly- 
ing foe.  Bragg 
considered  that  he  _Jj| 
could  attack  these  '<" 
scattered  bodies  in  ^ 
detail,  and  thus 
secure  a  series  of 
victories,  such  as 
would  have  been 
utterly  beyond  his 
reach  had  the  sev- 
eral corps  been  united.  But  he  was  met  by  an  un- 
expected degree  of  opposition  in  one  of  his  subordi- 
nates. General  D.  B.  Hill  objected  to  making  a  for- 
ward movement  against  General  Thomas,  who  was 
encamped  at  the  foot  of  Lookout  Mountain,  to  the 
left  of  the  Union  advance ;  and  the  duty  was  conse- 
quently assigned  to  Buckner,  in  combination  with  Gen- 
eral Hindman.  The  movement  resulted  in  failure. 
Owing  to  the  dilatory  proceedings  of  Hindman,  Thomas 
had  time  to  withdraw  among  the  mountain-passes,  and 


GENERAL  BRAXTON  BRAGG. 


2i8  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

by  about  the  middle  of  the  month  the  two  other  corps, 
under  McCook  and  Crittenden,  effected  a  junction  with 
the  one  which  had  been  so  seriously  menaced.  Simul- 
taneously with  the  attack  upon  Thomas,  Polk  was  to 
fall  on  Crittenden's  corps,  forming  the  center  of  the 
three  advancing  bodies  ;  but  he  was  as  unsuccessful 
as  Hindman  and  Buckner,  and  on  September  18,  the 
whole  of  the  Union  army  stood  on  the  western  bank 
of  Chickamauga  Creek.  Not  far  to  the  east  were  the 
Confederates,  and  it  was  obvious  to  both  sides  that  a 
general  action   must  presently  ensue. 

By  this  time,  Longstreet,  with  the  divisions  of  Hood 
and  McLaws,  had  been  despatched  by  Lee  to  the  sup- 
port of  Bragg,  and  the  advanced  brigades  of  the  rein- 
forcement had  already  arrived.  Rosecrans  felt  that  his 
line  was  weak  towards  the  left,  and  he  feared  lest  he 
should  be  cut  off  from  Chattanooga.  He  therefore,  on 
the  evening  of  the  i8lh,  moved  some  of  his  divisions 
from  the  right  to  the  opposite  extremity,  and  next  morn- 
ing the  two  armies  were  fronting  one  another  in  a  nar- 
row valley  formed  by  two  lines  of  hills  called  Mission 
Ridge  and  Pigeon  Mount — the  former  to  the  west,  the 
latter  to  the  east.  Between  the  two  uplands  flowed 
Chickamauga  Creek,  which  the  Confederates  had  by 
this  time  crossed,  so  as  to  seek  their  enemy.  The 
ground  was  uneven,  and  covered  with  oak-woods  ;  it 
therefore  presented  many  opportunities  for  effective 
manceuvering.  The  line  of  battle,  roughly  speaking, 
ran  north  and  south  ;  the  Union  Forces  facing  towards 
the  east,  the  Confederates  towards  the  west.  Bragg 
was  desirous  of  executing  the  very  movement  which 
Rosecrans  dreaded.  He  would  gladly  have  interposed 
between  his  adversary  and  Chattanooga;  but  Rose- 
crans thwarted  any  attempt  of  this  nature  by  the  change 
which  he  effected  in  his  front.  On  the  morning  of  the 
19th,  Rosecrans  brought  on  an  engagement  by  moving 


BATTLE    OF  CHICKAMAUGA. 


219 


forward  a  brigade  of  Thomas's  corps,  which  attacked 
the  Confederate  right  wing.  The  fighting  soon  became 
general ;  a  sanguinary  and  hotly-contested  action 
strewed  the  field  with  dead  and  wounded  ;  and  for  awhile 
the  Confederates  seemed  to  be  carrying  all  before  them. 
When  night  put  an  end  to  the  battle,  however,  the 
Southerners  had  been  checked.  Still,  they  were  in 
advance  of  the 
morning's  posi- 
tions, and  had 
gained  possession 
of  the  road  to 
Chattanooga,  be- 
sides having  driv- 
en the  Union  forces 
about  a  mile  west 
of  Chickamauga 
Creek,  almost  to  .._' 
the  foot  of  Mis-  k 
sion  Ridge.  % 

Longstreet,  the 
most  eminent  and 
capable  of  Lee's 
lieutenants,arrived 
at  Bragg's  head- 
quarters near 
midnight  on  the 
19th,  together  with 
placed    in  command 


GENERAL  LEONIDAS  POLK. 


an  additional  division,  and  was 
of  the  left  wing.  At  the  same 
same  time,  a  fresh  disposition  of  the  forces  was  carried 
out  by  Bragg's  directions,  and  it  was  ordered  that  the 
action  should  recommence  at  daybreak  on  the  20th. 
The  night  was  an  anxious  one.  R.osecrans  was  uneasy 
about  his  communications  with  Chattanooga,  and,  on 
the  representations  of  Thomas,  who  commanded  in  that 
direction,  again  transferred  some  of  his  troops  from  the 


220  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

right  to  the  left.  While  this  dangerous  movement  was 
in  course  of  execution,  the  Confederates  began  their  at- 
tack. It  was  now  ten  o'clock  in  the  day,  for  owing  to 
some  error  or  negligence,  the  Southern  troops  had  not 
opened  fire  at  the  early  hour  originally  contemplated. 
The  delay  had  enabled  the  Union  troops  to  throw  up 
breastworks,  and  to  strengthen  them  by  repeated  addi- 
tions. Against  these  entrenchments  the  right  wing  of 
Bragg's  army  repeatedly  hurled  itself,  but  without  any 
permanent  gain.  On  the  left  of  the  line,  however, 
Longstreet  met  with  almost  uniform  success.  His  men 
rushed  forward  with  fierce  impetuosity,  and  interposed 
themselves  between  the  two  wings  of  the  Union  army, 
where  the  removal  of  the  center,  to  strengthen  the  left, 
had  created  a  wide  gap.  Operating  in  both  directions 
at  once,  the  Confederates,  headed  by  Longstreet  in 
person,  struck  confusion  into  the  Union  line.  Several 
of  the  divisions  were  thrown  into  extreme  disorder,  and 
Rosecrans  rode  off  to  Chattanooga,  to  secure  his  supply- 
train,  and  his  pontoon-bridges  over  the  Tennessee 
River.  At  this  critical  moment,  Hood,  one  of  the 
bravest  of  the  Southern  Generals,  fell  severely  wounded, 
and  the  Confederate  advance  was  momentarily  delayed 
while  another  commander  was  being  put  in  his  place. 
The  Union  forces  now  rallied;  reinforcements  were  con- 
centrated at  the  weak  points ;  and  a  fresh  stand  was 
made  on  the  lower  slopes  of  Mission  Ridge.  The  day, 
however,  was  beyond  retrieval.  Advancing  once  more 
with  fresh  vigor,  the  right  wing  of  the  Confederates, 
under  Polk,  carried  the  opposing  breastworks  ;  the  left 
wing,  after  a  brief  repulse,  also  moved  forward  ;  and  the 
whole  army  retreated,  but  for  the  most  part  in  such 
good  order  that  Bragg  thought  it  prudent  to  refrain 
from  pursuit.  Longstreet  was  desirous  of  following  on 
the  track,  but  his  chief  countermanded  the  orders  he 
had  given  with  that  view.     That  the   Union   forces  had 


222       THE  BA  TTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

not  been  utterly  routed,  was  due  to  the  firmness  with 
which  Thomas  clung  to  his  position  on  the  left,  and  to 
the  promptitude  with  which  Granger,  on  hearing  heavy 
firing  in  the  distance,  sent  up  the  reserves  from  Ross- 
ville.  Longstreet  was  the  chief  hero  on  the  Confeder- 
ate side.  In  neither  army  did  the  principal  commander 
greatly  distinguish  himself. 

The  sacrifices  on  both  sides  had  been  very  severe. 
It  has  been  estimated  that  the  Confederates  lost  12,000 
men,  and  the  Unions  loss  was  16,000.  Bragg  confessed 
that  two-fifths  of  his  army  had  been  taken  from  him  ; 
and  on  that  side  alone  three  Brigadier-Generals  had 
been  killed.  The  Union  forces,  however,  were  the  great- 
est sufferers.  Thirty-six  of  their  guns  were  captured, 
and  large  quantities  of  small-arms  were  left  behind  upon 
the  field.  Rosecrans  was  considered  to  have  exhibited  so 
little  generalship  that  he  was  shortly  afterwards  suc- 
ceeded by  Thomas,  while  McCook,  Crittenden,  Negley, 
and  Van  Cleve,  were  suspended  from  their  commands, 
that  inquiry  might  be  made  into  their  conduct.  Of 
the  Confederate  superior  officers,  the  only  one  removed 
from  the  scene  of  the  recent  operations  was  Polk,  who 
was  thought  to  have  acted  with  hesitation  in  the  battle 
of  the  20th.  Much  blame  was  thrown  by  the  Southern 
public  on  Bragg  himself,  for  not  having  completed  a 
victory  which  had  been  so  well  begun  ;  but  Davis  re- 
fused to  recognize  these  complaints.  Even  in  removing 
Polk,  he  paid  a  high  compliment  to  that  officer  for  his 
past  services,  and  promised  him  a  speedy  appointment 
to  some  new  command. 

On  quitting  the  banks  of  the  Chickamauga,  the 
Union  corps  retreated  to  Chattanooga,  where  they 
speedily  entrenched  themselves.  On  September  23, 
Bragg  appeared  before  the  Union  lines,  and,  finding 
them  too  strong  to  be  takeA  by  assault,  determined  to 
invest  the  position.     Attempts  were  made  to  cut  off  all 


THE    UNION  FORCES  AT  CHATTANOOGA.       22$ 

the  sources  on  which  the  Northerners  depended  for 
their  daily  needs  ;  but  these  endeavors  were  defeated  by 
the  activity  of  the  Union  cavalry,  though  the  supply  of 
food  still  remained  a  matter  of  great  difficulty.  The 
position  of  the  army  at  Chattanooga  threatened  disas- 
trous results,  if  it  could  not  be  relieved;  and-Halleck 
and  the  authorities  at  Washington  saw  in  Grant  the  man 
most  likely  to  cope  with  existing  troubles.  He  was  ac- 
cordingly appointed  to  the  command  of  the  West,  and 
large  bodies  of  troops  were  set  in  motion  to  provide 
him  with  the  necessary  means  for  acting  decisively. 
The  lith  and  12th  corps,  under  Hooker,  were  trans- 
ferred from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  that  of  Tennes- 
see. These  two  corps  consisted  of  23,000  men,  who, 
together  with  their  artillery,  baggage,  and  animals, 
moved  from  the  Rapidan,  in  Virginia,  to  Stevenson,  in 
Alabama — a  distance  of  1,192  miles — in  seven  days, 
during  which  they  crossed  the  Ohio  twice.  With  the 
advance  of  autumn,  several  columns  were  converging 
on  Chattanooga,  to  the  relief  of  the  Union  forces ;  and 
Bragg's  forces,  though  continuing  to  watch  the  im- 
prisoned enemy,  could  do  little  else.  Burnside's  opera- 
tions in  Eastern  Tennessee  had  prevented  his  joining 
Rosecrans  in  time  to  avert  the  catastrophe  of  Chicka- 
mauga ;  and  he  was  now  withheld  from  marching  to 
the  succor  of  his  comrades  at  Chattanooga  by  the  oper- 
ations of  a  Confederate  detachment.  Yet  Bragg  either 
could  not  or  would  not  make  a  direct  attack  on  the 
Union  position  ;  and,  while  every  day  brought  rescue 
nearer  to  the  Union  forces,  it  rendered  still  more  prob- 
lematical the  chances  of  ultimate  success  on  the  part  of 
their  adversaries.  Among  those  who  were  hurrying 
towards  the  invested  city  was  Sherman,  who  started 
from  Vicksburg,  and  advanced  towards  Athens,  in  Ala- 
bama, near  the  borders  of  Tennessee.  He  was  now 
appointed  to  succeed  Grant  in  the  Tennessee  Depart- 


224 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ment,  and,  while  at  Iuka,  Mississippi,  on  his  route  to 
Athens,  was  directed  to  march  on  to  Bridgeport,  a  small 
town  situated  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee  River, 
24  miles  to  the  west  of  Chattanooga.  Thomas  was  by 
this  time  in  the  principal  command  at  the  beleaguered 
place  ;  and  he  was  endeavoring  to  open  a  road  along  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  so  as  to  establish  a  con- 
nection between  Hooker's  force,  which  at  the  close  of 
October  had  arrived  at  Bridgeport,  and  the  main  army. 
The  base  of  the  Union  army  was  at  Bridgeport  and 
Stevenson  (both  in  Alabama),  and  the  regiments  were 
supplied  from  depots  at  Nashville  (in  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky)  by  a  single  line  of  rail.  The  southern  side 
of  the  Tennessee  River  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy, 
with  the  exception  of  Chattanooga  and  the  surround- 
ing lines ;  and  the  road  on  the  north  side  was 
rendered  impassable  by  the  Confederate  sharp- 
shooters, who  fired  across  the  stream.  The  Union  forces 
were  consequently  obliged  to  bring  all  their  supplies  in 
a  circuitous  way  from  a  distance  of  nearly  60  miles  ; 
and  it  was  therefore  of  the  highest  importance  to 
open  the  river,  and  secure  a  shorter  communication 
with  the  military  base. 

Hooker's  arrival  at  Bridgeport  relieved  the  troops  at 
Chattanooga  from  any  further  anxiety  about  their  sup- 
plies;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  Sherman  was  on  his  way 
to  the  same  point.  Thomas  now  directed  his  principal 
engineer  officer,  General  W.  F.  Smith,  to  seize  the 
mouth  of  Lookout  Valley,  and  the  neighboring  heights, 
on  the  southern  side  of  the  river  (the  side  on  which 
Chattanooga  itself  is  situated),  while  Hooker  crossed 
from  Bridgeport,  on  the  opposite  bank.  On  the  night 
of  October  27  Smith  descended  the  river  in  boats  to 
Brown's  Ferry,  accompanied  by  infantry  and  engineers. 
Landing  at  the  mouth  of  the  valley  early  next  morning, 
with  but  slight  opposition    from  the  enemy,  he  made 


GRANT  AT  CHATTANOOGA. 


225 


good  his  position  in  the  contemplated  spot,  and  im- 
mediately proceeded  to  construct  a  pontoon  bridge, 
which,  though  900  feet  in  length,  was  put  together 
in  five  hours.  During  the  day  (the  28th)  Hooker 
crossed  the  river  at  Bridgeport,  and  marched  eastward, 
so  as  to  join  the  force  already  in  possession  of  the  en- 
trance to  Lookout  Valley.  This  movement  was  known 
to  the  Confederates.  Bragg  and  Longstreet  observed 
its  progress  from  the  brow  of  Lookout  Mountain,  but 
at  the  moment  refrained  from  attacking,  lest  a  general 
action  should  be  brought  on  with  inconvenient  precip- 
itancy. On  the  night  of  the  28th,  Longstreet  assailed 
a  detachment  of  Hooker's  Corps,  which  was  separated 
from  the  rest  on  the  western  side  of  Lookout  Creek ; 
but  the  attempt  was  unsuccessful,  and  the  Confederates 
then  abandoned  the  position  to  their  opponents,  and  re- 
tired across  the  creek,  leaving  behind  them  a  large 
number  of  dead  and  wounded. 

Bragg  now  determined  to  detach  Longstreet  against 
Burnside,  who  was  occupying  Knoxville  and  Kingston, 
in  Eastern  Tennessee.  This,  however,  had  the  effect 
of  weakening  the  Confederates  before  Chattanooga  to 
so  serious  an  extent  that  their  position  became  ex- 
tremely hazardous.  Grant,  who  had  arrived  at  Chatta- 
nooga on  the  night  of  October  20,  repeatedly  and 
urgently  telegraphed  to  Burnside  to  hold  Knoxville  at 
all  costs,  while  lie  himself  operated  against  Bragg.  The 
railway  from  Bridgeport  to  Brown's  Ferry  was  speedily 
repaired  by  the  Union  troops,  who  being  now  in  pos- 
session of  both  shores  of  the  river,  were  in  a  far  better 
position,  in  every  respect,  than  those  of  the  South,  and 
Bragg,  whose  abilities  were  not  of  a  shining  order,  had 
to  deal  with  an  adversary  of  very  superior  powers. 
Bragg's  arrangements  were  indeed  marked  by  ex- 
traordinary carelessness.  His  divisions  were  widely  scat- 
tered, while   the  Union  troops   were   adding    to    their 


226  TI1E   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

numbers  and  concentrating  their  forces  at  the  most 
available  points.  Sherman  reached  Chattanooga  on 
November  15,  and  was  speedily  instructed  by  Grant  as 
to  the  part  he  was  to  assume  in  the  attack  which  it  was 
resolved  to  make  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.  A 
division  of  his  troops  was  to  be  marched  to  Trenton 
(west  of  Lookout  Mountain),  so  as  to  threaten  the 
enemy's  left  flank ;  and  undercover  of  this  movement 
the  main  body  was  to  cross  General  W.  F.  Smith's 
pontoon-bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry,  and  enter  a  concealed 
camp  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee  River.  Ulti- 
mately the  troops  were  to  be  re-conveyed  to  the 
southern  side  of  that  stream,  near  the  mouth  of  Chicka- 
mauga  Creek,  and  to  take  up  a  position  on  the  left  of 
Grant's  line  of  battle,  while  Hooker  and  Thomas 
operated  in  other  directions  against  the  Confederate 
masses.  The  arrangements  were  of  a  complicated 
character,  and  were  designed  to  deceive  and  surprise 
the  enemy.  Over  the  frail  causeway  of  the  Brown's 
Ferry  bridge,  which  had  already  been  damaged  by  the 
rising  waters  of  the  river,  and  by  rafts  which  the  Con- 
federates had  sent  floating  down  the  current,  the  men 
and  horses  of  Sherman's  corps  advanced  on  the  23d 
from  the  southern  to  the  northern  shore,  under  heavy 
torrents  of  rain.  When  all  but  one  division  had  got 
across,  the  bridge  broke  up;  but,  in  the  main,  the  first 
part  of  the  operation  had  been  accomplished.  On  the 
same  day,  Grant  ordered  Thomas  to  push  forward  a 
reconnoissance  from  the  lines  of  Chattanooga.  The 
result  of  this  movement  was  that  with  but  little  fighting 
the  Union  troops  captured  some  rifle-pits,  and  occupied  a 
small  hill  between  Chattanooga  and  Mission  Ridge.  Just 
before  this  event,  Bragg  had  set  in  motion  additional  re- 
inforcements for  Longstreet;  but  they  were  recalled,  on 
its  becoming  evident  that  the  Union  forces  were  about 
to  undertake  operations  of  a  very  menacing  character. 


228  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

The  arrival  of  Sherman's  corps  had  raised  Grant's 
army  to  nearly  90,000  men,  while  Bragg  had  only  about 
half  that  number  with  which  to  defend  his  lines.  Bragg 
felt  the  weakness  of  his  position  and  the  insufficiency 
of  his  resources.  Perceiving  how  seriously  his  right 
was  threatened,  he  drew  off  a  whole  division  from  his 
left  on  Lookout  Mountain,  while  still  retaining  that 
position  with  a  most  inadequate  force.  On  the  morning 
of  the  24th,  his  army  was  thinly  distributed  along  an 
irregular  line  of  12  miles,  reaching  from  the  western 
slopes  of  Lookout  Mountain  to  a  point  near  the  outfall 
of  Chickamauga  Creek  into  the  river  with  which  it 
blends.  The  fighting  on  that  day  was  not  considerable; 
yet  the  combined  operations  of  the  Union  forces  were 
such  as  to  make  Bragg  still  more  sensible  of  the  peril 
in  which  he  stood.  He  evacuated  Lookout  Mountain 
after  dark,  relinquished  the  Valley  of  Chattanooga,  and  re- 
formed his  line  of  battle  along  Mission  Ridge;  his  front 
directed  nearly  to  the  west,  his  right  covering  Chicka- 
mauga Station,  and  his  left  overlooking  the  little  town  of 
Rossville.  The  morning  of  the  25th  was  foggy ;  but  when 
the  mists  cleared  off,  the  Confederates,  from  their  high 
ground,  beheld  the  dark  masses  of  Sherman's  corps 
(which  had  recrossed  the  Tennessee  on  the  previous 
day)  advancing  towards  the  extreme  right,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Chickamauga  Station.  Against  this  attack- 
ing force  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  was  opened ;  but 
the  Union  forces  swept  on,  and  presently  attained 
the  base  of  the  ridge.  Then  the  cannonade  slack- 
ened, and  the  sharp  rattle  of  musketry  broke  forth. 
Sherman's  division  was  endeavoring  to  scale  the  steep 
and  difficult  ground  occupied  by  the  Confederate  right 
wing,  commanded  by  General  Hardee.  The  attack  was 
pressed  with  the  utmost  gallantry,  and  maintained  for  a 
full  hour;  but  the  breastworks  which  the  Southerners 
had  erected  were  manned  by  stubborn  troops,  the  in- 


MISSION  RIDGE. 


229 


cessant  flash  of  whose  rifles  carried  death  into  the  Union 
ranks  at  every  discharge. 

Sherman's  men  at  last  reeled  back  to  the  rear ;  but 
Grant  ordered  the  attack  renewed.  Again  did  those 
devoted  soldiers  move  up  to  the  assault.  The  ground 
in  many  parts  was  slippery  with  blood,  and,  rising  sharp- 
ly towards  the  barricades,  presented  difficulties  of  no 
ordinary  kind;  yet  the  breastworks  were  once  more 
reached,  in  the  face  of  a  terrific  fire,  both  of  artillery 
and  musketry.  A 
desperate  combat 
took  place  in  front  of 
the  batteries ;  but 
again  the  heroic 
masses  of  Sherman's 
corps  were  hurled 
back  into   the  valley.  f&gL^ 

Grant  now  directed  a 
general  movement  on  ^^ 
the  left  centre  of  the 
Confederates.  Here 
also  the  opposition 
was  most  determined, 
and  resulted  in  fear- 
ful carnage;  but  the 
weak  point  in  the 
Confederate   line  had 

at  length  been  struck.  A  whole  brigade  of  Hindman's 
division  gave  way ;  the  Union  troops  leaped  into  the 
trenches,  and  scattered  their  antagonists  right  and  left; 
and  the  routed  line  fell  back  towards  Ringold.to  the  south- 
east of  the  Confederate  position.  Thousands  of  prisoners 
were  taken,  and  munitions  of  war  to  a  large  amount  fell 
into  the  conquerors'  hands.  Hooker  started  in  pursuit, 
and  on  the  26th  the  Confederates  retired  from  Ringold, 
after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  hold  that  place.     They 

Union — 15 


GENERAL    HARDEE. 


230 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    l/NWAT. 


then  took  up  a  position  on  a  line  of  hills  called  Taylor's 
Ridge,  where  they  presented  so  menacing  a  front  to 
their  opponents  that  on  the  27th  Grant  determined  that 
the  pursuit  should  not  be  pushed  any  farther,  but  that 
Hooker  should  remain  at  Ringold,  while  Sherman,  at 
the  head  of  a  strong  force,  marched  against  Longstreet. 
By  this  time,  Cleveland,  lying  to  the  east  of  Chattanooga, 
had  been  occupied  by  a  portion  of  Sherman's  com- 
mand, and  the  railway  between  that  place  and  Dalton 
had  been  effectually  destroyed,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
possibility  of  a  flank  movement  against  the  column  ad- 
vancing upon  Knoxville.  Bragg  had  completely  lost  the 
confidence  of  the  Southern  people.  Though  personally 
supported  by  Davis,  he  was  removed  from  his  command, 
and  the  direction  of  the  Georgian  forces  was  for  a  time 
conferred  on  Hardee,  whose  stubborn  courage  and  good 
generalship  on  the  25th  had  won  the  admiration  of  all. 
It  is  now  time  to  consider  what  was  passing  at 
Knoxville.  That  town  is  situated  on  the  East  Tennes- 
see and  Georgia  Railway,  south  of  Clinch  River,  and 
north-east  of  Chattanooga.  The  point  is  one  of  great 
strategical  importance,  since  it  commands  the  whole 
valley  of  the  Upper  Tennessee;  and  on  this  account 
Grant  had  ordered  Burnside  to  do  his  utmost  for  the 
retention  of  his  post,  threatened  by  the  advance  of 
Longstreet  from  the  army  before  Chattanooga.  Burn- 
side  was  in  command  of  two  corps ;  but  they  were  not 
very  strong  in  numbers,  and  the  several  divisions  were 
distributed  at  considerable  distances  from  one  another, 
and  from  the  center  at  Knoxville.  A  sudden  attack  on 
these  scattered  forces  seemed  not  unlikely  to  be  at- 
tended by  success.  Longstreet  left  the  neighborhood 
of  Chattanooga  early  in  November.  He  took  with  him 
about  12,000  men,  who  were  to  be  reinforced  by  the 
two  divisions  which  he  expected  to  find  at  Sweetwater, 
near  Loudon  ;    but,  on  arriving  at  that  place,  he  dis- 


LONGSTREET  BEFORE  KNOXVILLE. 


231 


covered  that  the  forces  stationed  there  had  been  ordered 
to  join  Bragg  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee,  and  that 
some  had  already  started.  He  was  therefore  obliged  to 
rest  contented  with  the  regiments  he  already  had  in 
hand,  strengthened  by  about  5,000  cavalry  under  Gen- 
eral Wheeler.  It  had  been  part  of  his  engagement 
with  Bragg  that  he  was  to  be  furnished  with  supplies ; 
but  no  supplies  were  forthcoming,  and  he  was  com- 
pelled to  halt  for  some  days  at  Sweetwater,  while  he 
sent  out  foraging  parties  to  collect  corn,  thresh  it,  and 
bring  it  into  a  proper  condition  for  being  made  into 
bread.  Not  only  were  his  men  ill-supplied  with  food ; 
they  were  also  destitute  of  tents,  and  poorly  furnished 
with  clothes.  Longstreet,  however,  had  the  confidence 
of  his  troops  as  much  as  Lee  himself.  He  had  been 
associated  with  many  victories,  and  entire  reliance  was 
placed  on  his  ability  to  overcome  the  most  adverse 
circumstances  with  which  he  was  likely  to  be  en- 
countered. He  accordingly  marched  forward  towards 
Knoxville,  strong  in  the  devotion  of  his  men  ;  and,  hav- 
ing crossed  the  Little  Tennessee,  came  into  collision 
with  two  divisions  of  Burnside's  forces  on  November  16. 
The  attack  was  vigorously  conducted,  but  the  Union 
troops  held  their  antagonists  in  check  sufficiently  to  effect 
their  retreat  within  the  fortifications  of  Knoxville.  Those 
fortifications  extended  from  hill  to  hill  round  the  town  ; 
and  within  the  works  were  collected  nearly  15,000 
infantry  and  artillery,  together  with  a  proportion  of 
cavalry;  Knoxville  was  invested  by  Longstreet  on  the 
17th  and  1 8th,  and  on  the  second  of  those  days  an 
assault  was  undertaken  against  one  of  the  principal  out- 
works, which  was  carried  after  a  very  obstinate  resistance. 
Although  one  of  the  outworks  was  now  in  possession 
of  the  Confederates,  Longstreet  doubted  his  ability  to 
carry  the  whole  of  the  fortifications  by  assault.  It 
was  equally  impossible  to  reduce  the  place  by  a  regular 


232  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

siege,  for  which  it  was  not  at  all  likely  that  time  would 
be  allowed  by  the  vastly  superior  forces  under  Grant. 
There  was  consequently  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  cut 
off  the  supplies,  and  thus  reduce  the  town  by  famine. 
This,  however,  was  in  itself  a  work  of  time,  and  after 
the  total  defeat  of  Bragg  it  became  evident  that  the 
plan  was  no  longer  practicable.  A  large  body  of  Union 
troops  would  soon  be  marching  to  the  relief  of  Knox- 
ville,  and  Longstreet  feared  to  be  caught  between  two 
fires.  He  therefore  fell  back  on  his  first  idea  of  an  as- 
sault. The  attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  and  Fort  Sanders,  or  College  Hill,  was  the 
point  selected  for  the  difficult  and  perilous  attempt. 
The  necessary  preparations  were  completed  on  the  night 
of  the  28th  ;  and  early  next  morning  the  storming- 
parties  were  sent  forward.  The  Union  batteries  having 
been  silenced,  these  brave  men  moved  across  the  open 
ground,  and  gained  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ;  but  it  was 
then  seen  that  there  were  no  scaling-ladders,  and,  while 
the  assailants  were  pausing  in  hesitation  as  to  what 
they  should  do,  the  Union  troops  poured  so  deadly  a 
fire  into  their  ranks  that  the  column  was  broken  and  dis- 
organized. Some  of  the  men  clambered  up  the  side  of 
the  works  on  to  the  parapet,  but  were  immediately  shot 
down  or  captured.  The  ditch  was  choked  with  dead 
and  wounded  ;  and  when  a  number  of  hand-grenades 
were  thrown  into  the  staggering  mass,  its  cohesion  was 
entirely  destroyed,  and  nothing  remained  but  to  retreat. 
Though  greatly  disappointed  by  the  result  of  this 
attempt,  Longstreet  still  maintained  his  positions  round 
the  town,  the  garrison  and  inhabitants  of  which  began 
to  suffer  from  shortness  of  provisions.  Sherman,  how- 
ever, was  now  on  his  road  to  Knoxville,  and  it  was 
known  to  the  army,  from  the  reports  of  prisoners,  that 
Bragg  had  been  defeated  before  Chattanooga,  and  that 
succor  could  not  be  long  in  arriving.     Marching  with 


SHERMAN  RELIEVES  KNOXVILLE. 


233 


rapidity,  and  only  pausing  to  repair  broken  bridges  or 
construct  new  ones  across  the  rivers  by  which  the 
country  was  intersected,  Sherman  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Knoxville  on  December  5.  Longstreet,  though 
lately  reinforced,  knew  that  he  was  not  strong  enough 
to  resist  the  united  armies  of  Burnside  and  Sherman ; 
and  when  the  latter  arrived  upon  the  spot,  he  found 
that  his  adversary  had  already  departed.  He  had 
quitted  his  lines  on  the  previous  night,  and  had  moved 
in  a  north-easterly  direction  to  the  borders  of  Virginia. 
Sherman  met  Burnside  outside  the  fortifications,  and 
proposed  to  him  to  pursue  Longstreet  with  a  force 
sufficient  to  ensure  the  withdrawal  of  the  Confederates 
from  Eastern  Tennessee ;  but  the  offer  was  refused  by 
Burnside,  who  is  said  to  have  exhibited  some  jealousy 
of  his  distinguished  colleague.  He  declared  that 
Granger's  corps,  in  addition  to  his  own,  would  be  suf- 
ficient to  guarantee  Knoxville  against  further  attack, 
and  that  the  pursuit  could  be  undertaken  by  his  cavalry. 
Very  little,  however,  was  done  to  harass  Longstreet's 
rear.  Sherman  returned  to  Chattanooga,  and  shortly 
afterwards  Burnside,  whose  health  was  failing  him, 
solicited  recall,  and  was  superseded  by  General  For- 
ster,  from  the  Department  of  North  Carolina. 

The  fame  of  Sherman  was  now  almost  equal  to  that 
of  Grant.  He  was  at  the  time  in  his  44th  year,  and 
during  the  early  period  of  the  Civil  War  had  been  re- 
garded as  a  man  of  inferior  abilities.  The  test  of  actual 
service,  however,  had  shown  that  he  was  possessed,  not 
merely  of  the  very  ordinary  gift  of  courage,  but  of  real 
military  genius,  of  tireless  energy  and  quick  discern- 
ment. Sherman's  troops  were  proud  of  their  General ; 
their  General  was  equally  proud  of  them.  Referring 
to  the  recent  course  of  events  in  one  of  his  official 
despatches,  he  said  : — "  In  reviewing  the  facts,  I  must 
do  justice  to  the  command  for  the  patience,  cheerful- 


234 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ness  and  courage  which  officers  and  men  have  dis. 
played  throughout — in  battle,  on  the  march  and  in 
camp.  For  long  periods,  without  regular  rations  or 
supplies  of  any  kind,  they  have  marched  through  mud 
and  over  rocks,  sometimes  barefooted,  without  a  mur- 
mur, without  a  moment's  rest.  After  a  march  of  400 
miles,  without  stopping  for  three  successive  nights,  we 
crossed  the  Tennessee,  and  then  turned  more  than 
100  miles  north,  and  compelled  Longstreet  to  raise 
the  siege  of  Knoxville,  which  gave  so  much  anxiety  to 
the  whole  country."  In  Sherman  and  his  troops  were 
to  be  found  all  the  elements  of  success,  and  a  series 
of  triumphs  attended  their  operations  wherever  they 
carried  the  flag  of  the  Republic,  Nearly  three  years 
of  civil  war  had  taughc  both  the  North  and  the 
South  to  be  soldiers  in  every  sense  of  the  word. 
They  were  no  longer  che  amateurs  who  had  been  help- 
lessly driven  to  the  Slaughter  in  the  dark  and  evil  days 
of  1 86 1.  They  had  acquired  the  professional  feeling 
and  the  professional  habits  of  veterans,  to  whom  war 
is  not  an  affair  of  declamation  in  the  first  instance,  and 
of  panic  in  the  second,  but  a  stern  and  terrible  duty, 
to  be  faced  with  courage  and  borne  with  resolution. 
In  the  earlier  part  of  the  struggle,  the  fighting-men 
of  the  South,  from  their  greater  familiarity  with  arms 
and  active  exercises,  had  shown  more  military  virtue 
than  their  brethren  of  the  North  ;  but  the  scale  was 
now  inclining  in  favor  of  the  other  side.  Freedom 
had  its  heroes,  as  well  as  slavery;  and  not  merely  its 
heroes,  but  its  men  of  genius  and  success.  In  Grant 
and  Sherman  alone,  the  Union  found  a  guarantee  that 
in  the  end  its  cause  would  certainly  prevail. 

The  campaign  in  Tennessee  was  over  for  the  present. 
The  State  had  been  snatched  from  the  grasp  of  the  Con- 
federacy, and  the  forces  of  the  Union  were  in  a  favorable 
position  for  acting  against  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas. 


CHAPTER    VI. 
Charleston  and  Fort  Sumter. 

The  flag  of  the  Palmetto  State  audaciously  waving 
from  Fort  Sumter  in  Charleston  Harbor  had  long  been 
looked  upon  as  a  sort  of  standing  rebuke  to  the  im- 
potent power  of  the  North.  It  appeared  impracticable 
to  attempt  the  recovery  of  the  fort;  so  it  was  determined 
to  destroy  the  present  usefulness  of  the  harbor,  and 
thus  prevent  the  egress  of  privateers  to  prey  on 
Northern  merchantmen,  and  the  ingress  of  the  swift- 
sailing  British  blockade-runners. 

Accordingly,  it  was  proposed  to  fill  the  channel 
by  blocking  it  up  with  huge  masses  of  stone.  Charles- 
ton had  been  the  cradle  of  the  rebellion,  and  some 
degree  of  punishment  for  the  immense  wrong  it  had 
committed,  and  the  misery  it  had  spread  far  and  wide 
in  the  prosecution  of  its  wicked  ambition,  should  be 
meted  out,  and  it  would  have  been  nothing  more  than 
just.  The  plan  met  with  approval,  and  45  old  whaling 
vessels  and  mercantile  ships  were  purchased  and  filled 
with  stones.  These  assembled  at  Port  Royal,  and,  on 
December  17,  under  convoy  of  ships-of-war,  sailed  for 
the  harbor  of  Charleston.  The  vessels  to  be  sunk, 
together  with  their  contents,  were  ships  and  barks  of  a 
burden  between  200  and  500  tons,  too  old  to  be  any 
longer  employed  in  long  sea-voyages,  but  very  well 
adapted  to  the  project  in  hand.     They  were  for   the 

(235) 


236  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

most  part  double-deckers,  and,  having  been  stripped  of 
their  copper  and  other  fittings,  were  loaded  with  stones 
as  deeply  as  was  considered  safe.  Each  vessel  was 
manned  by  about  fourteen  men,  and  precise  instructions 
were  given  as  to  how  they  should  proceed.  Measures 
of  a  similar  nature  had  already  been  taken  on  the  coast 
of  North  Carolina,  where  Ocracoke  Inlet,  Pamlico 
Sound,  had  been  to  some  extent  blocked  by  sunken 
vessels,  as  a  means  of  preventing  the  entrance  of 
blockade-runners.  The  old  boats  were  so  sunk  as  not 
entirely  to  block  up  the  outlets  to  the  current,  lest  the 
stream,  running  with  great  force  out  of  the  harbor, 
should  make  for  itself  a  fresh  passage,  equal  to  that 
which  had  been  closed.  On  December  19,  the  fleet 
assembled  off  Charleston  "Bar,  when  the  position  where 
each  ship  was  to  be  sunk  was  exactly  marked.  The 
act  of  sinking  the  vessels  was  believed  to  have  been 
thoroughly  effected;  but  the  calculation  proved  errone- 
ous. The  strength  of  the  current  soon  swept  away  the 
obstructions  in  its  channel  and  the  harbor  was  once 
more  free. 

The  defences  of  Charleston  had  been  greatly 
strengthened,  and  early  in  1863  General  Beauregard 
was  placed  in  command  of  the  department.  Charleston 
had  been  watched  by  a  large  fleet  of  ironclads;  but 
these  had  been  scattered  one  dark  night  towards  the 
end  of  January,  1863,  by  a  bold  attack  conducted  by 
Captain  Ingraham.in  command  of  two  rams  which  had 
been  built  and  equipped  on  the  spot.  One  of  the 
Union  ironclads  had  been  compelled  to  surrender  and 
the  Confederates  claimed  that  they  had  raised  the 
blockade.  Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  a  fresh 
expedition  was  directed  against  the  city  under  the  com- 
mand of  Admiral  Dupont. 

In  the  course  of  March,  the  greater  part  of  the  fleet 
was  transferred  from  Port  Royal  to  a  point  about  mid- 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHARLESTON. 


237 


way  between  that  locality  and  Charleston  Harbor,  and 
about  100  vessels  were  collected  at  the  mouth  of  the 
North  Edisto  River.  The  fleet  sailed  for  Charleston 
Bar  on  April  6.  The  bar  was  crossed  by  the  ironclads 
in  the  course  of  the  day;  and  a  position  was  taken  up 
in  the  main  channel  along  the  coast  of  Morris  Island. 
On  the  7th,  a  line  of  battle  was  formed,  in  which  the 


SOUTH    CAROLINA    FLAG. 


ironclads  were  to  take  the  principal  part.  The  wooden 
vessels  remained  outside  the  bar.  Attached  to  the  lead- 
ing ironclad,  the  Weehawken,  was  a  raft,  designed  to  ex- 
plode torpedoes  and  remove  obstructions. 

The  attacking  force  was  allowed  to  pass  the  outer 
uatteries ;  but  as  the  Weehazvken  was  about  to  enter  the 
inner  harbor,  a  gun  was  fired  from  Fort  Moultrie,  fol- 


238  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

lowed  by  all  the  batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island  and  Mor- 
ris Island,  and  by  those  of  Fort  Sumter.  On  reaching 
the  entrance  of  the  channel  between  Sumter  and  Sulli- 
van's Island,  the  leading  ship  got  entangled  in  a  hawser 
stretched  across  the  waterway,  to  which  were  sus- 
pended nets  and  various  contrivances  for  preventing  the 
action  of  the  screws.  The  ironclads  opened  fire  on  the 
forts;  but  a  good  deal  of  confusion  ensued  in  the  move- 
ments of  the  heavy-armored  ships.  The  Wcchaivken 
endeavored  to  steer  into  a  more  favorable  position,  and 
the  whole  squadron  got  mixed  up  in  a  way  that  was 
utterly  destructive  of  order. 

By  four  in  the  afternoon,  the  ironclads  were  ranged 
opposite  the  north-east  front  of  Sumter,  at  distances 
varying  from  550  to  800  yards,  where  they  were  ex- 
posed to  the  concentrated  fire  of  300  guns,  possessing 
extraordinary  range  and  power.  Setting  aside  the  Wee- 
hawken,  which  was  incapable  of  rendering  assistance, 
owing  to  the  obstructions  with  which  it  was  entangled, 
the  number  of  the  ironclads  was  but  eight,  carrying  not 
more  than  16  guns  in  all.  It  is  stated  that,  at  the  hot- 
test part  of  the  fire,  160  shots  were  counted  in  a  minute, 
and  officers  described  the  projectiles  as  sometimes 
striking  their  vessels  as  rapidly  as  the  ticking  of  a 
watch.  The  narrowness  of  the  channel,  the  dense 
clouds  of  smoke  proceeding  from  the  guns,  and  the 
necessity  of  avoiding  collisions  with  one  another,  with 
the  various  floating  obstructions,  and  with  the  sub- 
merged batteries,  proved  sources  of  great  embarrass- 
ment to  the  commanders  of  the  attacking  fleet.  Never- 
theless, the  action  was  maintained  with  much  spirit,  and 
Commander  Rhind  ran  his  vessel,  the  Keokuk,  within  a 
short  distance  of  Fort  Sumter,  where  she  was  so  hotly 
received  that  at  the  end  of  half  an  hour  she  was  forced 
to  retire,  lest  she  should  be  utterly  destroyed.  She  had 
been  struck  90  times  in  the  hull  and  turrets,  and    19 


240 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


shots  had  pierced  her  sides,  either  at  or  below  the  water- 
line.  It  was  only  with  much  difficulty  that  she  could 
be  brought  to  anchor  beyond  the  range  of  fire,  and 
next  morning  she  sank.  The  other  vessels  were  injured 
in  various  degrees,  though  not  so  severely  as  the  Keokuk. 
It  was  evident  that  the  guns  in  the  forts  and  batteries 
were  stronger  than  those  which  were  brought  to  bear 
in  reply,  and  that  the  armor-plated  sides  of  the  iron- 
clads were  not  of  sufficient  thickness  to  withstand  the 
tremendous  weight  of  metal  that  was  hurled  against 
them.  Moreover,  the  land  forces  were  too  few  in  num- 
ber to  render  any  assistance.  Dupont  therefore  gave 
orders  for  the  attack  to  cease.  Several  men  had  been 
killed  and  wounded  on  board  the  fleet,  while  only  two 
deaths  had  occurred  in  the  forts.  The  east  wall  of  Fort 
Sumter  had  been  somewhat  broken  by  the  Union  guns; 
but  the  damage  was  slight,  and  this  was  all  that  could 
be  set  against  the  enormous  amount  of  injury  that  had 
been  received  by  the  vessels.  A  large  proportion  of 
these  had  been  either  wholly  or  one-half  disabled  in  less 
than  an  hour's  engagement,  and  the  admiral  felt  con- 
vinced that  persistence  in  the  attack  would  have  resulted 
in  the  loss  of  nearly  all  his  ships.  With  the  exception 
of  the  New  Ironsides,  which  anchored  outside  Charles- 
ton Bar,  the  whole  fleet  returned  to  Port  Royal  on  April 
12.  Next  day  Lincoln  telegraphed  to  Dupont  that 
he  was  to  hold  his  position  inside  Charleston  Bar,  or,  in 
the  event  of  his  having  left  it,  was  at  once  to  return. 
He  was  not  to  allow  the  enemy  to  erect  new  batteries 
or  defences  on  Morris  Island,  and,  if  he  had  begun  to 
do  so,  he  was  to  drive  him  forth.  He  replied  by  ex- 
pressing his  willingness  to  obey  all  orders  with  fidelity, 
while  at  the  same  time  pointing  out  that  the  course  im- 
posed on  him  would  be  attended  with  great  risks.  He 
was    superseded    in  July  by   Admiral    Dahlgren,    and 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHARLESTON.  24 1 

arrangements    were    made    for    combined     operations 
against  Charleston  by  land  and  sea. 

A  third  attack  was  now  begun  on  Charleston,  that 
city  having  already  successfully  resisted  two  powerful  as- 
saults. It  was  settled  that  a  military  force  should  seize 
Morris  Island,  and  bombard  Fort  Sumter.  The  troops 
were  to  be  aided  by  a  strong  fleet  under  Dahlgren ;  and 
it  was  hoped  that  the  monitors  and  ironclads  would  be 
able  to  enter  the  harbor,  to  pass  the  batteries,  and  to 
reach  the  city.  An  army  was  collected  on  Folly 
Island,  to  the  south  of  Morris  Island,  and  early 
in  July  batteries  were  erected  among  the  woods. 
Under  cover  of  these  guns,  a  brigade  of  2000  men, 
commanded  by  General  Strong,  prepared  to  assail 
the  position  which  it  was  first  desired  to  occupy.  The 
southern  end  of  Morris  Island  was  defended  by  700 
Carolinian  infantry,  two  companies  of  artillery,  and  some 
other  forces,  under  the  direction  of  General  Ripley,  who 
acted  under  Beauregard.  Strong's  attack,  which  took 
place  on  July  IO,  was  successfully  conducted,  and  the 
Southerners  were  driven  back  to  Fort  Wagner,  situated 
near  the  farther  end  of  the  island.  The  fort  was 
strongly  constructed,  and  armed  with  20  guns  of  various 
calibre,  nearly  all  covering  the  only  approach  to  the 
walls,  which  was  along  a  barren  and  shifting  beach,  ex- 
tremely narrow,  and  subject  to  frequent  overflow.  Being 
in  communication  with  Charleston,  the  armament  and 
garrison  of  this  work  could  be  easily  maintained  at  its 
highest  standard,  and  any  attacking  force  was  within 
reach,  not  merely  of  the  guns  in  Wagner  itself,  but  of 
those  in  Fort  Sumter,  and  of  the  adjacent  batteries. 
After  forcing  the  Confederates  to  take  shelter  within 
their  lines,  the  Union  forces  refrained  from  commencing 
an  immediate  assault  upon  the  works,  owing  to  the 
exhaustion  which  they  had  already  suffered  from  the 
heat  of  the  day.     During  the  night,  two  fresh  regiments 


242 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


of  Confederates  were  sent  to  Fort  Wagner,  to  reinforce 
the  garrison;  but  at  daybreak  on  the  nth,  an  assault 
was  made  by  Strong's  troops,  who,  proceeding  along 
the  narrow  neck  of  land  between  the  sea  on  the  right 
hand  and  a  marsh  on  the  left,  advanced  in  good  order 
to  the  outer  defences.  A  Connecticut  regiment,  which 
occupied  the  front  position,  crossed  the  glacis,  and 
leaped  into  the  ditch;  but  all  attempts  to  climb  the 
parapet  were  defeated  by  the  terrific  fire  of  the  Con- 
federates. At  length  the  storming  party  was  compelled 
to  retreat,  losing  many  gallant  men  in  struggling  back- 
to  their  lines,  as  well  as  in  the  attack  itself,  Gillmore 
determined  to  proceed  against  the  fort  by  the  erection 
of  opposing  batteries,  which  were  aided  by  the  fire  of 
the  monitors.  The  garrison  suffered  greatly  from  the 
artillery  of  their  foes,  and  from  the  suffocating  heat  en- 
gendered in  the  bomb-proof  galleries  by  the  July  sun, 
and  the  continual  discharges  of  the  cannon.  The 
troops,  however,  could  be  frequently  relieved,  and  occa- 
sional sallies  varied  the  monotony  of  passive  defence. 

A  terrible  bombardment  was  opened  on  July  1 8. 
The  Confederate  guns  replied  feebly,  and  the  garrison 
in  Fort  Wagner  saw  that  they  would  shortly  have  to 
defend  the  walls  against  a  renewed  assault.  Their 
anticipations  were  realized  that  very  evening.  In  the 
midst  of  a  thunderstorm,  the  Union  columns  were 
formed  upon  the  beach.  The  head  of  the  first  brigade 
consisted  of  a  negro  regiment,  and  the  whole  body, 
consisting  of  blacks  and  whites,  pushed  steadily  on, 
under  a  concentrated  fire  from  Forts  Wagner,  Gregg, 
and  Sumter,  and  from  the  batteries  on  James  and  Sulli- 
van's Islands.  The  attempt  to  mount  the  walls  was 
fiercely  resisted  by  the  Southerners,  who  poured  into 
the  Union  ranks  a  stinging  fire  of  musketry  aided, 
whenever  the  antagonists  came  to  close  quarters,  by 
the  action  of  the  bayonet  and   the  sword.     The  dead 


if™ 


244 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


and  dying  dropped  from  the  ladders  into  the  mud  and 
ooze  of  the  ditch,  and  the  first  brigade  was  repelled  by 
the  vigor  and  determination  of  the  defenders.  This, 
however,  did  not  deter  the  second  brigade  from  advanc- 
ing to  the  assistance  of  the  first.  A  lodgment  was 
effected  in  one  of  the  angles  of  the  fort,  and  a  fierce 
encounter  was  kept  up  in  that  confined  space  for  about 
an  hour;  but  the  assailants  were  at  length  driven  out, 
and  forced  to  retire.  General  Strong  had  by  this  time 
been  wounded,  and  nearly  all  the  superior  officers  had 
fallen.  Owing  to  some  error,  the  third  brigade  did  not 
arrive  to  the  support  of  the  two  first ;  and  when  the 
attacking  forces  had  regained  their  own  positions,  it 
was  found  that  their  numbers  had  been  fearfully  reduced. 
The  Confederates  in  the  fort  had  lost  174  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing;  but  the  position  was  almost  as 
strong  as  ever.  General  Taliaferro,  who  commanded 
the  garrison,  estimated  that  9000  shot  and  shell  had 
been  hurled  against  the  works;  yet  the  walls  were  but 
slightly  injured.  The  fort  was  constructed  of  compact 
sand,  which  dulled  and  turned  aside  the  heaviest  pro- 
jectiles, while  such  damages  as  were  inflicted  could  be 
easily  repaired. 

Parallels  were  now  opened  against  the  fort,  and  the 
Union  forces  proceeded  with  all  the  regular  grada- 
tions of  a  siege.  The  ironclads  in  the  surrounding 
waters  frequently  engaged  Fort  Wagner  and  Fort  Sum- 
ter ;  but  the  garrison  of  the  former  were  regularly  rein- 
forced and  periodically  relieved,  and  the  batteries  were 
strengthened  by  fresh  guns,  which  were  conveyed 
thither  during  the  concluding  part  of  July,  and  in  the 
early  days  of  August.  The  breaching  batteries  of  the 
Union  forces  were  opened  on  August  17.  They  were 
directed,  however,  not  against  Wagner,  but  against 
Sumter,  which  was  reached  by  firing  over  the  interven- 
ing fort.     The  distance  from  the  batteries  to  Sumter 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHARLESTON.  24S 

was  not  far  short  of  three  miles ;  but  the  ramparts 
crumbled  before  the  awful  concentration  of  power  now 
brought  to  bear  on  them.  Forts  Wagner,  Gregg,  and 
Sumter  were  bombarded  by  the  Union  ironclads,  and, 
replying  with  energy,  added  to  the  horrible  roar  which 
filled  the  air.  The  vessels  were  compelled  to  withdraw 
at  noon,  by  which  time  the  men  were  almost  exhausted 
by  heat  and  fatigue.  They  returned  in  the  afternoon, 
but  the  defenders  of  Fort  Wagner  had  in  the  meanwhile 
repaired  the  injuries  which  had  been  inflicted  during 
the  morning.  The  bombardment  continued  during  the 
18,  19,  and  20th ;  and  whenever  the  flag  at  Fort  Sumter 
was  shot  away,  it  was  immediately  replaced,  though  he 
who  bore  it  aloft  stood  in  imminent  danger  of  being 
slain  in  the  act.  By  the  2 1st,  the  southern  wall  of 
Sumter  was  a  mere  pile  of  rubbish ;  on  the  north,  the 
stones  were  crumbling  into  a  mass  of  ruins  ;  several 
guns  had  been  dismounted,  and  others  removed ;  but 
the  garrison  themselves  had  lost  scarcely  any  of  their 
number.  Forts  Wagner  and  Gregg  had  suffered  very 
slightly,  while  the  inner  line  of  defences,  extending 
across  James  Island  in  the  direction  of  Sullivan's  Island, 
had  been  greatly  strengthened  by  the  Southern  forces. 
Encouraged  by  the  effect  he  had  produced  on  Fort 
Sumter,  Gillmore  now  demanded  the  surrender  of  that 
position,  and  of  the  works  on  Morris  Island,  on  pain  of 
the  city  of  Charleston  itself  being  bombarded  if  the 
requisition  were  refused.  The  letter  was  >sent  to 
Beauregard  on  the  night  of  August  21  ;  but  he  was 
away  at  the  time  on  a  reconnoissance,  and,  before  an 
answer  could  be  returned,  the  bombardment  opened 
upon  the  city  at  one  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  the  22d. 
It  necessarily  produced  consternation  among  the  sleep- 
ing inhabitants,  who,  rushing  confusedly  into  the  streets, 
made  for  the  open  country.  Beauregard  sent  a  remon- 
strance  with  respect  to  this  sudden  attack   upon  the 

Union — 16 


246  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

city.  He  remarked  that  among  nations  not  barbarous 
the  usages  of  war  prescribe  that,  when  a  city  is  about 
to  be  attacked,  timely  notice  shall  be  given,  so  that 
non-combatants  may  have  an  opportunity  of  withdraw- 
ing beyond  its  limits  ;  that  generally  the  time  allowed 
is  from  one  to  three  days,  but  that  Gillmore  had  given 
only  four  hours'  notice  ;  and  he  characterized  this  mode 
of  warfare  as  "atrocious,  and  unworthy  of  any 
soldier."  Gillmore  replied  that  he  had  been  steadily 
advancing  for  a  long  time,  and  that  an  attack  upon  the 
city  itself  was  to  be  expected,  and  should  therefore 
have  been  guarded  against  by  a  timely  removal  of  the 
women,  children,  and  old  people.  He  had  reason  to 
believe  that  many  of  these  had  in  fact  left  the  place 
long  before ;  but,  as  several  might  still  be  there,  he 
would  give  them  until  1 1  p.  m.  on  the  23d  before  he 
renewed  the  bombardment. 

The  bombardment  recommenced  at  the  expiration 
of  the  stated  time,  but  did  not  long  continue,  owing  to 
the  speedy  explosion  of  an  immense  Parrott  gun,  called 
by  the  soldiers  "  the  Marsh  Angel,"  which  was  em- 
ployed in  this  particular  work.  In  the  meanwhile,  the 
parallels  were  being  steadily  pushed  forward  towards 
Fort  Wagner  ;  the  Confederate  rifle-pits  were  carried  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet  on  the  26th,  and  a  fifth  par- 
allel was  then  completed  within  240  yards  of  the  main 
work.  Nevertheless  the  opposing  fire  from  the  Con- 
federate forts  and  batteries  continued  as  strong  as  ever, 
and  the  Dahlgren  fleet  being  unable  to  pass  the  bar- 
riers defending  the  inner  harbor,  could  do  nothing  to 
outflank  the  several  positions  which  (he  army  was  en- 
deavoring to  take  in  front.  The  Union  losses  increased 
from  day  to  day,  and  the  men  were  discouraged  at  the 
seemingly  endless  nature  of  their  task.  The  sappers 
could  only  work  at  night,  and  even  then  were  often 
brought  down  bv  aid  of  the  powerful  moonlight.     Yet 


2^8  TllE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Gillmore  held  firmly  to  his  purpose,  and  now  determined 
to  open  on  Fort  Wagner  a  bombardment  more  power- 
ful than  any  which  had  gone  before.  This  was  to  con- 
tinue day  and  night  without  any  cessation,  and  during 
the  hours  of  darkness  the  gunners  were  to  work  by  cal- 
cium lights,  which  had  already  been  tried  with  good 
effect.  The  new  bombardment  commenced  on  Septem- 
ber 5,  and  prevailed  for  42  consecutive  hours.  The 
land  batteries  were  assisted  by  one  of  the  ironclads, 
which  fired  enormous  shells  from  its  eight  broadside 
guns;  and  the  garrison,  compelled  to  keep  watch 
against  any  assault  that  might  be  intended,  lost  many 
of  their  number  in  exposed  positions.  The  work  was, 
in  fact,  no  longer  tenable,  therefore  preparations  were 
made  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops.  It  was  resolved 
to  abandon  Fort  Wagner,  together  with  Fort  Gregg, 
situated  at  Cumming's  Point,  which  is  the  northern  ex- 
tremity of  Morris  Island.  The  evacuation  commenced 
at  nine  on  the  evening  of  the  6th,  when  the  guns  were 
spiked,  and  fire  was  applied  to  the  magazines.  No  ex- 
plosion followed,  as  the  matches  failed  to  operate  ;  and 
while  the  Union  sappers  were  mounting  the  deserted 
parapet  of  Fort  Wagner,  the  last  of  the  Confederate 
garrison  were  quitting  the  island.  Their  retreat  was 
scarcely  interrupted  by  the  enemy,  and  next  morning 
the  Union  troops  were  compelled  to  repair  the  ramparts, 
to  protect  themselves  against  the  batteries  in  Fort 
Moultrie  and  on  James  Island,  which  were  immediately 
turned  upon  the  positions  just  abandoned  by  the  South- 
erners. It  was  believed  by  Dahlgren  that  Sumter  must 
be  surrendered  now  that  Morris  Island  was  in  posses- 
sion of  his  colleague.  The  fort  was  little  better  than  a 
ruin  ;  its  artillery  could  no  longer  be  worked,  and  the 
ground  was  held  merely  by  a  detachment  of  infantry, 
commanded  by  Major  Elliott.  To  this  officer  Dahl- 
gren   sent    a    demand    for    the    surrender   of  the    fort. 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHARLESTON. 


249 


Elliott  replied  that  the  admiral  might  have  Sumter 
when  he  could  take  it.  An  attempt  to  obtain  posses* 
sion  of  the  place  was  made  by  the  ironclads,  assisted 
by  a  military  force,  on  September  9,  but  it  was  not  suc- 
cessful. Some  of  the  crews  who  had  landed  were  re- 
ceived by  so  hot  a  fire  that  the  survivors  speedily  sur- 
rendered, and  the  vessels  thereupon  retired.  This  put 
a  termination,  for  the  time  being,  to  the  Union  successes 
before  Charleston.  The  city  and  the  remaining  forts 
were  occasionally  bombarded ;  but  it  was  not  until  the 
final  days  of  the  Civil  War  that  this  stronghold  of  re- 
bellion submitted  to  the  authority  of  the  Union. 

On  the  14th  of  April — the  fourth  anniversary  of 
the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  the  very  day  on 
which  Lincoln  was  assassinated — the  identical  flag 
which  had  been  lowered  in  1861  was  once  more  planted 
on  the  shattered  walls  of  the  great  fortifications  which 
protected  the  harbor  of  Charleston  ;  and  was  planted  there 
by  its  defender,  General  (formerly  Major)  Anderson. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

Sherman's  March  to  the  Sea. 

Sherman  was  entrusted  with  a  series  of  operations, 
for  the  prosecution  of  which  three  large  armies  were 
committed  to  his  charge.  These  were  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  under  McPherson  ;  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, commanded  by  Thomas  ;  and  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  at  the  head  of  which  was  Schofield,  who  had  re- 
cently succeeded  to  Forster.  All  were  men  of  ability  and 
experience,  though  Schofield  was  but  33  years  old  ;  and 
the  supreme  commander,  Sherman  himself,  had  given  evi- 
dence of  marked  and  brilliant  powers  as  a  military  leader. 
The  Confederate  Generals  were  Hardee,  Hood,  and 
Polk,  acting  under  the  directions  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston. 
The  three  Confederate  corps  were  inferior  in  numbers  to 
to  the  Union  troops ;  but  their  spirit  was  equal  to  that 
of  the  legions  which  were  contending  under  Lee  on  the 
blood-stained  fields  of  Virginia.  The  Northern  plan  of 
the  campaign  was  sketched  out  by  Grant,  who  visited 
Sherman  at  Nashville  in  the  middle  of  March,  when  he 
was  appointed  to  the  control  of  the  whole  military 
power  of  the  Union  forces  ;  and  the  conduct  of  the  op- 
erations was  confided  with  entire  reliance  to  the  known 
judgment  and  energy  of  Sherman. 

The  preparations  for  the  campaign  were  necessarily 
very  elaborate,  and  could  not  be  perfected  under  several 
wet'ks.  Supplies  were  sent  from  the  depots  at  Nash- 
(25°) 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE   SEA. 


251 


ville  to  Chattanooga ;  and  these  two  cities  were  made 
the  primary  and  secondary  bases  of  the  expeditionary 
force.  For  the  economizing  of  food,  it  was  ordered  that 
no  more  rations  should  be  issued  to  the  people  of  Ten- 
nessee, who  had  for  some  time  been  partly  supported 
by  the  Union  authorities.  Directions  were  also  given 
for  the  entire  devotion  of  the  railways  to  the  service  of 
the  army ;  and  in  the  early  part  of  May  not  far  short  of 
100,000  men,  with  254  guns,  had  been  concentrated  in 
and  about  Chattanooga.  It  was  felt  that  to  obtain 
possession  of  Georgia,  or  even  of  a  portion  of  that  State, 
would  be  a  great  advantage  to  the  Government ;  for  the 
mountainous  district  in  the  north-west  abounds  in  iron- 
ore,  which  had  been  turned  to  great  use  by  the  Con- 
federates. At  Rome,  and  Atlanta,  large  iron-works  had 
been  opened,  the  capture  of  which  by  the  Union  troops, 
together  with  the  cotton  and  woolen  mills  which  were 
to  be  found  at  othet  places,  would  be  a  source  of  ex- 
treme embarrassment  to  the  Southerners.  Atlanta  had 
become  a  chief  center  of  railway  communication  and 
trade  between  the  Western  States  and  those  on  the  At- 
lantic and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  machine-shops  of 
the  principal  railways  were  stationed  there,  and  the 
Confederate  Government  had  set  manufactories  of  arms, 
shot  and  shell,  gun-carriages,  cartridges,  and  military 
clothing.  The  place  was  therefore  one  of  importance 
to  the  Southern  Power;  and,  on  its  becoming  known 
that  Sherman  was  about  to  lead  a  powerful  army  in  that 
direction,  strenuous  efforts  were  made  for  defending  the 
approaches. 

Abandoning  his  first  idea  of  counteracting  Sherman 
by  invading  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  Johnston  now  de- 
termined to  dispute  the  road  to  Atlanta  by  making  a 
stand  on  every  hill  and  river  in  the  intervening  country 
which  offered  opportunities  of  temporary  defence.  He 
desired  to  avoid  a  general  engagement,  and  to  draw  on 


2j2  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

his  adversary  until  he  should  be  able  to  take  him  at  a 
disadvantage,  far  from  his  supplies  and  base  of  opera- 
tions. The  plan  did  not  find  favor  with  the  Richmond 
Government  nor  with  the  Southern  people  generally,  to 
whom  it  appeared  a  waste  of  strength  to  give  up  so 
many  mountain-barriers  without  a  more  stubborn  at- 
tempt to  hold  them  than  Johnston  seemed  disposed  to 
make.  These  objections,  however,  had  no  effect  in  al- 
tering the  views  of  the  Confederate  general,  whose 
brilliant  abilities  and  success  in  previous  years  had  put 
him  in  a  position  to  defy  adverse  criticism.  On  May 
6th,  his  forces  were  drawn  up  on  a  range  of  hills  trav- 
ersed by  a  pass,  known  as  the  Buzzard's  Roost,  lead- 
ing to  Dalton  and  Resaca.  The  three  Union  armies 
were  at  different  places  in  his  front,  and  one  of  them — 
Schofield's — was  in  close  proximity  at  the  other  end  of 
the  pass.  Johnston's  position  was  strongly  fortified, 
and  Sherman,  fearing  that  he  should  not  be  able  to  take 
it  simply  by  a  direct  attack,  decided  to  send  McPherson 
round  by  another  pass,  1 8  miles  to  the  south-west,  and 
thus  to  threaten  the  left  rear  of  his  opponent  with  one 
portion  of  his  army  while  with  the  rest  he  advanced 
against  the  centre.  Tunnel  Hill,  directly  in  front  of 
Buzzard's  Roost,  was  occupied  by  Thomas,  with  but 
slight  opposition,  on  the  7th  of  May,  and  two  days 
later  one  of  the  lower  ridges  of  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion was  carried  by  a  division  of  his  army.  An  attempt 
even  was  made  to  seize  the  crest  of  that  terrific  natural 
rampart,  and  the  troops  advanced  with  such  singular 
gallantry  and  devotion  that  for  a  moment  the  task 
seemed  almost  accomplished.  But  the  fire  of  the  Con- 
federates was  too  fearful  to  be  long  endured,  and,  after 
a  great  sacrifice  of  life,  the  troops  withdrew  to  less  ex- 
posed quarters. 

This  was  on  May  9th.     On  the  8th,  McPherson   sur- 
prised a  brigade  of  Confederate  cavalry ;  and  next  day 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE  SEA. 


253 


he  approached  Resaca.  The  place,  however,  was  too 
well  fortified  to  be  open  to  attack ;  no  convenient  road 
existed  for  further  progress  of  the  troops ;  and  McPher- 
son,  dreading  a  hostile  demonstration  on  his  left  flank, 


GENERAL  JAMES   B.   MCPHERSON. 


retired  and  took  up  a  position  where  he  was  not  likely 
to  be  assailed.  That  Johnston's  position  could  be  turned 
with  a  sufficiently  strong  force,  was  now  evident :  Sher- 
man therefore  resolved  to  make  the  movement  at  once 
with   the  greater  part  of  his  army.     McPherson,  pre- 


254 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ceded  by  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  marched  towards  Resaca 
on  the  13th.  In  an  encounter  with  the  enemy,  Kilpat- 
rick  fell  severely  wounded  ;  but  the  army  pushed  on, 
and  ultimately  drove  the  Confederates  within  their  forti- 
fications. Johnston  left  Dalton  on  the  night  of  the  12th, 
and  on  the  following  day  General  Howard  entered  that 
town,  and  pressed  the  Confederates  in  their  rear.  With 
prudent  foresight,  Johnston  had  constructed  a  number 
of  good  roads  from  Dalton  to  Resaca,  and  by  these  he 
was  enabled  to  transfer  his  army  with  despatch  from 
the  one  town  to  the  other.  Sherman  had  overcome  the 
first  obstacle  on  his  route  to  Atlanta ;  but  he  was  now 
confronted  by  a  strong  line  of  entrenchments  in  a  bend 
of  the  Oostenaula  River,  on  which  stream  the  town  of 
Resaca  is  situated. 

As  soon  as  his  whole  army  had  arrived  in  front  of  the 
position,  Sherman  determined  to  attempt  its  reduction. 
Two  divisions,  one  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  were 
ordered  to  cross  the  Oostenaula  below  Resaca,  and  to 
cut  the  railway  between  that  town  and  Kingston,  lying 
farther  to  the  south  ;  at  the  same  time,  the  main  army 
was  to  close  in  round  the  fortified  lines.  On  the  14th, 
the  Union  forces  threw  up  counter-works  to  those  of  the 
Southerners,  and,  under  cover  of  these,  directed  several 
attacks  against  the  Confederate  positions  on  the  neigh- 
boring hills.  Severe  and  desperate  fighting  took  place 
during  that  day  and  the  next ;  but  the  Union  forces 
were  unable  to  carry  the  opposing  lines  in  front.  The 
operations  against  the  flanks,  however,  had  been  more 
successful.  McPherson,  on  the  left,  threatened  to  cut 
off  his  adversary  from  the  bridges  by  which  the  Ooste- 
naula was  crossed,  and  the  Union  cavalry  had  penetrated 
to  the  railways  in  the  rear.  Johnston  perceived  that  he 
must  again  retire,  and  on  the  night  of  the  icth  crossed 
the  stream  at  his  back,  and  retreated  to  the  Etowah 
River,  forty  miles  south  of  Resaca.     Sherman  lost  no 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH    TO    THE  SEA. 


255 


time  in  pursuing.  The  division  of  Jefferson  C.  Davis, 
turning  to  the  south-west,  captured  and  occupied  Rome, 
while  the  rest  of  the  army  followed  on  the  track  of  the 
Confederates,  who,  crossing  to  the  southern  side  of  the 
Etowah,  took  up  a  position  in  the  Allatoona  Pass  of  the 
Etowah  Mountains.  Sherman  had  now  conducted  his 
soldiers  a  long  way  into  the  enemy's  country.  He  was 
nearly  a  hundred  miles  from  even  his  secondary  base  of 
operations,  at  Chattanooga;  and  in  his  rear  he  had  a 
hostile  population,  and  a  mountainous  and  almost  path- 
less region.  His  position,  consequently,  was  in  many 
respects  a  very  perilous  one,  and  Johnston  reckoned  on 
his  antagonist's  inability  to  maintain  himself  under  such 
difficult  circumstances.  With  less  capacity  in  the  chief 
commander,  the  expedition  might  indeed  have  entailed 
the  most  disastrous  consequences.  Sherman,  however, 
maintained  a  watchful  eye  over  all  the  arrangements  of 
the  campaign,  and  averted  danger  by  anticipating  it. 
The  army  marched  in  three  columns;  but  the  commu- 
nications were  well  kept  up,  the  flanks  were  watched  by 
cavalry,  and  the  several  divisions  were  rapidly  brought 
together  whenever  there  was  any  reason  to  apprehend  a 
concentration  of  the  opposing  forces.  In  this  way  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Johnston,  before  crossing  the 
Etowah,  to  crush  the  centre  column  of  Sherman's  army, 
was  completely  defeated,  though  not  without  a  sharp 
engagement.  Johnston  was  unable  to  beat  his  enemy 
in  detail,  and  was  glad  to  gain  the  shelter  of  another 
stream,  where  he  could  once  more  throw  up  defences 
against  the  constantly  advancing  foe.  For  some  days 
the  two  armies  continued  watching  one  another.  Sher- 
man had  ordered  that  his  troops  were  to  live  on  the 
country — a  regulation  which  the  evilly-disposed  con- 
verted into  a  license  for  all  kinds  of  plunder  and  devas- 
tation ;  yet  for  many  of  the  supplies  necessary  to  active 
operations  the  army  was  dependent  on  the  railway,  and 


256 


THE   BATTLES   EOR    THE    UNION. 


the  trains  were  frequently  attacked  by  guerillas  issuing 
from  the  thick  forests  that  bordered  the  line.  Had 
Johnston  been  sufficiently  strong  in  numbers  to  detach 
a  powerful  force  of  cavalry  for  the  complete  and  effec- 
tual destruction  of  the  railroads,  the  situation  of  Sher- 
man would  have  been  grave. 

Even  as  it  was,  the  only  safety  for  the  invaders  lay 
in  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  their  march.  Crossing 
the  Etowah  at  points  near  Kingston  on  the  23d,  Sher- 
man directed  his  course  towards  Dallas,  and  entered  a 
wild  and  rugged  country,  where  detached  bodies  of 
the  Confederates  were  frequently  encountered.  Both 
armies  entrenched  themselves  among  the  hills,  and  on 
the  28th  Johnston  attacked  McPherson  with  sudden 
fury,  but  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Sherman  was 
again  endeavoring  to  outflank  his  adversary,  and  in  this 
he  finally  succeeded.  Allatoona  Pass  was  entered  si- 
multaneously from  the  east  and  west  ends,  and  June  4, 
Johnston  again  fell  back,  leaving  Sherman  free  to  ad- 
vance on  Ack worth.  At  that  town  he  received  a  wel- 
come reinforcement,  and  by  the  9th  was  once  more  in 
motion,  after  establishing  in  his  rear  a  fortified  position 
in  the  pass  of  Allatoona.  Heavy  fighting  fol- 
lowed, and  General  Polk' — a  Bishop  in  the  Episcopal 
Church  of  Louisiana,  and  for  the  last  three  years  an 
officer  of  some  ability  and  varied  service — was  killed 
by  a  round  shot  during  a  heavy  cannonade  on  the  14th. 
Ultimately,  Johnston  was  compelled  to  evacuate  one 
part  of  his  position,  and  to  concentrate  his  army  within 
shorter  lines.  A  pause  then  followed  for  some  days; 
but  on  the  22d  Johnston  attacked  Hooker  and  Scho- 
field,  obtaining  some  temporary  advantage,  but  in  the 
end  suffering  a  defeat.  Sherman  now  abandoned  his 
former  tactics,  and  resolved  to  attack  the  center  of  his 
line  with  concentrated  force.  In  this  way  he  hoped  to 
reach  Marietta,  lying  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE  SEA. 


257 


position;  but  his  motives  were  not  merely  strategical. 
He  considered  it  right  to  prove  his  ability  to  make  a 
direct  attack,  and  feared  that  by  a  constant  repetition 
of  his  first  procedure  he  should  lower  the  fighting  ca- 


GENERAL   WILLIAM    TECUMSEH    SHERMAN. 

pabilities  of  his  troops,  and  induce  in  his  adversary  an 
opinion  that  he  shrank  from  more  onerous  encounters. 
He  therefore  assaulted  the  left  center  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army,  and  a  sanguinary  combat  took  place  on  the 
27th.     Sherman,  however,  had  for  once  miscalculated 


258 


THE  BATTLES  TOR    THE    UNION. 


his  powers.  He  lost  3,000  men  in  an  attempt  to  take 
the  slope  on  which  his  enemy  was  posted,  and  in  the 
end  was  compelled  to  withdraw.  Nothing  remained 
but  to  return  to  previous  methods,  and,  by  out-flank- 
ing the  Confederates,  to  compel  them  once  more  to 
retire.  A  movement  of  the  Union  forces'  right  towards 
the  Chattahoochee  River  so  seriously  threatened  John- 
ston's communications  with  Atlanta  that  on  the  night 
of  July  2  he  evacuated  Marietta,  and  assumed  a  new 
position  five  miles  in  its  rear.  Between  the  Union 
army  and  the  works  in  front  of  Atlanta,  there  was  now 
only  this  one  line  of  defence;  but  Johnston  made  the 
most  of  it.  Menaced,  on  the  4th,  by  another  flanking 
movement  on  the  part  of  his  indefatigable  foe,  he 
carried  the  greater  part  of  his  army  across  the  Chatta- 
hoochee, and  strongly  entrenched  himself.  Sherman 
did  not  care  to  risk  a  direct  attack.  He  sent  out 
parties  of  cavalry  to  destroy  the  flour-mills  and  cloth- 
factories  in  that  part  of  Georgia,  and  then  turned  his 
attention  to  the  enemy  in  front.  By  operating  on  vari- 
ous points  at  once,  and  thus  distracting  his  adversary, 
he  contrived,  while  seeming  to  proceed  in  the  main 
against  the  left  flank  of  Johnston,  to  obtain  a  command 
over  the  Chattahoochee  in  the  vicinity  of  his  right 
flank.  In  the  prosecution  of  this  difficult  and  some- 
what dangerous  manoeuvre  (which  took  place  between 
the  5th  and  9th  of  July),  Sherman  was  obliged  to  shift 
large  masses  of  his  troops  with  the  utmost  rapidity 
from  the  extreme  right  to  the  extreme  left  of  his  own 
line.  But  the  movement  was  attended  by  complete 
success,  and,  several  pontoon-bridges  have  been  thrown 
across  the  Chattahoochee,  a  portion  of  the  Union  army 
was  speedily  transferred  from  the  western  to  the  eastern 
bank  of  that  river.  This  threatened  to  place  Sherman 
once  more  in  the  rear  of  Johnston  ;  and  the  latter,  hav- 
ing lost  the  protection  of  the  stream,  was  forced  to  re- 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH   TO    THE  SEA. 


259 


treat  as  quickly  as  he  could,  and  to  enter  the  defences 
in  front  of  Atlanta. 

Sherman  now  paused  in  his  advance — partly  to  rest 
his  men,  partly  in  order  that  he  might  form  depots  for 
stores  at  Allatoona,  Marietta,  and  other  places,  and 
partly  that  he  might  defend  the  railway  by  which  he 
communicated  with  his  base.  His  army  was  by  this 
time  much  reduced  in  numbers,  though  admirable  in 
discipline,  and  animated  by  the  sense  of  triumph.  The 
slaughter  in  the  several  battles  had  been  great,  and  it 
had  been  necessary  to  leave  detachments  at  various 
points,  to  protect  the  rear,  and  to  keep  open  the  rail- 
way line  with  Chattanooga.  A  reinforcement  which 
Sherman  had  expected  from  Corinth,  Miss.,  had  been 
completely  routed  by  Forrest,  so  that  Sherman  was 
compelled  to  look  in  other  directions  for  the  neces- 
sary augmentation  of  his  corps.  He  accordingly  sent 
a  telegram  to  General  Rousseau,  commanding  2000 
cavalry  at  Decatur,  Ala.,  directing  him  to  join  the  camp 
on  the  Chattahoochee,  after  having  destroyed  the  rail- 
way which  connected  Alabama  with  Georgia.  Before 
the  arrival  of  this  force  on  the  22d,  Sherman  had  con- 
ducted the  main  body  of  his  army  to  the  farther  side 
of  the  Chattahoochee,  whither  some  of  his  divisions 
had  preceded  him  a  few  days  earlier.  By  the  17th  the 
whole  army  had  crossed,  with  the  exception  of  Davis's 
division  of  the  14th  corps,  which  was  left  to  keep  guard 
over  the  rear.  The  object  was  to  march  at  once  on 
Atlanta  by  turning  sharply  to  the  right;  but  the  move- 
ment was  fraught  with  peril,  as  the  Confederate  force 
was  by  no  means  small,  and  was  now  determined  to 
make  a  desperate  stand.  Johnston  felt  that  he  had  car- 
ried his  policy  of  retreating  to  the  very  limits  of  pru- 
dence, and,  urged  by  the  clamors  of  the  people,  as 
well  as  by  his  own  perception  of  what  was  necessary, 
had  formed  the  resolution  of  giving  battle  to  his  ad- 


26o  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

versaries  before  the  fortifications  of  Atlanta.  But  this 
design  he  was  not  permitted  to  carry  out.  Bragg,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Southern  forces,  had  an 
interview  with  Johnston  at  Atlanta,  and,  not  being  sat- 
isfied with  the  conduct  of  that  officer,  or  with  his 
promises  for  the  future,  had  recommended  Jefferson 
Davis  to  place  the  direction  of  the  Confederate  Army 
of  Tennessee,  as  it  was  called,  in  other  hands.  This 
was  done,  and  on  July  17,  Johnston  issued  a  farewell 
address  to  his  troops.  His  successor  was  General 
Hood,  an  officer  who  enjoyed  a  high  reputation  for 
dashing  courage,  energy  and  spirit.  Johnston  had  cer- 
tainly failed  in  preventing  Sherman's  advance  ;  but  he 
had  made  him  pay  dearly  for  his  success,  and  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  he  could  have  checked  the  vast 
and  highly-organized  invasion  of  that  commander,  had 
he  offered  battle  at  every  stage  of  his  progress.  The 
previous  career  of  Johnston  had  shown  that  he  was  a 
general  of  very  great  ability,  skilled  in  the  most  elabor- 
ate tactics  of  armies,  and  capable  of  winning  victories 
when  he  met  his  enemy  in  an  open  field,  and  with  any- 
thing like  equality  of  conditions.  But  in  the  present 
campaign  he  was  overmatched  in  numbers,  and  com- 
mitted to  the  defence  of  a  country  which  presented  as 
many  difficulties  to  the  protector  as  to  the  assailant. 
It  was  not  unnatural  or  surprising  that  the  people  of 
the  Confederacy  should  have  been  angered  at  his  frequent 
withdrawals  from  one  position  to  another ;  but  it  is 
likely  that  a  bolder  policy  would  simply  have  resulted 
in  more  sanguinary  losses,  and  no  greater  success. 

The  three  armies  of  the  Union  commander  con- 
verged towards  Atlanta  on  July  20.  By  means  of 
trestle-bridges,  Thomas's  army  crossed  the  lower  part 
of  Peach-tree  Creek,  a  small  tributary  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee, on  the  same  day  ;  and  a  detachment  of  that 
army,  while  lying  in  a  somewhat  exposed  position,  was 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE  SEA. 


26l 


attacked  by  Hood.  The  ground  was  hotly  disputed, 
but  the  Confederates  were  at  length  compelled  to  retire 
to  their  entrenchments.  The  remainder  of  the  Union 
forces  crossed  Peach-tree  Creek  on  the  2 1st,  and 
Sherman  was  now  immediately  in  front  of  the  Con- 
federate defences,  which  were  drawn  round  the  city  at 
a  distance  of  about  three  miles.  The  lines  had  been 
long  prepared,  but 
were  not  yet  com- 
pleted, for,  when 
the  Union  troops 
approached,  they 
found  their  adver- 
saries engaged  in 
connecting  the  re- 
doubts with  cur- 
tains, and  in  the 
construction  of 
other  works. 
McPherson  had 
by  this  time  ob-  -' 
tained  possession 
of  a  hill  to  the  left 
of  the  line,  from 
which  he  could 
overlook  the  city, 
and  materially 
help  in  its  reduc- 
tion. Hood  was  disinclined  to  let  him  remain  in  that 
position,  and  about  noon  on  the  22d  directed  a  sudden 
and  vehement  attack  on  his  left  flank.  On  hearing  the 
sound  of  firing,  McPherson  rode  towards  the  scene  of 
action,  but,  coming  unexpectedly  on  some  skirmishers, 
was  mortally  wounded  by  their  rifle-shots.  Though 
barely  36  years  of  age,  this  officer  was  one  of  the  ablest 
of  Sherman's  subordinates,  and  his  loss  at  so  critical  a 

Union — 17 


GENERAL   J.    B.    HOOD. 


•262  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

moment  was  a  serious  misfortune.  General  Logan 
was  temporarily  appointed  to  the  command,  and  took 
measures  against  the  threatening  demonstration  of  the 
Confederates.  The  attack  was  being  pushed  with  great 
spirit.  The  Union  line  was  assaulted  in  three  different 
places  ;  -several  guns  were  taken,  and  the  Southern 
cavalry,  under  General  Wheeler,  dashed  into  Decatur 
(Georgia),  in  the  rear  of  the  Union  line,  and  nearly 
captured  the  wagon  train.  Some  of  the  troops  began 
to  give  ground,  and  it  was  for  a  time  doubtful  whether 
their  line  would  not  be  cut  in  two  by  the  furious 
advance  of  the  Southerners.  By  special  efforts,  how- 
ever, and  by  the  concentration  of  reinforcements  at  the 
weak  points,  Sherman  contrived,  after  an  anxious 
interval,  to  restore  the  fortunes  of  the  day. 

With  a  view  to  isolating  Atlanta,  and  cutting  it  off 
from  all  sources  of  supply,  Sherman  entered  on  a 
series  of  operations  for  the  destruction  of  the  neighbor- 
ing lines  of  rail.  To  this  end  it  was  proposed  to 
occupy  East  Point,  a  small  town  about  five  miles  south 
of  Atlanta,  which  forms  the  meeting-place  of  the  West 
Point  and  Macon  Railways.  The  movement  was  one 
involving  some  risk,  for  it  was  necessary  to  extend  the 
right  of  the  Union  line  round  Atlanta,  so  as  to  reach 
the  junction  from  which  it  was  desired  to  operate.  Two 
bodies  of  cavalry  were  sent  out  on  this  service;  the 
larger  commanded  by  Stoneman,  the  smaller  by 
McCook.  Both  expeditions  ended  disastrously. 
Marching  by  different  routes,  the  two  columns  were 
to  meet  at  Lovejoy's  Station,  on  the  Macon  Railway; 
but,  owing  to  some  mistake,  the  coalition  was  not 
effected.  Each  body  was  encountered  by  a  superior 
force  of  Confederates  (McCook's  on  the  29th,  Stone- 
man's  on  the  3 1  st)  and  entirely  defeated.  Large 
numbers  of  prisoners  were  taken,  and  the  Union  army 
was  appreciably  weakened  with  respect  to  its  cavalry. 


264 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  now  under  command  of 
Howard,  who  had  succeeded  to  McPherson,  was 
occupying  a  high  ridge  which  crossed  one  of  the 
principal  roads  leading  from  the  Chattahoochee  to 
Atlanta,  when  a  large  body  of  Confederates  poured 
down  on  their  uncompleted  breastworks.  The  engage- 
ment lasted  from  noon  until  four  o'clock  p.  m.  ;  but, 
after  six  assaults,  the  attacking  force  withdrew.  Hood's 
object  in  ordering  this  movement  was  to  draw  away 
that  portion  of  Sherman's  army  which  was  being  ex- 
tended towards  the  right.  Herein  he  failed,  and  Sher- 
man, having  strengthened  his  position  by  extensive  and 
elaborate  entrenchments,  was  enabled  to  advance  his 
line  to  within  three  miles  of  East  Point.  Nevertheless, 
he  could  not  touch  the  railways,  which  Hood  protected 
by  a  counter-movement.  Engagements  were  constantly 
taking  place  ;  the  loss  of  life  on  both  sides  was  lamen- 
table ;  but  at  the  close  of  July  nothing  of  importance 
had  been  done.  Atlanta  was  now  being  bombarded, 
and  the  miserable  inhabitants  shrouded  themselves  in 
the  vaults  of  churches  and  the  cellars  of  private  houses. 
But  as  yet  there  were  no  signs  of  yielding,  and  Hood 
thought  he  could  relieve  his  own  communications  by 
threatening  those  of  his  enemy.  He  sent  a  body  of 
4500  cavalry,  under  Wheeler,  to  act  against  the  rail- 
way running  from  Marietta  to  Chattanooga — the  line  by 
which  Sherman  maintained  his  intercourse  with  the 
North.  Portions  of  the  rail  were  for  a  time  destroyed  ; 
cattle  and  stores  were  captured ;  and  Sherman  was 
obliged  to  take  special  measures  to  provide  against  the 
danger.  Yet  no  permanent  injury  was  effected  ;  the 
garrisons  at  the  several  stations  maintained  their  posi- 
tions;  the  lines  were  speedily  repaired;  and  when 
Steedman  marched  against  Wheeler  from  Chattanooga, 
the  Confederate  was  glad  to  escape  into  Eastern  Ten- 
nessee, and   ultimately  into  Northern  Alabama.      His 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH   TO    THE   SEA. 


265 


services  were  thus  lost  to  Hood,  who  had  soon  cause  to 
regret  his  mistake. 

Stoneman  had  been  captured  in  the  unfortunate  affair 
of  July  31;  but  his  place  was  supplied  by  Kilpatrick, 
who,  though  still  far  from  cured  of  his  severe  wound, 
received  before  Resaca  on  the  13th  of  May,  had 
heroically  returned  to  his  post,  and  in  the  early  part  of 
August  was  busily  engaged  in  the  task  of  reorganizing 
the  Union  cavalry,  which  had  been  much  reduced  by 
the  recent  operations,  and  by  the  surrender  of  so  many 
of  its  number.  On  August  18,  Kilpatrick  was  de- 
spatched to  operate  against  the  Southern  railways,  which 
he  was  not  merely  to  injure,  but,  if  possible,  to  destroy. 
In  executing  this  commission,  he  was  attacked  both  by 
cavalry  and  infantry,  and  only  with  difficulty  succeeded 
in  breaking  through  the  opposing  hosts.  He  then 
returned  to  Decatur,  which  he  reached  on  the  22d, 
after  having  made  a  complete  circuit  of  the  enemy's 
position.  Very  little  had  resulted  from  this  incursion, 
and  Sherman  saw  that,  if  he  would  produce  any  decided 
effect  on  his  antagonist's  communications,  he  must 
strike  with  nearly  the  whole  of  his  army.  Reverting 
to  his  favorite  method  of  outflanking  the  adversary,  he 
formed  a  plan  by  which,  while  leaving  behind  him  one 
corps  for  guarding  his  rear,  he  hoped  to  draw  Hood 
from  out  his  entrenchments,  and  compel  him  to  stake 
his  fortunes  on  a  decisive  battle,  unless  he  should  be 
able  to  retreat.  In  the  prosecution  of  this  scheme, 
Sherman  would  be  obliged  to  enter  the  very  heart  of 
the  enemy's  country,  and  to  endanger  his  own  com- 
munications with  the  North  ;  but  he  had  confidence  in 
his  ability  to  carry  out  the  movement,  especially  as  the 
absence  of  Wheeler's  horsemen  allowed  him  to  employ 
his  cavalry  with  but  little  fear  of  opposition  from  the 
Southerners.  Preparations  for  this  momentous  enter- 
prise were  rapidly  pushed  forward.     The  wagons  were 


266  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

loaded  with  fifteen  days'  provisions,  and  on  the  night 
of  the  25th  two  corps,  occupying  the  extreme  left, 
moved  quietly  out  of  their  entrenchments,  and  marched 
in  a  southwesterly  direction.  Other  corps  followed  on 
succeeding  days,  and  the  West  Point  Railway  was  soon 
destroyed.  For  twelve  miles  the  ties  were  burned,  and 
the  rails  twisted  out  of  all  ordinary  shape.  Large  gaps 
were  made  in  the  earth,  which  were  filled  up  with  the 
trunks  of  trees,  with  rocks  and  other  foreign  matter 
intermingled  with  torpedoes,  so  placed  as  to  explode 
should  any  attempt  be  made  to  remove  them.  With 
the  exception  of  the  20th  corps,  the  Union  army  was 
now  out  of  sight  of  Atlanta,  and  the  people  of  that 
city,  perceiving  the  abandoned  lines,  issued  forth  under 
a  false  impression  that  the  danger  had  been  entirely 
removed.  Hood,  having  but  little  cavalry  at  his  dis- 
posal, was  unable  for  several  days  to  ascertain  the 
whereabouts  of  his  opponent;  but,  on  discovering  that 
his  rear  was  menaced,  he  despatched  the  corps  of 
Hardee  and  S.  D.  Lee,  under  the  chief  command  of 
the  former,  to  Jonesborough,  a  few  miles  south  of 
East  Point,  on  the  Macon  Railway.  He  was  even  then 
ignorant  that  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Union  army  was 
severing  his  communications,  and  considered  that  a 
portion  of  his  force  would  be  sufficient  for  encounter- 
ing what  he  regarded  as  a  detachment  of  the  enemy. 
Howard,  marching  due  east  from  Fairburn,  on  the  30th 
arrived  within  half  a  mile  north  of  Jonebboj  ough  on 
the  evening  of  that  day,  when,  finding  the  two  Con- 
federate commanders  entrenched  outside  the  town,  he 
proceeded  to  throw  up  entrenchments  o{  his  own  at  a 
little  distance.  He  was  attacked  on  the  31st,  but  with- 
out being  dislodged  from  his  position.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  Confederates  were  obliged  to  retire;  and,  as 
the  Union  troops  were  reinforced  by  successive  divi- 
sions during  the  action — Sherman  himself  being  now 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE   SEA.  26j 

on    his    way    to    Jonesborough — the  position    of  the 
Southerners  became  extremely  critical. 

It  was  important  to  divide  the  corps  of  Hardee  and 
Lee  from  that  which  was  still  left  in  Atlanta  itself.  To 
accomplish  his  design,  Sherman  ordered  Schofkld  to 
move  rapidly  along  the  Macon  Railway,  which  he  was 
entirely  to  destroy  ;  at  the  same  time,  Howard,  with  one 
corps  of  Thomas's  army,  was  to  engage  Hardee  in  front, 
while  the  cavalry  vexed  his  flank  and  rear.  The  plan 
failed  in  some  of  its  particulars,  but  was  so  far  success- 
ful that  a  lodgment  was  effected  within  Hardee's  lines 
before  nightfall  on  September  I.  Darkness  coming  on 
Hardee  was  enabled  to  fall  back  seven  miles  south  to 
Lovejoy's  Station  on  the  Macon  Railway,  where  he 
fortified  himself  in  a  strong  position.  The  feeling  of 
consternation  in  Atlanta  itself  was  now  extreme.  It 
had  become  known  during  the  day  that  the  main  body 
of  the  Union  army  lay  between  the  city  and  Hardee  ; 
and  Hood  perceived  that  he  would  no  longer  be  able  to 
hold  the  position.  His  left  flank  had  been  completely 
turned;  his  communications  with  the  south  had  been 
intercepted;  and  he  feared  that  Hardee  and  Lee  would 
be  overwhelmed,  and  that  the  large  body  of  prisoners 
at  Andersonville,  amounting  to  no  fewer  than  44,000, 
might  be  released  by  the  Union  cavalry,  and  form  an 
army  for  the  devastation  of  Georgia.  It  was  imperative, 
therefore,  to  abandon  Atlanta  with  all  speed.  A  large 
proportion  of  the  army  stores  was  rapidly  packed  in  mili- 
tary wagons  ;  the  rest  was  burned,  or  distributed  to  the 
people;  and  by  the  light  of  vast  conflagrations,  which 
reddened  the  sky  for  many  miles,  Hood's  soldiers,  ac- 
companied by  several  of  the  citizens,  marched  out  of 
the  city,  and  made  their  way  towards  Lovejoy's  Station. 
The  explosion  of  ordnance  trains  was  distinctly  heard 
by  the  Union  forces  at  a  great  distance ;  and  it  was 
evident    from  jfhis    circumstance,  and    from    the  wide- 


268  TIIE   BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 

spread  glare  of  the  flames,  that  Atlanta  had  been  re- 
linquished in  despair.  General  Slocum,  from  his  posi- 
tion on  the  Chattahoochee,  sent  out  a  heavy  reconnoiter- 
ing  column  at  daybreak  on  the  2d.  Meeting  with  no 
opposition,  the  Northern  troops  entered  the  city  at  nine 
o'clock  a.  m.  The  mayor  shortly  afterwards  made  a 
formal  surrender  of  the  place,  and  the  stars  and  stripes 
were  raised  over  the  Court  House  to  the  throb  of  mar- 
tial music.  On  abandoning  Atlanta,  Hood  directed  his 
course  west,  and  succeeded  in  forming  a  junction  with 
Hardee  and  Lee  at  Lovejoy's  Station.  On  September  2 
Sherman,  marching  from  the  north,  appeared  before 
the  entrenchments  of  Hardee,  but,  hearing  of  the  capit- 
ulation of  Atlanta,  did  not  consider  it  worth  while  to 
risk  an  attack  on  the  now  reunited  Confederate  forces. 
He  accordingly  led  his  army  by  easy  marches  towards 
the  captured  city  ;  and  on  the  8th  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  encamped  round  Atlanta,  that  of  the  Ten- 
nessee above  East  Point,  and  that  of  the  Ohio  at 
Decatur. 

The  capture  of  Atlanta  placed  in  Sherman's  grasp  a 
city  not  very  remarkable  in  itself,  but  valuable  as  form- 
ing the  connecting  point  of  several  lines  of  rail  linking 
together  many  wide  and  productive  districts.  It  was  a 
centre  from  which  the  power  of  the  Union  could  radiate 
in  various  directions,  and  which  it  was  therefore  impor- 
tant that  the  Union  forces  should  gain,  and  grievous 
that  the  Confederates  should  lose.  The  great  fact  was 
known  at  Washington  on  the  very  day  when  it  oc- 
curred, and  Lincoln  despatched  an  expression  of  the 
national  thanks  to  Sherman,  his  officers  and  soldiers, 
for  the  distinguished  ability,  courage,  and  perseverance 
which  had  been  displayed  throughout  the  campaign. 
September  1 1  was  appointed  a  day  of  solemn  thanks- 
giving for  the  successes  of  Sherman  in  Georgia,  and  of 
Farragut  at  Mobile.     On  arriving  at  Atlanta,  Sherman 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH   TO    THE   SEA.  26a 

determined  that  the  place  should  for  the  present  be  ap- 
propriated exclusively  to  military  purposes,  and  orders 
were  issued  for  the  departure  ol  all  civilians,  except 
those  employed  by  Government.  A  truce  of  ten  days 
was  proposed  in  a  letter  from  Sherman  to  Hood,  and 
accepted  by  the  latter,  though  not  without  a  strong 
protest  against  the  contemplated  measure  of  his  victori- 
ous adversary,  which  he  denounced  as  transcending  in 
studied  and  ingenious  cruelty  all  acts  ever  before 
brought  to  his  attention  in  the  dark  history  of  war. 
The  Mayor  of  Atlanta  likewise  sent  a  petition  to  Sher- 
man, imploring  him  to  reconsider  his  decision,  and 
painting  in  vivid  hues  the  misery  which  it  would  cause 
to  large  numbers  of  women,  children  and  infirm  people. 
Sherman  replied  to  both  these  representations ;  ve- 
hemently attacking  the  whole  policy  of  the  South  in 
his  answer  to  Hood,  and  with  greater  moderation  ar- 
guing with  the  mayor  to  the  effect  that  war  is  inevi- 
tably cruel,  that  the  necessity  of  re-establishing  the 
Union  was  paramount,  and  that  his  military  plans  were 
such  as  to  make  Atlanta  a  place  totally  unfit  for  non- 
combatants. 

An  extension  of  the  truce  was  obtained,  as  a  conces- 
sion to  the  unfortunate  people  who  were  compelled  to 
remove.  In  the  result,  440  families,  counting  705 
adults,  860  children,  and  470  servants,  were  moved 
south,  together  with  the  furniture  and  household  goods 
of  each  family. 

Hood  exhibited  great  ability  in  withdrawing  his  corps 
from  Atlanta,  and  effecting  a  junction  with  the  rest  of 
the  army  on  the  Macon  and  Augusta  lines.  In  this 
way  he  was  still  able  to  cover  the  main  roads  to  the 
South,  and,  as  his  numbers  were  far  from  contemptible, 
was  in  a  position,  even  after  his  great  defeat,  to  present 
a  formidable  front  to  the  enemy.  Sherman  considered 
it  prudent  to  fortify  Atlanta  against  any  possible  attack. 


2yo 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


He  also  strengthened  the  entrenched  posts  on  the  line 
connecting  his  army  with  Chattanooga,  and,  having 
provided  that  place  and  Rome  with  efficient  garrisons, 
despatched  Schofield  to  watch  over  the  conquests  that 
had  just  been  made  in  Eastern  Tennessee.  In  the 
interval  between  his  late  exploits  and  those  which  were 
to  follow,  it  was  a  sad  but  necessary  duty  to  count  up 
the  cost  of  what  he  had  already  won.  •  His  loss  was 
estimated  at  30,400  men  ;  but  it  was  probably  more. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  set  down  at  42,000;  but  it 
may  have  been  less.  The  campaign  had  been  skilfully 
and  valorously  conducted  by  both  combatants  ;  but  it 
had  proved  the  immense  superiority  of  the  Union  over 
the  Confederation — a  superiority  which  every  month 
was  making  more  overwhelmingly  apparent.  Sherman, 
it  is  true,  was  in  a  position  of  some  danger ;  but  his 
forces  were  being  constantly  augmented  by  conscripts 
from  the  North,  while  the  Southern  army  could  hardly 
be  maintained  at  its  original  strength.  Thus  did  mat- 
ters stand  in  those  desolated  regions  during  the  autumn 
days  of  1864;  and  the  feeling  of  exultation  at  the  North 
found  its  natural  counterpart  in  an  extreme  depression 
at  the  South,  which  even  the  steady  self-reliance  and 
unflinching  purpose  of  Jefferson  Davis  could  scarcely 
counteract. 

Alarmed  by  the  defeat  of  Hood  and  the  fall  of  At- 
lanta. Davis  determined  to  investigate  for  himself,  by 
personal  examination  and  inquiry,  the  real  state  of 
affairs  at  the  South.  Although  his  presence  was  needed 
at  Richmond,  and  the  distance  from  that  city  to  Hood's 
headquarters  on  the  Macon  Railway  was  very  con- 
siderable, he  made  his  way  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Jonesborough.  There  he  found  much  to  inspire  him 
with  grave  anxiety ;  but  Hood  was  full  of  confidence  in 
his  ability  to  retrieve  the  misfortunes  of  the  Southern 
army.      He  proposed  to  Davis  to  assume  the  offensive 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE  SEA. 


27I 


by  attacking  Sherman's  lines  of  communication.  It 
was  a  bold  and  hazardous  plan  ;  but  nothing  else  of 
an  equally  practical  character  remained  open  to  the 
harassed  Confederates,  and  Davis  gave  his  sanction  to 
the  scheme.  With  astonishing  want  of  prudence,  how- 
ever, he  made  a  speech  at  Macon,  in  which  the  main 
features  of  the  contemplated  operations  were  revealed. 
The  address  was  reported  in  the  Southern  journals,  and 
soon  got  into  those  of  ihe  North  ;  so  that  in  a  very 
little  while  Sherman  was  well  informed  as  to  the  blow 
that  was  being  prepared  against  him,  and  took  his  meas- 
ures accordingly. 

Davis'  imprudence  was  not  confined  to  his  intimation 
of  what  it  was  intended  to  do  in  the  future.  In  his 
querulous  outbursts  of  disappointment,  he  divulged  the 
fact  that  Hood's  army  was  very  much  weakened  by  de- 
sertions, and  made  the  success  of  the  proposed  opera- 
tions dependent  on  the  return  of  the  absentees.  The 
grievance  was  in  truth  very  serious.  Governor  Brown, 
of  Georgia,  had  just  withdrawn  from  Hood's  command 
the  whole  body  of  the  State  militia,  on  the  ground  that 
the  men  had  been  called  out  for  the  defence  of  Atlanta, 
and  that  the  fall  of  that  city  released  them  from  any 
further  obligations.  Such  was  the  true  Southern  idea 
of  patriotism — an  idea  purely  local,  circumscribed  with- 
in the  narrowest  limits,  and  entirely  disdainful  of 
nationality.  This  was  a  matter  in  respect  to  which 
Davis  was  constantly  at  issue  with  Governor  Brown. 
He  perceived  the  necessity  of  establishing  some  species 
of  strong  central  government  in  place  of  that  which  he 
had  helped  to  overthrow  ;  and  the  safety  of  the  Con- 
federation was  with  him  a  more  important  matter  than 
the  convenience  of  particular  citizens,  or  the  exagger- 
ated independence  of  certain  States.  But  to  many  of 
the  Southerners,  and  to  the  Georgians  especially,  such 
ideas  were  the  expression  of  pure   tyranny.     The  year 


272 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


1864  abounded  in  complaints  against  the  Richmond 
Government  for  transcending  its  powers,  and  aiming  at 
despotic  predominance.  Yet  if  ever  a  political  body 
had  reason  to  remember  the  fable  of  the  bundle  of 
fagots,  that  body  was  the  Slave  Confederacy  of  America 
in  the  dwindling  days  of  its  existence. 

Having  determined  on  their  plan,  the  Southerners 
were  prompt  in  their  endeavors  to  carry  it  into  execu- 
tion. Even  before  Davis'  ridiculous  speech  at  Macon, 
Forrest  had  made  a  movement  against  the  communica- 
tions. He  crossed  the  Tennessee  on  September  20, 
and  captured  Athens,  in  Alabama;  then,  turning  north- 
wards, he  attempted  to  cut  the  railway  which  passes 
from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga.  But  the  incursion  was 
speedily  repelled  by  the  skilful  combinations  of  the 
Union  troops  and  Forrest  escaped  with  difficulty  to  the 
neighborhood  from  which  he  had  started.  The  forward 
movement  of  Hood  and  his  colleagues  commenced 
on  October  1,  when  they  crossed  the  Chattahoochee, 
and  marched  on  Lost  Mountain,  lying  to  the  west  of 
Marietta.  Detachments  were  sent  out  in  various  direc- 
tions to  destroy  the  rail,  and  to  threaten  the  Union 
troops  in  many  places  at  once  ;  but  Sherman  knew  that 
his  adversary  had  passed  the  river  very  shortly  after  the 
event  occurred,  and  he  had  already  made  arrangements 
for  resisting  an  attack  to  which  he  might  be  exposed. 
Desirous  of  learning  a  little  more  as  to  the  enemy's 
plans  before  he  made  any  important  move,  he  remained 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Atlanta  until  the  4th  ;  but  on 
that  day,  having  ascertained  beyond  a  doubt  that  a  large 
force  was  in  his  rear,  he  marched  with  five  corps  to 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the 
elevation  on  which  Hood  had  drawn  up  the  main  body 
of  his  army. 

By  this  time,  Colonel  Tourtelette,  with  the  men  under 
his  command,  was  threatened  at  Allatoona  Pass,  one  of 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE  SEA. 


273 


the  military  stations  by  which  Sherman  guarded  his  rear. 
The  troops  at  that  post  stood  in  great  danger  of  being 
overwhelmed  by  French's  division  of  Stuart's  corps ; 
and  Sherman,  dreading  the  consequences,  sent  word  to 
General  Corse,  at  Rome,  to  go  with  the  whole  of  his 
division  to  the  assistance  of  Tourtelette.  A  portion  of 
this  force  was  at  once  moved  up ;  but  the  rest  was  de- 
layed by  an  accident  on  the  railway,  owing  to  the  dam- 
aged condition  of  the  line.  Even  with  the  reinforce- 
ment, not  more  than  2000  troops  could  be  brought  to- 
gether ;  and  to  these  a  whole  division  was  opposed. 
The  Union  forces  were  drawn  up  on  both  sides  of  a 
deep  railway  cutting,  and  were  protected  by  forts  from 
sudden  assault.  A  vigorous  attack,  however,  was  made 
on  the  morning  of  October  5.  Advancing  along  the 
railway  track,  and  at  the  same  time  operating  against 
the  heights,  the  Confederates  struck  with  vigor  and 
effect,  and  the  feeble  ranks  of  their  opponents  were 
driven  from  fort  to  fort  until  they  reached  the  last  of 
the  defences.  Supplies  to  a  large  amount  were  stored 
up  at  Allatoona;  and  for  this  reason  alone  it  was  most 
important  that  the  position  should  be  retained,  to  say 
nothing  of  its  value  as  one  of  the  links  in  the  chain 
which  bound  the  invaders  to  their  military  bases. 
During  that  anxious  day,  Sherman  was  standing  on  the 
crest  of  Kenesaw  Mountain,  where,  though  he  was  18 
miles  off,  he  could  see  the  smoke  from  the  guns  at 
Allatoona,  and  hear  some  faint  reverberation  of  the  dis- 
charges. The  electric  wires  along  the  railway  had  been 
cut;  but  a  less  rapid  mode  of  communication  still  ex- 
isted in  the  form  of  signal-posts,  by  means  of  which 
Sherman  was  able  to  send  orders  to  the  commander  at 
the  pass.  It  was  a  great  relief  to  him  when  he  learned 
by  the  same  method  that  General  Corse,  with  a  portion 
of  his  command,  was  at  the  scene  of  action.  He  knew 
th.9t  that  officer  was  one  on  whom  the  fuUest  reliance 


274 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


could  be  placed;  that  he  would  hold  out  to  the  last, 
even  against  superior  numbers.  Such  proved  to  be  the 
fact.  In  the  progress  of  the  struggle,  Corse  was 
wounded,  and  for  a  time  insensible;  but  on  recovering 
consciousness  he  urged  his  men  to  renewed  efforts,  and 
about  four  in  the  afternoon  the  Confederates,  being  once 
more  repulsed,  and  having  lost  a  large  proportion  of 
their  number  in  killed,  wounded  and  captured,  thought 
it  prudent  to  retire.  Their  retreat  was  hastened  by  a 
report  that  a  large  body  of  Union  troops  was  marching 
against  them  ;  in  truth  Sherman  had  sent  to  the  relief 
of  his  beleaguered  detachment  the  corps  under  General 
Stanley  which  had  been  stationed  at  Pine  Mountain. 

Disappointed  with  the  result  of  French's  attack  on 
Allatoona,  Hood  pushed  rapidly  northwards,  crossed 
the  Etowah  and  the  Oostenaula,  and  made  for  Resaca, 
at  the  foot  of  the  Rocky  Hill  Ridge.  Sherman  followed 
on  his  track,  and,  proceeding  through  Allatoona  Pass 
on  October  8,  reached  Kingston  three  days  later.  On 
the  1 2th,  the  Confederates  summoned  the  garrison  of 
Resaca  to  surrender,  but,  being  met  by  a  refusal,  moved 
on  towards  Dalton.the  hills  round  which  were  occupied 
by  Hood  on  the  14th.  A  demand  for  the  capitulation 
of  the  fort  was  at  first  rejected,  but  not  for  long.  The 
position  was  held  by  a  colored  regiment,  under  Colonel 
Johnston,  who,  finding  himself  surrounded  by  the  whole 
bulk  of  Hood's  army,  considered  that  defence  would 
be  impracticable.  All  this  while,  the  Southern  forces 
were  tearing  up  the  rails  behind  them  ;  but  the  work 
was  so  ill  performed  that  Sherman,  as  he  pursued  his 
way,  was  able  roughly  to  restore  the  line  without  much 
difficulty.  After  the  fall  of  Dalton,  Hood  passed 
through  Tunnel  Hill,  and  for  a  few  hours  took  up  a 
position  near  Villanow.  Sherman  was  close  at  his 
heels;  but  some  dispositions  which  he  made,  in  the 
hope  of  bringing  his  adversary  to  bay,  and   cutting  orK 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE   SEA. 


275 


his  retreat,  were  foiled  by  the  rapid  movements  of  the 
Southerners.  Fighting  with  his  rear-guard,  Hood  es- 
caped on  the  1 5th  into  the  valley  of  the  Chattanooga,  and, 
turning  southwest,  entered  Alabama,  where  he  took  up 
a  position  at  Gadsden,  between  the  spurs  of  Lookout 
Mountain  and  the  river  Coosa.  The  northern  advance 
had  been  a  failure,  and  Sherman  was  relieved  of  anxiety 
with  respect  to  his  communications.  He  followed  his 
enemy  as  far  as  Gaylesville,  where  he  halted,  and  sent 
out  strong  working  parties  to  effect  a  complete  repair 
of  the  railways.  The  work  was  done  with  remarkable 
rapidity,  and  in  a  very  few  days  trains  were  running  as 
usual  between  the  several  towns  which  had  been 
threatened  by  Hood's  adventurous  campaign. 

Hood  was  now  to  some  extent  superseded  by  Beau- 
regard, who  on  October  17  assumed  command  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  West,  and  issued  an  address  to 
the  troops,  in  which  he  said: — "  The  army  of  Sherman 
still  defiantly  holds  Atlanta.  He  can  and  must  be 
driven  from  it.  It  is  only  for  the  good  people  of 
Georgia  and  the  surrounding  States  to  speak  the  word, 
and  the  work  is  done."  Notwithstanding  the  appoint- 
ment of  this  officer,  Hood  retained  his  special  command, 
subject  to  the  supervision  and  direction  of  Beauregard. 
After  remaining  some  time  at  Gadsden,  Hood  moved, 
about  November  1,  towards  Warrington,  and  thence  to 
Decatur,  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  where 
he  was  enabled  to  menace  the  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta 
Railway.  He  was  somewhat  puzzled  at  the  inactivity 
of  Sherman,  and  did  not  know  what  schemes  were  being 
revolved  in  that  commander's  mind.  It  was  obvious  to 
Sherman  that  Hood,  though  possessing  an  army  capable 
of  endangering  his  communications,  was  unable  to  meet 
him  in  open  fight.  He  considered  that  to  follow  him 
would  be  simply  to  waste  his  strength  in  vain  attempts 
to  overtake  an  active  and  constantly  retreating  enemy, 


276 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


and  would  necessitate  the  abandonment  of  Georgia,  with 
all  the  great  results  which  the  retention  of  that  State 
would  render  probable.  A  further  prosecution  of  the 
advance  seemed  therefore  the  most  advisable  course  to 
pursue.  Sherman  had  previously  suggested  to  Grant 
a  plan  which  amounted  substantially  to  the  destruction 
of  Atlanta  and  of  the  railway  track  to  Chattanooga, 
followed  by  a  march  through  the  heart  of  Georgia,  with 
a  view  to  capturing  one  or  more  of  the  great  seaports. 
"  Until  we  can  repopulate  Georgia,"  he  wrote  to  Grant, 
"  it  is  useless  to  occupy  it ;  but  the  utter  destruction  of 
its  roads,  houses,  and  people,  would  cripple  their  military 
resources."  He  felt  confident  of  his  ability  to  reach 
Savannah,  Charleston,  or  the  mouth  of  the  Chattahoo- 
chee, and  dwelt  on  the  advantage  of  compelling  Hood 
to  guess  at  what  he  meant,  instead  of  being  obliged 
himself  to  guess  at  what  his  adversary  designed.  While 
staying  at  Gaylesville,  Sherman  renewed  these  proposals, 
with  certain  modifications,  but  at  the  same  time  insisted 
on  being  left  free  to  adopt  one  of  the  three  alternative 
routes,  in  which  case  he  could  follow  so  eccentric  a 
course  that  no  one  could  guess  at  his  objective.  Grant 
authorized  the  proposed  movement,  but  indicated  his 
preference  for  Savannah  as  the  objective,  and  fixed 
Dalton  as  the  northern  limit  for  the  destruction  of  the 
railway. 

Towards  the  end  of  October,  Sherman  detached  Stan- 
ley's and  Schofield's  corps  to  Chattanooga,  where  they 
were  placed  under  the  orders  of  Thomas  for  the  protec- 
tion of  Tennessee.  Preparations  for  the  great  march 
were  now  being  actively  hurried  forward.  By  moving 
like  a  devastating  storm  across  Georgia,  from  Atlanta 
to  the  sea,  Sherman  hoped  to  cut  the  Confederacy  in 
two,  and  thus  to  hasten  its  death.  He  had  ardently 
desired  that  Hood,  in  retreating  after  his  ineffectual  at- 
tempt to  sever  his  communications,  would   retire  west- 


Union — 18 


278 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ward  into  Alabama,  instead  of  southward  to  the  vicinity 
of  Jonesborough.  When  the  event  proved  that  the 
Confederates  had  done  the  very  thing  wanted,  Sherman 
saw  that  his  opportunity  had  arrived.  He  threw  out 
strong  reconnoissances  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  so 
as  to  induce  in  him  the  idea  that  future  operations 
would  be  towards  the  west ;  but  at  the  same  time  every- 
thing was  being  arranged  for  an  eastward  march.  For 
the  present,  however,  the  design  was  kept  a  profound 
secret  from  all  but  the  corps-commanders,  and  the  head 
of  the  cavalry,  General  Kilpatrick.  Nearly  70,000  men 
were  brought  together,  and  these  were  divided  into  two 
columns ;  the  right  under  Howard,  the  left  under  Slocum. 
The  garrisons  were  withdrawn  from  Kingston,  Rome, 
Resaca,  and  Dalton  ;  all  troops  north  of  Kingston  were 
concentrated  in  and  around  Chattanooga  ;  the  railways 
south-east  of  the  Oostenaula  were  completely  destroyed; 
and  the  country  about  the  Chattahoochee  was  reduced 
to  the  condition  of  a  desert.  Sherman  had  determined 
to  relinquish  his  former  bases  of  supply  at  Chattanooga 
and  Nashville,  and  to  live  entirely  on  the  fertile  regions 
through  which  he  was  about  to  make  his  way.  On  the 
evening  of  November  15,  Atlanta  was  fired,  and  contin- 
ued burning  all  that  ni<7ht.  The  <?lare  of  the  conflacrra- 
tion  filled  the  heavens,  and  the  roar  of  exploding  shells 
and  magazines  was  heard  at  intervals,  as  the  rear-guard 
of  Sherman's  army  marched  in  a  south-easterly  direction, 
to  join  the  more  advanced  divisions  which  were  already 
on  their  road.  When  Sherman  ordered  the  removal  of 
non-combatants  from  that  unfortunate  city,  and  told  the 
mayor  that  his  military  plans  rendered  such  a  step 
necessary,  he  was  doubtless  contemplating  this  event, 
and  the  great  march  to  which  it  was  a  preliminary. 

Beauregard  and  Hood  were  at  Tuscumbia,  south  of  the 
Tennessee  River,  with  a  view  to  the  invasion  of  the  State. 
The  former  had  for  some  time  been  moving  in  an  opposite 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE   SEA. 


279 


direction  to  that  which  Sherman  was  now  pursuing. 
He  had  never  for  a  moment  suspected  the  great  de- 
sign of  his  opponent,  and  both  he  and  Beauregard  were 
much  surprised  when  they  heard  that  Sherman  had 
burned  Atlanta  and  struck  into  the  heart  of  Georgia. 
It  was  too  late  to  overtake  him,  for  he  had  by  this 
time  got  the  start  for  more  than  250  miles.  The  Con- 
federate leaders  therefore  determined  to  conduct  a 
series  of  operations  against  Tennessee  and  Kentucky, 
in  the  hope  that  Sherman  would  in  that  way  be  drawn 
back  to  the  defence  of  the  imperilled  States.  At  the 
same  time,  arrangements  were  made  for  harassing  the 
rear  of  the  invading  force,  and  for  bringing  into  the 
field  as  many  troops  as  possible  for  opposing  the 
onward  march.  Alabama  and  Mississippi  were  re- 
quired to  aid  Georgia  to  the  utmost  of  their  power ; 
but  the  resources  of  the  South  were  now  nearly  ex- 
hausted, and  only  a  very  small  army,  as  compared  with 
that  of  the  Northern  commander,  could  be  collected  at 
the  bidding  of  Beauregard.  This  poverty  in  the 
material  of  war  was  well  known  to  Sherman,  and  was 
one  of  the  elements  in  the  general  situation  on  which 
he  had  based  his  calculations.  Had  the  forces  under 
Hood  been  in  front  of  Sherman,  a  better  show  of  re- 
sistance might  have  been  made ;  but  they  had  been 
cleverly  manceuvered  out  of  the  way,  and  Georgia  lay 
at  the  mercy  of  the  Union  advance. 

Sherman's  army  moved  in  four  columns,  forming 
two  principal  wings.  The  direction  followed  was  be- 
tween Macon  and  Augusta,  so  as  to  compel  the  Con- 
federate general  to  divide  their  forces  for  the  protec- 
tion of  both  those  towns.  The  habitual  order  of 
march,  whenever  practicable,  was  by  four  roads,  as 
nearly  parallel  as  possible,  and  converging  at  points 
which  were  indicated  from  time  to  time.  No  general 
train  of  supplies  had   been   provided;  but  each  corps 


28o  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

was  accompanied  by  its  ammunition  and  provision 
train,  and  the  army  had  permission  to  "  forage  liberally  " 
on  the  country.  To  the  corps-commanders  was  en- 
trusted power  to  destroy  mills,  houses,  cotton-gins, 
&c. ;  but  no  such  destruction  was  to  take  place  in  dis- 
tricts where  the  army  was  unmolested.  "  In  all  forag- 
ing, of  whatever  kind,"  said  Sherman's  order  laying 
down  the  details  of  the  march,  "  the  parties  engaged 
will  refrain  from  abusive  or  threatening  language,  and 
may,  when  the  officer  in  command  thinks  proper,  give 
written  certificates  of  the  facts,  but  no  receipts ;  and 
they  will  endeavor  to  leave  with  each  family  a  reason- 
able proportion  for  their  maintenance."  The  high  mili- 
tary genius  of  Sherman  will  not  be  questioned  by  any, 
nor  can  the  honesty  of  his  intentions  be  for  a  moment 
impeached;  but  his  greatest  admirers  must  admit  that 
in  the  accomplishment  of  his  designs  he  was  remorse- 
less. The  ends  attained,  he  had  probably  not  a 
thought  of  revenge  ;  but  no  considerations  of  mercy 
ever  softened  the  rigor  of  his  will,  or  the  iron  temper 
of  his  disposition. 

The  movement  from  Atlanta  commenced  on  Novem- 
ber 14;  but  Sherman  did  not  leave  until  the  16th,  when 
he  started  with  the  left  wing.  Howard  was  at  the  head 
of  the  right  wing,  which  was  ordered  to  proceed  due 
south,  and  to  destroy  the  Macon  Railway  at  various 
points.  The  left  was  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Slocum,  who  was  to  menace  Augusta,  and  tear  up  the 
Georgia  Central  Railway.  The  Confederate  forces  op- 
posed to  this  immense  invading  host  consisted  prin- 
cipally of  militia,  under  the  command  of  Howell  Cobb, 
who  had  been  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and 
had  traitorously  used  his  authority  when  in  that  office 
towards  the  furtherance  of  secession.  At  the  utmost, 
he  had  not  more  than  10,000  infantry  under  his  orders ; 
and  Wheeler's  horsemen,  by  whom  he  was  supported, 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH   TO    THE  SEA.  28l 

were  few  in  comparison  with  the  well-appointed  cavalry 
of  his  antagonist.  Very  little  resistance,  therefore, 
could  be  opposed  to  the  torrent  of  invasion  now  pour- 
ing through  the  land.  Passionate  appeals  to  the  citizens 
were,  indeed,  not  wanting.  On  the  18th,  Beauregard, 
from  his  headquarters  at  Corinth,  Alabama,  put  forth 
an  address  to  the  people  of  Georgia,  which  promised 
success  as  the  speedy  result  of  vigorous  efforts. 
"  Obstruct  and  destroy  all  the  roads  in  Sherman's  front, 
flank,  and  rear,"  he  said,  "  and  his  army  will  soon  starve 
in  your  midst.  Be  confident ;  be  resolute."  The 
Georgian  Senators  in  the  Confederate  Congress,  writing 
on  the  same  day  from  Richmond,  told  their  fellow- 
citizens : — "You   have   now   the   best  opportunity  ever 

yet  presented  to  destroy  the  enemy Every 

citizen  with  his  gun,  and  every  negro  with  his  spade 
and  axe,  can  do  the  work  of  a  soldier.  You  can 
destroy  the  enemy  by  retarding  his  march."  Governor 
Brown  ordered  a  levy  en  masse  of  the  whole  of  the 
free  white  population  of  the  State  between  the  ages  of 
sixteen  and  forty-five,  and  offered  pardon  to  such  con- 
victs as  would  volunteer.  Very  little,  however,  came 
of  all  these  efforts.  A  few  skirmishes  occurred  now 
and  then,  but  they  were  without  effect  in  checking  the 
advance  of  Sherman's  legions.  Bridges  were  burned, 
but  speedily  repaired;  and  roads  which  were  broken  up 
by  the  retreating  troops  were  soon  put  once  more  into  a 
practicable  state  by  those  who  followed.  Milledgeville, 
the  capital  of  Georgia,  was  occupied  on  the  2ist  and 
22d.  When  the  expedition  started  from  Atlanta,  the 
Legislature  was  in  session  at  Milledgeville.  On  hear- 
ing that  the  Union  forces  were  approaching,  Brown,  the 
State  representative,  and  several  officials,  fled  in  panic 
to  Augusta;  two  days  after,  the  Union  scouts  dashed 
into  the  town,  which  was  at  once  surrendered  by  the 
mayor.      It   was   plundered   and    partially    destroyed; 


2g2  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

large   numbers  of  slaves  were   set  free ;  and  the  army 
swept  on. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  the  cavalry  under 
Kilpatrick  had  been  sent  towards  Macon,  in  order  to 
distract  the  enemy's  attention  ;  and  800  horsemen,  with 
four  cannon,  made  a  feigned  attack  on  East  Macon, 
two  miles  from  the  chief  city,  but,  after  an  animated 
combat,  retired  in  the  direction  of  Griswoldville,  destroy- 
ing several  miles  of  rail.  The  demonstration  against 
Macon  was  resumed  on  the  22d,  when  very  severe 
fighting  took  place  between  a  large  body  of  Union 
troops  and  a  Confederate  army  of  5000  troops.  The 
Southerners,  who  made  six  desperate  assaults  upon  the 
breastworks  which  their  opponents  had  constructed, 
were  ultimately  compelled  to  retire,  and  Macon  itself 
might  have  been  taken,  had  it  formed  any  part  of  the 
Union  scheme  to  do  so.  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  afterward 
joined  the  right  wing  at  Milledgeville,  in  accordance 
with  previous  arrangements.  The  plan  of  the  campaign 
was  carried  out  with  the  utmost  regularity  and  success, 
and  the  Confederates,  not  knowing  where  the  blow  was 
principally  to  fall,  were  distracted  with  anxiety  and 
apprehension.  Augusta  was  now  hastily  garrisoned, 
and  Hardee  obstructed  the  roads  towards  Savannah  by 
as  many  defences  as  he  could  improvise.  Sherman's 
advance,  however,  continued  with  inexorable  steadiness. 
On  November  24,  the  right  wing  of  the  Union  army, 
marching  from  Milledgeville  and  Gordon,  arrived  at  the 
Oconee  River,  which  they  immediately  prepared  to 
cross.  Being  edged  with  swamps,  through  which  many 
creeks  ran  in  winding  courses  towards  the  main  stream, 
the  Oconee  seemed  easy  of  defence,  and  difficult  for  an 
invading  army  to  pass.  The  Georgian  militia,  under 
General  Wayne,  endeavored  to  hold  the  line  ;  but  the 
troops  got  across  with  little  trouble,  and  the  Con- 
federates retreated  without  any  serious  attempt  at  fight- 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH   TO    THE  SEA. 


283 


ing.  Kilpatrick  entered  Waynesborough  on  the  27th, 
and,  after  tearing  up  the  railway  which  connected  that 
town  with  Augusta,  escaped  towards  the  left  v/ing  of  the 
advancing  army  ;  though  not  without  a  sharp  action,  in 
which  his  regiments  were  very  nearly  surrounded  and 
taken  prisoners.  The  left  had  by  this  time  crossed  the 
Ogeechee,  and,  on  the  28th,  Louisville  was  entered  by 
that  division  of  the  invading   force. 

Sherman's  troops  were  now  approaching  the  sea,  and 
the  arid  soil  and  wiry  pine-trees  of  Eastern  Georgia  had 
succeeded  to  the  richer  forest  lands  and  cultivated  fields 
of  the  interior  portions  of  the  State.  Sherman,  with  the 
center  corps  of  his  army,  was  at  Millen  on  December 
3,  from  which  spot  he  made  demonstrations  against 
Augusta  and  Savannah,  that  the  Confederates  might  be 
kept  in  doubt  as  to  what  point  would  be  attacked.  He 
then  moved  down  the  peninsula  formed  by  the  Ogee- 
chee and  Savannah  Rivers,  and  thus  approached  the 
object  of  his  march  through  the  swamps  and  rice-fields 
by  which  it  is  encompassed.  Deluging  rain  had  come 
on  ;  the  marshy  soil  presented  great  difficulties  to  the 
masses  of  heavily-armed  troops,  with  their  artillery  and 
baggage-wagons ;  and  it  was  necessary  in  many  places 
to  construct  the  roads  over  which  the  army  was  to  pass. 
Felled  trees,  field-works,  and  other  defences  were  now 
encountered  by  the  invaders ;  but  by  the  10th,  the 
Southern  troops  had  been  driven  within  their  lines, 
and  Sherman's  entire  army  was  massed  in  front  of  Sa- 
vannah, after  a  march  of  more  than  300  miles,  which 
had  been  accomplished  in  about  25  days.  The  Union 
losses  during  this  great  military  operation  had  been 
very  few,  and  all  the  divisions  were  in  excellent  condi- 
tion when  Savannah  rose  before  them  over  the  flat  and 
watery  landscape.  The  men  would  gladly  have  as- 
saulted the  town  at  once ;  but  the  walls  were  mounted 
with  heavy  guns,  and  Sherman  had  brought  with  him 


284  THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION: 

nothing  stronger  than  field-artillery.  He  therefore  re- 
frained from  a  general  attack,  and  trusted  to  the  effect 
of  time  in  starving  out  the  city  and  its  garrison.  The 
fleet  under  Dahlgren  was  lying  not  far  off;  but  it  was 
no  easy  matter  to  communicate  with  the  naval  force, 
owing  to  the  guns  of  Fort  McAllister,  which  com- 
manded the  mouth  of  the  Ogeechee.  It  was  necessary 
in  the  first  instance  to  capture  that  work,  and  this  was 
effected,  after  a  hot  and  gallant  contest  on  the  13th,  by 
General  Hazen's  division  of  the  15th  corps,  which 
carried  the  position  by  assault. 

The  fleet  was  thus  enabled  to  operate  with  the  army. 
Arrangements  were  made  for  a  supply  of  ammunition 
and  heavy  guns  from  Hilton  Head,  and  Sherman  sent 
instructions  to  General  Foster,  commanding  the  Union 
troops  in  that  department,  to  occupy  the  railway  be- 
tween Savannah  and  Charleston,  so  as  to  complete  the 
environment  of  the  former  city  on  the  side  where  alone 
any  gap  existed  in  the  investing  force — viz.,  the  side 
towards  the  north.  The  surrender  of  Savannah  was  de- 
manded on  the  17th,  but  refused  by  Hardee,  who  ap- 
parently relied  on  his  ability  to  defend  the  position. 
Preparations  were  made  for  a  bombardment  and  assault, 
while  on  the  other  hand,  the  Confederate  batteries,  as 
well  as  the  gunboats  on  the  river,  kept  up  a  constant 
fire,  which  seemed  to  promise  a  desperate  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  besieged.  But  Hardee  had  in  fact  made 
up  his  mind  to  abandon  the  city  to  its  fate.  It  was  con- 
sidered that  the  army  would  be  of  much  greater  use  in 
other  quarters  than  in  a  town  where  it  was  shut  up 
within  walls,  and  exposed  to  the  certainty  of  capture,  if 
once  the  defences  were  overcome.  The  Confederates 
still  had  command  of  the  Savannah  River,  and  across 
that  stream  they  escaped  during  the  night  of  the  20th. 
Having  reached  the  farther  shore,  they  threaded  a  little- 
known  road  through  the  swamp,  and  made  their  way  to 


SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO    THE   SEA. 


285 


South  Carolina.  Sherman  entered  the  city  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  and  despatched  a  telegram  to  President 
Lincoln,  in  which  he  said  : — "  I  beg  to  present  you,  as 
a  Christmas  gift,  the  city  of  Savannah,  with  150  heavy 
guns,  and  plenty  of  ammunition  ;  also  about  25,000 
bales  of  cotton."  A  good  deal  of  Union  feeling  seemed 
to  be  latent  among  the  citizens.  They  behaved  with 
civility  towards  the  soldiers,  and  made  no  attempt  to 
destroy  cotton  or  any  other  kind  of  property.  On  the 
28th,  a  meeting  was  held  at  the  requisition  of  the  mayor, 
at  which  certain  resolutions  were  unanimously  adopted 
with  a  view  to  a  complete  submission  to  the  Union,  and 
the  laying  aside  of  all  differences  ;  and  under  the  consid- 
erate rule  of  General  Geary,  the  commandant  appointed 
by  Sherman,  the  city  enjoyed  a  period  of  repose  and  of 
comparative  prosperity. 

Reckoning  up  the  results  of  the  campaign,  in  the 
official  report  which  he  afterwards  sent  the  War  De- 
partment, Sherman  wrote  : — "  I  estimate  the  damage 
done  to  the  State  of  Georgia  and  its  military  resources 
at  $100,000,000,  at  least  $20,000,000  of  which  have  been 
used  to  our  advantage,  and  the  remainder  is  simple 
waste  and  destruction.  This  may  seem  a  hard  species 
of  warfare  ;  but  it  brings  the  sad  realities  of  war  home 
to  those  who  have  been  directly  or  indirectly  instru- 
mental in  involving  us  in  its  attendant  calamities." 
Sherman's  wonderful  success  had  been  accomplished  at 
a  cost  of  not  more  than  567  men  in  killed,  wounded  and 
missing.  The  almost  total  collapse  of  the  South  had 
been  made  manifest  by  the  facility  with  which  he  had 
conducted  his  legions  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea;  and  the 
transport  of  enthusiasm  at  the  North  was  all  the  greater 
in  consequence  of  the  previous  feeling  of  anxiety.  The 
news  of  Sherman's  triumph  came  like  a  burst  of  sun- 
shine to  brighten  the  departing  year,  and  those  who  had 
been  most  doubtful  now  acknowledged  that  one  of  the 


286  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

greatest  achievements  of  the  war  had  been  accomplished, 
and  that  the  subjugation  of  the  Confederacy  at  no  dis- 
tant date  was  thenceforth  assured. 

During  the  progress  of  these  events  in  the  South, 
Hood  was  conducting  that  series  of  operations  in  Ten- 
nessee which  ultimately  proved  his  ruin.  His  army 
was  of  respectable  dimensions,  consisting  of  nearly 
30,000  infantry  and  artillery,  with  about  1 2,000  cavalry; 
and  the  forces  of  Thomas,  to  whom  the  defence  of  Ten- 
nessee had  been  confided  by  Sherman,  were,  speaking 
roughly,  about  equal  to  those  by  which  he  was  con- 
fronted. The  Union  base  of  operations  was  at  Nash- 
ville, where,  while  awaiting  the  arrival  of  some  addi- 
tional regiments,  Thomas  formed  his  plans  of  resistance 
to  the  threatened  attack.  Hood  began  his  forward 
march  on  November  21,  shaping  his  course  along  the 
road  between  Florence  and  Nashville  ;  and  the  outlying 
Union  divisions  were  either  concentrated  at  Chatta- 
nooga and  Murfreesboro',  or  withdrawn  across  the 
Duck  River  in  the  direction  of  Nashville.  Forrest,  in 
command  of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  crossed  the  river 
a  few  miles  above  Columbia  on  the  night  of  the  28th, 
and  Schofield,  who  had  command  of  the  Northern 
armies  in  the  open  country,  was  nearly  cut  off  from  his 
line  of  retreat.  The  Southerners  were  actually  on  the 
flank  of  one  of  Schofield's  divisions  ;  Confederate  re- 
inforcements were  advancing  from  other  directions  ;  and 
had  an  attack  been  made  at  once,  it  seems  almost  cer- 
tain that  a  great  success  would  have  been  achieved. 
But  the  Confederate  officer,  General  Cheatham,  let  his 
opportunity  slip  by.  He  awaited  the  arrival  of  Stewart, 
and,  after  that  officer  had  reached  the  spot,  still  hesitated 
to  engage  the  enemy.  The  two  armies  were  so  close 
that  even  after  nightfall  the  march  of  the  Union  regi- 
ments could  be  distinctly  seen  by  their  adversaries  ;  yet 
Cheatham    forbore    to    attack.     Thomas    now    ordered 


THE    WAR   IN   TENNESSEE. 


287 


Schofield  to  entrench  himself  in  such  a  position  as 
would  enable  him  to  defend  the  approaches  to  Nash- 
ville from  Columbia.  This  he  immediately  did  ;  but, 
before  his  works  could  be  completed,  he  was  furiously 
assailed  by 
Hood. 

Schofield 
had  thrown 
up  his  en- 
trenchments 
in  front  of  the 
small  town  of 
Franklin,  sit- 
uated on  the 
Big  Harpeth 
River,  18 
miles  south 
of  Nashville ; 
but  he  was 
somewhat  en- 
cumbered by 
a  long  train 
of  wagons, 
which  had 
not  yet  got 
over  the  river 
extending  in 
his  rear.  If, 
therefore,  he 
could  be  de- 
feated in  this  position,  he  would  probably  be  over- 
whelmed, and  one  great  obstacle  to  Hood's  plans  would 
be  removed.  The  Confederate  force  was  divided  into 
two  columns,  one  of  which  was  to  attack  Franklin  in 
front,  while  the  other  was  to  move  down  the  stream, 
to  cross  it  some  distance  east   of  Franklin,  and  thus 


GENERAL   SCHOFIELD. 


288  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

unexpectedly  to  approach  the  Union  rear.  At  four  in 
the  afternoon  of  November  30,  Hood's  main  column 
advanced  to  the  attack.  The  contest  was  prolonged 
and  sanguinary;  entrenchments  were  taken  and  re- 
taken; but  Schofield,  at  the  head  of  15,000  men,  held 
his  positions  until  nearly  midnight,  when,  ascertaining 
that  he  was  in  danger  of  being  outflanked  by  the  col- 
umn that  had  crossed  the  river,  he  ordered  a  retreat. 
This  was  continued  during  the  night,  and  on  Decem- 
ber 1  Schofield  had  reached  a  point  seven  miles  south 
of  Nashville,  where  General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  was 
posted.  Hood  had  suffered  very  severely  in  the  action, 
and  confessed  to  a  loss  of  4500  men,  including  a  large 
number  of  general  officers  ;  but,  as  the  Union  troops 
also  had  suffered  grievously,  and  were  dispirited  by  the 
necessity  of  retreating,  the  Confederate  leader  did  not 
hesitate  as  to  the  expediency  of  pursuit.  He  followed 
closely  on  his  adversary's  track,  and  Smith,  finding 
himself  hard-pressed,  fell  back  to  the  outer  line  of  the 
Nashville  entrenchments,  which  were  situated  three 
miles  from  the  town. 

The  consternation  in  Nashville  was  extreme  when  it 
became  known  that  the  outlying  armies  had  been  de- 
feated, and  that  the  enemy  was  near  at  hand.  Large 
numbers  of  civilians  were  hurriedly  armed  ;  Thomas's 
forces  were  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  outside  the  town, 
and  additional  troops  were  brought  up  by  rail  from 
Chattanooga.  Hood  arrived  in  front  of  Nashville  on 
the  2d,  and,  throwing  up  strong  works  and  counter-bat- 
teries, made  preparations  for  a  siege.  Forrest,  in  com- 
mand of  a  body  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  was  despatched 
towards  Murfreesboro',  to  summon  the  garrison  to 
surrender;  but  a  portion  of  this  detachment  behaved  ill, 
and  the  army  before  Nashville  was  weakened  by  the 
absence  of  so  large  a  contingent.  Thomas,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  being  continually  reinforced,  and  by  the 


THE    WAR   IN   TENNESSEE. 


289 


middle  of  the  the  month  felt  himself  strong  enough  to 
deliver  a  powerful  assault  on  the  beleaguering  hosts. 
In  the  early  morning  of  the  15th,  a  feint  was  made  on 
Hood's  right,  and  a  real  attack  on  his  left,  which  ended 
in  the  capture  of  several  redoubts  and  guns,  and  in  the 
complete  discomfiture  of  Hood,  who  was  forced  from 
his  chief  position  on  Montgomery  Hill,  and  compelled 
to  retreat  a 
distance  of 
some  miles. 
Next  day  his 
troops  were 
again  attack- 
ed, and,  after 
an  action  of 
varying  for- 
tunes, driven 
in  confu- 
sion towards 
Franklin. 
The  division 
which  misbe- 
haved itself 
at  Murfrees- 
boro'  had 
once  more 
given  evi- 
dence of  de- 
ficiency       i  n 

fighting  qualities.  Its  dismay  was  communicated  to 
other  divisions,  and  only  one  corps  preserved  its  organ- 
ization and  self-respect.  The  retreat  of  the  main  body 
necessitated  the  withdrawal  of  Forrest  from  before 
Murfreesboro' ;  but,  owing  to  the  swollen  condition 
of  the  rivers,  his  detachment  had  great  difficulty  in 
joining  the  regiments  that   had    fled  from   Nashville, 


GENERAL    GEORGE    H.    THOMAS. 


290 


THE  BATTLhS    bUR    THE    UNION. 


The  pursuit  was  vigorously  pressed  by  Thomas,  and 
Hood's  defeated  legions,  pouring  over  the  Duck  River, 
and  in  time  obtaining  the  support  of  Forrest,  who  re- 
joined the  army  at  Columbia,  made  for  the  Tennessee, 
which  was  crossed  on  the  27th.  The  Confederate  Army 
of  the  West  was  completely  shattered.  In  the  two 
days'  battles  before  Nashville,  54  guns  and  4460 
prisoners  had  been  captured  by  the  Union  forces,  and 
the  entire  loss  of  the  Confederates  during  the  whole 
campaign  was  stated  at  13,189  in  prisoners  alone,  in- 
cluding several  general  officers,  and  1000  others  of 
lower  grades.  During  the  same  period,  more  than 
2000  deserters  came  into  the  Northern  lines,  and  72 
pieces  of  artillery  passed  from  the  defeated  to  the 
victorious  army.  The  Union  loss  was  about  10,000  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  but  the  authority  of  the 
Union  in  Tennessee  was  saved  by  a  series  of  actions  in 
which  Hood  had  done  lfttle  more  than  demonstrate  the 
weakness  of  his  resource?,  and  his  own  want  of  com- 
manding ability  as  a  general  Shortly  after  his  with- 
drawal into  the  northern  part  of  Alabama,  he  was  re- 
lieved of  the  command,  at  his  own  request,  and  was 
succeeded  by  General  Taylor,  who  wa«  transferred  from 
the  Trans-Mississippi  Department. 

Sherman  rested  at  Savannah  only  long  enough  to 
prepare  for  that  further  advance  of  his  armies  which  he 
from  the  first  judged  to  be  necessary.  To  penetrate 
northwards  through  South  Carolina,  to  enter  North 
Carolina,  and  in  due  time  to  combine  his  forces  with 
those  besieging  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  seemed  to 
him  the  most  likely  way  of  terminating  the  war.  Grant 
desired  that  the  whole  of  Sherman's  army  should  at 
once  be  transported  by  sea  from  Georgia  to  the  banks 
of  the  James  River ;  but  the  hero  of  Savannah  con- 
sidered that  it  would  be  far  better  to  march  through  the 
intervening  country,  reducing   it  to   submission  by  an 


SHERMAN  IN  THE    CAROLINAS. 


29I 


overwhelming  display  of  force.  The  land,  it  is  true, 
presented  in  many  parts  great  difficulties  to  the  progress 
of  a  hostile  body ;  but  the  Confederate  Army  was  now 
so  reduced  in  numbers,  and  so  broken  in  spirits,  that 
little  active  opposition  was  to  be  feared.  In  January, 
1865,  Beauregard  was  at  Augusta,  on  the  Georgian  side 
of  the  Savannah  River,  endeavoring  to  scrape  together 
from  various  localities  a  force  to  resist  the  further  meas- 
ures of  Sherman.  But  his  attempts  of  this  nature  were 
not  very  successful,  and  he  found  himself  at  length  in 
command  of  only  a  few  thousand  men  with  which  to 
confront  the  serried  legions  of  his  adversary.  He 
wished  to  augment  his  scanty  divisions  by  abandoning 
Charleston  and  Wilmington  ;  but  these  measures  were 
not  then  sanctioned  by  the  Confederate  Government. 

Beauregard  had  the  assistance  of  General  D.  H.  Hill, 
and  also  of  Wade  Hampton,  who  commanded  the  cav- 
alry. The  want,  indeed,  was  not  in  generals,  but  in 
men,  so  that  little  could  be  done  to  protect  the  roads  by 
which  Sherman  would  move  towards  the  more  northern 
States.  On  the  completion  of  his  preparations  at  Savan- 
nah, that  commander  found  himself  at  the  head  of 
60,000  infantry,  10,000  cavalry,  and  artillery  in  propor^ 
tion.  A  detachment  of  his  force  he  left  at  Savannah, 
and  with  the  rest  set  out  for  Goldsborough,  in  North 
Carolina.  To  deceive  the  enemy,  demonstrations  were 
to  be  made  against  Charleston  to  the  right,  and  Augusta 
to  the  left ;  and,  while  these  were  in  progress,  the  main 
body  was  to  push  forward  along  the  causeways  by 
which  the  marshes  of  the  coast  are  traversed.  The 
advance  did  not  fairly  commence  until  February  1st, 
when  the  several  divisions  set  out  on  their  northward 
march,  and  entered  on  a  dreary  tract  of  flooded  lands, 
where  the  Confederate  cavalry  had  done  their  utmost 
to  impair  the  roads  and  destroy  the  bridges,  and  where 
therefore  it  was  necessary  to  conduct  many  engineering 


292 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


operations  before  the  troops  could  pursue  their  course. 
In  South  Carolina,  as  in  Georgia,  houses,  barns,  agri- 
cultural produce,  and  even  large  woods,  were  set  on  fire, 
and  the  invaders,  as  they  passed  over  the  country,  left 
behind  them  a  blackened  desert,  stripped  of  everything 
which  could  support  the  life  of  man  or  beast. 

The  Confederates  held  the  line  of  the  Salkahatchie, 
but,  on  their  positions  being  forced,  fell  back  behind  the 
Edisto  at  Branchville,  where  they  burned  two  bridges. 
Sherman's  forces,  however,  crossed  the  stream,  and  ad- 
vanced towards  Orangeburg,  which  was  occupied  on 
February  12th.  Wade  Hampton  was  now  compelled 
to  fall  back  on  Columbia,  the  State  capital,  situated 
north  of  the  Congaree  River.  The  bridge  in  front  of 
the  town  was  burned  by  the  retreating  Southerners  ;  but 
the  Union  troops,  on  reaching  the  banks  of  the  Conga- 
ree, early  in  the  morning  of  February  16,  passed  the 
river  by  means  of  extemporary  bridges,  and  received 
the  surrender  of  Columbia.  The  place  was  consumed 
by  fire  on  the  night  of  the  17th;  but  Sherman  charged 
this  fact  on  Wade  Hampton  himself,  who,  it  is  alleged, 
applied  the  torch  to  a  large  quantity  of  cotton  and  lint 
stored  up  in  the  town,  blazing  fragments  of  which  were 
carried  by  an  unusually  high  wind  in  many  directions. 
Hampton  denied  the  accusation,  and  vehemently  asserted 
that  the  city  was  fired  by  Sherman's  men.  The  left 
wing,  under  Slocum,  reached  Winnsborough  on  the  2 1st, 
and  was  followed  by  the  cavalry  of  Kilpatrick.  The 
latter  then  moved  upon  Lancaster,  so  as  to  foster  the 
impression  that  Sherman  intended  a  general  march  on 
Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  to  which  city  Beauregard 
and  all  the  Confederate  cavalry  had  by  this  date  retreated 
from  Columbia. 

At  the  same  time,  Hardee  evacuated  Charleston,  It 
being  considered  that  to  retain  1 1,000  troops  within  the 
defences  of  that  city,  when  they  were  so  much  needed 


SHERMAN  IN   THE   CAROLINAS. 


293 


to  oppose  the  advance  of  Sherman,  would  be  a  grave 
mistake.  Thus,  the  original  proposal  of  Beauregard 
was  now  adopted ;  but  the  time  had  passed  when  it 
was  capable — if  it  was  ever  capable — of  producing  the 
desired  effect.  The  abandonment  of  Charleston  was 
attended,  on  the  night  of  February  17,  by  the  burning 
of  the  city,  which  was  fired  by  the  Confederates  them- 
selves, in  order  that  the  Northerners  should  have  little 
but  a  mass  of  ruins  as  the  reward  of  their  long  endeavors 
to  take  this  stronghold  of  rebellion.  The  Government 
stores,  the  railway  depots,  and  the  ironclads  in  the  har- 
bor, were  burned  or  blown  up ;  the  guns  on  the  ram- 
parts were  burst;  and  the  rear-guard  of  Hardee's  army 
left  by  rail  for  the  north-west,  in  the  midst  of  an  infernal 
glare  and  clamor  of  destruction,  which  the  Union  troops 
were  for  the  moment  powerless  to  prevent.  Gillmore's 
troops  entered  the  flaming  city  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 8th,  and,  hoisting  the  national  colors  once  more  over 
the  remnants  of  the  forts,  proceeded  to  subdue  the  con- 
flagration. But  only  a  small  portion  of  the  city  could 
be  saved.  Charleston,  the  cradle  of  the  rebellion,  had 
perished  in  fires  of  her  own  kindling — a  fit  type  of  that 
rapacious  and  cruel  oligarchy  which  would  wreck  where 
it  could  not  rule,  and  which  knew  no  medium  between 
the  insolence  of  domination  and  the  despair  of  baffled 
crime. 

Wilmington,  in  North  Carolina,  was  also  abandoned. 
The  reduction  of  Fort  Fisher,  on  January  15,  had 
greatly  diminished  the  value  of  the  position  ;  and  in  this 
instance,  as  well  as  in  the  case  of  Charleston,  it  was 
thought  better  to  add  the  garrison  to  the  scanty  forces 
then  in  the  field  under  the  direction  of  Johnston,  who 
had  been  restored  to  command  as  one  of  the  most  capa- 
ble of  the  Southern  leaders,  notwithstanding  the  series 
of  defeats  which  he  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  Sher- 
man in  Georgia.     During  the  depth  of  winter,  the  23d 

Union — 19 


294 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


corps,  under  Schofield,  had  been  transported  from  Clif- 
ton, on  the  Tennessee  River,  to  the  vicinity  of  Wilming- 
ton, that  it  might  aid  in  the  capture  of  that  city,  and, 
when  the  main  object  had  been  effected,  might  assist 
the  designs  of  Sherman  by  marching  on  Goldsborough. 
The  siege  operations  against  Wilmington  were  so  vigor- 
ously prosecuted  that  both  the  outer  and  the  inner  line 
of  defences  were  outflanked  in  the  course  of  February, 
and  on  the  22d  of  that  month  the  Confederates  under 
Hoke  destroyed  the  steamers,  cotton,  and  Government 
stores,  and,  retreating  on  Goldsborough,  where  Johnston 
was  concentrating  his  forces,  abandoned  Wilmington. 
Schofield  then  determined,  as  soon  as  his  arrangements 
should  be  complete,  to  advance  in  two  columns  from 
Wilmington  and  Newbern  to  Goldsborough.  But 
means  of  transportation  could  not  at  once  be  obtained, 
and  the  first  week  of  March  had  nearly  closed  ere  his 
movement  began. 

After  quitting  Winnsborough,  Sherman  turned  east- 
wards, and  directed  his  columns  on  Cheraw,  a  small 
town  situated  on  the  Great  Pedee  River,  at  the  termina- 
tion of  the  line  of  rail  running  from  Charleston.  His 
supplies  were  getting  short;  the  solitary  lands  where 
he  now  found  himself  yielded  but  little  for  the  support 
of  his  regiments ;  and  it  became  imperative  to  open 
communications  with  the  sea.  Progress  was  fatiguing 
and  difficult.  Heavy  rain  was  frequently  falling,  and 
the  roads  were  so  rotten  with  mud  and  ooze  that  it  was 
often  necessary  to  make  long  causeways  of  felled  trees 
across  some  desolate  stretch  of  watery  soil.  The  labors 
of  the  men  were  prodigious  ;  yet  their  advance  was  not 
seriously  delayed. 

Sherman  pushed  on  to  Fayetteville,  and  while  there 
learned  that  the  fragments  of  an  army  that  had  left 
Columbia  under  Beauregard  had  been  reinforced  by 
Cheatham's  corps  from  the  West,  and  by  the   garrison 


THE  BATTLE  AT  BENTONVILLE.  295 

of  Augusta ;  that  Hardee  had  succeeded  in  getting 
across  Cape  Fear  River;  and  that  the  whole  of  the 
Confederate  forces,  under  Johnston,  made  up  an  army- 
superior  to  his  own  in  cavalry,  and  not  contemptible 
either  in  infantry  or  artillery.  Sherman  was  quick  to 
see  that  the  real  difficulties  of  his  enterprise  were  about 
to  begin,  and  that  his  further  operations  must  be  char- 
acterized by  extreme  caution. 

On  the  15th,  he  resumed  his  forward  march,  and  on 
the  1 6th  discovered  Hardee  strongly  entrenched  at  a 
point  where  the  road  branches  off  towards  Goldsbor- 
ough,  by  way  of  Bentonville.  He  was  immediately 
attacked  and  defeated  by  the  Union  left  wing,  and  dur- 
ing the  ensuing  night  the  whole  body  withdrew  in  the 
direction  of  Smithfield,  where  Hardee  effected  his 
junction  with  Johnston.  Another  battle  was  fought 
on  the  19th  near  Bentonville,  where  Slocum's  column 
sustained  a  temporary  check.  Johnston  had  moved 
from  Smithfield  with  great  rapidity,  and  without  the 
encumbrance  of  many  heavy  guns,  hoping  to  over- 
whelm his  opponent's  left  flank  before  it  could  be  re- 
lieved by  the  co-operating  columns ;  but  Sherman  had 
expected  such  a  movement,  and  was  prepared  for  it. 
The  action  continued  the  whole  day,  and  Slocum's 
forces  repulsed  no  fewer  than  six  attacks,  delivered  by 
the  Confederates  with  their  accustomed  energy  and  en- 
thusiasm. The  Union  troops  had  hastily  entrenched 
themselves,  and,  being  reinforced  during  the  night,  were 
in  a  position  of  comparative  security  on  the  morning 
of  the  20th.  The  two  armies  then  confronted  one  an- 
other from  behind  their  respective  breastworks.  The 
battle  was  resumed  on  the  21st,  when,  after  many  hours 
of  heavy  fighting,  the  Southerners  were  driven  towards 
Smithfield,  and,  Sherman,  who  had  by  this  time  been 
joined  by  Schofield,  remained  master  of  the  situation. 
Schofield's  advance  had  been  delayed  by  the  vigorous 


296  THE  BATTLES  FOR  THE  UNION. 

opposition  of  Hoke's  forces,  with  whom  some  severe 
actions  had  been  fought.  On  the  21st  the  Union 
columns  entered  Goldsborough,  where  Sherman  left 
his  army  under  Schofield,  while  he  proceeded  alone  to 
Grant's  headquarters,  which  he  reached  on  the  27th, 
and  then  for  the  first  time  learned  the  general  state  of 
affairs,  of  which  he  had  been  ignorant  since  the  end 
of  January.  The  main  Union  armies  were  now  in  such 
a  position  with  reference  to  one  another  that  they  could 
readily  combine  for  the  prosecution  of  any  campaign 
which  might  be  considered  advisable  in  the  spring. 
The  great  object  of  the  march  had  been  obtained,  and 
the  two  Carolinas,  as  well  as  Georgia,  were  all  but  lost 
to  the  Confederacy. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Closing  Battles  in  Virginia. 

When,  in  March,  1864,  General  Grant  was  invested 
with  the  command  of  all  the  armies,  he  found  himself 
at  the  head  of  770,000  troops,  provided  in  the  most 
ample  measure  with  the  resources  of  modern  warfare. 
To  this  immense  army  the  Confederates  could  only 
oppose  much  scantier  legions  (Lee's  veterans  who 
fell  in  the  awful  charge  of  Gettysburg  could  never  be 
replaced).  The  North  could  now  depend  on  the  ser- 
vices of  tried  and  able  officers  ;  and  in  Grant  was  found 
a  directing  mind  which  would  not  fail  in  energy  or  in- 
telligence. His  idea  was  that  active  and  continuous 
operations  by  all  the  troops  that  could  be  brought  into 
the  field,  regardless  of  season  and  weather,  were  neces- 
sary to  complete  and  speedy  success.  The  armies  of 
the  East  and  of  the  West,  he  perceived,  acted  inde- 
pendently of  each  other,  and  without  concert ;  while 
the  enemy,  taking  advantage  of  his  interior  lines  of 
communication  for  transporting  troops  from  one  point 
to  another,  was  enabled  to  reinforce  any  army  that 
might  be  particularly  pressed,  and  also,  during  seasons 
of  Union  inactivity,  to  furlough  large  numbers  of  men, 
who  were  then  at  liberty  to  return  to  their  homes  and 
assist  for  a  few  months  in  reproductive  labors.  Grant 
determined  to  use  all  the  troops  practicable  against  the 
armed  hosts  of  the  Confederacy,  thus  preventing  his 

(297) 


298 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE  UNION. 


opponents  from  using  the  same  force  at  different 
seasons  against  first  one  and  then  another  of  the  North- 
ern armies,  and  allowing  them  no  possibility  of  repose 
for  refitting,  or  for  the  production  of  fresh  supplies. 
He  resolved  to  strike  continuously  against  the  forces 
of  the  enemy,  until  "  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other 
way,"  nothing  should  be  left  them  but  submission. 

To  crush  out  the  rebellion  by  simultaneous  opera- 
tions on  a  vast  scale  was  Grant's  scheme.  He  proposed 
to  march  against  Richmond  with  the  armies  of  the 
Potomac  and  of  the  James  River,  while  Sherman,  in 
command  of  the  three  armies  of  the  Cumberland,  Ten- 
nessee and  Ohio,  was  to  move  towards  Atlanta,  in 
Georgia.  For  the  protection  of  Richmond,  Lee  had 
less  than  58,000  men  of  all  arms.  In  other  parts  of 
the  Confederacy,  the  armies  of  the  South  were  for- 
midable rather  by  the  fighting  qualities  of  the  soldiers, 
and  the  ability  of  the  generals,  than  by  positive  num- 
bers ;  but  altogether  the  assemblage  of  armed  men, 
when  we  consider  both  sides,  was  probably  greater 
than  any  one  nation  has  ever  set  in  hostile  array.  If 
to  the  forces  of  the  North  already  referred  to  we  add 
222,000  for  those  of  the  South — and  this  appears  to  be 
a  probable  estimate — we  reach  a  total  of  nearly  a  mil- 
lion men.  The  much  larger  population  of  the  Northern, 
as  compared  with  the  Southern  States,  enabled  the 
Government  to  put  such  gigantic  armies  in  the  field, 
and,  after  repeated  losses  of  the  most  appalling  charac- 
ter, to  be  ready  with  fresh  legions  for  yet  grander  enter- 
prises. Even  more  remarkable,  however,  was  the  abil- 
ity of  the  South  to  bring  forward  a  force  of  more  than 
200,000  men,  after  their  separation  from  the  Western 
and  the  border  States. 

Wilderness  (May  5,6,  1864). — The  new  movements 
of  the  Union  armies  were  to  begin  as  early  in  May  as 
possible.     The  Potomac  army  now  consisted  of  three 


BATTLE    OF  THE    WILDERNESS. 


299 


instead  of  five  corps.  These  were  wielded  by  Hancock, 
Sedgwick  and  Warren,  while  Meade  continued  as  prin- 
cipal commander,  under  the  general  directions  of  Grant. 
On  May  4,  1864,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  crossed 
the  Rapidan,  driving  in  the  Confederate  pickets,  and 
advancing  through  the  dense  shades  of  the  Wilderness 
in  a  south-easterly  direction.  Burnside,  with  the  9th 
corps,  remained  for  a  while  at  Warrenton,  north  of  the 
Rappahannock,  to  protect  the  line  of  communication 
with  Washington. 

Lee's  forces  were  also  divided  into  three  corps,  com- 
manded by  Longstreet,  Hill  and  Ewell,  and  occupied  a 
position  round  Orange  Court  House,  south-west  of 
Fredericksburg.  Lee  ordered  the  larger  part  of  his 
army  to  march  towards  the  advancing  foe,  while  with 
the  rest  he  watched  the  fords  of  the  Upper  Rapidan, 
that  he  might  guard  against  a  flank  attack  on  his  left. 
Early  on  May  5,  the  vanguard  of  Ewell's  corps  came 
into  collision  with  the  Union  troops.  After  a  fiercely- 
contested  action,  in  which  success  seemed  to  incline  first 
to  the  one  side  and  then  to  the  other,  the  Confederates 
remained  in  the  most  favorable  position,  although  their 
brilliant  courage  and  lavish  expenditure  of  life  had 
enabled  them  to  do  little  more  than  check  the  Union  ad- 
vance. The  battle  lasted  all  day  and  was  distinguished 
by  the  utmost  valor  and  resolution  on  both  sides. 
Grant  sought  to  outflank  his  enemy  on  the  right,  so  as 
to  get  between  him  and  Richmond  ;  but  in  this  he 
failed. 

The  struggle  began  again  next  morning.  The  Union 
Army  was  drawn  up  across  the  Orange  and  Fredericks- 
burg road — the  right,  under  Sedgwick,  covering  Ger- 
mania  Ford  ;  the  center,  under  Warren,  posted  at  Wil- 
derness Tavern,  and  the  left,  under  Hancock,  drawn  up 
to  the  south-east  of  Chancellorsville.  The  reserve, 
under  Burnside,  which  had  crossed  the  Rapidan  during 


300 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


the  previous  night,  was  stationed  in  the  rear,  with  orders 
to  support  Sedgwick,  if  he  needed  it ;  or  in  the  event 
of  the  worst  happening  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army 
towards  its  base.  The  Union  line  extended  over  five 
miles,  and  was  involved  in  tangled  woods.  The  trees 
were  so  thick  the  cavalry  could  not  be  employed,  nor 
could  the  artillery  make  use  of  any  complicated 
manoeuvres.  Hard  hand-to-hand  fighting  was  what 
lay  before  the  combatants,  and  during  the  day  they  had 
plenty  of  it.  Grant  (who  in  the  rear  of  the  center  was 
acting  with  Meade)  ordered  an  advance  of  his  whole 
line,  and  for  some  hours  the  battle  swayed  to  and 
fro  with  changeful  fortune.  The  Union  left  attacked 
with  such  irresistible  force  that  the  Confederates  under 
Wilcox  and  Heath  were  scattered  in  utter  rout,  and 
Lee,  for  once,  lost  his  equanimity  as  he  saw  the  ruin 
that  had  overtaken  some  of  his  trusted  divisions.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  timely  appearance  of  Longstreet 
with  McLaw's  division,  the  disaster  would  have  been 
more  extreme.  Longstreet's  arrival  saved  the  right 
from  a  crushing  reverse.  The  attacking  force  was  driven 
back  with  the  loss  of  many  prisoners,  and  Grant  then 
ordered  the  greater  part  of  Burnside's  corps  to 
strengthen  the  line  between  the  left  and  the  center.  Lee 
now  directed  a  vehement  attack  on  the  Union  positions. 
This  was  headed  by  Longstreet,  who  fell  seriously 
wounded — struck  accidentally,  like  Jackson  at  Chan- 
cellorsville — by  a  volley  from  his  own  men  who,  seeing 
some  officers  through  the  trees,  mistook  them  for 
Unionists.  Another  Confederate  general  (Jenkins)  was 
killed  by  the  same  discharge ;  and  this  started  a  feeling 
of  confusion  and  dismay  into  the  attacking  force.  Ulti- 
mately, after  a  great  deal  of  hot  fighting  in  all  parts  of 
the  line,  the  Confederates  were  repulsed,  and  the  Union 
troops  in  the  main  retained  the  ground. 

Spottsylvania  (May  8-12,   1864). — It  was  thought 


BATTLE    OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA.  30 1 

that  the  Union  forces  would  retire  back  to  the 
Rapidan.  Grant,  on  the  contrary,  gathered  up  his 
army,  and  pushed  towards  Spottsylvania  Court  House. 
Longstreet's  corps  were  sent  thither,  and  were  in  posses- 
sion when,  on  the  7th,  a  large  body  of  Union  infantry 
arrived.  Lee  sent  up  additional  troops,  and  the  fighting 
on  the  8th  resulted  in  the  Confederates  retaining  their 
possession.  Some  unimportant  fighting  occurred  on 
the  9th,  when  General  Sedgwick  was  killed.  Towards 
night  Grant  ordered  another  advance.  The  right  wing 
crossed  over  the  south  bank  of  the  Upper  Po  ;  but  after 
an  encounter  with  the  opposing  troops  the  Union  forces 
withdrew  to  the  northern  side  of  the  river.  On  the 
10th,  severe  fighting  again  took  place,  and  the  Union 
losses  throughout  the  day  were  estimated  to  exceed 
10,000.  The  slaughter  was  great  and  without  any  com- 
mensurate gain.  The  Confederates  were  driven  to  their 
breastworks,  but  were  not  compelled  to  abandon  their 
chief  positions.  The  Confederates  lost  a  large  number 
in  dead,  wounded  and  captured  on  the  morning  of  the 
nth.  Grant  was  satisfied  with  the  progress  he  had 
made  during  the  six  days'  struggle,  and  wrote  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  "  I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this 
line  if  it  takes  all  summer."  The  nth  was  a  day 
of  comparative  rest.  It  rained  heavily,  and  both  sides 
Were  glad  of  any  excuse  for  repose.  Some  fighting 
was  done  by  Hancock  on  the  12th.  Lee  fell  back  a 
short  distance  on  the  13th,  but  his  b'-'d  on  Spottsyl- 
vania Court  House  was  not  relinquif  ed.  Six  days  of 
comparative  inactivity,  varied  by  o~casional  engage- 
ments of  a  minor  character,  followed  this  tremendous 
series  of  battles.  Torrents  of  rain  had  converted  all  the 
ways  into  so  many  muddy  channels,  and  manceuvering 
was  impossible  until  the  weather  should  change,  and  the 
roads  become  more  dry. 

Up  to  this  time,  it  cannot  be  said  that  Grant's  plans 


302 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNIOltf. 


had  been  attended  by  any  great  measure  of  success, 
He  vowed  he  would  not  turn  back;  but  advance  toward 
Richmond.  He  held  his  positions  in  front  of  Lee's 
army,  and  created  a  feeling  of  anxiety  and  watchfulness 
at  the  Confederate  capitol.  The  Southern  forces  had 
been  so  well  handled,  so  ably  directed,  and  so  expedi- 
tiously moved  from  one  point  to  another,  that  they 
seemed  more  numerous  than  they  really  were. 

Cold  Harbor,  (June  3,  1864). — Grant  concluded  that 
he  could  not  force  his  way  through  the  Southern  army, 
and  he  therefore  proposed  to  outflank  it,  and  compel 
its  retreat  towards  Lynchburg,  lying  on  the  James 
River,  to  the  south-west  of  the  threatened  city.  He 
moved  his  immense  army,  and  after  a  deal  of  manoeuver- 
ing  and  some  severe  fighting,  Lee  slipped  into  the  en- 
trenchments of  Cold  Harbor.  Heavy  rains  prevented 
an  attack  on  June  2,  but  on  the  3d  the  advance  was 
begun.  Hancock  attacked  with  his  usual  vigor,  and 
Breckenridge  was  driven  back;  but  the  success  was 
short-lived.  Hancock's  men  were  repulsed  with  great 
slaughter  to  their  former  lines,  and  in  other  directions 
the  Confederates  held  their  ground  against  the  utmost 
endeavors  of  the  Union  forces.  Lossing  asserts  that, 
"  in  20  minutes,  10,000  Union  soldiers  were  killed  or 
wounded."  Lee's  army,  sheltered  behind  its  works, 
suffered  but  little. 

Grant  telegraphed,  "  We  have  driven  the  enemy 
within  his  entrenchments  at  all  points,  but  without 
gaining  any  decisive  advantage.  Our  troops  now 
occupy  a  position  clc-ae  to  the  enemy."  Grant's  new 
movement  had  been  as  unsuccessful  as  his  first ;  but  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Lee  had  done  nothing  more 
than  hold  his  own,  and  had  been  totally  unable  to  drive 
off  his  adversary.  On  the  evening  of  the  3d,  the  Con- 
federates suddenly  attacked  Smith's  brigade  and  Gib- 
bon's division,  but,  after  a  furious  combat  of  half  an 


BATTLE    OF  COLD  HARBOR. 


303 


hour's  duration,  were  completely  repulsed.  On  the  foK 
lowing  morning,  Lee's  left  wing,  in  front  of  Burnside, 
was  found  to  have  been  drawn  in  during  the  night; 
yet  for  the  most  part  the  opposing  lines  continued  close 
to  each  other. 

Grant  had  arranged  for  three  co-operative  movements 
to  divide  the  strength  of  the  Confederate  army.  Sigel, 
with  10,000  men,  was  to  advance  up  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  and  threaten  the  railroad  communications  with 
Richmond.  He  was  totally  routed  at  New  Market 
(May  15).  Hunter,  who  superseded  him,  defeated  the 
Confederates  at  Piedmont  (June  5),  but  pushing  on  to 
Lynchburg  with  about  20,000  men,  he  found  it  too 
strong,  and  prudently  retired  into  West  Virginia. 
Sheridan  likewise  had  been  defeated  by  the  cavalry  of 
Wade  Hampton  and  Fitzhugh  Lee. 

In  the  second  week  in  June,  Butler,  with  30,000  men, 
ascended  the  James  River,  under  the  protection  of 
gunboats,  and  landed  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  After 
some  trifling  successes,  he  was  surprised  in  a  dense  fog 
by  Beauregard,  and  driven  back  into  his  defences  with 
considerable  loss.  Beauregard  could  get  no  reinforce- 
ments from  Richmond,  so  the  entrenchments  in  front  of 
Butler  were  secretly  evacuated,  and  the  men  added  to 
the  scanty  forces  still  holding  desperately  to  Petersburg. 

The  operations  against  that  city  were  now  being 
pushed  with  great  energy.  Grant  marched  his  army 
over  the  James  River,  and  fell  upon  Petersburg;  but 
here  again  he  was  confronted  by  his  indomitable  an- 
tagonist, and  the  works  could  not  be  forced.  Grant, 
therefore,  threw  up  entrenchments.  The  campaign  now 
resolved  itself  into  a  siege  of  Richmond,  with  Peters- 
burg as  its  advanced  post.  The  campaign  had  cost  the 
Union  army  40,000  men  and  the  Confederates  30,000. 

It  was  proposed  to  run  a  mine  under  one  of  the 
approaches    to    the  Confederate    entrenchments  before 


j04  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

Petersburg,  and  having  created  a  gap  by  its  explosion, 
to  surprise  the  town  by  capture  in  the  crisis  of  con- 
fusion and  alarm  created  by  the  catastrophe.  The 
plan  was  adopted,  though  reluctantly.  More  than 
three  weeks  were  consumed  in  the  construction  of  the 
mine.  Eight  thousand  pounds  of  powder  were  placed 
in  the  chambers.  The  explosion  occurred  in  the  early 
morning  of  July  30.  It  resulted  in  the  formation  of 
a  cavity  200  feet  in  length,  60  feet  wide,  and  20  feet 
deep.  The  defenders  of  the  parapet  were  struck  with 
consternation,  and  began  to  retire  into  the  town;  but 
Lee  and  Beauregard  were  soon  on  the  spot,  and  restor- 
ing the  self-reliance  of  their  men,  ordered  their  bat- 
teries to  reply  to  those  of  the  Union  works,  which 
opened  fire  immediately  after  the  explosion.  Owing, 
perhaps,  to  this  unexpected  opposition,  the  assault  was 
made  with  but  little  spirit,  and  the  attacking  force, 
instead  of  dashing  over  the  aperture,  simply  occupied 
it.  The  men  sought  cover,  and  fired  over  the  edge  of 
the  crater,  without  attempting  to  advance  any  farther. 
The  Confederates,  now  calm  and  collected,  sent  their 
shells  in  great  numbers  into  the  crater,  inflicting  terrible 
slaughter  on  the  unfortunate  men  huddled  together  in 
that  ghastly  hole.  No  commander  of  high  rank  was 
present  to  give  directions  such  as  might  retrieve  the 
failure  of  the  first  assault;  and  long  before  night  closed 
on  that  disastrous  day  the  Union  loss  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  captured  was  more  than  4000  men.  A  long  series 
of  misfortunes  had  received  another  dismal  addition,  and 
Grant  had  to  consider  once  more  how  he  should  con 
quer  that  success  which  was  so  long  in  coming. 

Invasion  of  Maryland. — The  exposed  condition  of 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  consequent  on  Hunter's  retreat, 
and  on  the  large  concentration  of  troops  before  Peters- 
burg and  its  vicinity,  invited  attack  during  the  summer, 
and  the  Confederates  took  advantage  of  their  opportunity. 


INVASION  OF  MARYLAND. 


305 


General  Early  resolved  to  advance  from  the  Valley,  and 
enter  the  Northern  States,  and  in  this  way  draw  off  a 
portion  of  Grant's  army  which  was  giving  so  much 
trouble  to  the  forces  of  Lee,  Bragg,  and  Beauregard. 

On  July  2,  Early  forced  Sigel  to  evacuate  Martins- 
burg,  with  the  loss  of  some  of  his  stores.  Early  con- 
tinuing to  advance,  Sigel  fell  back  across  the  Potomac, 
and  took  up  a  position  on  Maryland  Heights.  This 
movement  of  the  Confederates  was  a  dangerous  one,  for 
a  successful  blow  might  be  struck  before  Union  rein- 
forcements could  be  sent  to  repel  the  invasion. 
Scattered  bodies  were  seen  in  various  places,  and  Penn- 
sylvania was  entered,  as  well  as  Maryland.  Whole 
neighborhoods  were  laid  waste,  in  revenge  for  what  had 
been  done  by  Hunter  in  the  Valley ;  and  the  rich  people 
■\vere  compelled  to  ransom  their  dwellings  and  property 
Ly  the  payment  of  large  sums  of  money.  To  meet  this 
invasion  Lincoln  called  for  12,000  militia  from  New 
York,  Pennsylvania  and  Massachusetts.  On  the  even- 
iag  of  July  8,  General  Wallace,  in  command  of  a 
hastily  raised  force,  was  attacked.  His  ill-disciplined 
troops  soon  gave  way  before  the  vehement  assault  to 
which  they  were  exposed,  and  fled  towards  Baltimore, 
pursued  by  cavalry.  This  disaster  produced  consterna- 
tion in  Washington.  Reinforcements  were  hurried  up 
and  a  corps  of  Grant's  army  was  despatched  from  be- 
fore Petersburg.  Early  next  attacked  Rockville,  Mary- 
land, a  little  town  about  14  miles  west  of  Washington. 
Some  of  his  troops  got  within  five  miles  of  the  Capital, 
where  they  siezed  prisoners,  horses  and  cattle,  and  in- 
flicted a  large  amount  of  damage.  Intoxicated  by  his 
success,  Eatly  appeared  before  Washington  on  July  II, 
and  engaged  the  batteries  of  Fort  Stevens,  one  of  the 
outworks  of  the  metropolis.  Reinforcements  had  by 
this  time  reached  the  city,  and  in  the  evening  a  body  of 
men  under  General  Auger  sallied  forth  to  drive  away  so 


306  THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 

troublesome  and  humiliating  an  enemy.  A  sharp 
skirmish  ensued,  and  the  Confederates  were  speedily 
compelled  to  retreat,  leaving  ioo  dead  and  wounded  on 
the  field.  The  invaders  retired  up  the  Potomac  to  the 
western  side  of  the  Shenandoah.  Early  established 
his  headquarters  at  Winchester,  and  successfully  re- 
sisted an  attack  by  General  Averill,  who  was  obliged  to 
seek  shelter  behind  the  works  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  July  29,  Early  once  more  crossed  the  Potomac 
into  Maryland  and  advanced  on  Chambersburg, 
Pennsylvania.  '  Gilmor's  cavalry  demanded  $200,000 
in  gold,  which  the  people  declined  to  furnish.  The  city 
was  accordingly  given  to  the  flames,  and  Averill,  on  ar- 
riving for  its  relief,  found  it  fiercely  burning.  The  Con- 
federates retreated,  and  contrived  to  elude  the  Union 
troops  sent  to  intercept  them,  and  again  to  reach  in 
safety  the  southern  shores  of  the  Potomac.  Grant, 
before  Petersburg,  determined  to  unite  in  one  the  three 
departments  of  Western  Virginia,  Washington,  and  the 
Susquehanna  ;  and  placed  the  direction  of  this  large 
area  under  control  of  General  Sheridan,  who  found  him- 
self at  the  head  of  more  than  40,000  men.  Early  had 
only  about  13,000  troops  with  whom  to  maintain  his 
position  round  Winchester ;  yet  Grant  refused  to  sano 
tion  any  offensive  movement  on  Sheridan's  part,  fearing 
the  disastrous  consequences  of  a  defeat.  At  length,  he 
gave  his  consent,  but  only  on  the  understanding  that 
the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  should  be  completely  de- 
vastated, so  that  nothing  might  be  left  to  invite  any  fur- 
ther invasion. 

On  September  19,  Sheridan  attacked  Early  with  com- 
plete success.  2500  prisoners  and  five  pieces  of  artillery 
were  captured.  Gordon  and  Rhodes  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army  were  killed.  The  Union  forces  were  them- 
selves   great  losers,  for  the  Confederates  fought    well. 

Sheridan  made    another    attack  on  the  21st,  when 


SHERIDAN'S  CAMPAIGN. 


307 


Early  was  again  defeated  and  forced  to  withdraw  farther 
into  the  Valley.  A  division  of  Longstreet's  corps  rein- 
forced Early,  but  Sheridan's  divisions  were  too  strong 
to  be  seriously  menaced. 


GENERAL    PHILIP    H.    SHERIDAN. 


Sheridan  carried  out  only  too  well  the  instructions 
he  received  from  Grant ;  and  a  scene  of  desolation  was 
produced  in  one  of  the  most  fertile  and  beautiful  valleys 
in  the  land.  These  frightful  excesses  were  much  con- 
demned 


3o8 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


On  his  return  down  the  Cedar  Creek  Valley  in  the  di« 
rection  of  the  Potomac,  Sheridan  was  closely  followed 
by  a  large  force  of  Confederates.  A  collision  took 
place  on  October  5,  ending  in  the  repulse  of  the 
Southerners ;  and  ten  days  later  a  more  important 
action  was  fought  on  the  banks  of  Cedar  Creek.  The 
Union  troops  were  entrenched  on  the  north  bank  of 
that  stream  (which  runs  into  the  Shenandoah),  when,  in 
the  early  morning  of  the  19th,  they  were  unexpectedly 
attacked  by  the  Confederates.  Sheridan  had  gone  to 
Washington,  leaving  General  Wright  in  temporary  com- 
mand ;  while  his  adversary  was  preparing  for  a  power- 
ful and  well-directed  blow.  The  assault,  when  it  came, 
was  delivered  simultaneously  against  the  front  and  the 
rear.  Most  of  the  pickets  were  captured ;  the  rest  of 
the  troops,  suddenly  aroused  from  sleep,  were  thrown 
into  confusion,  and  driven  back  tumultuously  on  the 
road  to  Middletown.  Eighteen  of  the  Union  guns  were 
seized  by  Early,  and  turned  on  their  late  possessors ; 
and  for  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  the  Union  troops  would 
be  utterly  overwhelmed.  Wright  succeeded  in  restor- 
ing order  to  the  ranks,  and  in  checking  the  advance; 
the  Southerners,  scattering  themselves  through  the 
abandoned  camps,  began  drinking  and  plundering;  and 
when  Sheridan  arrived  from  Winchester — "  thirty  miles 
away  " — and  ordered  a  vigorous  attack,  the  opposing 
troops  gave  way  in  unreasonable  panic,  abandoning  the 
guns  they  had  captured  in  the  morning. 

Sheridan's  reputation  was  greatly  advanced  by  this 
affair,  and  the  President,  on  November  14.  promoted 
him  to  the  rank  of  major-general,  as  a  reward  for  his 
"  personal  gallantry,  military  skill  and  just  confidence  in 
the  courage  and  patriotism  of  his  troops."  He  had  in 
truth  saved  the  Union  cause  from  a  crushing  reverse, 
and  had  inflicted  on  Early  a  blow  which  made  his  forces 
stagger.     On  the  morning  of  that  memorable  October 


3io 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


19,  the  Union  troops  had  fallen  back  in  dismay;  in  the 
evening,  it  was  their  adversaries  who  were  in  flight,  and 
who,  smitten  with  dread,  blocked  the  roads  with  the 
scattered  remnants  of  an  army  which  only  a  few  hours 
before  had  almost  attained  the  summit  of  victory.  A 
charge  by  the  Union  cavalry,  as  dusk  was  setting  in, 
completed  the  ruin  that  had  already  been  commenced* 
and  from  that  hour  nothing  but  terror  and  despair  pre- 
vailed throughout  the  Confederate  ranks.  Early  biv- 
ouacked at  Fisher's  Hill  during  the  night,  and  next 
day  retreated  beyond  Woodstock,  followed  by  the 
cavalry.  He  did  not  consider  himself  safe  until  he  had 
taken  up  a  position  on  Mount  Jackson,  near  the  south- 
ern extremity  of  the  Great  North  Mountains,  where, 
counting  up  his  losses,  he  found  that  22  of  his  guns 
had  passed  over  to  the  enemy,  together  with  most  of 
his  stores  and  camp-equipages.  The  Southerners  were 
extremely  disappointed  at  the  result  of  his  movement. 
They  had  not  only  lost  a  large  number  in  killed, 
wounded  and  captured,  but  their  operations  in  the  Val- 
ley had  been  injured  beyond  the  hope  of  redemption. 
The  superiority  of  the  Union  troops  in  that  locality  was 
now  so  clearly  established  that  Grant  felt  he  could 
safely  recall  to  the  army  before  Petersburg  those  de- 
tachments which  he  had  sent  a  few  months  earlier  to 
guard  Washington.  It  had  been  hoped  at  Richmond 
that  the  alarm  at  Washington  would  be  so  great  as  to 
induce  Grant  to  transport  the  major  portion  of  his  army 
northward  for  the  protection  of  the  Government ;  but 
Grant,  refusing  to  be  influenced  by  the  fears  of  the 
timid,  only  despatched  a  comparatively  small  contingent 
and  retained  the  bulk  of  his  forces  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  task  he  had  in  hand.  Lee,  therefore,  had  been 
but  slightly  helped  by  Early's  bold  incursion.  Great 
courage  and  ability  had  been  shown  by  the  Southern- 
ers, who  had  at  one  time  carried  the  utmost  dismay  into 


SHERIDAN'S   CAMPAIGN.  3U 

Washington ;  but  their  divisions  were  not  strong 
enough  to  meet  the  superior  forces  of  the  North,  and 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  after  being  desolated  in  turn  by 
the  hostile  operations  of  both  armies,  remained  as  the 
prize  of  the  Union  troops,  and  throughout  the  further 
course  of  the  war  was  not  again  threatened  by  the 
Southern  armies. 

While  these  events  were  proceeding  on  the  banks  of 
the  Shenandoah,  Grant  continued  to  watch  his  adver- 
saries at  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  in  the  hope  that  he 
should  be  able  to  discover  some  weak  point  through 
which  he  could  strike  effectually  at  one  or  both  of 
those  cities.  His  lines,  strongly  fortified,  covered  a 
length  of  nearly  30  miles,  starting  from  near  the  Weldon 
Railway  on  his  left,  and,  after  crossing  the  James  River, 
terminating  in  the  vicinity  of  Newmarket  on  his  right. 
During  the  autumn  and  early  winter,  he  made  many 
attempts  to  turn  the  Confederate  flanks ;  but  Lee  ac- 
commodated his  own  movements  to  those  of  his  oppo- 
nents with  so  much  skill  and  address  that  nothing  could 
be  effected.  The  army  under  Lee  consisted  of  veterans, 
who  had  had  experience  of  almost  every  kind  of  war, 
and  whose  steadiness  was  certain  not  to  desert  them 
under  any  circumstances,  however  adverse ;  but  their 
numbers  were  few  in  comparison  with  those  of  Grant, 
and,  what  was  worse,  the  population  of  the  Confederate 
States  seemed  to  have  lost  all  heart  in  the  struggle,  and 
to  be  increasingly  disinclined  to  furnish  the  recruits 
who  were  now  so  sorely  needed.  "  The  rebels,"  Grant 
wrote,  "  have  now  in  their  ranks  their  last  men.  The 
little  boys  and  old  men  are  guarding  prisoners,  guard- 
ing railroad  bridges,  and  forming  a  good  part  of  their 
garrisons  for  entrenched  positions.  A  man  lost  by  them 
cannot  be  replaced.  They  have  robbed  the  cradle  and 
the  grave  equally  to  get  their  present  force.  Besides 
what  they  lose  in  frequent  skirmishes  and  battles,  they 


3*2 


THE  BATTLES  EOR    THE    UNION. 


are  now  losing  from  desertions  and  other  causes  at  least 
one  regiment  per  day.  With  this  drain  upon  them,  the 
end  is  not  far  distant,  if  we  will  only  be  true  to  our- 
selves." These  statements  were  substantially  correct. 
The  desperate  game  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  was 
almost  played  out,  and  it  was  merely  the  determination 
of  a  few  able  and  adventurous  men  that  prevented  the 
immediate  submission  of  the  people  to  a  power  which 
they  might  dislike,  but  which  it  was  obvious  they  could 
not  withstand.  The  consciousness  of  this  fact  strength- 
ened Grant  in  that  tenacity  of  purpose  which  was  one  of 
his  most  distinctive  characteristics.  Another  might 
have  given  up  the  attempt  on  Petersburg  and  Richmond 
after  so  many  failures;  Grant,  on  the  contrary,  held  to 
his  position,  and  did  not  suffer  himself  to  be  discouraged 
by  incidental  reverses. 

The  weakening  of  Lee's  force  by  the  despatch  of  divi- 
sions to  the  assistance  of  Early,  appeared  to  offer  an  oppor- 
tunity  for  an  offensive  movement.  The  approaches  to 
Richmond  from  the  north-eastern  side  of  the  James  River 
were  believed  to  be  guarded  by  not  more  than  8000 
men  ;  and  Grant  accordingly  sent  a  strong  detachment, 
under  the  general  orders  of  Hancock,  up  that  stream  to 
Deep  Bottom.  The  troops,  however,  disembarked  with 
so  much  slowness  that  Lee  had  time  to  concentrate  his 
regiments  on  the  menanced  point,  and,  after  a  good  deal 
of  righting,  the  Union  forces  were  obliged  to  retire. 
This  was  a  movement  against  the  left  flank  of  Lee,  to 
repel  which  it  had  been  necessary  to  draw  away  the 
greater  number  of  the  defending  army  from  the  oppo- 
site extremity  of  the  line.  Grant,  being  aware  of  the 
fact,  struck  in  that  direction  also.  The  commander  of 
the  expedition  against  the  Confederate  right  was  War- 
ren, who  took  with  him  the  5th  corps,  and  succeeded  in 
obtaining  a  position  beyond  the  Weldon  Railway.  Al- 
though Lee  had  only  a  few  troops  in  that  quarter,  he 


3H 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


assailed  his  antagonist  with  great  spirit,  and  achieved  a 
temporary  success  ;  but  the  Union  forces,  on  being  rein- 
forced, recovered  the  ground  they  had  abandoned,  and 
proceeded  to  fortify  themselves  against  further  molesta- 
tion. An  attack  by  the  Southerners,  on  August  21,  met 
with  no  success,  and  on  the  same  day  Hancock  reached 
the  Weldon  Railway  at  a  point  four  miles  south  of 
Warren's  entrenchments.  On  the  25th,  an  action  took 
place  between  Hancock  and  Hill,  which  resulted  in  the 
Confederates  obtaining  possession  of  Reams'  Station, 
and  in  the  retreat  of  the  Union  forces.  Nevertheless, 
the  latter  still  held  the  Weldon  Railway,  and  succeeded 
in  connecting  it  with  the  center  of  the  army  in  front  of 
Petersburg.  All  this  while,  that  city  was  shelled  by  the 
Union  troops,  and  the  Confederate  batteries  on  the 
James  River  were  revenging  themselves  by  firing  on  the 
Union  gunboats. 

Grant  now  ordered  Meade  to  conduct  a  feigned 
attack  against  Lee's  right,  while  he  sent  two  corps 
under  Butler,  to  make  an  attempt  against  the  Confeder- 
ate works  north  of  Chaffin's  Bluff,  opposite  Drury's 
Bluff,  on  the  James  River.  It  was  believed  that  only  a 
small  force  of  Southerners  occupied  the  works  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  and  it  seemed  therefore  not  im- 
probable that  a  sudden  movement  and  rapid  advance  in 
that  direction  might  ensure  the  capture  of  Richmond. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  city  were  apprehensive  for  their 
safety,  and,  being  threatened  at  so  many  points,  feared 
that  at  some  one  the  circle  would  be  broken  through,  and 
all  would  be  lost.  Even  should  the  movement  fail,  it 
was  anticipated  that  the  withdrawal  of  a  large  part  of  the 
Confederate  force  from  the  southern  to  the  northern  side 
of  the  river  would  materially  aid  the  Union  forces  in  their 
operations  against  Petersburg  ;  and  it  was  therefore  con- 
sidered by  Grant  that  the  venture  would  be  worth  the 
cost  in  life  it  would  demand.     The  movement  was  com- 


THE   SIEGE    OF  RICHMOND. 


315 


menced  on  the  night  of  September  28,  when  General 
Ord,  with  the  18th  corps,  was  directed  to  cross  the  James 
at  Aikin's  Landfng,  eight  miles  above  Deep  Bottom, 
and  at  daylight  to  advance  quickly  against  the  enemy's 
works  in  his  front.  At  the  same  time,  General  Birney, 
with  the  ioth  corps,  was  to  move  on  Bermuda  Hundred, 
and  cross  the  river  during  the  night.  These  two  de- 
tachments were  to  obtain  possession  of  the  Newmarket 
road,  and  to  form  a  connection  in  front  of  Richmond. 
The  design  was  carried  out  without  any  accident,  and 
the  outer  line  of  Confederate  defences  was  soon 
in  the  hands  of  the  two  Union  commanders.  The 
inner  defences  at  Chaffin's  Bluff  were  now  before 
the  assailants,  and  preparations  were  made  for  carry- 
ing them.  Before  these  preparations  could  be  com- 
pleted, reinforcements  had  reached  the  garrison,  and 
the  assault,  when  at  length  it  came,  proved  unsuccess- 
ful. The  troops  employed  on  this  service  were  negroes, 
of  whom  only  a  small  proportion  succeeded  in  reaching 
one  of  the  forts..  These  behaved  with  much  gallantry, 
but  were  unable  to  take  so  formidable  a  position.  All 
who  were  not  killed  were  captured,  and  it  was  found 
necessary  to  abandon  the  attack.  On  the  30th,  further 
portions  of  the  enemy's  lines  were  seized  by  the  Union 
troops,  and  an  attempt  to  recapture  the  works,  on  the 
same  day,  was  wholly  without  result.  On  October  7, 
the  Confederates  made  a  partially  successful  endeavor 
to  turn  the  right  flank  of  their  opponents,  but  were  re- 
pulsed. Other  encounters  took  place  on  subsequent 
days,  without  materially  altering  the  position  of  the  be- 
ligerants  towards  one  another  ;  and  Grant,  considering 
it  important  to  keep  what  he  had  gained,  extended  his 
lines  from  opposite  Dutch  Gap  to  the  Newmarket  road. 
Meade's  simultaneous  movement  against  the  right  of 
the  Confederate  line  ended,  after  an  engagement  of  three 
days'  duration,  and  a  heavy  loss  in  men,  in  the  Union 


316 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


forces  acquiring  a  position  across  the  Squirrel  road 
parallel  with  the  Weldon  Railway  ;  whereupon  the  Con- 
federates retired  within  their  main  entrenchments. 

Another  attempt  to  capture  Petersburg  followed 
these  operations.  Meade  was  ordered  to  occupy  the 
Boydton  road  and  the  Southside  Railway,  both  lying 
to  the  south-west  of  the  town ;  and  this  movement  was 
accomplished  by  Hancock  on  the  27th.  The  march 
was  performed  with  great  secrecy,  and  without  being 
discovered  by  the  enemy.  The  2d  corps  passed  round 
the  Confederate  flank,  and  was  proceeding  to  execute 
other  portions  of  the  concerted  scheme,  when  Hancock 
received  orders  to  halt.  The  9th  corps,  under  Warren 
and  Parke,  had  been  directed  to  engage  the  adversary 
in  front ;  but  Parke  had  been  unsuccessful  in  capturing 
the  works  against  which  he  was  sent,  and  Warren  was 
accordingly  instructed  to  form  a  junction  between  Han- 
cock's right  and  Parke's  left.  This,  however,  could  not 
be  effected,  owing  to  the  density  of  the  forest,  the  mazy 
character  of  the  roads  which  intersected  it,  and  the 
want  of  proper  maps.  Hill,  who  commanded  the  Con- 
federates in  that  direction,  conceived  that  the  proper 
time  had  arrived  for  making  an  attack,  as  the  Union 
corps  were  now  separated  and  confused.  Hancock'  and 
Warren  were  simultaneously  assailed,  and  night  closed 
in  over  an  undecided  combat.  Next  day,  the  Union 
troops,  perceiving  that  their  design  had  been  a  failure, 
withdrew  across  Hatcher's  Run,  a  stream  crossing  the 
Boydton  road,  and  with  some  difficulty  got  back  to 
their  own  lines.  At  the  same  time,  Butler  attempted  a 
similar  manoeuvre  on  the  north  side  of  the  James 
River;  but  his  operations  entirely  failed,  and  it  was 
with  a  loss  of  nearly  1500  men  that  the  Union  troops 
returned  to  the  point  whence  they  had  started.  This 
terminated  the  active  operations  of  the  year  in  front  of 
Petersburg  and  Richmond.     Both   sides    were  getting 


THE   SIEGE    OF  RICHMOND. 


3*7 


sick  of  the  struggle.  From  both  armies  there  were 
many  desertions;  but  the  Union  army  could  suffer  this 
depletion  of  their  ranks  much  better  than  the  Con- 
federates. Grant's  numbers  might  have  been  called 
overwhelming,  but  that  they  did  not  overwhelm ;  the 
Confederates,  on  the  contrary,  presented  a  daily  dimin- 
ishing host  to  their  adversaries,  and  could  ill  afford  any 
further  reduction  of  their  meagre  legions.  Yet, 
although  his  forces  were  so  numerous,  Grant  was  deeply 
impressed  with  the  necessity  of  filling  those  gaps  which 
the  progress  of  the  war  had  inevitably  made.  He  com- 
municated his  views  to  the  Government,  and  the  call  for 
500,000  men,  issued  by  the  President  on  July  18,  was 
ordered  to  be  carried  into  effect  on  September  19,  and 
succeeding  days.  Grant,  writing  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  "  prompt  action  in 
filling  our  armies,  will  have  more  effect  upon  the  enemy, 
than  a  victory  over  them.  They  profess  to  believe,  and 
make  their  men  believe,  there  is  such  a  party  North  in 
favor  of  recognizing  Southern  independence  that  the 
draft  cannot  be  enforced.  Let  them  be  undeceived." 
To  the  same  effect,  and  on  the  same  day,  wrote  Sher- 
man from  Atlanta ;  and  as  by  this  time  there  was 
evidence  of  the  Confederacy  giving  way  on  all  sides, 
the  probability  of  an  enthusiastic  response  to  the  draft 
was  considerable. 

The  last  two  months  of  1864  were  not  characterized 
by  any  events  of  importance  on  the  Potomac  or  the 
James  River.  Grant  had  failed  in  all  his  active  opera- 
tions, but  he  had  obtained  a  position  in  close  proximity 
to  his  antagonist,  from  which  that  antagonist  was  unable 
to  expel  him.  The  Union  lines  were  fortified  so 
strongly  as  to  defy  successful  attack,  and  Butler  was 
engaged  in  cutting  a  canal  through  Dutch  Gap  (a 
peninsula  formed  by  a  great  bend  of  the  James  River), 
in  the  hope  of  facilitating  the  passage  of  the  troops,  and 


3i8 


'THE  BATTLES  FOP    THE    UNION. 


of  turning  the  Confederate  batteries  at  that  part  of  the 
channel.  The  Southern  armies  in  Richmond  and 
Petersburg  were  getting  short  of  food  and  clothing; 
yet  the  soldiers  manning  the  works  still  fought  with 
resolution,  and  repelled  with  spirit  whatever  attacks 
were  directed  against  their  lines  during  the  early 
winter;  and  it  is  impossible  not  to  admire  the  courage 
and  self-reliance  exhibited  by  these  men  at  a  time  when 
everything  was  tending  to  their  defeat.  Fort  Fisher 
covered  the  harbor  of  Wilmington  (North  Carolina), 
one  of  the  great  resorts  of  the  blockade-runners ;  and, 
until  it  could  be  reduced,  Wilmington  was  secure  from 
attack,  together  with  the  vessels  which  preyed  on  our 
commerce.  In  the  early  winter,  a  detachment  of  6500 
men,  under  Butler,  was  sent  to  act  in  concert  with 
Admiral  Porter.  The  fort  was  defended  by  rather  less 
than  1  OCX)  men.  The  assailants  were  in  every  respect 
much  stronger  than  the  assailed  ;  but  it  was  not  pro- 
posed to  take  the  fort  by  storm.  A  plan  was  formed 
for  destroying  the  work,  by  blowing  up  a  powder  vessel 
beneath  its  walls,  and  215  pounds  of  the  explosive  were 
placed  on  board  the  steamer  Louisiana,  which,  under 
pretence  of  being  a  blockade-runner,  was  anchored 
within  three-quarters  of  a  mile  of  the  fort.  The 
attempt  turned  out  a  failure ;  for,  although  the  powder 
exploded,  it  did  not  take  fire  simultaneously,  and  the 
effect  was  thus  dissipated.  The  boat  was  fired  on  the 
morning  of  December  24,  but  the  detonation  was  pro- 
ductive of  but  trifling  results.  It  was  followed  on  the 
same  day  by  a  tremendous  bombardment  of  the  fort. 
The  fleet  was  extremely  powerful ;  but,  although  the 
roar  of  the  guns  was  terrific,  and  the  garrison,  expecting 
immediate  death,  crowded  into  the  bomb-proof  galleries, 
very  little  damage  was  effected.  The  attack  was 
renewed  on  the  following  day,  when  a  detachment  of 
more  than  2000  men,  commanded  by  General  Weitzel, 


FORT  FISHER. 


319 


landed  beneath  the  walls,  and  took  up  a  position  for 
ulterior  operations.  The  bombardment  from  the  fleet 
still  continued  ;  yet  Weitzel  found  he  could  do  nothing. 
He  reported  to  Butler  that  it  would  be  butchery  to 
order  an  assault,  and  under  these  circumstances  it  was 
determined  to  abandon  the  attempt.  The  troops  were 
re-embarked,  and  conveyed  to  Fortress  Monroe.  Fort 
Fisher  was  scarcely  injured,  and  its  garrison  was  now 
strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  troops  from  Richmond. 
Butler  was  removed  from  command,  and  the  proceed- 
ings at  Fort  Fisher  were  made  the  subject  of  an  in- 
quiry, which  resulted  in  Butler  being  acquitted  of  blame. 
A  second  expedition  against  the  fort  was  sent  out 
almost  immediately  after  the  failure  of  the  first.  On 
the  departure  of  the  army,  Porter  withdrew  his  fleet  to 
Beaufort,  in  the  confident  expectation  that  the  troops 
would  soon  be  ordered  back  again.  He  had  not  long 
to  wait,  for  on  January  2,  1865,  General  Terry,  com- 
manding a  division  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Fort  Fisher  with  the  soldiers 
who  had  been  employed  in  the  former  attempt  and  an 
additional  brigade  of  1500  men.  Having  arranged  a 
plan  of  operations  with  Porter,  Terry  made  his  way  to 
New  Inlet,  by  which  Cape  Fear  River  is  approached 
from  the  Atlantic.  While  the  ironclads  and  monitors 
shelled  the  fort,  the  disembarkation  of  the  troops  was 
effected  on  January  13.  The  works  were  presently 
bombarded  by  all  the  vessels  of  the  fleet,  and  the  gar- 
rison were  able  to  make  scarcely  any  reply,  owing  to 
the  inferiority  of  their  guns.  Bragg,  who  was  at  Wil- 
mington, sent  on  some  reinforcements;  but  little  could 
be  done  against  so  terrible  and  concentrated  a  fire. 
The  small  gunboats  got  in  very  close  on  the  14th,  and, 
firing  with  great  accuracy,  dismounted  some  of  the 
guns  on  the  land-face.  Preparations  were  made  for  an 
assault  on  the  following  day.     The  walls  were  begin- 


320 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ning  to  show  signs  of  serious  injury.  The  rampart 
was  overthrown,  the  palisades  were  torn  away,  and 
communication  with  the  mines  was  cut  off.  Early  in 
the  afternoon,  three  brigades,  under  General  Ames, 
were  sent  against  the  north-eastern  rampart,  while  a 
party  of  sailors  and  marines,  who  had  landed  on  the 
beach,  made  a  feint  against  the  sea-face.  The  Confed- 
erates fought  with  much  resolution,  and  the  two  prin- 
cipal commanding  officers  were  severely  wounded;  but 
the  determination  of  the  Union  troops  was  equal  to 
that  of  their  enemies.  From  one  position  to  another 
the  defenders  of  the  fort  were  driven  back  ;  the  whole 
work  was  at  length  abandoned ;  and  the  garrison,  fly- 
ing to  the  extremity  of  the  neck  of  land  on  which  the 
fort  was  built,  threw  down  their  arms  in  despair.  The 
feint  against  the  sea-face  had  been  badly  managed, 
and  resulted  in  a  somewhat  precipitate  retreat  of  the 
sailors  ;  but  the  main  attack  had  been  successful  in  the 
highest  degree,  and,  now  that  Fort  Fisher  had  fallen, 
Wilmington  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  conquerors.  For 
the  present,  however,  it  was  not  attacked.  The  other 
works  at  the  entrance  to  Cape  Fear  River  were  aban- 
doned by  the  Confederates,  and  the  stream  was  entered 
when  the  torpedoes  had  been  removed.  A  few  days 
afterwards,  the  ironclad  squadron  which  had  recently 
been  built  at  Richmond,  and  launched  on  the  James, 
made  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  pontoon  bridges  and 
transports  by  which  the  Union  troops  were  supporting 
their  operations  in  that  quarter.  On  the  night  of  Janu- 
ary 24,  the  Confederate  vessels  tried  to  force  their  way 
through  the  obstructions.  One  of  the  ironclads  passed 
a  boom  which  had  been  drawn  across  the  channel ;  but 
three  larger  vessels  grounded,  and  in  the  early  morning, 
when  the  shore  batteries  opened  fire,  the  flotilla  was 
compelled  to  withdraw. 

Peace  negotiations  of  a  formal  character  were  opened 


jgpnwrw; 


322 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


in  January.  Three  commissioners — one  of  whom  was 
Alexander  H.  Stephens,  Vice-President  of  the  Confed- 
eracy— were  charged  with  power  to  arrange  with  Union 
agents  the  terms  on  which  peace  might  be  concluded. 
These  discussions  ended  in  nothing  but  a  more  com- 
plete manifestation  of  the  inability  of  the  two  sides  to 
find  any  common  ground  of  agreement.  Lincoln  went 
in  person  to  Fortress  Monroe  and  met  the  commis- 
sioners. Nothing  was  effected.  Lincoln  would  not  re- 
cede from  his  inflexible  demand  of  absolute  submission 
on  the  part  of  the  South  ;  the  commissioners  were  not 
empowered  to  make  any  such  terms.  The  conference 
was  held  on  February  3,  and  it  was  the  last  attempt 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy  to  obtain  peace  to- 
gether with  independence.  The  game  was  very  nearly 
played  out,  and  the  South  was  shortly  compelled  to 
accept  peace  on  any  terms  it  could  get. 

"  The  man,"  Davis  remarked,  "  who  should  go  be- 
fore the  Southern  people  with  any  proposition  which 
implied  that  the  North  was  to  have  a  voice  in  deter- 
mining the  domestic  relations  of  the  South,  could  not 
live  here  a  day.  He  would  be  hanged  to  the  first 
tree,  without  judge  or  jury." 

We  now  approach  the  final  series  of  operations  which 
proved  the  ruin  of  the  Confederacy.  The  state  of  af- 
fairs at  Richmond  was  now  very  critical,  the  troops  had 
been  on  short  rations  throughout  the  winter,  and,  as 
the  Northern  forces  tightened  their  grip  on  the  devoted 
city,  it  was  evident  that  the  prevalent  distress  would 
become  still  greater.  If  anything  more  was  to  be 
done,  it  must  be  done  at  once.  Lee  accordingly  deter- 
mined to  strike  a  heavy  blow  at  Grant,  such  as  might 
possibly  compel  his  withdrawal  from  Petersburg  and 
Richmond,  and  enable  the  Confederate  forces  of  that 
locality  to  unite  with  those  under  Johnston  for  ulterior 
operations  against  Sherman  and  Schofield.     The  point 


ATTACK  ON  FORT  STEAD  MAN. 


323 


of  attack  was  Fort  Steadman,  the  second  work  from  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Union  defences  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Appomattox.  The  position  was  most  formid- 
able. Works  of  a  very  elaborate  character,  strongly- 
built  and  heavily  armed,  stretched  for  a  distance  of  30 
miles  from  the  north  side  of  the  James  to  Hatcher's 
Run,  on  the  south  side.  These  lines  had  the  Appomat- 
tox in  front  during  the  greater  part  of  their  course, 
and  between  them  and  the  river  were  the  opposing 
works  of  the  Confederates.  The  attack  on  Fort  Stead- 
man  was  made  at  dawn  on  March  25.  The  assailants 
were  led  by  General  Gordon,  and  the  garrison  was  so 
completely  surprised  that  the  place  was  captured  with 
but  little  difficulty.  Gordon  then  proceeded  towards 
Fort  Hascall,  forming  a  portion  of  the  second  line  of 
defence ;  but  the  attempt  to  carry  this  position  was  an 
utter  failure.  Baffled  and  discouraged,  Gordon  retired 
to  Fort  Steadman,  where  he  was  furiously  attacked  by 
the  9th  Union  corps,  and,  after  a  sanguinary  fight,  was 
compelled  to  yield  what  he  had  acquired  with  such  de- 
lusive facility.  Losing  a  large  proportion  of  their 
number  by  death  and  capture,  the  Confederates  re- 
treated to  their  own  works,  followed  by  the  victorious 
Union  troops  who  established  themselves  in  a  position 
beyond  that  which  they  had  occupied  when  the  day's 
operations  began.  It  was  two  days  after  this  event 
that  Sherman  arrived  at  City  Point,  on  the  James  River, 
to  consult  with  Grant  on  the  future  conduct  of  the  cam- 
paign. The  two  commanders,  together  with  Meade, 
Ord  and  President  Lincoln,  subsequently  met  in  con- 
ference in  front  of  Petersburg,  and  debated  on  the 
measures  necessary  for  the  final  subjection  of  the  Con- 
federacy. The  great  object  was  to  keep  the  forces  of 
Lee  and  Johnston  from  effecting  a  junction,  and  thus 
prolonging  the  struggle  over  an  indefinite  period.  To 
frustrate  this  design,  Grant  proposed  to  take  the  initia- 


324 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE   UNION. 


tive  and  to  make  so  overwhelming  an  attack  on  Lee 
as  to  prevent  the  union  of  the  two  armies.  March  29 
was  fixed  upon  for  the  renewal  of  active  operations. 
The  plan  embraced  a  simultaneous  attack  on  many  scat- 
tered points  of  the  Confederate  position  about  Peters- 
burg. For  resisting  this  combined  assault,  Lee  had 
only  a  comparatively  small  body  of  troops;  but  those 
troops  were  seasoned  veterans,  and  Lee  himself  was  a 
commander  of  the  highest  ability.  The  approaching 
contest,  therefore,  seemed  likely  to  be  the  death- 
grapple,  and  each  side  summoned  up  all  its  energies  for 
the  prosecution  of  the  task  which  lay  before  it. 

The  movement  began  on  the  29th,  when  the  2d 
corps,  under  Humphreys,  and  the  5th,  under  Warren, 
arrived  before  the  Confederate  breastworks  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Hatcher's  Run.  That  night  Grant  communi- 
cated with  Sheridan,  and  directed  him  to  act  in  con- 
junction with  the  main  army,  instead  of  simply  operating 
against  the  enemy's  lines  of  communication,  as  had 
been  originally  intended.  Violent  rain  on  the  30th 
prevented  any  active  measures  ;  but  the  Confederates  in 
the  meanwhile  concentrated  several  of  their  brigades 
opposite  the  corps  of  Humphreys  and  Warren.  On  the 
31st,  Lee  considered  himself  strong  enough  to  antici- 
pate his  enemy's  blow  by  striking  a  blow  of  his  own. 
A  portion  of  Warren's  force  was  driven  back  with  great 
slaughter  ;  but  the  success  was  only  temporary,  and  was 
followed  by  a  recoil  when  other  troops  were  encountered. 
Lee  then  turned  on  Sheridan,  who  had  taken  up  a 
position  in  front  of  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  at  the  Five 
Forks — a  meeting  of  cross-roads,  three  of  which  run 
towards  the  Southside  Railway.  The  attack  was  made 
with  so  much  impetuosity  and  vigor  that  Sheridan's 
men  were  for  a  time  driven  back,  and  seemed  likely  to 
be  entirely  defeated.  The  troopers,  however,  retired 
behind  a  breastwork  of  logs  and  earth  which  had  pre- 


5 

msBESBm 

Pf                                             ■   ■   '■•■■' 

1||hh 

iifiSlSfflil 

v,  rj^^: 

jp*  .  ..J^" 

,{~r 

11 

llllfcwliPl 

SUP  !|fc 

-'"''                              I        BEN 

-■ill! 

lijpllJjIJSi 

1,  ki    %h 

•  i*           *              -4,',     ■ 

i   m,  '■■'    -          t      F,  j}~lt  2j  I 

Union — .'/ 


326 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


viously  been  erected,  and  after  a  while  the  combat  was 
renewed  by  two  brigades  of  Union  cavalry,  who  at- 
tacked the  Southerners  in  flank,  and  checked  their 
farther  advance.  Towards  night,  the  Confederates  were 
forced  to  yield  the  ground  they  had  won  at  an  earlier 
period  of  the  day,  and  this  was  at  once  occupied  by 
their  antagonists,  who  in  some  directions  pushed  their 
line  beyond  the  points  which  they  had  held  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  action.  A  detachment  from  Warren's 
corps  was  sent  on  the  night  of  the  31st  to  the  support 
of  Sheridan  ;  and  when  these  troops  arrived  at  daybreak 
on  April  1,  they  beheld  the  rear  of  the  opposing  cavalry 
in  rapid  retreat.  Sheridan  now  felt  in  a  position  to 
assume  the  offensive,  and  a  murderous  conflict  again 
ensued,  ending  in  the  total  discomfiture  of  the  Con- 
federates, who  retreated  in  disorder  towards  Petersburg. 
On  April  1,  Grant  opened  a  furious  bombardment 
along  his  whole  line,  and  directed  the  corps  of  Wright, 
Parke,  and  Ord,  which  had  not  as  yet  been  employed 
in  this  series  of  operations,  to  attack  Petersburg  next 
morning.  The  assault  commenced  at  daybreak.  The 
three  corps  appointed  to  the  work  dashed  across  the 
narrow  belt  of  land  separating  their  own  from  the  Con- 
federate lines,  and,  attacking  with  irresistible  spirit  and 
enormous  concentration  of  power,  swept  like  an  im- 
mense wave  over  the  entrenchments  which  had  so  long 
resisted  the  Union  advance.  At  the  same  time,  Hum- 
pnreys,  whose  corps  was  on  the  left,  beyond  Hatcher's 
Run,  assailed  the  works  in  his  front,  and  drove  back  the 
defenders  into  the  inner  fortifications.  Magnificent 
efforts  were  made  by  the  Confederate  generals  to  re- 
trieve this  dire  misfortune;  but  the  troops  were  fast  los- 
ing their  organization,  and  there  was  too  much  reason 
to  apprehend  that  panic  would  presently  succeed  to 
confusion.  The  less  determined  were  seeking  the  rear; 
the  more  self-reliant  were  desperately  striving  to  retain 


BATTLE    OF  FIVE   FORKS. 


327 


such  positions  as  still  remained  within  their  grasp;  but 
the  case  was  hopeless,  and  at  the  utmost  nothing  more 
could  be  done  than  to  delay  the  Union  progress,  and 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  army,  so  as  possibly  to  avoid 
the  humiliation  of  a  complete  surrender.  Fort  Gregg 
was  held  for  some  hours  by  a  small  body  of  devoted 
men,  who  in  the  midst  of  general  consternation  retained 
their  coolness  and  their  courage.  The  garrison  of  Fort 
Alexander  also  stood  firmly  to  their  guns.  Repeated 
onsets  were  made  by  Gibbons's  division  ;  but  it  was 
not  until  half-past  two  in  the  afternoon  that  Fort  Gregg 
surrendered,  with  the  small  handful  of  men,  30  in  num- 
ber, who  alone  remained  out  of  the  250  forming  the 
garrison  that  morning. 

The  day  was  Sunday;  and  while  Davis  was  at  wor- 
ship, a  message- from  Lee  was  handed  to  him  which 
must  have  cast  an  additional  shadow  upon  that  worn 
and  weary  face.  Lee  announced  that  his  outer  lines  had 
been  forced,  that  he  could  resist  only  a  few  hours 
longer,  and  that  Richmond  must  be  immediately  evacu- 
ated. In  the  course  of  the  morning,  however,  Lee  was 
enabled  to  rally  his  troops  behind  the  inner  defences, 
and  so  far  to  restore  their  confidence  as  to  undertake  the 
offensive  on  his  own  part.  Hill,  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished of  the  Confederate  commanders,  was  directed 
to  attack  the  enemy's  9th  corps,  and  executed  the  move- 
ment with  so  much  skill  and  daring  that  they  were  for 
a  time  staggered.  But  in  this  heroic  effort  Hill  was 
slain,  and  his  troops  were  ultimately  obliged  to  recede. 
Field's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  however,  was  at 
the  same  time  so  vigorously  handled  as  to  keep  the 
Union  troops  in  check  ;  and  during  the  night  of  that 
disastrous  day  the  Southerners  evacuated  Petersburg, 
without  further  molestation  from  their  opponents. 

They  retired  on  Amelia  Court  House,  to  the  north- 
west of  Petersburg ;  and  on  this  point  were  concentrated 


328 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


the  forces  that  had  previously  been  north  of  the  James. 
Great  fires  were  kindled  in  Richmond,  where  the  Con- 
federates applied  the  torch  to  the  Government  offices, 
the  great  storehouses  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  and 
other  buildings.  Davis,  the  members  of  his  Cabinet, 
and  all  the  citizens  of  importance,  departed  for  Char- 
lotte, North  Carolina. 

The  evacuation  of  Richmond  became  known  to  Gen- 
eral Weitzel — who  occupied  the  Union  works  north  of 
the  James — at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  April  3. 
At  daylight  he  moved  his  men  forward,  and,  meeting 
with  no  opposition,  entered  the  city.  He  found  much 
suffering  and  poverty  among  the  population.  The  rich 
as  well  as  the  poor  were  destitute  of  food  ;  and,  what- 
ever their  political  sympathies,  it  must  in  some  respects 
have  been  a  relief  that  the  long  and  arduous  struggle 
was  over.  The  great  news  was  at  once  telegraphed  to 
Washington,  and  on  the  following  day  President  Lin- 
coln arrived  at  Richmond,  and  occupied  the  house  be- 
longing to  Davis,  which  was  now  used  as  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Union  garrison.  Martial  law  was  for  the 
present  proclaimed  in  the  city,  and  the  people  were  re- 
quested to  remain  quietly  in  their  houses,  and  to  avoid 
all  public  assemblages,  or  meetings  in  the  streets.  At 
the  same  time,  strict  orders  were  given  for  restraining 
the  victorious  soldiery  from  acts  of  plunder  and  outrage, 
and  from  the  use  of  insulting  words  or  gestures  towards 
the  citizens.  To  have  obtained  possession  of  the  Con- 
federate capital  was  a  great  triumph  for  the  Northern 
cause;  yet  the  Confederation  itself,  though  pierced  and 
mortally  wounded  in  many  places,  had  still  some  life 
remaining,  and  was  capable  of  resistance  in  the  field. 
Lee  had  effected  his  escape  at  the  head  of  an  army  not 
contemptible  in  numbers,  and  eminent  for  valor  :  and  to 
the  crushing  of  that  force,  wherever  it  might  be  found, 
Grant  immediately  directed  his  attention. 


CAPTURE    OF  RICHMOND. 


329 


Breaking  down  the  bridges  over  which  he  passed, 
Lee  pursued  his  way  in  a  westerly  direction,  and  was 
presently  16  miles  ahead  of  his  adversaries.  The  fear 
was  lest  he  should  unite  with  Johnston,  in  which  case 
he  might  still  have  offered  a  formidable  resistance  in  the 
open  country.  To  prevent  such  a  result,  every  nerve 
was  strained ;  and  as  early  as  the  evening  of  the  2d  the 
cavalry  under  Sheridan,  and  a  number  of  infantry,  were 
marching  in  the  direction  of  the  Southside  and  Lynch- 
burg Railway.  Lee  was  then  retreating  along  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Appomattox;  and  at  Amelia 
Court  House  the  forces  from  Richmond  joined  those 
from  Petersburg  on  the  morning  of  the  4th.  Lee  hoped 
to  have  an  opportunity  of  taking  some  of  the  Union 
columns  in  detail,  and  beating  them  one  by  one;  but 
the  commissariat  stores  which  he  had  ordered  to  be  col- 
lected at  that  spot  had  by  some  error  failed  to  reach  the 
depot.  It  has  been  said  that  they  were  sent  by  mistake 
to  Richmond,  and  that  they  perished  there  in  the  con- 
flagration. The  disaster,  however  arising,  was  one  of 
an  overwhelming  character.  The  Confederate  troops 
carried  with  them  rations  for  not  more  than  one  day ; 
the  country  was  in  such  a  state  that  it  could  not  supply 
them  with  food ;  and  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  per- 
form the  long  and  difficult  march  by  which  alone  Lee 
could  combine  with  Johnston.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
4th,  Sheridan  cut  the  rail  to  Danville  between  Amelia 
Court  House  and  Burkesville,  and,  entrenching  himself 
strongly,  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  main  army.  The 
Confederates  were  now  exhausted,  depressed,  and  out 
of  heart;  desertions  were  numerous,  and  many  per- 
mitted themselves  to  be  captured.  An  attempt  to  escape 
towards  Lynchburg,  on  the  night  of  the  5th,  was  de- 
feated by  the  able  combinations  of  the  Union  troops, 
and  next  morning  the  advance-guard  of  Ord's  army 
was  planted  across  the  roads  by  which  Lee  was  march- 


330 


THE    BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


ing.  The  obstruction  was  for  the  moment  swept  aside 
after  a  sharp  encounter ;  but  the  Confederates  were  by 
this  time  reduced  to  such  terrible  extremities  that  they 
were  compelled  to  feed  on  the  young  shoots  of  trees. 
The  horses  and  mules  were  in  an  equally  bad  state  with 
their  masters,  and  the  soldiers  were  utterly  broken  down 
by  want  of  sustenance,  and  the  fatigue  of  constant 
marching.  It  was  so  evident  that  all  was  over,  that  large 
numbers  of  guns  and  wagons  were  destroyed,  to  pre- 
vent their  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
records  and  papers  belonging  to  the  army  were  burned. 
Most  of  the  baggage  shared  the  same  fate,  and  it  was 
now  only  a  question  of  how  soon  the  inevitable  collapse 
would  take  place.  Meanwhile,  the  pursuit  was  kept  up 
with  remorseless  rigor.  Lee's  rear  was  attacked  by 
Sheridan,  and  by  the  infantry  of  the  2d  corps,  on  the 
6th.  In  the  first  instance,  the  men  fought  with  the  fury 
of  despair;  but,  on  finding  every  avenue  of  retreat  cut 
off  by  the  converging  columns  of  the  foe,  they  threw 
down  their  arms,  and  surrendered.  Lee  pushed  on,  at 
the  head  of  io.OOO  men,  conceiving  that  he  might  even 
yet  reach  Lynchburg,  where  supplies  had  been  collected. 
General  Pendleton  expressed  to  him  the  opinion  of  him- 
self and  his  fellow-officers  that  surrender  was  now  una- 
voidable ;  but,  clinging  to  his  desperate  hope,  he  refused 
to  admit  it.  A  few  scattered  actions  still  took  place, 
and  the  attempts  of  the  Union  troops  to  bar  the  road 
of  retreat  were  repulsed  with  amazing  valor ;  but  the 
end  was  by  this  time  a  foregone  conclusion.  Submis- 
sion might  be  delayed  for  a  day  or  two  ;  but  in  the  very 
near  future  it  stood  before  those  vanquished  and  starv- 
ing men,  a  fact  inevitable  as  death,  inexorable  as  fate. 

On  April  7,  Grant  addressed  a  letter  to  Lee  in  which 
he  said: — "The  result  of  last  week  must  convince  you- 
of  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  this  struggle.     I  feel 


CAPTURE   OF  RICHMOND,  33 1 

that  it  is  so,  and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from  my- 
self the  responsibility  of  any  further  effusion  of  blood 
by  asking  of  you  the  surrender  of  that  portion  of  the 
Confederate  States  Army  known  as  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia."  Lee  replied  on  the  same  day,  and,  while 
remarking  that  he  was  not  entirely  of  the  opinion  ex- 
pressed by  Grant  as  to  the  hopelessness  of  further  resist- 
ance, reciprocated  the  desire  of  that  commander  to  avoid 
useless  bloodshed,  and  therefore,  before  considering  his 
proposition,  asked  the  terms  he  would  offer  on  condi- 
tion of  the  army  surrendering.  Grant  wrote  on  the  8th, 
demanding  that  the  men  surrendered  should  be  disquali- 
fied from  taking  up  arms  against  the  Government  until 
properly  exchanged,  and  adding  that  he  would  meet 
Lee,  or  would  designate  officers  to  meet  any  officers 
named  by  him,  at  any  point  that  might  be  considered 
desirable,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  the  terms  upon 
which  the  surrender  would  be  received.  But  Lee  was 
still  disinclined  to  entertain  the  proposition.  He  desired 
a  personal  interview  with  Grant,  that  the  restoration  of 
peace  might  be  talked  over ;  and  proposed  a  meeting 
between  the  picket  lines.  If  by  this  species  of  equivo- 
cation Lee  hoped  to  effect  any  arrangement  by  which 
the  war  could  be  terminated,  and  the  Confederacy  at  the 
same  time  recognized,  with  whatever  limitations  or  under 
whatever  conditions,  he  deceived  himself.  Grant  told 
him,  in  a  letter  written  on  the  9th,  that  peace  might  be 
had  at  once  on  the  South  laying  down  its  arms ;  and  by 
that  time  he  must  have  fully  understood,  as  regarded 
his  own  army  at  least,  that  no  other  course  was  possible. 
His  forces  had  sustained  another  severe  defeat  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  9th.  Sheridan  had  cut  off  the  line 
of  retreat.  Four  trains  laden  with  provisions,  which 
were  approaching  along  the  line  from  Lynchburg,  were 
captured.  A  last  despairing  attempt  to  cut  through 
the  opposing  ranks  was  baffled ;  and  as  Sheridan  was 


332 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


preparing  to  charge  the  staggering  masses  of  the  Con. 
federates,  a  flag  of  truce  was  seen  approaching,  with  the 
information  that  hostilities  had  been  suspended,  in  order 
to  arrange  terms  of  surrender.  Lee  had  at  length 
requested  an  interview  with  Grant  in  accordance  with 
the  offer  contained  in  the  letter  of  the  previous  day ;  and 
the  preliminaries  were  on  the  point  of  being  arranged. 

The  two  great  rivals  met  during  April  9,  in  a  small 
dwelling  near  Appomattox  Court  House.  The  terms 
of  surrender  were,  that  the  officers  were  to  give  their 
individual  paroles  not  to  take  up  arms  against  the 
United  States  until  properly  exchanged  ;  that  each  com- 
pany or  regimental  commander  should  sign  a  similar 
parole  on  behalf  of  the  men ;  and  that  the  arms,  artil- 
lery, and  public  property,  should  be  made  over  to  officers 
appointed  by  Grant  to  receive  them.  This  last  condi- 
tion was  not  to  embrace  the  side-arms  of  the  officers, 
nor  their  private  horses  or  baggage.  On  these  stipula- 
tions being  complied  with,  the  officers  and  men  would 
be  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  and  would  not  be 
disturbed  by  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  so  long 
as  they  observed  their  paroles,  and  the  laws  existing 
where  they  might  reside.  The  surrender  was  to  include 
all  the  forces  operating  with  the  Army  of  Virginia  on 
April  8,  and  these  auxiliary  troops  speedily  laid  down 
their  arms. 

The  conduct  of  Grant  and  of  his  officers  was  in  the 
highest  degree  considerate  and  kind,  and  the  Union 
soldiers  shared  rations  with  their  famished  antagonists, 
now  their  antagonists  no  longer.  Next  day  General 
Lee  issued  a  farewell  address  to  his  army.  "  After 
four  years  of  arduous  service,  marked  by  unsurpassed 
courage  and  fortitude,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
has  been  compelled  to  yield  to  overwhelming  numbers 
and  resources.  I  need  not  tell  the  survivors  of  so  many 
hard-fought  battles,  who  have  remained  steadfast  to  the 


LEE'S  SURRENDER. 


333 


last,  that  I  have  consented  to  this  result  from  no  dis- 
trust of  them;  but,  holding  that  valor  and  devotion 
could  accomplish  nothing  that  could  compensate  for  the 
loss  that  would  attend  the  continuation  of  the  contest, 
I  have  determined  to  avoid  the  useless  sacrifice  of  those 


THE    HOUSE   WHERE   GENERAL    LEE    SURRENDERED. 


whose  past  valor  has  endeared  them  to  their  country- 
men. By  the  terms  of  agreement,  officers  and  men  can 
return  to  their  homes,  and  remain  there  until  exchanged. 
You  will  take  with  you  the  satisfaction  that  proceeds 
from  the  consciousness  of  duty  faithfully    performed ; 


334 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


and  I  earnestly  pray  that  a  merciful  God  will  extend 
you  His  blessing  and  protection."  On  that  same  day 
— April  10 — Lee  went  with  an  escort  of  Union  cavalry 
to  Richmond,  where  he  visited  the  quarters  of  Long- 
street,  and  afterwards  took  leave  of  his  staff,  previous 
to  departing  for  his  own  home. 

The  number  of  officers  and  men  who  surrendered  on 
this  occasion  is  not  exactly  known ;  but  it  has  been 
estimated  that  Lee's  army  on  evacuating  Richmond, 
consisted  of  nearly  30,000  men.  Probably  it  was  not 
so  large  as  this,  but  it  was  large  enough  to  make  the 
loss  to  the  Confederacy  one  of  the  most  crushing 
disasters  that  the  Southern  League  could  undergo  in 
its  then  exhausted  condition.  Even  before  the  sur- 
render, many  of  the  rebel  soldiers  had  abandoned  the 
army,  and  returned  home,  seeing  the  utter  hopelessness 
of  a  struggle  where  the  resources  on  one  side  were 
practically  illimitable,  and  those  on  the  other  incapable 
of  renewal  or  repair.  The  number  of  muskets  given 
up  by  Lee  scarcely  exceeded  10,000,  and  the  pieces  of 
artillery  were  thirty.  The  total  captures  of  artillery 
during  this  series  of  battles,  and  the  pursuit  that  fol- 
lowed, amounted  to  170  guns,  while  of  wagons  about 
350  were  yielded  to  the  conquerors.  On  receiving 
news  of  the  surrender,  the  War  Department  at  Wash- 
ington issued  an  order  to  the  effect  that  a  salute  of  200 
guns  should  be  fired  at  the  headquarters  of  every  army 
and  department,  at  every  post  and  arsenal  in  the 
United  States,  and  at  the  Military  Academy  at  West 
Point.  The  Northern  people  were  transported  with 
delight  at  the  great  intelligence  which  reached  them 
from  Virginia.  It  was  true  that  the  army  under 
Johnston,  and  the  armies  of  the  West,  still  kept  pos- 
session of  the  field ;  but  there  could  now  be  not  the 
slightest  question  as  to  the  final  issue  of  the  war.  The 
slaveowners'   rebellion    was    virtually  at  an  end ;    the 


336 


THE  BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


authority  of  the  Union  was  on  the  eve  of  being 
restored  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
Republic.  A  tremendous  price  had  been  paid  for  this 
supremacy  of  the  Federation  over  its  turbulent  mem- 
bers ;  but  the  result  was  nearly  achieved.  It  was  no 
longer  possible  for  unfriendly  critics,  in  England  or 
elsewhere,  to  say  that  the  American  Government  was 
one  which  naturally  tended  to  disunion,  that  the  model 
Republic  was  a  bubble,  that  the  commonwealth  estab- 
lished by  Washington,  by  Adams,  by  Jefferson,  by 
Franklin,  and  by  many  worthy  peers,  had  a  natural 
tendency  to  fly  into  discordant  fragments,  to  relapse 
into  chaos,  and  to  end  in  ruin. 

With  the  surrender  of  Lee,  the  last  hope  of  Southern 
independence  vanished.  As  he  rode  back  from  his 
interview  with  Grant  the  troops  crowded  around  him  in 
transports  of  grief  and  enthusiasm.  He  said,  "  Men, 
we  have  fought  through  the  war  together.  I  have  done 
the  best  that  I  could  for  you."  There  can  be  no  ques- 
tion that  he  had. 

On  April  15,  1865,  President  Lincoln  was  shot  while 
attending  a  theatre;  and  Andrew  Johnson,  the  Vice- 
President,  was  inaugurated  President  three  hours  after 
Lincoln's  death. 

The  surrender  of  Lee  was  the  last  great  event  under 
the  Presidency  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  The  first  great 
event  under  the  Presidency  of  Andrew  Johnson  was  the 
surrender  of  the  Confederate  leader  opposed  to  Sher- 
man. Sherman  had  conducted  his  forces  in  safety  to 
Goldsborough,  in  North  Carolina,  and  Johnston,  after 
vain  attempts  to  bar  his  progress,  had  retreated  to 
Smithfield,  a  few  miles  distant  on  the  same  line  of  rail- 
way. For  some  time,  no  active  operations  took  place 
between  the  principal  opponents;  but,  in  the  final  days 
of  March  and  early  days  of  April,  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  marched  to   and  fro  in   various  directions,  de- 


JOHNSTON'S  SURRENDER.  337 

stroying  railways  and  bridges,  burning  depots  of  stores, 
and  so  interfering  with  the  lines  of  retreat  of  all  the 
Confederate  forces  in  that  part  of  the  country  as  to 
make  their  position  even  more  desperate  than  before. 
At  the  same  time,  General  Wilson,  with  another  body 
of  cavalry,  rode  through  Alabama  and  a  part  of  Geor- 
gia, defeating  Forrest,  capturing  Selma  (a  place  con- 
taining an  arsenal,  an  armory  and  large  depots)  on 
April  3,  and  threatening  other  points.  Mobile  was 
surrendered  to  General  Canby  on  April  12,  after  a  short 
siege,  and  when  Davis  arrived  at  Johnston's  camp  it 
was  apparent  that  the  Confederacy  was  doomed. 

On  April  10,  Sherman  advanced  in  force  against 
Johnston.  Marching  in  two  columns  in  a  westerly  di- 
rection along  the  northern  bank  of  the  Neuse  River, 
and  overcoming  with  but  little  difficulty  the  slight  op- 
position of  the  Confederate  rear-guard,  he  entered 
Smithfield  on  the  nth.  Here  he  found  that  his  adver- 
sary had  crossed  to  the  southern  bank  of  the  stream 
and  escaped  him,  but  he  also  learned  that  Lee  had 
surrendered,  and  he  saw  that  if  Johnston  could  be 
brought  to  the  same  pass,  the  war  would  be  virtually 
at  an  end.  That  he  might  move  with  greater  quick- 
ness, he  abandoned  his  trains,  baggage  and  other  im- 
pediments and  pushed  rapidly  forward  to  Raleigh. 
Finding  the  enemy  still  in  advance,  he  bent  towards 
the  South,  crossed  the  Cape  Fear  River,  and  made  for 
Greensboro',  whither  the  Confederates  were  now  re- 
treating. But  Johnston  was  not  disposed  to  abide  the 
shock  of  battle  any  further.  He  saw  how  fearfully  he 
was  overmatched.;  he  knew  that  succor  was  impossible; 
he  perceived  that  his  troops  would  soon  be  destitute  of 
the  very  means  of  life;  and  as  Lee  had  done  under 
similar  circumstances,  he  negotiated  for  a  surrender. 

On  April  26,  it  was  agreed  that  the  Confederate 
A  rmy  of  the  Tennessee  should  be  surrendered  on  the 
22 


338 


THE   BATTLES  FOR    THE    UNION. 


same  terms  as  those  which  had  been  granted  to  the 
Army  of  Virginia.  The  men  laid  down  their  arms  and 
returned  to  their  homes.  A  few  of  the  cavalry  escaped 
to  Mississippi,  and  some  other  members  of  the  same 
force  accompanied  Davis  in  his  renewed  flight  towards 
the  south,  whence  he  hoped  to  escape  by  some  port  on 
the  seacoast.  With  these  exceptions,  the  Confederate 
soldiers  under  the  command  of  Johnston  ceased  to  be 
an  army,  and  returned  to  their  original  capacity  as 
civilians. 

Jefferson  Davis  was  captured  on  May  io,  at  Irwins- 
ville,  Georgia.  He  was  taken  to  Fortress  Monroe  as  a 
prisoner,  and  remained  there  till  May  13,  1867,  when 
he  was  released  on  bail,  and  departed  for  Canada ;  and 
after  further  postponements  of  his  trial  and  enlarge- 
ments of  his  bail  the  prosecution  was  dropped  on  Feb- 
ruary 6,  1 869.  The  leniency  of  the  Government  towards 
their  traitorous  citizens  was  most  remarkable,  and  con- 
ferred on  the  nation  the  highest  honor  it  could  receive. 

General  Grant  became  the  eighteenth  President  on 
March  4,  1869,  and  was  re-elected  for  a  further  term  of 
four  years  on  the  expiration  of  his  first  term  of  office. 

The  Civil  War  was  one  of  the  most  destructive 
on  record.  During  the  four  years  of  its  continuance, 
on  the  Union  side.  2,656,533  men  were  called  into  ser- 
vice; 1,400,000  were  in  actual  service;  6o.OOO  men 
were  killed  in  the  field,  30,000  mortally  wounded, 
and  184,000  died  in  hospital  or  camp.  The  Confeder- 
ates, it  is  supposed,  lost  an  equal  number,  while  on  both 
sides  a  large  number  were  more  or  less  disabled  for 
life.  Nor  was  the  expenditure  of  money  less  lavish. 
In  August,  1865,  three  months  after  the  close  of  the 
war,  the  debt  of  the  Union  was  $3,000,000,000,  and  if 
we  include  the  whole  nation,  the  actual  cost  of  the 
war  must  have  been  over  #6,000,000,000. 


ALTEMUS*  NEW  ILLUSTRATED 

Young  People's  Library 

A  new  series  of  choice  literature  for  children,  selected  from  the 
best  and  most  popular  works.  Handsomely  printed  on  fine 
paper  from  large  type,  with  numerous  colored  illustrations  and 
black  and  white  engravings,  by  the  most  famous  artists,  mak- 
ing the  handsomest  and  most  attractive  series  of  juvenile 
classics  before  the  public. 

Fine  English  cloth,  handsome  new  original  designs,  40  cents  each. 

THE  ADVENTURES  OF  EOBINSON  CRUSOE.  70  illustra- 
tions. 

ALICE'S  ADVENTURES  IN  WONDERLAND.     42  illustrations. 

THROUGH  THE  LOOKING  GLASS  AND  WHAT  ALICE 
FOUND  THERE.     50  illustrations. 

BUNYAN'S  PILGRIM'S  PROGRESS.     46  illustrations. 

A  CHILD'S  STORY  OF  THE  BIBLE.     72  illustrations. 

A  CHILD  'S  LIFE  OF  CHRIST.     49  illustrations. 

jESOP'S  FABLES.     62  illustrations. 

SWISS  FAMILY  ROBINSON.     50  illustrations. 

EXPLORATION  AND  ADVENTURE  IN  AFRICA.  80  illustra- 
tions. 

GULLIVER'S  TRAVELS.     50  illustrations. 

MOTHER  GOOSE 'S  RHYMES,  JINGLES  AND  FAIRY  TALES. 
234   illustrations. 


2         HENRY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 

THE  STORY  OF  THE  FROZEN  SEAS.     70  illustrations. 

WOOD'S  NATURAL  HISTORY.     80  illustrations. 

BLACK  BEAUTY.     By  Anna  Sewell.     50  illustrations. 

ARABIAN  NIGHTS'  ENTERTAINMENTS.     130  illustrations. 

ANDERSEN'S  FAIRY  TALES.     75  illustrations. 

GRIMM'S  FAIRY  TALES.     50  illustrations. 

FLOWER  FABLES.     By  Louisa  M.  Alcott.     50  illustrations. 

AUNT  MARTHA'S  CORNER  CUPBOARD.     By  Mary  and  Eliza 
beth  Kirby.     54  illustrations. 

WATER   BABIES.      By   Charles   Kingsley.     84  illustrations. 

UNCLE  TOM'S  CABIN.     90  illustrations. 

TALES  FROM  SHAKESPEARE.     By  Charles  and  Mary  Lamb. 
65  illustrations. 

ADVENTURES  IN  TOYLAND.     70  illustrations. 

ADVENTURES  OF  A  BROWNIE.     18  illustrations. 

MIXED  PICKLES.     31  illustrations. 

LITTLE  LAME  PRINCE.     By  Miss  Mulock.     24  illustrations. 

THE  SLEEPY  KING.     77  illustrations. 

RIP  VAN  WINKLE.     By  Washington   Irving.     4G   illustrations. 

A  CHILD'S  GARDEN  OF  VERSES.     By  Robert  Louis  Steven- 
son.    100  illustrations. 

ANIMAL   STORIES   FOR  LITTLE   PEOPLE.     50   illustrations. 


ALTEMUS' 

Stories  from  History  Series 

A  series  of  stories  from  history  which  every  boy  and  girl  should 
know.  No  library  is  complete  without  these  valuable  con- 
tributions to  juvenile  literature. 

Profusely  illustrated.  Bound  in  cloth  with  illuminated  covers, 
40  cents  each. 

KOMULUS,  THE  FOUNDER  OF  ROME.  By  Jacob  Abbott,  49 
illustrations. 

CYRUS  THE  GREAT,  THE  FOUNDER  OF  THE  PERSIAN 
EMPIRE.     By  Jacob  Abbott.     40  illustrations. 

DARIUS  THE  GREAT,  KING  OF  THE  MEDES  AND  PER- 
SIANS.    By  Jacob  Abbott.     34  illustrations. 

XERXES  THE  GREAT,  KING  OF  PERSIA.  By  Jacob  Abbott. 
39  illustrations. 

ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT,  KING  OF  MACEDON.  By  Jacob 
Abbott.     51  illustrations. 

PYRRHUS,  KING  OF  EPIRUS.  By  Jacob  Abbott.  45  illustra- 
tions. 

HANNIBAL,  THE  CARTHAGINIAN.  By  Jacob  Abbott.  37 
illustrations. 

JULIUS  CESAR,  THE  ROMAN  CONQUEROR.  By  Jacob  Ab- 
bott.    44  illustrations. 

DICKENS'  CHILD'S  HISTORY  OF  ENGLAND.  80  illustra- 
tions. 

ALFRED  THE  GREAT,  OF  ENGLAND.  By  Jacob  Abbott.  40 
illustrations. 

WILLIAM  THE  CONQUEROR,  OF  ENGLAND.  By  Jacob 
Abbott.     43  illustrations. 


4         HENRY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 

CHRISTOPHER     COLUMBUS     AND    THE    DISCOVERY    OT 
AMERICA.     70  illustrations. 

HERNANDO  CORTEZ,  THE  CONQUEROR  OF  MEXICO.     By 

Jacob  Abbott.     30  illustrations. 

QUEEN   ELIZABETH,  OF  ENGLAND.     By  Jacob  Abbott.     49 
illustrations. 

MARY,  QUEEN  OF  SCOTS.     By  Jacob  Abbott.     45  illustrations. 

GRANDFATHER'S   CHAIR.     By   Nathaniel    Hawthorne.     68   il- 
lustrations. 

KING  CHARLES  THE  FIRST,  OF  ENGLAND.     By  Jacob  Ab- 
bott.    41  illustrations. 

KING   CHARLES   THE   SECOND.   OF   ENGLAND.     By   Jacob 

Abbott.     28  illustrations. 

MADAME  ROLAND,  A  HEROINE  OF  THE  FRENCH  REVO- 
LUTION.    By  Jacob  Abbott.     42  illustrations. 

MARIE  ANTOINETTE,  QUEEN  OF  FRANCE.     By  John  S.  C. 
Abbott.     41  illustrations. 

JOSEPHINE,  EMPRESS  OF  FRANCE.     By  Jacob  Abbott.     40 
illustrations. 

BATTLES  OF  THE   WAR  FOR  INDEPENDENCE.     By   Pres 

cott  Holmes.     70  illustrations. 

MILITARY  HEROES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.     GO  illustra- 
tions. 

HEROES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY.     GO  illustrations. 

LIVES  OF   THE   PRESIDENTS  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES. 
With  portraits  and  illustrations. 

BATTLES   OF    THE    WAR   FOR    THE    UNION.     By    Prescott 

Holmes.     80  illustrations. 

YOUNG  PEOPLE'S  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

50  illustrations. 


HENRY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS.         5 

Altemus'  Illustrated 

Mother  Goose  Series 

A  series  of  entirely  new  editions  of  the  most  popular  books 
for  young  people.  Handsomely  printed  from  large,  clear 
type,  on  choice  paper;  each  volume  containing  about  one 
hundred  illustrations.  Half  vellum,  with  illuminated  sides 
(6%x83/4  inches).    Price,  50  cents  each. 

Aladdin*;  or,  The  Wonderful  Lamp. — Our  Animal  Friends. — 
Beauty  and  the  Beast. — Bird  Stories  for  Little  People. 
— Cinderella;  or,  The  Little  Glass  Slipper. — The  House 
that  Jack  Built. — Jack  and  the  Bean-Stalk. — Jack  the 
Giant-Killer. — Little  Bed  Biding  Hood. — Puss  in  Boots. — 
The   Sleeping   Beauty. — Who    Killed    Cock   Robin? 


Altemus'  Illustrated 

Little  Men  and  Women  Series 

A  new  series  for  young  people,  by  the  best  known  English 
and  American  authors.  Profusely  illustrated,  and  with 
handsome  and  appropriate  bindings.  Cloth,  12mo.  Price, 
50  cts.  each. 

Black  Beauty.    By  Anna  Sewell. 

Hiawatha.     By  Henry  W.  Longfellow. 

Alice  in  Wonderland  and  Through  the  Looking  Glass.     By 

Lewis  Carroll. 

Paul  and  Virginia.     By  Sainte  Pierre. 


6         HENRY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 

Altemus'  Illustrated  Little  Men  and  Women  Series,  Continued 
Galopoff,  the  Talking  Pont.     By  Tudor  Jenks. 
Gypsy,  the  Talking  Dog.     By  Tudor  Jenks. 
Caps  and  Capers.     By  Gabrielle  E.  Jackson. 
Doughnuts  and  Diplomas.     By  Gabrielle  E.   Jackson. 
For  Prey  and  Spoils.     By  Frederick  A.  Ober. 
Tommy  Foster's  Adventures.     By  Frederick  A.  Ober. 
Tales  from  Shakespeare.     By  Charles  and  Mary  Lamb. 
A  Little  Rough  Rider.     By  Tudor  Jenks. 
Another  Year  with  Denise  and  Ned   Toodles.     By   Gabrielle 

E.    Jackson. 
Poor  Boys  '  Chances.     By  John  Habberton. 
Sea  Kings  and  Naval  Heroes.     By  Hart  well  James. 
Polly  Perkins's  Adventures.     By  E.  Louise  Liddell. 
Folly  in  Fairyland.     By  Carolyn  Wells. 
Folly  in  the  Forest.     By  Carolyn  Wells. 
The  Boy  Geologist.     By  Prof.  E.  J.  Houston. 
Helen  's  Babies.     By  John  Habberton. 


HENEY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS.         7 

Altemus'   Illustrated 

Wee  Books  for  Wee  Folks 

Filled  with  charming  stories,  beautifully  illustrated  with  pic- 
tures in  colors  and  black  and  white.  Daintily,  yet  durably 
bound.     Price,  50  cents  each. 

Nursery  Tales. — Nursery  Ehymes. — The  Story  of  Peter  Bab- 
bit.— The  Foolish  Fox. — Three  Little  Pigs. — The  Bobber 
Kitten, 


Altemus'   Illustrated 

Banbury  Cross  Series 

Tbis  is  a  series  of  old  favorites,  printed  on  plate  paper;  each 
volume  containing  about  forty  beautiful  illustrations, 
including  a  frontispiece  in  colors.  Half  vellum,  with 
illuminated   sides.      Square  16mo.     Price,   50  cents   each. 

Old  Mother  Hubbard. — Chicken-Little. — Blue  Beard. — Tom 
Thumb. — The  Three  Bears. — The  White  Cat. — The  Fairy 
Gifts. — Snow-White  and  Bose-Bed. — Aladdin,  or  The 
Wonderful  Lamp. — Ali  Baba  and  the  Forty  Thieves. 


Altemus'   Illustrated 

Boys  and  Girls  Booklovers  Series 

A  new  illustrated  series  of  books  for  young  people,  by  authors 
of  established  reputation.    Price,  50  cents  each. 

Bumper  and  Baby  John. — The  Story  of  the  Golden  Fleece. — 
The  Wanderings  of  Joe  and  Little  Em. — Witchery  Ways. 
— Bobbie's  Bible  Stories. — Baby  Bible  Stories. — Delight. 


8         HENEY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 

Altemus'   Illustrated 

Dainty  Series  of  Choice  Gift  Books 

Bound  in  half-white  vellum,  illuminated  sides,  unique  designs 
in  gold  and  colors,  with  numerous  half-tone  illustrations. 
Price,  50  cents  each. 

The  Silver  Buckle.     By  M.  Nataline  Crumpton 

Charles  Dickens'   Children   Stories. 

The  Children's  Shakespeare. 

Young  Rodin  Hood.     By  G.  Manville  Fenn. 

Honor  Bright.     By  Mary  C.  Rowsell. 

The   Voyage  of  the  Mary  Adair.     By  Frances  E.   Crompton. 

The  Kingfisher's  Egg.     By  L.  T.  Meade. 

Tattine.     By  Ruth  Ogden. 

The   Doings   of   a  Dear  Little  Couple.     By   Mary  D.   Brine. 

Our  Soldier  Boy.     By  G.  Manville  Fenn. 

The  Little  Skipper.     By  G.  Manville  Fenn. 

Little  Gervaise  and  Other  Stories. 

The  Christmas  Fairy.     By  John  Strange  Winter. 

Molly  the  Drummer  Boy.     By  Harriet  T.  Comstock. 

How  a  "Dear  Little  Couple"  Went  Abroad.     By   Mary  D. 

Brine. 
The  Rose-Carnation.     By  Frances  E.  Crompton. 
Mother's  Little  Man.     By  Mary  D.  Brine. 
Little  Swan  Maidens.     By  Frances  E.  Crompton. 
Little  Lady  Val.     By  Evelyn  Everett  Green. 
A  Young  Hero.     By  G.  Manville  Fenn. 
Queen  of  the  Day.     By  L.  T.  Meade. 
That  Little  French  Baby.     By  John  Strange  Winter. 
The  Powder  Monkey.     By  G.  Manville  Feun. 
The  Doll  that   Talked.     By  Tudor  Jenks. 
What  Charlie  Found  to  Do.     By  Amanda  M.  Douglas. 


H±JJNJK*r  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS.        9 

Altemus' 

Young  Folks  Puzzle  Pictures'  Series 

A  new  series  for  young  people,  including  numerous  Puzzle 
Pictures  by  the  best  artists.  Full  cloth,  illuminated  cover 
design.     Price,  50  cents  each. 

Mothek  Goose's  Puzzle  Pictures. 

The  Tale  of  Peter  Rabbit,  with  Puzzle  Pictures. 

Animal  Tales,  with  Puzzle  Pictures. 

The  Night  Before  Christmas,  with  Puzzle  Pictures. 

Dog  Tales,  Cat  Tales  and  Other  Tales,  with  Puzzle  Picturfs. 


Altemus'  Illustrated 

Mother  Stories  Series 

An  entirely  new  series,  including  the  best  stories  that  mothers 
can  tell  their  children.  Handsomely  printed  and  profusely 
illustrated.     Ornamental  cloth.     Price,  50  cents  each. 

Mother  Stories.     89  illustrations. 

Mother  Nursery  Rhymes  and  Tales.     135  illustrations. 

Mother  Fairy  Tales.     117  illustrations. 

Mother  Nature   Stories.     97  illustrations. 

Mother  Stories  from  the  Old  Testament.     45  illustrations. 

Mother  Stories  from  the  New  Testament.     45  illustrations. 

Mother  Bedtime  Stories.     86  illustrations. 

Mother  Animal  Stories.     92  illustrations. 

Mother  Bird  Stories.     131  illustrations. 

Mother  Santa  Claus  Stories.     91  illustrations. 


10       HENRY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  Series 

By  H.  Irving  Hancock 

These  popular  books  are  altogether  American  in  plots,  scenes, 
characters  and  narratives.  These  are  wholesome  stories, 
full  of  incident  and  action,  and  cannot  fail  to  arouse  the 
interest  and  attention  of  boys  and  girls  everywhere. 
Handsomely  printed  in  large  type  on  fine  paper.  Splen- 
didly bound  in  cloth  with  decorated  covers. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  of  the  Kennebec;  Or,  The  Secret  of 
Smugglers'  Island. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  at  Nantucket;  Or,  The  Mystery  of  the 
Dunstan   Heir. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  off  Long  Island;  Or,  A  Daring  Marine 
Game  at  Eacing  Speed. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  and  the  Wireless  ;  Or,  The  Dot,  Dash 
and  Dare  Cruise. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  in  Florida;  Or,  Laying  the  Ghost  of  Alli- 
gator Swamp. 

The  Motor  Boat  Club  at  the  Golden  Gate;  Or,  A  Thrilling 
Capture  in  the  Great  Fog. 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated.  Price,  per  Volume,  GO  cts. 


HEWKY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS.       11 

The  Submarine  Boys  Series 

By  Victor  G.  Durham 

These  splendid  books  for  boys  and  girls  deal  with  life  aboard 
submarine  torpedo  boats,  and  with  the  adventures  of  the 
young  crew,  who,  by  degrees,  become  expert  in  this 
most  wonderful  and  awe-inspiring  field  of  modern  naval 
practice.  Every  boy  longs  to  go  aboard  of  a  submarine 
torpedo  boat,  and  thinks  wistfully  of  diving  with  it. 
These  boys  did  go  aboard  and  dive,  and  sped  their  way 
through  the  most  exciting  adventures  and  thrilling  escapes. 
The  books  are  written  by  an  expert  and  possess,  in  addition 
to  the  author's  surpassing  knack  of  story-telling,  a  great 
educational  value  for  all  young  readers.  Handsomely 
printed  in  large  type  on  fine  paper.  Splendidly  bound 
in  cloth  with  decorated  covers. 

The  Submarine  Boys  on  Duty;  Or,  Life  on  a  Diving  Torpedo 
Boat. 

The  Submarine  Boys'  Trial  Trip;  Or,  "Making  Good"  as 
Young  Experts. 

The  Submarine  Boys  and  the  Middies;  Or,  The  Prize  Detail 
at  Annapolis. 

The  Submarine  Boys  and  the  Spies;  Or,  Dodging  the  Sharks 
of  the  Deep. 

The  Submarine  Boys'  Lightning  Cruise;  Or,  The  Young  Kings 
of  the  Deep. 

The  Submarine  Boys  for  the  Flag;  Or,  Deeding  Their  Lives 
to  Uncle  Sam. 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated.  Price,  per  Volume,  50  cts. 


12       HENRY  ALTEMUS  COMPANY'S  PUBLICATIONS. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  Series 

By  Frank  Gee  Patchin 

These  books  fairly  breathe  the  spirit  of  young  American  man- 
hood. While  wholesome  and  moral  in  tone,  they  are  full 
of  the  joy  of  living  that  comes  to  those  who  spend  their 
days  in  the  open  air.  The  stories  are  replete  with  action 
and  stirring  incidents,  and  are  sure  to  hold  the  interest 
of  the  reader  from  cover  to  cover.  Handsomely  printed 
in  large  type  on  fine  paper.  Splendidly  bound  in  cloth 
with  decorated  covers. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  in  the  Rockies;  Or,  The  Secret  of  tho 
Lost  Claim. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  in  Texas;  Or,  The  Veiled  Riddle  of  the 
Plains. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  in  Montana;  Or,  The  Mystery  of  the 
Old  Custer  Trail. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  in  the  Ozarks;  Or,  The  Secret  of  Ruby 
Mountain. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  on  the  Alkali;  Or,  Finding  a  Key  to  the 
Desert  Maze. 

The  Pony  Rider  Boys  in  New  Mexico;  Or,  The  End  of  the 
Silver  Trail. 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated.  Price,  per  Volume,  50  cts. 


High  School  Boys  Series 


^j 


HIGH  SCHOOL 
FRESHMEN 

H-IRVINGHANCOCK 


By  H.  Irving   Hancock 


In  this  series  of  bright,  crisp  books  a  new- 
note  has  been  struck. 

Boys  of  every  age  under  sixty  will  be  in- 
terested in  these  fascinating  volumes. 

i  The  High  School  Freshmen  ;  Or, 
Dick  &  Cos  First  Year  Pranks 
and  Sports. 

2  The  High  School  Pitcher;  Or, 
Dick  &  Co.  on  the  Gridley 
Diamond. 

3  The  High  School  Left  End  ;  Or, 
Dick   &   Co.   Grilling    on    the 

Football  Gridiron. 
4    The  High  School  Captain  of  the  Team  ;  Or,  Dick  & 
Co.  Leading  the  Athletic  Vanguard. 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated  Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 


Cjrammar  School  Boys  Series 

By  H.  Irving  Hancock 


This  series  of  stories,  based  on  the  actual 
doings  of  grammar  school  boys  comes  near  to 
the  heart  of  the  average  American  boy. 


The    Grammar   School   Boys  of 

Gridley  ;  Or,  Dick  &  Co.  Start 

Things  Moving. 
The  Grammar  School  Boys  Snow- 
bound ;  Or,  Dick  &  Co.  at  Winter 

Sports. 
The  Grammar  School  Boys  in  the 

Woods;    Or,   Dick  &  Co.  Trail 

Fun  and  Knowledge. 
The  Grammar  School  Boys  in  Summer  Athletics 

Dick  &  Co.  Make  Their  Fame  Secure. 


TDK's 
GRAMMAR  SCHOOL 
BOYS  OF  GRIDLEY 

H-IKyiNO-HANC' 


Or, 


Cloth,  Illustrated 


13 


Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 


West    Point   Series 

-    By    H.    Irving    Hancock 


DICKPRESCOTTS 

FIRST-YEAR 
ATWESTRQINT 

H-lRVIVld;  HANCOCK 


4     Dick  Prescott's 
Ready  to  Drop 

Cloth,  Illustrated 


The  principal  characters  in  these  narratives 
are  two  sound,  wholesome,  manly  young 
Americans  who  go  strenuously  through  their 
four  years  of  cadetship.  Their  doings  will 
prove  an  inspiration  to  all  American  boys. 

i  Dick  Prescott's  First  Year  at 
West  Point  ;  Or,  Two  Chums  in 
the  Cadet  Gray. 

2  Dick  Prescott's  Second  Year  at 

West   Point;   Or,   Finding  the 
Glory  of  the  Soldier's  Life. 

3  Dick  Prescott's  Third  Year  at 

West  Point  ;  Or,  Standing  Firm 

for  Flag  and  Honor. 
Fourth  Year  at  West  Point;   Or, 
the  Gray  for  Shoulder  Straps. 

Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 


An  napolis   Series 

By    H.    Irving    Hancock 

The  Spirit  of  the  new  Navy  is  delightfully 
and  truthfully  depicted  in  these  volumes. 

i  Dave  Darrin's  First  Year  at 
Annapolis;  Or,  Two  Plebe 
Midshipmen  at  the  U.  S.  Naval 
Academy. 

2  Dave   Darrin's  Second  Year  at 

Annapolis;  Or,  Two  Midship- 
men as  Naval  Academy  "  Young- 
sters." 

3  Dave    Darrin's   Third   Year    at 

Annapolis;  Or,  Leaders  of  the 
Second  Class  Midshipmen. 

4  Dave    Darrin's    Fourth    Year 

Headed  for  Graduation  and  the 


DAVEDARRINS 

FIRSTYEAR 
ATANNAP0L1S 

HJRVING^ HANCOCK 


Cloth,  Illustrated 


at    Annapolis  ;    Or, 
Big  Cruise. 

Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 


14 


Boys  of  the  Army  Series 

By    H.   Irving    Hancock 


These  books  breathe  the  life  and  spirit  of 
the  United  States  Army  of  to-day,  and  the  life, 
just  as  it  is,  is  described  by  a  master-pen. 

i  Uncle  Sam's  Boys  in  the  Ranks; 
Or,  Two  Recruits  in  the  United 
States  Army. 

2  Uncle  Sam's  Boys  on  Field  Duty  ; 
Or,  Winning  Corporal's  Chev- 
rons. 

3  Uncle  Sam's  Boys  as  Sergeants  ; 
Or,    Handling   Their  First   Real 

Commands. 

{Other  volumes  to  follow  rapidly.') 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated  Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 


Battleship    Boys    Series 

By    Frank    Gee    Patchin 


THE  BATTLESHIP 
These  stories  throb  with  the  life  of  young  BOYS  AT  SEA 

Americans    on    today's    huge    drab    Dread-       f;       f«an»  «e  p*tc 
naughts. 

i  The  Battleship  Boys  at  Sea  ;  Or, 
Two  Apprentices  in  Uncle  Sam's 
Navy. 

2  The  Battleship  Boys  First  Step 

Upward;    Or,   Winning  Their 
Grades  as  Petty  Officers. 

3  The  Battleship  Boys  in  Foreign 

Service;  Or,  Earning  New  Rat- 
ings in  European  Seas. 

(Other  volumes  to  follow  rapidly.) 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated  Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 

i5 


The   Circus   Boys   Series 

By  EDGAR  B.  P.  DARLINGTON 

Mr.  Darlington  is  known  to  all  real  circus  people  along  every  route 
that  big  and  little  shows  travel.     His  books  breathe  forth  every  .phase 
of  an  intensely  interesting  and  exciting  life, 
i     THE  CIRCUS  BOYS  ON  THE  FLYING  RINGS;  Or,  Making  the 

Start  in  the  Sawdust  Life. 
2    THE  CIRCUS  BOYS  ACROSS  THE  CONTINENT ;  Or,  Winning 

New  Laurels  on  the  Tanbark. 
.;    THE  CIRCUS  BOYS  IN  DIXIE  LAND  ;  Or,  Winning  the  Plaudits 

of  the  Sunny  South. 

(  Other  volumes  to  follow  i  a/u'dlv) 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated  Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 


The   High   School   Girls  Series 

By  JESSE  GRAHAM  FLOWER,  A.M. 

These  breezy  stories  of  the  American  High  School  Girl  take  the 
reader  fairly  by  storm. 

i     (,RACE  HARLOWE'S  PLEBE  YEAR  AT  HIGH  SCHOOL;    Or 
The  Merry  Doings  of  the  Oakdale  Freshmen  Girls. 

2  GRACE  HARLOWE'S  SOPHOMORE  YEAR  AT  HIGH  SCHOOL; 

Or,  The  Record  of  the  Girl  Chums  in  Work  and  Athletics. 

3  GRACE  HARLOWE'S  JUNIOR  YEAR  AT  HIGH  SCHOOL;  Or, 

Fast  Friends  in  the  Sororities. 

4  GRACE  HARLOWE'S  SENIOR  YEAR  AT  HIGH  SCHOOL  ;  Or, 

The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated  Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 

The    Automobile    Girls    Series 

By  LAURA  DENT  CRANE 

No  girl's  library — no  family  book-case  can  he  considered  at  all  com- 
plete unless  it  contains  these  sparkling  twentieth-century  books, 
written  for  present-day  girls. 

1  THE  AUTOMOBILE  GIRLS  AT  NEWPORT;  Or,  Watching  the 

Summer  Parade. 

2  THE  AUTOMOBILE  GIRLS  IN  THE  BERKSHIRES;    Or,  The 

Ghost  of  Lost  Man's  Trail. 

3  THE    AUTOMOBILE    GIRLS    ALONG     THE     HUDSON;     Or, 

Fighting  Fire  in  Sleepy  Hollow. 

(Otiier  volumes  to  follow  >  afiidly) 

Cloth,  12mo,  Illustrated  Price,  per  Volume,  50c. 

16 


